Municipal certification issued after site verification by an authorised technical person and recording that a building was complete in all respects can establish the project's completion date for service-tax purposes. Where a later formal completion certificate is issued on the basis of that certification, the later approval is procedural and does not displace the earlier recorded date of actual completion. Accordingly, rejection of the municipal certificate dated 11.06.2010 did not support service-tax liability, interest or penalty.

Beneficiation and washing of coal constituted mining activity and were not taxable as Business Auxiliary Service before 1 June 2007. The later introduction of a separate taxable category for services related to mining, without any amendment to the Business Auxiliary Service definition, confirms that the earlier general category did not cover those activities for the pre-introduction period. Accordingly, a tax demand on coal beneficiation or washing under Business Auxiliary Service for that period was unsustainable. The stated principle is that a newly introduced specific taxable service cannot retrospectively bring an activity within an unchanged pre-existing general category.

Showroom fit-out contracts converting bare newly constructed commercial shells into functional showrooms through flooring, ceilings, partitions, HVAC, fire-suppression and plumbing systems qualify as original works under the works-contract valuation rules. Service tax was therefore correctly discharged on the prescribed portion of the works-contract value, and the related demand was unsustainable. Customer advances forfeited after abandonment of goods purchases did not arise from any service and were not taxable consideration. Reimbursement for goods lost in a showroom fire compensated loss rather than any service rendered and was likewise not taxable. With no taxable basis for any component, the associated penalties could not survive.

Reimbursements received for payments made to third parties on a service recipient's behalf are excluded from the taxable value of clearing and forwarding services where the provider acts as a pure agent. Exclusion applies when the expenses are incurred for the recipient, paid to third parties, recorded and adjusted in the provider's books, and recovered from the recipient, satisfying the conditions under Rule 5(2). Such qualifying pure-agent reimbursements are not subject to service tax; related tax demand, interest and penalty are unsustainable.

Electroplating job work that converts inputs into a finished article is treated as manufacture and falls outside business auxiliary service. Exemption under Notification No. 8/2005-ST may apply to goods produced for a client where Notification No. 24/2003-CE is conditional rather than unconditional. The Revenue withdrew its appeal because of low monetary value, and the Supreme Court dismissed it as not pressed, without determining the substantive service-tax issues.

Claims for release of attached villa plots by alleged bona fide purchasers require verification of consideration payments, allotment cancellations, sale agreements and possible collusion with accused persons. Substantial payments and alleged vendor misdeclarations may support the claims, but the absence of executed sale deeds, incomplete payment proof and missing agreements prevents a conclusive determination. Entitlement to protection as bona fide purchasers remains for determination by the Special Judge under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The Enforcement Directorate may verify the claims and report to that court, where relief for restoration of property may be sought under Section 8(8).

Redistribution and disbursement under an approved resolution plan were not restrained because an earlier appellate judgment had crystallised the admitted claim, directed the Monitoring Committee to redistribute the allocated amount, and required determination of escrowed amounts. As the challenge to those directions was pending before the Supreme Court without any stay on distribution, reconsidering the same relief through the application was considered inappropriate. The request to restrain redistribution or distribution was therefore refused.

Fraud classification requires a bank to demonstrate application of mind and procedural fairness, though its order need not contain reasons equivalent to a judicial judgment. An order may adequately disclose reasons by incorporating transaction-audit findings identifying diversion of funds through an undisclosed account, related-party dealings, unjustified transfers, and interest-free loans and advances. Natural justice is satisfied where affected persons receive the draft and final audit materials, access to relevant records, and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the show-cause notice. A vague request for additional time may be refused where those opportunities were not used.

Interim asset disclosure and restraints may operate from the commencement of foreign proceedings where the record supports prospective protective relief. Disclosure is procedural, identifies assets for possible protection, and does not determine attachability. A reasoned interlocutory exercise of discretion should not be disturbed absent arbitrariness, caprice, perversity, or disregard of settled principles. Certified foreign judgments carry a statutory presumption of competent jurisdiction unless rebutted, and fresh adjudication under the Code of Civil Procedure is not required before granting interim disclosure relief. A party previously seeking to restrain enforcement of the same foreign judgment may be estopped from disputing knowledge of it or insisting on prior re-adjudication.

Order XXXIX Rule 3 was substantially complied with where the injunction application served on defendants included the plaint and relevant annexures, enabling a full contest before the returnable date. The plaint prima facie disclosed a cause of action for an alleged provident-fund deficit or defalcation by an exempted establishment, and exclusion of provident-fund dues from a resolution plan did not bar that claim. Provident Fund authorities' powers did not oust civil jurisdiction, and parallel civil recovery and criminal investigation could continue. Alleged defalcation involving employee contributions and operations across multiple jurisdictions supported continuation of the SFIO investigation. Applications to vacate interim protection were dismissed pending adjudication of the injunction application.

Interactive LED touchscreen display panels with integrated CPU, GPU, RAM and storage are described as automatic data processing machines where they are user-programmable and execute applications and complex processing functions. The touchscreen serves as an input device and the LCD panel as an output device within one integrated system. Applying the relevant Chapter Note and General Rules for Interpretation, the panels possess the essential characteristics of automatic data processing machines and are classifiable under Customs Tariff Item 8471 41 90, rather than as display monitors under Customs Tariff Item 8528 59 00.

Cost-recovery customs-supervision charges apply where Customs officers are additionally sanctioned and exclusively posted at a warehouse. The applicable framework requires an assessment of operational requirements and distance from the Customs office to determine whether supervision is chargeable on a merchant-overtime or cost-recovery basis. Although the warehouse licensee undertook to pay supervision costs and an evaluation was communicated, no proposal for cost-recovery posting was made to the competent board and no officer was exclusively posted. As merchant overtime bills were raised and accepted throughout the relevant period, a differential demand between cost-recovery and merchant-overtime charges was unsustainable.

Refund claims for IGST paid on imported goods by a United Nations specialised agency were considered timely because Circular No. 23/2019-Customs first clarified that Customs authorities were the proper forum for such claims. Before that clarification, the filing authority had not been specified and limitation could not begin. Applying the prescribed period from the date of clarification together with the Supreme Court's COVID-19 limitation extension, claims filed in May 2022 fell within time and were allowable.

A Glow Plug Control Unit, as a single printed-circuit-board electronic module regulating glow-plug heating and contributing to compression-ignition engine starting, is classifiable under Heading 8511 rather than Headings 8537 or 9032. Heading 9032 excludes electrical circuit-control apparatus more specifically covered by Chapter 85, and the unit does not meet the structural requirements of Heading 8537. Prior Customs clearance of the importer's consistently declared alternative classification negates suppression, misdeclaration, and intent to evade duty. Duty recovery is therefore confined to the normal limitation period, and the extended-period demand and penalty are unsustainable.

The first proviso to Section 129A(1) excludes Tribunal appellate jurisdiction over orders relating to goods imported or exported as baggage. Where gold chains were brought by a passenger from Kuwait in checked-in baggage and proceedings concerned alleged non-declaration, improper importation, seizure, confiscation and penalty, those merits issues do not displace the statutory exclusion. The prescribed remedy is revision before the competent Revisional Authority under Section 129DD, rather than an appeal to the Tribunal.

Refund claims for customs interest must be filed within one year of payment under Section 27 of the Customs Act, unless the payment was made under protest. Payment made to generate electronic challans and complete clearance does not by itself establish a written protest. Claims before customs authorities remain subject to the statutory refund mechanism and limitation even where the amount is alleged to have been collected without authority of law. Technical difficulties, bona fides, hardship, late procedural awareness, and administrative waiver orders do not permit statutory authorities or the Tribunal to extend limitation without an express statutory exclusion. Accordingly, the stated refund claim was time-barred.

Writ jurisdiction requires credible material indicating cognisable wrongdoing or abuse of official power before an independent investigation into alleged Customs corruption may be sought; administrative delay and unsubstantiated suspicion are insufficient. Claims for compensation arising from delayed import clearance may involve disputed questions on loss, causation and responsibility, requiring adjudication before a competent civil court or other appropriate forum rather than under Article 226. Import, fiscal and administrative policy formulation remains within the legislative and executive domain, and writ jurisdiction cannot compel creation of a specified regulatory framework or departmental-delay penalty mechanism without a statutory or constitutional obligation.

A statutory bar on CESTAT appeals relating to payment of drawback does not extend to interest claimed under Section 75A for delayed disbursement of sanctioned drawback. The exclusion must be strictly construed, and delayed-payment interest is a separate statutory liability from entitlement to, or quantification of, drawback. Interest accrues if drawback is not paid within one month of the deemed claim date. Under the Drawback Rules, the shipping bill is deemed filed on the Let Export Order date; pending proceedings do not defer accrual where entitlement is ultimately established. The exporter is therefore entitled to interest from one month after the Let Export Order until actual payment.

Where an Interim Board for Settlement lacks the statutory quorum and cannot exercise jurisdiction, that non-functional period must be excluded when computing the time limit for disposal of settlement applications under the Customs Act. The settlement timeline presupposes a duly constituted forum capable of deciding the application; inability to act because of absent quorum differs from delay before an available competent forum. Treating the two alike would make settlement rights depend on administrative contingencies beyond an applicant's control. Where the applicant completed the required steps and the matter was heard and reserved before the Board became non-functional, the proceedings do not abate and related abatement communications are unsustainable.

Separate show-cause notices retained independent legal character despite arising from a common investigation, being assigned to the same adjudicating authority, and being heard together. A stay expressly limited to proceedings under one notice could not, by implication, prevent adjudication under the other notice. Challenges alleging denial of hearing, non-supply of relied-upon material, adjournments, evidentiary errors, and defects in adjudication were required to be pursued through the effective statutory appellate remedy, with no exceptional basis for writ intervention. Limitation, Call Book, extension, and communication issues concerning the still-pending notice were left to the adjudicating authority, which must provide an effective hearing before finalising proceedings.