Section 117 creates an estoppel preventing an acceptor of a bill of exchange from disputing the drawer's authority to draw or endorse the bill. A bailee or licensee cannot deny the bailor's or licensor's authority at the commencement of the bailment or licence. An acceptor may challenge the purported drawer's genuineness, while a bailee may prove another person's superior right to delivered goods.

Tenant and licensee estoppel prevents a tenant, or a person claiming through the tenant, from disputing the landlord's title to immovable property at the beginning of the tenancy while it continues. It also prevents a person who entered property under a licence from denying the licensor's title to possession when the licence was granted.

Section 115 establishes estoppel where a person, through a declaration, act or omission, intentionally causes or permits another person to believe a matter to be true and to act on that belief. In a suit or proceeding between those persons, or their representatives, the person making or permitting the representation and that person's representative cannot deny the truth of the matter represented.

When a victim deposes before the court that she was subjected to sexual harassment, had her modesty outraged, was disrobed, stalked, or had her privacy intruded upon, or was sexually harassed by any means, the court may, unless the contrary is proved, presume that the identified person committed the relevant offence. The presumption is discretionary and may be rebutted by proof to the contrary.

Section 114A establishes a mandatory presumption of absence of consent in specified rape prosecutions. Where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved, consent is in issue, and the woman states in court evidence that she did not consent, the court shall presume consent was absent. Sexual intercourse includes acts specified in clauses (a) to (d) of section 375 of the Penal Code.

Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 confers discretionary power to presume facts likely to have occurred from the ordinary course of natural events, human conduct, and business. Permissive inferences may arise from recent possession of stolen goods, uncorroborated accomplice evidence, consideration for negotiable instruments, continued existence, regular official acts, ordinary business practice, withheld evidence, voluntary refusal to answer, and possession of an obligation instrument by the obligor. Each inference remains subject to countervailing circumstances.

Section 113B creates a mandatory presumption that a person caused a woman's dowry death where, soon before her death, she was subjected by that person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, a dowry demand. "Dowry death" has the same meaning as under section 304B of the Indian Penal Code. The provision operates within the burden-of-proof framework and requires temporal proximity between the dowry-related cruelty or harassment and the death.

Section 113A creates a discretionary evidentiary presumption where a married woman commits suicide within seven years of marriage after being subjected to cruelty by her husband or a relative of her husband. The presumption may concern abetment of suicide, subject to consideration of all other circumstances. Cruelty carries the meaning assigned under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.

Section 113 treats a Gazette of India notification recording the pre-Part III cession of any portion of British territory to a Native State, Prince or Ruler as conclusive proof in legal proceedings. The notification conclusively establishes both the validity of the cession and its occurrence on the stated date mentioned in it.

Birth during a valid marriage, or within 280 days after dissolution while the mother remains unmarried, conclusively establishes the child's legitimacy in relation to the mother's husband. The conclusive proof is displaced only upon demonstrating that the spouses had no access to each other at any time when conception could have occurred.

Section 111A creates a rebuttable presumption where an accused person was present at a place in a disturbed or extensively disturbed area when firearms or explosives were used there to attack or resist personnel maintaining public order. Unless the contrary is shown, the person is presumed to have committed the relevant specified offence. The presumption covers offences concerning waging war against the State, related arms collection or concealment, and specified conspiracy, attempt, or abetment.

Where the good faith of a transaction is questioned between parties in a relationship of active confidence, the burden of proving good faith lies on the party occupying that position. An attorney must prove good faith in a sale by a client to the attorney, while a father must prove it where a son who has just attained majority challenges a sale to the father.

Where ownership of anything possessed by a person is disputed, the person affirming that the possessor is not the owner must prove that assertion. Possession supplies the factual basis for placing the evidentiary burden on the challenger to ownership.

Section 109 places the burden of proof on a person who asserts that an established relationship of partnership, landlord and tenant, or principal and agent does not exist or has ceased. Once parties have been shown to have acted in any of those respective capacities, the contrary assertion must be proved by the person making it, rather than by the person relying on the demonstrated relationship.

Where a person's life or death is in question, proof that the person has not been heard of for seven years by those who would naturally have heard of the person if alive shifts the burden of proving continued life to the person asserting that the person remains alive. The rule regulates the evidential burden concerning whether a person is alive or dead.

Section 107 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 allocates the burden of proof where a person's life or death is in issue. Once it is shown that the person was alive within thirty years, the party asserting that the person has died must prove the death. The provision places the evidentiary burden on the affirmative claimant of death in such circumstances.

Burden of proof for a fact especially within a person's knowledge rests on that person. The individual with particular knowledge must establish the fact in question. Where conduct reflects an apparent intention but a different intention is asserted, the person performing the act must prove that differing intention. A person charged with railway travel without a ticket must prove ticket possession.

Section 105 places on an accused person the burden of proving circumstances that bring the case within a General Exception, a special exception or proviso in the Indian Penal Code, or an exception or proviso contained in a law defining the offence. In the absence of such proof, the court must presume that those circumstances do not exist. The burden applies to each asserted exception.

Admissibility of evidence depends on the party tendering it proving any foundational fact required before that evidence may be received. The burden lies on the person seeking to rely on the subsequent evidence. A party relying on a dying declaration must establish the declarant's death, while a party seeking secondary evidence of a document's contents must establish loss of the original document.

Burden of proof for a particular fact rests on the person seeking the Court's belief in that fact, unless another law places that burden on a specified person. A party relying on an alleged admission must establish it, while a person asserting that they were elsewhere at the relevant time must prove that fact.