TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (1) TMI 1401
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....53 (b) of the Competition Act, 2002 (the "Competition Act/Act") by Tamil Nadu Power Producers Association ("TNPPA") who is the Appellant herein, challenging the Impugned Order dated 09.04.2021 in Case No. 73 of 2015 passed by the Competition Commission of India under Section 27 of the Competition Act. 2. Competition Commission of India is the Respondent No. 1 in the present appeal. 3. Chettinad International Coal Terminal Pvt. Ltd. ("CICTPL"), who is the operator of the common user coal terminal at Kamarajar Port, is the Respondent No. 2 herein. 4. Kamarajar Port Limited ("KPL"), who is the landlord Kamarajar Port, is the Respondent No. 3 herein. 5. The Appellant submitted that the TNPPA, is duly constituted to act as an association representing consortium of independent power producers whose thermal power generation facilities are strategically located in and around the Chennai region, with a primary dependence on coal as the essential raw material for their operations. These members procure coal from diverse array of sources, encompassing both domestic suppliers within India and imports from various global markets, to ensure a steady and cost-effective fuel supply for....
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....coal from these distant ports would have greatly increased land transport costs, making the total cost of coal delivery to the Gumidipoondi power plants very high. Any possible savings in port charges would have been far outweighed by these extra transport expenses, making such options economically unworkable. 11. The Appellant submitted that the CICTPL is the only common user coal terminal available within Kamarajar Port. This special position is based on a license agreement dated 14.09.2006 between the CICTPL and the KPL, under which the CICTPL was allowed to develop, operate, and later transfer the coal terminal on a Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) basis for a period of 30 years starting from the date of commercial operations. 12. The Appellant contended that under this license agreement, the KPL, as the port authority, allowed the CICTPL to freely decide and revise its coal handling charges without any external tariff regulation. In return, the KPL was assured either a minimum guaranteed yearly revenue or a revenue share of 52.33% of the CICTPL's gross income, whichever was higher. Although the KPL is a major port under the Central Government, its corporate structure ke....
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....ed that due to the continuous abusive conduct of the CICTPL since October 2011, especially the steep tariff hikes and compulsory third-party payments, it filed a complaint (Information) before the CCI under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act. 18. The Appellant submitted that after detailed hearings, the CCI passed a prima facie order dated 04.01.2016 under Section 26(1), where it correctly defined the relevant product market as "the provision of coal terminal services," based on the nature, price, and use of these services by consumers. 19. The Appellant contended that the key issue concerns the definition of the relevant geographic market. The CCI noted that because the Appellant's members' power plants were located near Chennai and depended on low-cost sea transport, they were sourcing coal through the CICTPL at Kamarajar Port. The Appellant submitted that although the CICTPL claimed ports like Krishnapatnam and Karaikal were alternatives, the CCI rightly rejected this argument. The long distances of 176 km and 347 km respectively, made these ports impractical due to high inland transport costs. This was in line with Section 19(6) of the Act, which requires considering transport c....
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....ppellant stated that only a few user statements were recorded, most of which supported the CICTPL's dominance. Most nearby users sourced coal only from the CICTPL. The Appellant contended that there was no evidence of real competition, such as price matching or customer switching, between the ports. The Appellant further submitted that even after sharp price increases, users did not shift away from the CICTPL, clearly proving their dependence and the CICTPL's dominance. 25. The Appellant argued that the DG wrongly treated third-party charges as voluntary, even though the CICTPL's license already covered all such services. The Appellant pointed out that the charges paid to third parties were sometimes higher than those paid to the CICTPL itself, proving that these charges were artificial and unjustified. The Appellant submitted that several affidavits showing forced payments were ignored, while untested statements of the Opposite Parties were accepted and also highlighted contradictions in third-party statements and overlapping services, clearly showing coordination with the CICTPL. The Appellant submitted that nearly all users were forced to pay third-party charges, proving they....
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....liance on the CICTPL's explanations, and failure to enforce its contractual and statutory obligations under the BOT agreement, amounted to serious dereliction of duty, which the CCI overlooked without providing any proper reasoning. 29. The Appellant further contended that the CCI committed a serious error in redefining the relevant product market in its final order as "the provision of common user coal terminal services at sea-ports." This broad definition ignored the Appellant's detailed objections raised during the investigation stage and failed to apply the mandatory factors under Section 19(7) of the Act, such as end-use, consumer preferences, and price sensitivity. The Appellant pointed out that earlier the CCI decisions in Case Nos. 03/2011 and 59/2012 had recognized coal supplies for thermal power plants as a distinct segment. International jurisprudence from the UK and EU also supports market definitions based on specific customer groups. By clubbing traders and thermal power producers together, the CCI distorted the competitive assessment. 30. The Appellant submitted that the CCI also erred in redefining the relevant geographic market as "the provision of common use....
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....er, differences in installed capacity are irrelevant when the market itself is incorrectly defined. 35. The Appellant contended that even the CCI's limited analysis of abuse, despite denying dominance, effectively confirmed it. The abusive conduct began immediately after the closure of Chennai Port, when users had no alternatives. The third-party charges were imposed uniformly, continued for years, and were supported by corporate structures and personnel linked to the CICTPL. Describing this conduct as "opportunistic" ignored the reality that such conduct persisted because users were captive and could not switch ports. 36. In view of the above, the Appellant prayed that this Appellate Tribunal set aside the impugned order dated 09.04.2021 in its entirety. The Appellant further requested that this Appellate Tribunal restore the findings of the prima facie order dated 04.01.2016 and the supplementary DG report dated 18.10.2019, hold that the CICTPL is dominant in the relevant market and has abused its dominant position in violation of Sections 4 and 19 of the Competition Act, and grant appropriate reliefs, including directions to cease the abusive conduct, impose penalties, ord....
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....PL's hinterland had used both the CICTPL and the Krishnapatnam Port interchangeably. This overlap was treated as evidence of substitutability and similar competitive conditions under Sections 2(s) and 19(6) of the Act. 43. The CCI further contended that the DG highlighted the substantial difference in scale between the two ports. The CICTPL had only one common user coal berth with a capacity of 8 million metric tonnes per annum, whereas Krishnapatnam Port had nine coal berths with a combined capacity of 40.5 million metric tonnes per annum. Additionally, Krishnapatnam Port enjoyed a 30-year exclusivity zone extending 30 km on either side, while the CICTPL's exclusivity at the KPL was limited to five years and ended in March 2016. These factors, according to the DG, weighed against a finding of dominance by the CICTPL. 44. The CCI submitted that the DG also examined financial data from 2011 to 2016. The analysis showed that Krishnapatnam Port's asset base grew at an average annual rate of 10.59%, while the CICTPL's assets grew by only 0.45%. Krishnapatnam also earned significantly higher and fluctuating profits, whereas the CICTPL incurred losses initially and earned relativel....
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.... customer base, including some members of the Appellant. The Impugned Order specifically noted that simultaneous use of both ports by users contradicted the claim that the CICTPL could act independently of market forces. 50. The CCI submitted that with regard to the coordination and liasoning charges, the Impugned Order acknowledged that these charges began around mid-2011, were not included in published tariffs, and were widely adopted. The CCI accepted that the Chettinad entities exercised effective control through employees and directors, making these services practically mandatory for users. The CCI contended that despite these observations, such conduct could not amount to abuse under Section 4 of the Act in the absence of dominance. The CCI argued that the Act penalizes abuse of dominance, not mere opportunistic conduct by non-dominant entities, accordingly, closure of the case under Section 26(2) of the Act was consistent with the statutory scheme. 51. The CCI contended that concerns regarding incomplete supplementary investigation were addressed in paragraphs 92 and 93 of the Impugned Order. The CCI concluded that further remand was unnecessary, as two detailed invest....
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....ad already attained finality after the order dated 21.12.2018, is legally impermissible. 58. The CICTPL contended that even the Main Investigation Report was comprehensive and self-sufficient, rendering the remand by the CCI to the DG, unnecessary. This was consistently pointed out by the CICTPL. The Appellant's claim of prejudice is therefore unfounded, as the CCI ultimately considered both reports and all submissions before arriving at a reasoned conclusion of non- dominance. 59. The CICTPL submitted that the CCI's discussion on abuse of dominance after holding that dominance was absent violates the settled sequence of inquiry under Section 4 of the Act. Reliance was placed on MCX Stock Exchange v. NSE (2011), which clarifies that abuse can be examined only after dominance is established. Accordingly, the CICTPL prayed this Appellate Tribunal for deletion of such ultra vires observations by the CCI as well as the DG. 60. The CICTPL contended that the operational needs of fixed thermal plants do not eliminate interchangeability between ports. The movement of traders and uniform pricing demonstrate a broader market, supported by elasticity analysis and international guidel....
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.... coal terminal services were interchangeable across ports. This uniformity mirrors the situation at Karaikal Port, where approximately 64% of coal handled was trader-driven. 64. The CICTPL contended that the Appellant's attempt to exclude Krishnapatnam Port from the geographic market analysis is untenable, particularly when Table 1 of the investigation reports demonstrates near parity in usage, with 51.41% volumes handled by Krishnapatnam Port. The CICTPL further submitted that claims of investigative incompleteness ignore the explicit scope of the remand, which never required tracing individual end-buyers beyond feasibility limits, as noted in paragraph 9.44.3 of the Main Investigation Report. 65. Concluding pleadings, the CICTPL requested this Appellate Tribunal to dismiss the appeal with cost. 66. The KPL/Respondent No. 3 also denied all averments made by the Appellant as frivolous. 67. The KPL submitted that although the Appellant had named the KPL as a party in the proceedings, the Appellant never made any specific allegation against the KPL at any stage. 68. The KPL further contended that even the Supplementary Investigation Report dated 18.10.2019 does not rec....
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....ther confirmed that it did not receive any share or benefit from any alleged coordination and liaison charges. 73. The KPL contended that under the licence agreement, any subcontracting of services requires prior written approval from the KPL and it conducted inquiries with the CICTPL and received confirmation that no unauthorised subcontracting had taken place. In light of this, the KPL cannot be held responsible or vicariously liable for any alleged conduct attributed to the CICTPL. 74. The KPL submitted that the Appellant's pleadings neither disclose any specific allegation, any evidence, nor any challenge to the DG's findings on the KPL. Therefore, the appeal discloses no cause of action against the KPL, and its continuation against the KPL is wholly unwarranted. 75. Concluding pleadings, the KPL requested this Appellate Tribunal to dismiss the appeal, uphold the exoneration of the KPL recorded by the CCI. Findings 76. We have noted the submissions of all the parties in detail while noting their pleadings in the preceding discussions. 77. The Appellant is aggrieved on several grounds as enumerated in the appeal including delineation of the relevant product mar....
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....the issues are inter-connected, inter-dependent and inter-related, we shall deal all issues submitted by the Appellant in a holistic manner in subsequent discussions. 84. The Appellant empathetically argues, that the CICTPL was a dominant player in the relevant product and relevant geographic market and was involved in abuse of dominance, having Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC). 85. It has been reiterated by the Appellant that the CCI asked the DG to investigate the matter under Section 19 of the Act and the DG submitted its report on 24.03.2018 and the CCI sought objections from the Stakeholders. It is noted that the Appellant objected to the main investigation report of the DG dated 24.03.2018 which was considered by the CCI and further ordered the DG of supplementary investigation in terms of Section 26(7) of the Act. 86. Now, we take into consideration the salient features of the DG's main report dated 24.03.2018. The DG defined the relevant product market as the provision of common user coal terminal services at sea ports, and the relevant geographic market as in and around Kamarajar Port, comprising Kamarajar Port and Krishnapatnam Port. Accordingly, ....
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....oneous exoneration of the Opposite Parties. 93. The Appellant stated that the CCI had correctly identified the relevant market as the provision of coal terminal services in and around Kamarajar Port and had prima facie found the CICTPL to be dominant after the closure of Chennai Port. However, the DG improperly expanded the relevant geographic market to include distant ports such as Krishnapatnam, ignoring transport costs, plant proximity, consumer dependence, and end-use constraints. This flawed market definition vitiates the dominance assessment. 94. The Appellant further alleged that the CICTPL abused its dominant position by imposing unfair and discriminatory conditions on coal importers by compelling them to mandatorily engage certain third-party coordination and liasoning service providers and pay charges over and above the published tariff. These services were neither required nor optional and were imposed as a precondition for availing terminal services. The Appellant alleged that even the KPL also failed to prevent such conduct of the CICTPL despite having oversight obligations. 95. The Appellant contends that, contrary to overwhelming evidence, the DG wrongly con....
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....In determining the relevant geographic market, the DG placed emphasis on consumer preference, transportation cost, plant proximity, and hinterland considerations. The DG found that Coal being a low-value, high-volume commodity, post-landing transportation costs were considered to be main decisive factor in port selection. The DG observed that evidence showed that power producers and fixed-plant consumers overwhelmingly preferred the nearest port to minimize logistics costs. The DG noted that most aggrieved importers were located in and around Gummidipoondi, approximately 40-55 km from Kamarajar Port. Alternative ports such as Krishnapatnam (around 176 km away) and Karaikal (around 347 km away) were found to be economically non-substitutable for most importers. Each port was observed to have a distinct captive hinterland with limited overlap. Accordingly, the DG delineated the relevant geographic market as the area in and around Kamarajar Port, being its captive hinterland. The relevant market was therefore defined as the provision of common user coal terminal services in and around Kamarajar Port. 99. As regard the Assessment of Dominance, the DG concluded that the CICTPL enj....
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....ompetitive forces. The investigation also highlighted serious concerns regarding the mandatory nature and lack of transparency of coordination and liaisoning services, attracting abuse of dominance under Section 4 of the Act. 103. After considering the rival contentions and pleadings of the parties, we have examined the Information/ Complaint filed by the Appellant before the CCI "the CCI's prima-facie opinion directing the DG to conduct and investigation vide order dated 04.01.2016, the DG's Main Investigation Report dated 24.03.2018, the objections filed by Stakeholders to the DG's report, the CCI's order dated 21.012.2018 directing submission of a supplementary report, the DG's Supplementary Investigation Report dated 18.10.2019 and finally Impugned Order dated 09.04.2021 passed by the CCI. 104. The main issue is whether the CICTPL was dominant in the relevant market in terms of Section 2(r) of the Act and if so whether the CICTPL has abused its position of dominance violating section 4 of the Act. Section 4 of the Act stipulate determination of relevant market which in turn will help to determine whether the CICTPL was dominant in such relevant market and whether the CICT....
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....titutable by the consumer, by reason of characteristics of the products or services, their prices and intended use; or (ii) the production or supply of, which are regarded as inter-changeable or substitutable by the supplier, by reason of the ease of switching production between such products and services and marketing them in the short term without incurring significant additional costs or risks in response to small and permanent changes in relative prices;] "SECTION 19 - Inquiry into certain agreements and dominant position of enterprise. (1) The Commission may inquire into any alleged contravention of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 3 or sub-section (1) of section 4 either on its own motion or on - • (a) receipt of any information, in such manner and accompanied by such fee as may be determined by regulations, from any person, consumer or their association or trade association; or ***** (3) The Commission shall, while determining whether an agreement has an appreciable adverse effect on competition under section 3, have due regard to all or any of the following factors, namely: • (a) cr....
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....; • local specification requirements; • national procurement policies; • adequate distribution facilities; • transport costs; • language; • consumer preferences; • need for secure or regular supplies or rapid after-sales services. • characteristics of goods or nature of services; • costs associated with switching supply or demand to other areas. (7) The Commission shall, while determining the "relevant product market", have due regard to all or any of the following factors, namely: • • (a) physical characteristics or end-use of goods or the nature of services; • (b) price of goods or service; • (c) consumer preferences; • (d) exclusion of in-house production; • (e) existence of specialised producers; • (f) classification of industrial products. • (g) costs associated with switching demand or supply to other goods or services; • (h) categories of customers. (Emphasis Supplied) 107. We note that the Appellant filed information petiti....
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.... user coal terminal services in and around Kamarajar Port". We note that the Appellant has vehemently argued before us that independent power producer plants are located in Chennai Region and Krishnapatnam Port being far away is not substitutable. The Appellant further argued that even if the charges being levied by the CICTPL and Krishnapatnam Port are in similar range, however, the road transportation cost from their power plants to Krishnapatnam Port would make it expensive and uneconomic and thus, the Krishnapatnam Port was incorrectly added by the CCI in the Impugned order 09.04.2021, despite the DG in its supplementary report did not include Krishnapatnam Port. 112. We note that the CCI itself did not include Krishnapatnam Port in its original order dated 04.01.2016. The DG although in main investigation report included Krishnapatnam Port, however, in the supplementary investigation report dated 18.10.2019, changed delineation of relevant market definition from the original investigation report and restricted to services in and around to Kamarajar Port. 113. Thus, inclusion and exclusion of Krishnapatnam Port for determination of relevant market becomes crucial. It i....
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....ly switch to other products or sources in response to a price increase. 117. The relevant market has two inseparable aspects: a Product aspect: products or services that are interchangeable or substitutable for each other; and b Geographic aspect: areas where conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous. The relevant market, therefore, may be treated as the area of effective competition within which the enterprise operates and where its ability to control prices or restrict competition can be assessed. Identifying the relevant market involves determining the specific product or service concerned, the alternative sources of supply available to consumers, and the geographic area where competitive conditions are similar. 118. Section 2(t) defines the relevant product market as a market comprising all products or services that are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by consumers, having regard to their characteristics, price, and intended use considering their end use, their physical or technical characteristics and their relative prices. The key tests applied are reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand, both of ....
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....relevant ports in relevant geographic market, inter-port, competition, catchment area analysis, substitutability between different ports etc. We have also considered various datum including total coal imports at these ports i.e., CICTPL ( Kamarajar Ports) and Krishnapatnam Port and Karaikal Port. Similarly, percentage of details of quantity imported by various parties including power producers and traders has also been taken into account. We have also considered details of consumer wise quantity of coal imported at CICTPL and Krishnapatnam Port. We have also noted that interaction by the DG with the concerned stakeholders and recorded relevant statements of such stakeholders and their officers in its detailed investigation. 122. We have also examined inputs given by the Appellant and the CICTPL and the KPL, keeping in view provisions under Section 2(r), 2(s) and 2(t) of the Act and datum of goods/ services, consumer preferences, transportation cost, exclusivity, physical cross-examination of stakeholders by the DG, Port distance and proximately to the plant, hinterland analysis of the DG (bifurcated captive and contestable). We have also taken into account the data of party-wise....
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....such, both Kamarajar Port and Krishnapatnam Port were competative to each other. 127. Based on this analysis, the CCI differed from the DG and the Appellant and defined the relevant market under Section 2(r) of the Act as "provision of common user coal terminal services at sea-ports in and around Kamarajar Port which includes CICTPL and common user coal terminals at Krishnapatnam Port". 128. We shall now look into the relevant data as used by the DG as well as the CCI used in determination of relevant market to understand whether the Impugned Order has correctly defined the relevant market under Section 2(r) of the Act or otherwise. 129. The CCI in its Impugned Order have been used table 4 and table 5 of the DG's main investigation report which reads as under: - Table 4 Quantity of coal imported at CICTPL and Krishnapatnam Port by 20 consumers considering the services at these ports as substitutable Total Coal Handled by CICTPL Total Coal Handled by Krishnapatnam Port Years Quantity (MT) % SHARE Quantity (MT) % SHARE 2011-12 1764984 41.7 2467994 58.3 2012-13 1415979 34.47 2692375 65.53 2013-14 2072214....
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....is found out considering its geographical locations, road and rail network in the area, connection of the ports to these network, geographical conditions etc. Normally, users of port consumer like Appellant in this case would prefer the nearer port which is cost effective, providing same or similar standard of service. We further take into account that the DG in supplementary report has correctly detailed similarity and dissimilarity on the aspect of captive hinterland and contestable hinterland w.r.t to Krishnapatnam Port and Kamarajar Port and further came to correct conclusion that hinterland of Krishnapatnam Port is distinct and separate which is not shared with other ports. 133. We tend to agree with the analysis of the DG that location of traders become inconsequential during such analysis as traders are not actual users or consumers but they import coal for trading purpose. We understand that the traders will prefer the port which is cost effective, based on the location and the actual users, hence for traders there may be flexibility for using other port like Krishnapatnam Port depending upon the context of each transaction with ports. 134. We have taken into consider....
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....al, was 1,72,91,765 MT, which is nearly 50% of total coal handled by the CICTPL during the same period. 141. We also take into account the analysis of the DG that the CICTPL increased its existing port charges of Rs. 180/- PMT to Rs. 300/- PMT in October, 2011, which progressively increased to Rs. 375/- PMT by July, 2014. However, contrary to the law of demand, the volume of traffic handled at the CICTPL also increased from 0.5 MMT during the year 2011 to 3.49 in 2012, and from 5.05 MMT in 2013 to 8 MMT in 2014. This increase in demand indicated that coal importers could not switch to other ports. It means that the CICTPL enjoyed the advantage of its location and high transportation cost involved to switch to other ports. The infrastructure and investment requirements, locational advantages, connectivity, etc. required for a new port/ terminal also could not have been have been altered in the short term. Therefore, the inter-port competition in true sense, did not constrain the CICTPL from any meaningful competition during the relevant period. 142. The DG further analysed several factors including investment by the CICTPL of appro. Rs. 400 Crore for developing common user coa....
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....bove the notified tariff, thereby demonstrating its proactive and transparent approach. During the investigation, the KPL also clarified that third-party service providers could operate within the port premises only after obtaining prior approval from the KPL, and no such approval was granted to BEPL or OILPL. The KPL further confirmed that it did not receive any share or benefit from any alleged coordination and liaison charges. 146. The KPL contended that under the licence agreement, any subcontracting of services requires prior written approval from the KPL and it conducted inquiries with the CICTPL and received confirmation that no unauthorised subcontracting had taken place. In light of this, the KPL cannot be held responsible or vicariously liable for any alleged conduct attributed to the CICTPL. 147. We would like to reiterate that we have already found the finding of the CCI regarding delineation of relevant market under Section 2(r) as erroneous which included Krishnapatnam Port in the relevant market definition. Once the Krishnapatnam Port is excluded from the relevant market definition. We now need to find facts only relating to Kamarajar Port to see whether the CI....
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....y in nature. The CICTPL as further pleaded that no evidence has been shown by Appellant in this connection making the CICTPL responsible for making mandatory so-called mandatory co-ordination & Liasoning Charges. 154. In this connection, the KPL/ Respondent No. 3 stated that they did not stipulate any such conditions for using any third-party services for coordination and liasoning charges by any user. The KPL further pointed out in fact they had given instructions that only published charges are to be payable by the users. The KPL stated that in any case, they have issued any direction for these services. 155. On this issue, we take into consideration that both the DG and the CCI have agreed that these charges were mandatory in nature. The CCI although did not agree to the Appellant contention that this was abusive practice violating Section 4 of the Act, but the CCI treated these Act as "Opportunistic" not falling in the definition of abuse of dominance position. The CICTPL was not found as dominant by the CCI in the Impugned Order in relevant market. 156. We take into consideration the finding of the DG in its supplementary report on this issue. The DG has taken into co....
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....ent importer would engage any third party service providor, unless the same is forced on the importer as a condition precedent for import clearance. Hence, it is very likely that such services would have been forced on the importers during the material time by the CICTPL as the CICTPL would not only receive additional service charges through third party service providers, but the said charges would also not form part of the sharable tariff structure to the KPL. 162. The DG further analysed that relationship of third-party service provider with the Chettinad Group and also analysed the income of these three entities. The DG also referred to MCA 21 database in analysing the corporate structure and taken into consideration various emails exchanged between the employees of Chettinad Group and employees of these three entities and established that even the MoA and AoA of these companies were shared with the management of Chettinad Group while forming these companies. This leaves little scope to rule out any possibilities of no connection between three entities which provide Co- ordination and Liasoning Charges and the Chettinad Group, owner of the CICTPL. 163. The DG enclosed in t....
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.... 168. The CCI stated that there seem to be no reason why user would pay additional charges to third party for availing services which ought to have been provided by the CICTPL. The CCI also noted that there was no economic sense for any importer to pay separate charge for coordination and liasoning charges to third party service provider and these charges were rather imposed upon users. The CCI also taken into consideration the DG's finding regarding the relationship between these three entities with the Chettinad Group and held that the DG has successfully established the linkage even the no flow of funds from these companies to the CICTPL was found. The CCI also agreed that observation of the DG that these companies are not officially as part of Chettinad Group and however, the affairs and conduct of these three entities were manged and controlled by employees of the Chettinad Group. However, the CCI in para 128 of the Impugned Order treated conduct of the CICTPL as being "opportunistic" and not abusive since, the CICTPL was not held to be dominant in the Impugned Order by the CCI. It tantamount that had the CCI treated the CICTPL as the dominant player in the relevant market,....