TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (5) TMI 1601
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....on of delay in filing of the appeal which is being taken up for consideration . 2. Company Appeal No. 503 of 2026 has been e-filed by the Applicant before this Tribunal on 30.01.2026. The Appeal has been accompanied with I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 which is an application praying for condonation of delay in filing of the Appeal. The prayers contained in I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 read as follows: "a. Allow the present application thereby condoning the delay of 16 days in filing the accompanying Appeal; b. Pass any other such order(s)/direction(s) that this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in light of the above mentioned facts and circumstances and in the interest of justice." 3. At the very outset we take notice that the limitation period for filing an appeal under Section 61(2) of the IBC is 30 days, which period is, however, extendable by a further period not exceeding 15 days in the event the Tribunal is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the 30 days permissible period of limitation. Section 61(2) is extracted below: "61. Appeals and Appellate Authority. (2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be....
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....peal could be successfully e-filed on 30.01.2026 after personally approaching the Registry. The technical glitch aspect has been articulated in paragraph 4 of I.A No. 1951 of 2026 which reads as under: "4. That the counsel was trying to e-file the appeal since 28.01.2026, however due to the technical defects on the e-filing portal, the same could not be filed. On 29.01.2026, the registry of this Hon'ble Tribunal informed that there is some technical defect from the backend which is taking considerable time to repair. On 30.01.2026, the appeal was finally e-filed after the counsel specially approached the registry of this Hon'ble Tribunal." 7. It has further been contended that the Applicant repeatedly failed to e-file the Appeal on 28.01.2026 and 29.01.2026 due to technical glitch on the e-filing portal and ultimately the appeal came to be efiled on 30.01.2026 after approaching the Registry. It was therefore submitted that the delay, if any, apart from being a marginal delay of only one day, even that delay was not deliberate on their part but was occasioned by the fact that the e-filing portal the Registry was dysfunctional which prevented the Applicant from filing....
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.... 9. We have heard both sides and perused the materials placed on record carefully. 10. The principal issues which arise for consideration is whether in the facts of the present case, the limitation for the purposes of filing the Appeal under Section 61 of the IBC deserves to be computed from the date of the impugned order i.e. 15.12.2025 or from the date on which the impugned order came to be uploaded on the portal and/or when knowledge thereof was allegedly acquired by the Applicant. The other issue which also requires consideration is whether the technical glitches in the NCLAT e-portal which prevented the Applicant from filing their appeal on 29.01.2026 which happened to be the 45th day from the date of impugned order is sufficient ground to allow the condonation of delay. 11. Coming to the chronology of filing of this Appeal, we find that the impugned order was passed on 15.12.2025 which order was subsequently uploaded on 19.12.2025. Calculated from the aforesaid date of pronouncement of order, the statutory period of 30 days for filing the appeal came to an end on 14.01.2026. The further extendable period of 15 days in terms of proviso to Section 61(2) of the IBC expir....
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....ry for an appeal to NCLAT against an order passed under IBC must be based on a harmonious interpretation of the applicable legal regime, given that IBC is a Code in itself and has overriding effect. Sections 61(1) and (2) IBC consciously omit the requirement of limitation being computed from when the "order is made available to the aggrieved party", in contradistinction to Section 421(3) of the Companies Act...." It is therefore amply clear that question as to when the Applicant came to know about the order is not a material factor and cannot be a ground for arresting the running of limitation from the date of pronouncement of the order. 14. This brings us to the next plank of delay condonation taken by the Applicant that they could not file the appeal on the 45th day despite making bonafide and persistent efforts to do so. However, their efforts were stultified because of glitches in the NCLAT e-portal for which the Applicant cannot be held responsible in any manner. Since it was the technical problems in NCLAT e- portal file which prevented them from filing the appeal within the 15 days extendable period, the delay of only one day should be condoned in view of the exception....
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....ntion that the High Court of Madras had held that an appeal cannot be rejected solely on the ground that the soft copy was not uploaded due to technical problems and that in the interest of justice the Applicant should be given an additional opportunity to present their case. The relevant paragraph of the above judgment is as reproduced below: "5. Considering the submissions made, this Court finds that the appeal was rejected solely on the ground that the soft copy was not uploaded due to technical problems. This Court acknowledges that the delay in filing the appeal was genuine, as it was caused by these issues during the upload process. In such circumstances, an appeal should not be rejected without affording the parties an opportunity to be heard, particularly when the rejection arises from technical issues beyond their control. Therefore, in the interest of justice, this Court deems it appropriate to grant the petitioner an additional opportunity to present their case." 17. The distinguishing feature of the above case was that this judgment was passed by the High Court of Madras by invoking writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which juris....
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....eal after 90 days, but within a period of 30 days. Thus, the discretion of the Appellate authority ends on the completion of additional 30 days. Such discretion does not extend to powers under Article 226 of the Constitution on India as well. The statute, thus provides additional one month to file the appeal, and all the reasons satisfying the expression "sufficient cause" can be raised by the appellant. Similar expression is found in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and Section 29 of Limitation Act, 1963 which deals with "Savings", which prevents the overriding the provisions of specific statutes that have their own distinct limitation periods. It permits such laws to govern their own timelines while still leveraging the mechanics of the Limitation Act. Thus, when an additional period of 30 days is supplied by the statute over and above the basic period of 90 days, and the same stands exhausted, this Court cannot exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to dilute the intention of the legislature and further extend the limitation by condoning the delay by re-examining the "sufficient cause". The reason assigned by the petitioner that he did not have his login I.d....
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....tion 9 IBC, this Court underscores the IBC's strict procedural discipline i.e., only applications strictly conforming to statutory requirements can be entertained. This principle is also applicable to limitation issues under section 61(2), as it supports the idea that tribunals must operate within the bounds of the Code, without adding equitable or discretionary powers not conferred by statute. This Court in Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited & Another has categorically held that the NCLAT cannot condone any delay beyond 15 days even on equitable grounds; and that the appellate mechanism under IBC is strictly time-bound by design to preserve the speed and certainty of the insolvency resolution process. 11.2. Thus, the NCLAT has no power to condone delay beyond the period stipulated under the statute. Accordingly, the second issue is answered by us. 13. Before parting, we may observe that time is of the essence in statutory appeals, and the prescribed limitation period must be strictly adhered to. Even a delay of a single day is fatal if the statute does not provide for its condonation. As held by us, the NCLAT has no power to condone delay beyo....