TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1999 (3) TMI 682
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....edly belonging to the family of Kamat from Sanquelim. The property comprises of arecanut trees, coconut trees, mango trees and other fruit bearing trees besides cashew grove, rubber plantation, sugarcane plantation and other jungle trees. 3. It is the case of the respondent that the suit property is enjoyed and possessed by him for the last several years and the petitioners who were having agricultural property adjoining the suit property while trying to lay a false claim over the suit property, made attempts to pluck the cashew trees and therefore the respondent was compelled to file the suit and to seek for interim relief. 4. As against this, it is the case of the petitioners that the suit property is on lease to them by the owners of the property and they have done the arecanut and cashew plantation in the property and it was only with the permission of the petitioners that in some portion of the property the respondent was allowed to plant sugarcane. It is their further case that in the earlier suit between the respondent and the owners of the property that the respondent had admitted that the property was leased to the petitioners by the owners of the property. 5. The....
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....t to suppression of facts by the respondent so as to deny the equitable relief to the respondent. The lower appellate Court has further held that the lease deed of 1968 does not rebut the presumption arising in respect of the entry made after 1971 in the Record of Rights in favour of the respondent. Placing reliance upon an undertaking stated to have been given by one Razak while removing the timber from the suit property, the lower appellate court has held that the respondent is tenant in respect of the suit property and further that the materials on record are sufficient to hold that the respondent is in possession of the suit property. 7. Upon hearing Smt. Agni, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners and Shri R. V. Kamat, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent and on perusal of the records, it is evident that the trial Court had refused to grant temporary injunction mainly on three grounds i.e. firstly that the lease deed of 1968 disclosed the possession of the petitioners in their capacity as lessees of the suit property, secondly suppression of material documents and facts by the respondent and thirdly, that the materials on record rebut the presumption arisi....
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....entry being made in the Record of Rights. There is no disclosure in the records placed before this Court as to since when the property was given in the possession of the respondent by the petitioners. Once it is admitted by the respondent that the property was in possession of the petitioners, while admitting the lease deed between the petitioners and the owners of the property, and it was the claim of the respondent that the possession of the suit property was delivered to them by the petitioners, it was necessary for the respondent who is the plaintiff in the suit to disclose as to how and since when the possession was delivered to the respondent by the petitioners and in what capacity it is retained by the respondent. In the absence of any such disclosure and the said admission, the presumption arising under the said entry in the Record of Rights in favour of the respondent, clearly stood rebutted. The lower appellate court has totally ignored this aspect and merely because the lease deed was executed in the year 1968, arrived at the finding that presumption arising in favour of the respondent under the said entry was not rebutted by the documentary evidence. The finding is clea....
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....d. v. State Bank of India and another reported in A.I.R. 1992 Delhi, 197. In the said suit, the plaintiff therein had approached the Court seeking relief of permanent injunction along with an application for interim relief without disclosing the fact of filing of two earlier suits which were withdrawn later on. In that regard, the Delhi High Court observed thus :- "The suppression of material fact by itself is a sufficient ground to decline the discretionary relief of injunction. A party seeking discretionary relief has to approach the court with clean hands and is required to disclose all material facts which may, one way or the other, affect the decision. A person deliberately concealing material facts from court is not entitled to any discretionary relief. The court can refuse to hear such person on merits. A person seeking relief of injunction is required to make honest disclosure of all relevant statements of facts otherwise it would amount to an abuse of the process of the court. Reference may be made to decision in The King v. The General Commissioners for the purpose of the Income-tax Acts for the District of Kengsington, 1917 (1) King's Bench Division 486 wher....
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....sjunctively and in isolation, but has to be read along with other pleadings in the written statement. It is evident that the case of the petitioners is that the property is in their possession as the lessees thereof and the respondent being relative of the petitioners was allowed to do certain work in the suit property as has been held by the trial Court. Even otherwise, a party approaching the court seeking to restrain the respondent from interfering with the possession of the suit property with the plaintiff, has to establish that the possession can be related to some right or title of the plaintiff to the suit property. In other words, in order to obtain a relief from the court to protect possession of the party such possession has to be lawful possession. The learned Single Judge of this Court in Mulji Umershi Shah and etc. v. Paradisia Builders Pvt. Ltd. Mumbai and others reported in A.I.R. 1998 Bombay, 87 has observed that: "In the suit for perpetual injunction the Court, may be called upon to hold inquiry in title, right, interest or status, as the case may be, of the plaintiff to find out whether plaintiff is entitled to protection of his possession by decree of....
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....had held that the plaintiff being in settled possession, she could not have been dispossessed except by recourse to law. In Ram Rattan's case, the Apex Court has held that a true owner has every right to dispossess or throw out a trespasser while he is in the act or process of trespassing, but this right is not available to the true owner if the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner. In such circumstances the law requires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies available under the law. That was a case where the plaintiff was in peaceful possession of land to the knowledge of the opponent and therefore it was held that he was entitled to defend his possession and the opponent being the aggressors and had opened the assault, could not have claimed any right of private defence either of person or property. Clearly on facts, both the decisions are distinguishable and the observations therein are not applicable to the facts of this case. 14. Considering the law laid down by the Apex Court and by this Court in the above referred decisions and applying the same to the facts o....