Gross-profit estimation requires a reasoned rejection of books of account founded on cogent grounds and material defects before profits may be estimated. A decline in the gross-profit ratio alone does not justify an addition where adverse market conditions, reduced production and sales, and continuing fixed overheads explain lower profitability. Gross-profit examination also falls outside limited scrutiny confined to tax deduction or deposit defaults and related business loss unless the prescribed conversion to complete scrutiny is validly made. The gross-profit addition was therefore deleted, with consequential relief required.

Penalty proceedings under Section 271AAB(1) require a notice that identifies the applicable clause-(a), (b), or (c)-and the precise statutory default, because each clause prescribes distinct factual conditions and penalty rates. Section 271AAB(3) applies the notice requirement in Section 274 to these proceedings. A notice merely proposing penalty under Section 271AAB does not permit an effective defence and is invalid. Later hearing notices or the assessee's participation cannot cure the defect or create jurisdiction. Consequently, defective notice vitiates initiation and the resulting penalty.

Article 11 of the India-Ireland Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement limits Indian tax on interest paid to an eligible Irish resident to 10% of gross interest, including interest on an income-tax refund. Section 90(2) of the Income-tax Act permits application of that treaty rate where it is more beneficial than domestic law. Tax deducted at source credit requires verification of whether credit was previously granted and, if not, must be allowed to the extent eligible under law. The treaty limitation therefore governs refund-interest taxation, while the withholding-credit claim remains subject to factual verification.

Concealment penalty was not leviable where the disallowance of interest on secured premium notes was subsequently reversed because the borrowing related to business purposes. A disallowance in assessment does not, by itself, establish concealment when the taxpayer has disclosed all material facts and provided a bona fide explanation. The interest claim was regarded as debatable, preventing the imposition of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Interest on borrowings used to acquire shares in a subsidiary qualifies as deductible business expenditure where the acquisition serves business expansion and commercial expediency. Increasing shareholding in an entity operating in the same line of business, followed by its merger and expansion of multiplex resources, showed that the dominant purpose was securing control and maximising business resources rather than earning dividend income. The interest was therefore allowable under section 36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act.

Rule 68B limitation permits an amendment to extend recovery time only where the original limitation period remained subsisting when the amendment took effect; recovery for assessment years 2007-08 and 2008-09 was therefore time-barred, unlike later years. For recovery against a partnership firm, notice to the firm named in the recovery certificate suffices for sale of firm assets, while individual notice is required if a partner's personal assets are targeted. Service on the firm and copies to partners satisfied the applicable notice and natural-justice requirements. Auction sales remain valid absent material proof of defective service, irregular valuation, inadequate price, or invalid payment; demand drafts funded on behalf of the purchaser do not alone invalidate the sale.

A consequential assessment made under Section 143(3) read with Section 263 cannot survive where the underlying revision order has been quashed. The revision order is the jurisdictional foundation for that assessment; once quashed, it no longer confers authority on the Assessing Officer. A pending Revenue challenge to the quashing order does not preserve jurisdiction or operate as a stay. Consequently, the assessment lacks a surviving legal basis and is invalid.

A reassessment following a return furnished in response to Section 148 requires a valid notice under Section 143(2) issued after that return. A notice issued before the return cannot meet this mandatory requirement. Section 292BB may cure defects in the service, timing or manner of service of an issued notice, but cannot cure the absence of a valid post-return notice. Failure to issue the required notice is a jurisdictional defect rather than a curable procedural irregularity, rendering the reassessment invalid.

Reassessment initiation requires a meaningful opportunity to respond and consideration of the assessee's reply before a determination is made. Curtailing the statutory response period despite available time, where an extension was sought before the deadline and a reply was uploaded before the order, causes prejudice and violates principles of natural justice. The order under Section 148A(d) and consequential reassessment notice under Section 148 were set aside, requiring a fresh determination after considering the reply.

Revision under Section 263 validly applies where an assessment order is both erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue interests. Expenses claimed despite alleged non-deduction of tax at source required verification from the assessee's records, including evidence of tax deduction and deposit. An unsupported assertion that much of the expenditure comprised reimbursements did not cure the assessment's lack of enquiry. Failure to undertake adequate verification of the tax-deduction-at-source implications rendered the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue interests, permitting revision.

Rule 29 compliance for additional evidence required fresh determination where Tribunal receipt endorsements and file inspection prima facie showed that Paper Book No. II-A and the supporting affidavit had been filed. The absence of a separately titled Rule 29 application did not by itself justify doubting their filing. The Tribunal must determine whether the affidavit met Rule 29 requirements and, if so, whether the additional material was relevant to the appeal and what consequential effect it should have. The rejection of the miscellaneous application was set aside only to that extent; the grievance concerning Paper Book No. II was not pursued.

Section 260A requires an income-tax appeal to be filed within 120 days and permits delayed admission only where sufficient cause is established. After exclusion of the pandemic-related limitation period, an unexplained delay of 1,116 days remained. Administrative workload, difficulty tracing records and departmental pressure, without supporting material, did not explain the delay after appeal papers were finalised. The absence of due diligence and bona fides precluded a liberal limitation approach, and the delay was not condoned.

Section 10(38) addresses exemption of long-term capital gains, while Section 115JB governs computation of book profits for minimum alternate tax. The relevant interpretive issue concerns the proviso to Section 10(38) and whether gains excluded from total income must nevertheless be included in book profits for MAT purposes. The subject therefore distinguishes ordinary total-income computation from the statutory treatment of exempt capital gains under the MAT regime.

Writ of mandamus was invoked under Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21, 261 and 265 to seek enforcement of statutory duties concerning alleged tax evasion. The allegations relied on an FIR, sworn testimony before a Family Court, affidavits concerning declared assets, and purported unaccounted cash transactions. The central legal issue concerns the scope of writ jurisdiction and judicial restraint where allegations remain disputed, alongside constitutional claims relating to equality, free expression, personal liberty, inter-State recognition, and taxation only by authority of law.

Order giving effect to an appellate direction could not stand where the expressly contemplated reasonable opportunity of hearing was not provided to the assessee. Earlier High Court directions had also required a hearing. The Supreme Court set aside the appellate-effect order and the impugned High Court judgment, directing the Assessing Officer to reconsider the matter after hearing the assessee and keeping all contentions open.

Section 80IB(10) deduction eligibility depends on calculating the prescribed 1,000 sq. ft. limit through the unit's built-up area. The relevant measurement concerns habitable area and inner measurements at floor level, while requiring consideration of whether common areas, projections and balconies are included or excluded. These components determine whether a residential unit satisfies the area condition for the housing-project deduction.

Refund of accumulated input tax credit under an inverted duty structure is not conditional on the claimant being a manufacturer rather than a trader. A circular addressing accumulation arising from a GST-rate reduction on the same goods does not bar a claim where no such rate reduction occurred merely because input and output classifications overlap. Statutory refund eligibility and the Rule 89(5) formula require computation using period-specific data. Verification of eligible inputs, exclusion of ineligible credit, invoice matching and zero-rated supplies supports the claim where no material displaces the verification findings. Refunds remain sustainable when statutory conditions and the prescribed formula are met.

Personal hearing requirements for GST liability orders under Section 75(4) were central to the challenge. The factual circumstances were not shown to differ from those considered in an earlier ruling on the same requirement. The writ petition was therefore decided in accordance with that earlier decision, addressing whether the impugned GST liability order complied with the statutory personal-hearing requirement.

Statutory appellate remedies against cancellation of registration and rejection of revocation take priority over writ jurisdiction where disputed factual questions require determination. Although the cancellation order was defectively drafted and undated, its service date was to be treated as the relevant date for filing an appeal. The factual dispute concerning production of electronic devices remained open for examination by the appellate authority. The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to pursue the statutory appeal.

Bail was directed after the charge-sheet had been filed, as no further custodial interrogation was required. Continued custody for nearly three months, coupled with the absence of stated criminal antecedents, supported release. The petitioner was therefore released on bail pending proceedings, and the special leave petition was disposed of on the stated facts.