2026 (1) TMI 1048

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.... 05/13. By the impugned order, the Learned Special Judge discharged the opposite party, Shri Chandra Nath Kayal, an Income Tax Officer, from charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act), on the ground of an invalid sanction and the legal impossibility of its rectification. 2. The prosecution case originated from a successful trap operation conducted on May 2, 2012, following a complaint that the opposite party had demanded a bribe of Rs.2,000/- for processing a tax refund. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. 3. The material facts, which remain uncontroverted, are that the opposite party was appointed as an Income Tax Officer by the....

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....it is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Section 19(1)(c) of the PC Act stipulates that sanction must be granted by the authority "competent to remove" the public servant. This statutory mandate is anchored in the constitutional safeguard of Article 311(1), which prohibits removal by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority. Applying this principle, the CCIT is the appointing authority. 7. Applying this principle, the CIT is undeniably subordinate to the CCIT. It is settled law, as held in Mahesh Prasad vs. State of U.P. (AIR 1955 SC 70), that a sanction granted by a subordinate authority suffers from a fundamental jurisdictional defect. Departmental circulars or notifications cannot override or dilute this constitutional mandate....

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.... prosecution's authority in violation of the constitutional protection under Article 311(1). b. Secondly, and perhaps more critically, while a defective sanction is generally curable under the curative principle of Nanjappa, it becomes incurable in the face of a subsequent statutory embargo. The withdrawal of general consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act acts as a jurisdictional curtain; it precludes the agency from undertaking the substantive exercise of power required to re-initiate the sanctioning process. To hold otherwise would be to permit the agency to perform an act of substantive jurisdiction-namely, the fresh application of mind for a new sanction-at a time when it has been statutorily divested of the authority to d....