Foreign tax credit is available for overseas tax withheld on professional legal-service receipts where the gross foreign income is included in taxable income in India. Professional receipts from Japanese clients are characterised under Article 12(4) of the India-Japan DTAA rather than the independent personal services provision, which applies to individuals. Credit may be claimed where the taxpayer has rendered the services abroad, filed Form 67, and furnished authenticated foreign tax-deduction certificates. Where the foreign receipts and corresponding withholding are undisputed, Rule 128 does not impose a restriction denying credit.

Interest on staff advances and statutory or bank deposits is treated as not derived from an eligible undertaking and therefore does not qualify for deductions under sections 80-IB/80-IE, whereas interest on overdue bills and the Sikkim unit's eligible profits qualify on the stated prior-year position. Section 14A disallowance requires verification of sufficient interest-free own funds; only administrative expenditure is recomputed. Assignment of LLP partnership rights is a capital transfer, but any claimed loss requires reliable valuation and financial evidence. For book profit, a statutory debenture redemption provision is an ascertained liability, and exempt bond interest credited to profit and loss account is reducible despite omission in the return.

Reassessment requires prior disposal of an assessee's objections to recorded reopening reasons through a separate speaking order. Where objections are filed but no independent speaking order is issued before reassessment is completed, discussion of those objections in the reassessment proceedings or a show-cause notice does not satisfy this mandatory procedural safeguard. The defect affects the assumption of reassessment jurisdiction and cannot be cured by remanding the matter for a fresh assessment. The reassessment was therefore treated as invalid and quashed.

Restoration of a dismissed writ petition was considered to permit a challenge to Section 147-A and related reassessment proceedings. The review application was allowed, the prior dismissal was set aside, and the writ petition was restored with liberty to amend. Reassessment proceedings were stayed while the restored writ petition remains pending, preserving the challenge to the reassessment process for further consideration.

Prosecutions for wilful failure to furnish returns pursuant to search-assessment notices cannot be quashed through inherent jurisdiction where the accused's alleged requests for seized material, the Department's receipt and supply of that material, and the ability and intention to file returns within time remain disputed. The record did not prima facie establish a request for material before expiry of the prescribed period. Inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to assess contested evidence, determine factual defences, or resolve wilful default and mens rea, which require adjudication at trial. The disputed defences must therefore be determined by the Trial Court.

Rule 34 requires the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to pronounce orders within 60 days where no pronouncement date is fixed after hearing, with an extension up to an outer limit of 90 days only in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances that make timely pronouncement impracticable. Repeatedly releasing argued and reserved matters without judgment causes unjustified litigation hardship. The Tribunal must fix a pronouncement date and comply with the prescribed timeline. The pending appeal was directed to be decided by the specified date, and all Income Tax Appellate Tribunals were directed to scrupulously follow Rule 34.

Reassessment beyond four years of a completed scrutiny assessment requires a failure to make full and true disclosure of material facts. Where the shareholding pattern, transactions and lender-company details were disclosed during the original assessment, reopening lacks legal foundation. The alternative-remedy rule does not bar writ jurisdiction where the assessment disregards binding precedent raised in objections and acts contrary to settled law. Deemed-dividend provisions do not apply to a loan received by a non-registered shareholder merely through statutory fiction; the common shareholder's holding was also below the prescribed threshold. The reassessment proceedings and consequential fiscal demands were therefore invalid.

TDS on External Development Charges received by HUDA from private persons or builders was addressed under sections 194C and 194I. Where tax had not been deducted on those charges, the Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition by following its earlier order in DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd. The dismissal leaves the earlier approach governing TDS treatment of such External Development Charges applicable to the parties.

A vehicle detained during transport of goods may be released pending verification under the detention framework in Section 129 upon adequate security for its assessed value. The stated approach requires release to the petitioner on execution of a personal security bond equal to the vehicle value determined by the concerned Road Transport Authority, while statutory proceedings continue.

Recovery of interest and penalty for delayed CGST and SGST payment was addressed where the taxpayer claimed that tax liability had been discharged through adjustment of input tax credit in the electronic credit ledger. Verification was required to determine whether the adjustment occurred within the permissible period and whether interest and penalty remained payable. The taxpayer could submit a representation seeking that verification, and recovery proceedings were stayed until the representation was disposed of.

Claimed cess payment requires verification by the competent authority before deciding whether the recovery demand should continue. The petitioner may submit a representation seeking verification, and fresh orders must be issued after that exercise. Recovery of the cess demand and the related bank attachment remain stayed pending verification and reconsideration.

Assessment and demand orders were challenged because an assessment for 2019-20 included turnovers from March and April 2021 and March 2022, while the same demands were separately raised for April 2021 to March 2022. The material indicated duplication across tax periods and lack of application of mind. The orders were set aside, while permitting the Assessing Authority to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law.

Assessment proceedings under Sections 73 and 74 must correspond to the relevant tax period and cannot be combined into a single show-cause notice or assessment order for multiple financial years once the annual-return filing due date has been reached. A composite assessment order covering two financial years was therefore impermissible and invalid. The order was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Composite GST assessment orders under Sections 73 and 74 cannot cover more than one tax period where assessment precedes the annual-return due date, or more than one year after that due date. A single assessment covering April 2019 to March 2024 was therefore inconsistent with these period-wise limits. The order was set aside, with fresh proceedings permitted separately for each assessment year.

A best-judgment assessment for non-furnishing of returns is deemed withdrawn when the registered person furnishes a valid return within the statutory period under Section 62(2). The registered person must still pay applicable interest and late fee. Filing the valid return for the relevant tax period with those payments removes the best-judgment assessment while preserving liability for interest and late fee.

Availability of a further statutory appeal required the petitioner to pursue that remedy rather than seek adjudication of the writ claims. The non-availability of the appellate tribunal did not justify bypassing the statutory appellate framework where the appeal remained available. The petitioner was relegated to the appellate remedy, and the intervening period was directed to be excluded for limitation purposes.

Rule 97A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits manual filing in addition to electronic filing; it does not replace an online refund application acknowledged within the prescribed period. A refund claim electronically filed and acknowledged on time must therefore be treated as the relevant application, notwithstanding that its manual copy was submitted later. Rejecting the claim as time-barred solely by reference to the later manual filing was described as illegal and arbitrary, requiring reconsideration based on the timely online application.

Section 62(2) treats an assessment for failure to furnish returns as deemed withdrawn when the registered person subsequently files the prescribed returns within the stipulated framework and pays the applicable late fee. Where returns for the relevant periods, including GSTR-3B, are filed with the prescribed late fee, the amended provision's benefit applies to condone the delay. The assessment orders for non-filing of returns consequently stand deemed withdrawn.

Statutorily recognised IGST refund claims cannot be denied solely because the online customs system generates technical mismatches or does not permit electronic processing. Portal-related limitations do not curtail the entitlement to refund under the applicable GST enactments. Refund claims must therefore be processed manually on the basis of physical documents, with appropriate refund orders passed in accordance with the GST framework.

Best-judgment assessments for failure to furnish GSTR-3B are deemed withdrawn under Section 62(2) when the registered person subsequently furnishes a valid return within the prescribed period and pays applicable interest and late fee. Furnishing the return after the assessment order, together with the additional late fee and interest, satisfies this condition where the amended provision applies. The assessment consequently ceases to operate, while liability for interest and late fee remains.