Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: (i) Whether the conviction could be sustained on the testimony of the food inspectors in the absence of an independent witness, and (ii) whether the sale of linseed oil containing artificial dye fell under section 2(i)(j) or only section 2(i)(l) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, with a consequent claim to lesser sentence and probation.
Issue (i): Whether the conviction could be sustained on the testimony of the food inspectors in the absence of an independent witness.
Analysis: The absence or hostility of an independent witness did not by itself require rejection of the prosecution case. The panch witness had signed the panchanama in his own handwriting and the food inspector's evidence that he was present at the sampling was not challenged. The need for corroboration of a food inspector is a rule of prudence and not a rule of law, and a conviction may rest on such evidence if the court finds it reliable.
Conclusion: The conviction could validly be based on the evidence of the food inspectors, even without independent corroboration.
Issue (ii): Whether the sale of linseed oil containing artificial dye fell under section 2(i)(j) or only section 2(i)(l) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, with a consequent claim to lesser sentence and probation.
Analysis: The clauses in section 2(i) are not mutually exclusive and an article of food may be adulterated under more than one clause. Since Rules 23, 28 and 29 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 prohibited the use of colouring matter in linseed oil, the presence of artificial dye meant that the article contained colouring matter other than that prescribed in respect of it. The case therefore fell within clause (j) as well as clause (l), and once clause (j) applied the proviso for lesser sentence was unavailable. The plea for probation was also rejected having regard to the object of the Act, the legislative policy against leniency in food adulteration cases, and the newly introduced section 20AA of the Act.
Conclusion: The offence was covered by section 2(i)(j), the minimum sentence was upheld, and probation was refused.
Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence were affirmed and the appeal failed in full.
Ratio Decidendi: Corroboration of a food inspector is a rule of prudence only, not a rule of law, and where the relevant rules prohibit colouring matter in an article of food, the presence of such colouring matter constitutes adulteration under section 2(i)(j) even if no colouring matter is positively prescribed for that article.