2026 (2) TMI 1414
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....n the manner as directed. 3. The order dated 30th December, 2013 was carried in appeal [FAO No. 582 of 2015] by the State of Odisha before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack [High Court] on 16th October, 2015. The appeal was time-barred. Not only that, the appeal was not accompanied by the certified copy of the impugned order. Since presentation of the appeal, for a period of 8 years to be precise, the State of Odisha had not filed the certified copy of the impugned order. By an order dated 26th April, 2023, the High Court dismissed the appeal citing failure to file the certified copy of the Tribunal's order as the reason. 4. Stung by such order, the State of Odisha woke up from its slumber. It obtained the certified copy of the Tribunal's order dated 30th December, 2013 on 13th February, 2024. A week later, the State of Odisha filed an application [I.A. No.165 of 2024] seeking recall of the order dated 26th April, 2023. Together with such application was filed an application for condonation of delay [I.A. No.126 of 2025] seeking condonation of 291 days' delay. 5. The application for condonation of delay was taken up for consideration by the High Court on 21st February, 2....
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....itted, on instructions, that the State of Odisha would invite a detailed order with reasons in support of dismissal of the special leave petition. 10. We recalled the order dismissing the special leave petition as withdrawn and, instead, dismissed the same as time-barred considering paragraphs 3 and 4 of the application for condonation of delay, excerpted above, with the observation that reasons would follow. 11. We now proceed to assign our reasons. 12. No cause, much less sufficient cause, has been shown for exercise of discretion in favour of the State of Odisha. The nature of explanation in the application for condonation of delay is such that with much ado, the proceedings could be closed. 13. However, since there is a long line of decisions of this Court propounding the law that the expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice and in view of the submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have considered it appropriate to consider the matter in some depth. 14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land ....
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....and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning - of course, within reasonable limits - is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. ... 16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were consistently followed by this Court until adoption of a di....
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....none other than Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay [1994 Supp (2) SCC 603] and admonishing officers of the "revenue" in not acting with promptitude. This order was made within six years of the decision in Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its entirety hereunder: 1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior counsel for the Revenue. 2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in the past, this Court has been making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost on the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over a few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better be set out in petitioner's own words: "(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for approval to the Boar....
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