Retrospective expansion of taxability for offshore technical-service payments under Section 9(1)(vii) cannot displace relief available under the law in force when the payments were made. The Finance Act, 2010 Explanation removed the requirement that services be rendered in India and substantively widened the charging provision; it therefore operates prospectively where retrospective application would create a fresh tax liability or remove vested benefits. A later legislative amendment does not justify review of a concluded decision. Treaty protection under Article 12(4) of the India-USA DTAA remains available where more beneficial under Section 90(2), and withdrawal of beneficial Board circulars operates prospectively.

An assessee's appeal under Section 260A requires a substantial question of law. Challenges to refusal of delay condonation based on medical evidence and to stamp-duty-based property valuation were characterised as factual matters requiring reappreciation of evidence, not issues of statutory interpretation, conflicting legal views, or perversity. The tax-effect restrictions applicable to Revenue litigation do not remove an assessee's obligation to establish the statutory jurisdictional threshold. Accordingly, factual disputes over delay and valuation alone do not make a Section 260A appeal maintainable.

A statutory appeal or remand cannot be made contingent on payment of costs where automatic default consequences would revive an ex parte appellate order passed without adequate hearing. Although procedural costs may be imposed under appellate powers, they cannot defeat the substantive right to merits adjudication or validate an order affected by breach of natural justice. A reasoned first-appellate order must identify the points for determination, decisions and reasons. For cash-credit additions, the assessee must establish the lender's identity, creditworthiness and transaction genuineness; banking and corporate evidence requires independent factual evaluation rather than reliance on generalized third-party information. Fresh de novo adjudication is required where that evidence has not been effectively considered.

Paper bags and sacks classifiable under Tariff Item 48194000 of Heading 4819 fall within Entry 319 of Schedule I to Notification No. 09/2025-Central Tax (Rate). The entry expressly covers paper sacks and bags under Chapters 39 and 48, and the reference to biodegradable bags does not limit coverage to paper bags that are independently biodegradable. Accordingly, such paper bags attract GST at 5% rather than the higher Schedule II rate.

Ophthalmic binocular surgical microscopes specially designed for eye examination and delicate eye surgery are classified under tariff heading 9018 as medical or surgical instruments, rather than heading 9011 for general optical microscopes or heading 9012 for non-optical microscopes. The HSN notes expressly distinguish ophthalmic binocular-type microscopes mounted on adjustable supports for medical use. As goods of heading 9018, these microscopes fall within Entry 483 of Schedule I to Notification No. 09/2025-Central Tax (Rate) and attract the concessional 5% rate.

Condonation of a 418-day delay in filing a writ appeal requires credible and supported sufficient cause. Bereavement and hospitalisation assertions without particulars or records do not establish such cause. A belief that relief could be pursued before the GST Appellate Tribunal is untenable where the petitioner had approached the High Court because that Tribunal had not been constituted. An extension for filing appeals before the Tribunal does not cure delay in filing a writ appeal. Registration and return-filing deficiencies also did not justify appellate intervention; condonation was therefore refused.

Physical application for revocation of cancelled GST registration was permitted despite expiry of the ordinary statutory period. In the stated circumstances, the petitioner could approach the competent authority with a physical application within two weeks. The authority was required to entertain the application and decide it in accordance with law within three weeks of its submission.

Retrospective application of amended Rule 42(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 was challenged in relation to reversal of input tax credit, interest and penalty for credit availed before the amendment took effect on 1 April 2019. The petition was withdrawn after the availability of an appellate remedy before the GSTAT was noted. The petitioner was permitted to file an appeal with the statutory pre-deposit and raise all available questions of law and fact.

A provisional attachment under Section 83 remains effective for one year from its date. Where that statutory period expires before disposal of a writ petition, the attachment ceases to operate by efflux of time, leaving no subsisting order for adjudication. A challenge directed solely against the expired provisional attachment therefore does not survive.

Statutory appeal limitation under GST permits restoration where the appeal is filed within the legally condonable period but lacks a delay-condonation application. The FORM GST DRC-07 summary was uploaded on the portal within the relevant period, and the appeal was filed within the further condonable period. The time-bar dismissal was set aside, requiring the appellate authority to consider delay condonation under law and, if satisfied, decide the appeal on merits.

Release of detained perishable goods under the owner-specific limb of section 129(1) depends on the claimant establishing ownership. Where the adjudicating authority found that the claimant was not the owner and the owner could not be traced, release could not be claimed under section 129(1)(a), although the claimant could seek release as a non-owner under section 129(1)(b). The direction to auction the goods while permitting the claimant to participate was set aside because non-ownership did not justify that direction. Release of the vehicle to its registered owner remained sustained, and the detention authority's jurisdiction remained open for adjudication in writ proceedings.

Section 73 demand proceedings based on alleged undervaluation of guarantees require prior scrutiny, audit, inspection or investigation to establish tax leakage and suppressed taxable value. Where authorities issue and confirm a demand without determining whether the guarantees are corporate guarantees or verifying the alleged suppression, the demand lacks the necessary factual foundation. The demand-confirming order was quashed, and the matter was remitted for inspection or investigation and fresh determination if warranted.

Assessment orders passed without the taxpayer's replies to show-cause notices, along with appellate orders dismissing the appeals as time-barred, were identified as requiring reconsideration where the taxpayer asserted bona fide reasons, unavoidable circumstances and sufficient cause. A justice-oriented approach supported granting an opportunity to submit replies and supporting material, subject to costs. The assessment and appellate orders were set aside, and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication from the stage of filing replies to the show-cause notices.

A jurisdictional High Court judgment binds tribunals and authorities within its territorial jurisdiction unless stayed, reversed or overruled by the Supreme Court. A contrary decision of another High Court and a pending special leave petition with an interim order do not permit a Tribunal to constitute a Larger Bench to reconsider the correctness or applicability of that binding precedent on refund under the CGST Act. The proper course is to defer the pending Tribunal appeal until the Supreme Court finally determines the related special leave petition; the Larger Bench constitution was therefore impermissible.

Common show-cause notices under Section 74 may cover multiple tax periods. The earlier view quashing such proceedings was displaced by a coordinate-bench ruling that permitted common notices and restored the related notices and original orders. Challenges to the order-in-original and appellate order must be pursued through the statutory appellate mechanism before the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal. The position supports the Revenue: common notices are valid for multiple tax periods, while objections to original and appellate orders require exhaustion of the prescribed appellate remedy.

The petitioner was permitted to pursue the statutory appellate remedy against the assessment order. The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to file an appeal within two weeks, subject to the statutory pre-deposit and an application for condonation of delay.

A writ petition concerning a garnishee notice proposing attachment beyond the demand raised in the Order-in-Original was disposed of with liberty to pursue the statutory appellate remedy. The petitioner could file an appeal subject to the required pre-deposit and seek condonation of delay. No coercive action under the garnishee notice could be taken during the period granted for filing the appeal.

Delay in filing a statutory appeal was condoned in view of the disputed tax liability and the pre-deposit made with the appeal, allowing the appellate remedy to be pursued on merits. As the appeal was directed to be decided on merits, the consequential bank recovery notice could not continue and was quashed. The underlying tax liability remains open for determination by the appellate authority.

Statutory appellate remedy against an order-in-original and consequential recovery action remains available where the petitioner is permitted to file an appeal with the required pre-deposit and an application for condonation of delay. The petitioner was granted two weeks to file the appeal, while coercive recovery action was restrained during that period. The writ petition was disposed of accordingly.

Concessional IGST at 0.1% for merchant-export supplies under Notification 41/2017 requires strict compliance with prescribed conditions, including supply and movement of goods between the registered supplier and registered recipient. The Supreme Court declined to interfere under Article 136 with the judgment concerning eligibility for the concessional rate and dismissed the special leave petition.