TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (9) TMI 1721
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.... the expressions "after the prescribed period" and "for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period c. The expression "within such period" cannot be conflated with "during such period" or "for such period". d. The contextual import of the expression "within such period" with the Canons of Law of Limitation. e. Decisions which Rewa Coal Fields (supra) failed to take into consideration. f. Condonation of Delay entails Extension of Limitation and not Exclusion B. What is to be understood by "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation i. Length of the delay may be instructive but not determinative. ii. Technical Considerations vis-à-vis Substantial Justice. C. In what circumstances can the exercise of discretion to condone the delay be interfered with? D. There is no room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act i. View on the subject of Condonation of Delay prior to the decision of Postmaster General. ii. Shift in jurisprudence on Condonation of Delay after the decision of Postmaster General. iii. T....
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....orporation, praying for the relief of declaration of title and possession of the land in question. g. The said suit came to be dismissed by the Trial Court vide order dated 17.04.1997. h. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant preferred the Regular Appeal No. 405 of 2004 (hereinafter the "first appeal") before the 3rd Addl. District Judge, Gulbargam (hereinafter the "First Appellate Court"). i. The First Appellate Court vide its judgment and order dated 03.01.2006 allowed the appeal and accordingly decreed the suit in favor of the appellant, granting the declaration as prayed for in the suit. However, the First Appellate Court declined to grant the relief of possession in view of the fact that substantial construction had already been undertaken on the land in question by the respondent housing corporation, and thus, instead directed the grant of compensation to the appellant herein. j. Since no action was taken by the respondent no. 1 in accordance with the decree drawn by the First Appellate Court, the appellant herein initiated execution proceedings on 20.01.2011. k. Remarkably, it was only on 14.02.2017, that the respondent no. 1 reali....
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....ression "sufficient cause" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. 25. In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision-making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting he plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest." E. Case laws relied by the Petitioner: - 1. Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. ofBrihan Mumbai, (....
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....Ltd v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha) Para 73 In the present case, the Hon'ble High Court has exercised its discretionary power after considering the sufficient cause and the same cannot be said to be clearly wrong so as to require interference. III) That third submission is that in case there have been deliberate lapses on the part of the public officials and public servants to defeat justice by causing delay, delay, however huge may be, should be condoned and the latter be decided on merits. i) 2015 (3) SCC 569 (Executive Officer, Antiyur Town Panchayat v. G. Arumugam (D) By Lrs.) para 3 and 4 IV) That fourth submission is when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the former would_ prevail specially when public interest is involved. It is submitted that it is not the length of delay but sufficiency of cause, which is relevant. i) 1987 (2) SCC 107 (Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag &Anr. v. Mst. Katiji& Ors). para 3 ii) 2005 (3) SCC 752 (State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao & Ors.) Para 8 & 9 iii) 2013 (12) SCC 649 (Esha Bhattaharyajeev. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy) Para 21....
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.... Advocate and contact the Advocate regularly, order sheet of Execution Petition reveals that neither the Executive Engineer nor the Assistant Executive Engineer have engaged Advocate in Execution Petition. KHB came to know the issue -of warrant of attachment of their movables from Deputy Commissioner only on 28.01.2017. Both the officers were suspended. X) It is submitted that neither the land is purchased nor acquired by the KHB nor any allotment is made by KHB. The petitioner filed a suit for possession. The lower appellant court moulded the relief and directed payment of compensation. The payment of compensation without acquisition of land by Respondent-1 is against public interest and it also involves huge public money. Respondent-1 cannot be directed to pay compensation when they have not acquired the land. The persons in possession are illegal occupants and the KHB has nothing to do with that land or its occupants. It is relevant to note that petitioners filed WP No. 82306/2011 praying for mandamus direction R-1 and R-2 to acquire the land, which was withdrawn on 19.07.2011. XI) KHB has no objection if decree is passed for possession against the persons in p....
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....ient cause" for the resultant delay in filing / presenting of the appeal or application is shown by the defaulting party, and the courts are satisfied with the explanation and sufficiency of such cause that the recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be taken by the courts, and in exercise of its discretion the delay be condoned and thereby admit the appeal or application. i. Meaning and Scope of the expression "Within Such Period" used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 12. Ms. Suri, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents herein vociferously contended that although it is a well settled position of law that for the purpose of seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay in the filing of an appeal or application beyond the stipulated period of limitation has to be explained by demonstrating the existence of a "sufficient cause" yet there appears to be a divergence of opinion as to the precise period for which the "sufficient cause" must be demonstrated for seeking condonation. 13. It was submitted that, there is a cleavage of opinion expressed as regards the meaning of the expression "within such period" o....
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....hip, then was) held that the aforesaid expression means that existence of a sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal or application, as the case may be, has to be shown for the period from the last day of the limitation prescribed till the date of the actual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be. In other words, if the period of limitation is, say, 90-days, delay has to be explained only for the 90th day till the day of actual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be. The said decision is in three parts: - (i) First, it held that in the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the expression "within such period" used therein, means the period from the last day of the limitation that has been prescribed till the day on which the appeal or application is filed. Thus, it held that for the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the party has to assign sufficient cause for why he was unable to file an appeal for the entire period covered from the last day of the limitation prescribed till the day on which such appeal or application came to be filed. The relevant observations read as under: - ....
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....n call upon the party to explain its conduct during the whole of the said period. Accordingly, it rejected the contention that for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay in filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be, has to be explained for the entire period of the limitation prescribed. The relevant observations read as under: - 8. [...] If the Limitation Act or any other appropriate statute prescribes different periods of limitation either for appeals or applications to which Section 5 applies that normally means that liberty is given to the party intending to make the appeal or to file an application to act within the period prescribed in that behalf. It would not be reasonable to require a party to take the necessary action on the very first day after the cause of action accrues. In view of the period of limitation prescribed the party would be entitled to take its time and to file the appeal on any day during the said period; and so prima facie it appears unreasonable that when delay has been made by the party in filing the appeal it should be called upon to explain its conduct during the whole of the period of limitation prescribed. [.....
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....e increasing pressure of business in the law Courts and the many facilities now available for the punctual filing of suits, appeals and applications therein, it is high time that litigants and their legal advisers were made to realise the dangers of the procrastination which defers the presentation of a suit, appeal or application to the last day of the limitation prescribed therefor". There can be no difference of opinion on the point that litigants should act with due diligence and care; but we are disposed to think that such general consideration can have very little relevance in construing the provisions of Section 5. The decision of the Judicial Commissioner shows that he based his conclusion more on this a priori consideration and did not address himself as he should have to the construction of the section itself. Apparently this view has been consistently followed in Nagpur. 12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in t....
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....ant/appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. it was laid down that in showing sufficient cause to condone the delay, it is not necessary that the applicant/appellant has to explain whole of the period between the date of the judgment till the date of filing the appeal. It is sufficient that the applicant/appellant would explain the delay caused in the period between the last of the dates of limitation and the date on which the appeal/application is actually filed." (Emphasis supplied) 17. Thus, as per the decisions of this Court in Rewa Coal Fields (supra) and Chandra Mani (supra), respectively, the expression "within such period" used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been construed to mean the period commencing from the last date on which the prescribed period of limitation would have expired, and extending up to the actual date on which such appeal or application comes to be filed, and therefore, "sufficient cause" for the delay in such filing has to be explained only for this circumscribed interval, rather than for the whole of the period of....
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....cause" includes the prescribed period of limitation i.e., the period before the limitation prescribed had expired as per Ajit Singh Thakur (supra) and the last day on which the limitation would have expired as per Rewa Coal Fields (supra), as the net effect of embracing both these perspectives, is one and the same, that "sufficient cause" is required to be established for the period within the prescribed limitation, which includes the last day on which the said period would have expired, as clarified in Rewa Coal Fields (supra), till the date of actual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be. 21. However, we do not think, that when this Court in Ajit Singh Thakur (supra) said that "no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause", what it had in its mind was that the sufficient cause must establish some event or circumstance, only for the last day of the prescribed period of limitation, as held in Rewa Coal Fields (supra). This is because, nowhere has this Court in Ajit Singh Thakur (supra) made any reference to the point of origin if a "sufficient cause" would suffice to mean only the last day of the prescribe....
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....ourt that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. [...] xxx xxx xxx 11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible." (Emphasis supplied) 23. In Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), this very Bench had the occasion to examine the meaning of the expression "within such period" used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Placing reliance on the decisions of this Court in Ajit Singh Thakur (supra) and Basawaraj (supra), it was held that for the purpose of Section 5, the party seeking condonation of delay has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within the prescribed period of limitation....
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....itation Act. b. Textual Import of the expressions "after the prescribed period" and "for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. 25. At the cost of repetition, we deem it necessary to once again quote the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for a better exposition. The same reads thus: - "5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.- Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.- The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." 26. The text of the provision stipulates that where an appeal or application, as the case may be, is not filed within the prescribed period of limitation, the same may be admitted if "sufficien....
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....t, as the case may be, has committed in preferring the appeal or application, respectively, which is nothing but the failure to file it within the prescribed statutory period of limitation. This is further reinforced when one considers the meaning that would have been derived, if the negative language used in the provision is stripped away, or in other words, by understanding the opposite meaning of the aforesaid phrase, which the legislature has deliberately chosen not to provide by use of the negative language "for not". 31. By removing or inverting the said negative connotation from the phrase "for not preferring ... or making", the expression would then inevitably have connoted that point of time at which the appeal or application, as the case may be, ought to have been instituted or the period within which, the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, was otherwise well within its right to prefer the appeal or make the application, respectively. 32. The aforesaid makes it crystal clear that the legislature, by employing the phrase "for not preferring the appeal or making the application", is unmistakably alluding to the original statutory period of limitation with....
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....eal or application, as the case may be. There can be no question of construing "within such period" as making a reference either to only the original period of limitation or to only the actual period of delay after the expiry of limitation. 38. It is a well settled rule of statutory interpretation that while construing a provision, a meaningful effect should be given to each and every word used by the legislature within the text of the provision. In interpreting a provision, a coherent meaning has to be culled out from the entire scheme of the Act and the provisions contained therein. The entire text of the provision must be read holistically with the entire Act, in toto, and harmoniously integrated with the other provisions to preserve internal consistency. Stray lines or words of a provision cannot be isolated or construed in fragments, detached from the remaining words and expressions of the provision as-well as the other provisions within the statute. 39. Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that both the expressions, by a necessary implication indicate that the phrase "within such period" signifies that the period covered therein extends to not only the original period ....
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....rovision. 44. Insofar, as the apprehension that Rewa Coal Fields (supra) harboured as regards the expression "within such period" being conflated with "during such period" if Section 5 is construed to mean that delay has to be explained for the duration of the prescribed period of limitation, the same, to our minds does not appear to be a correct understanding of the bare text of the provision. 45. No doubt, in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the legislature has not used the expression "during such period" and instead, has consciously employed the phrase, "within such period", and thus, the expression cannot be solely confined to mean only the prescribed period of limitation. To the extent of the aforesaid, we are in complete agreement with Rewa Coal Fields (supra). 46. However, to say that the expression "within such period" has to then necessarily be construed to mean only the period after the expiry of limitation, beginning from the last day of the prescribed limitation till the day on which the appeal or application is filed, is not a correct appreciation of the provision. 47. We must be mindful of the fact, that the legislature has consciously not employed the phr....
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....he context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, more particularly the manner and the circumstances in which the court condones the delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be. d. The contextual import of the expression "within such period" with the Canons of Law of Limitation. 52. This Court in Rewa Coal Fields (supra) observed that since a party is entitled to take its time and file the appeal or application, as the case may be, on any day, during the prescribed period of limitation, it would be "unreasonable that when delay has been made by the party in filing the appeal it should be called upon to explain its conduct during the whole of the period of limitation prescribed". Although, it said that such consideration may be of relevance for the purpose of deciding whether a particular case is one fit for the court to exercise its discretion to condone the delay, yet the same would be a question to be answered, only after sufficient cause is shown, as otherwise it is of no significance, for the purpose of construing the period for which delay has to be explained under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It further elaborated that the general considerations of ....
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.... 59. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. [See: N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123] 60. The bedrock of law on limitation flows from two age-old Latin maxims; interest reipublicae up sit finis litium and vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt, which mean; "it is in the interest of the State that there be an end to litigation" and "the law assis....
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.... which the set off is pleaded; (ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the counter claim is made in court; (c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is presented to the proper officer of that court." 63. Bare reading of the aforesaid provision leaves no room for doubt that if a suit is instituted, appeal is preferred or application is made after the prescribed period, it has to be dismissed even though no such plea has been raised or defence has been set up. In other words, even in the absence of such plea by the defendant, respondent or opponent, as the case may be, the court or authority must dismiss such suit, appeal or application, if it is satisfied that the suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation. Limitation goes to the root of the matter. If a suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation, a court or an adjudicating authority has no jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain such suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits. [See: Noharlal Verma v. Distt. Coop. Central Bank Ltd., (2008) 14 SCC 445] 64. Section 3 sub-section (1) of the Limitation Act makes every ....
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....hat it is an exception to the core axioms of 'interest reipublicae up sit finis litium' and 'vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt' that underline the Limitation Act. The aforesaid form the very jurisprudential underpinnings on why we even have prescribed periods of limitation, and are the very basis for the existence of statutes on limitation in every civilized country that has ever existed. 68. Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are only an exception insofar as the mandate enshrined under Section 3 is concerned, which enjoins a duty upon the courts to dismiss any suit instituted, appeal preferred, or application made after the prescribed period of limitation. They as a matter of exception, enable the courts to entertain a suit, appeal or application, filed even after the prescribed period of limitation where the delay was owed to factors beyond the reasonable control of the litigant. But this does not mean, that delays occasioned or accompanied to some extent by negligence, inaction, or a lack of care or vigilance of the litigant would also be liable to be excused, or at the very least ignored by the court even if the delay in question happens to formulaically fu....
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....niunt' it was held that a court of law never tolerates an indolent litigant since delay defeats equity. It further held that lapse of time is a species for forfeiture of right. The relevant observations read as under: - "14. Needless to record that engrossment of stamped paper would undoubtedly render the decree executable but that does not mean and imply, however, that the enforceability of the decree would remain suspended until furnishing of the stamped paper - this is opposed to the fundamental principle on which the statutes of limitation are founded. It cannot but be the general policy of our law to use the legal diligence and this has been the consistent legal theory from the ancient times: even the doctrine of prescription in Roman law prescribes such a concept of legal diligence and since its incorporation therein, the doctrine has always been favoured rather than claiming disfavour. Law courts never tolerate an indolent litigant since delay defeats equity - the Latin maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt (the law assists those who are vigilant and not those who are indolent). As a matter of fact, lapse of time is a species for forfeiture of right....
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....e legislative intent that backs the particular statute containing the said provision cannot be done casually. Mere omission of few stray words, does not detract or take away the lofty intent behind enacting the statute and cannot always be interpreted to impute a contrary intent unless the same is apparent and supported by some other salutary object with which such omission may have been made. 75. In this regard, it could be argued that the legislature may have intentionally omitted the express mentioning of any of the aforesaid parameters pertaining to party diligence in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to lay stress on two key components of the law of limitation. First, that a party has a right to file an appeal or application, as the case may be on any day within the prescribed period of limitation and secondly, that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy or extinguish rights of litigants but only to curb deliberate dilatory tactics. 76. If at all such was the intention behind the legislature, then the same is being adequately subserved by virtue of the discretion bestowed onto the the courts under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 77. There was no need to excl....
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....period" or "sufficient cause", to our minds, appears to be the least disruptive interpretation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that would balance the salutary object of any statute of limitation, in toto. It would not only ensure that not even an ounce of dilatory tactics by a litigant is allowed to pollute the streams of justice, but also curb the seriously falling standards of diligence that the litigants today have towards assertion of their rights or availment of remedies, and a growing tendency to leave things for the last moment, at the cost of prejudice to other litigants, and without any modicum of respect for the courts and judicial resources. At the same time, it will also allow courts to save those rights and permit their enforcement or adjudication, by a judicious exercise of their discretion in justified instances of delays, that are not a byproduct or result of the litigant's own inaction or negligence. 82. Thus, to our minds, the fixation by Rewa Coal Fields (supra) that "within such period" covers only the period from the last day of limitation till the actual date of filing, does not appear to be supported either by the bare text of the provision or by the m....
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....piry of limitation' and 'the period after the expiry of limitation till the date of filing', as the same for the purpose of condonation of delay, which is to say that, as long as there was a "sufficient cause" continuing between all these three intervals, the court would have the discretion to condone the same, provided the sufficient cause is not the result of negligence, inaction or lack of diligence of the litigant. 86. One another good reason that fortifies our mind to hold the aforesaid is due to the very nature of the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The said provision, as evident from its text, is only applicable in respect of appeals or applications. Lis that arises from appeals or applications, more often than not, do not partake the character of original proceedings. The deliberations and contemplations that a party undertakes before availing the remedy of the courts, is much lesser in threshold in case of appeals or applications, than in proceedings of original nature. 87. The aforesaid unique distinction between the nature of original and appellate proceedings for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, was recognized by this Court in Universi....
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.... both the expressions "sufficient cause" and "within such period". We need not discuss, all the decisions, and rather intend to only refer and rely upon a handful of them. 91. In Dinabandhu Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj, reported in (1954) 1 SCC 800, a five-Judge Bench of this Court was inter-alia called upon to examine Section 85 of the Representation of People's Act, 1951, which is materially similar to Section 5 of the erstwhile Limitation Act, 1908, which is pari materia to its counterpart provision under the present Limitation Act. In the said decision, this Court approvingly referred to a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan reported in 1889 SCC OnLine Mad 1, to hold that the words "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive "a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable" (emphasis). The relevant observations read as under: - "Even if the matter had to be judged under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it would have been a proper exercise of the power under that section to have excused the delay. As was observed in the Full Bench de....
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.... authority to inter-alia condone the delay was due to sufficient cause. The prayer for condonation fo delay was rejected by the concerned authority and thereafter by the High Court as-well. In appeal, this Court placed reliance on Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to construe the import of the term "sufficient cause". Although, this Court ambiguously observed that "in dealing with the question of condonation of delay" the "party has to satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause" and "this has always been understood to mean that the explanation has to cover the whole of the period of delay", yet it never explained or elaborated what duration of period would be covered. It did not allude whether the same would include only the period from the last day of expiry of limitation, till the date of actual filing, or only the prescribed period of limitation, or both, nor does the decision relied upon by it shed any light on the same. However, a closer look at the decision would reveal that, what was in the mind of this Court was that explanation has to cover both the aforesaid periods i.e., the entire duration from when the limitation period started till the actual date of filing. ....
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.... ignorance of law can be a sufficient cause, then the period until May 2, 1952, would be covered by the appellants' ignorance about the true scope and effect of the provisions of Section 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act. This position may be conceded. It is true that the true effect of the said section was not appreciated by either the workmen and Their union or the employers or the authorities under the Factories Act, or even by the industrial courts. But the question still remains whether the appellants are not required to explain the delay made by them after May 2, 1952. Mr Phadke says that it is not necessary for his clients to explain this delay. His argument is that what the relevant proviso really means is that if sufficient cause has been shown for not making the application within the prescribed period of six months then the application can be made any time thereafter. The statutory bar created by the prescribed limitation is removed once it is shown that there was sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period; and once that bar is removed, there is no further question of limitation and the applicant cannot be called upon to explai....
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....ns as regards the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned, may be understood from one another angle. 96. The marginal note appended to Section 5 of the Limitation Act is titled "Extension of prescribed period in certain cases". The provision provides that where an appeal or application, as the case may be, is not filed within the prescribed period of limitation, the same may be admitted if "sufficient cause" for such failure is shown. The court may, in its discretion, proceed to condone the delay, if it is satisfied about the existence of such sufficient cause that resulted in the delay. In doing so, the court condones the delay in such filing by 'extending' the prescribed period of limitation in order to bring the application or appeal, as the case may be, in the eyes of law, within the limitation period, to then admit the same. 97. What is pertinent to take note of is that the condonation of delay does not result in exclusion of the period during which the sufficient cause persisted, it instead talks about extension of the period from the date when the prescribed period of limitation expired till the actual date of filing of the appeal or application. This g....
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....a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as a matter of right, yet it is trite that in construing sufficient cause. The relevant observations read as under: - "6. Having heard the learned counsel, we are of the opinion that in the instant case a sufficient cause had been made out for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and therefore, the High Court erred in declining to condone the same. It is true that even upon showing a sufficient cause, a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as a matter of right, yet it is trite that in construing sufficient cause, the courts generally follow a liberal approach particularly when no negligence, inaction or mala fides can be imputed to the party. (Emphasis supplied) 101. From the above discussion, it is clear that the period which is being effectively extended is only ancillary to the "sufficient cause" that would have occasioned. Even the bare text of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, makes it abundantly clear that while "sufficient cause" has to be shown for the duration covered by the expression "within such period", nowhere does the provision allude that the "period" which would be effectively exten....
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....ustration, say, the prescribed period of limitation was 90-days, and the actual date of filing took additional 10-days. Now, in such a scenario, if we read "extension" as "exclusion", then "sufficient cause" only has to be shown for the 10-days so that, once it is excluded, his filing would be deemed as if it was filed on the 90th day. 105. Although the aforesaid, may not, on the surface seem like a drastic consequence if "extension" is read as "exclusion", yet, it would have an underlying effect which would be contrary to the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which we shall now explain. If "extension" is read as "exclusion" and a party is required to demonstrate "sufficient cause" only for that duration necessary to be excluded, for the appeal or application, to once again fall within the prescribed period of limitation, for it to be admitted, then the entire exercise contemplated under Section 5, would in simple terms involve showing "sufficient cause" such that after the exclusion, the litigant is once again put back into the "prescribed period of limitation". 106. In other words, if the above interpretation is adopted then the litigant would only have to....
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....n it should condone the delay". 111. The discretion that the courts have been conferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is two-fold, for determining if "sufficient cause" existed and where the former is answered in the affirmative, then whether the case is a fit one for it to condone the delay, to admit the appeal or application as the case may be. Which is why, the legislature consciously used the word "extension" rather than "exclusion" in marginal note to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 112. To say, that the purpose for demonstrating "sufficient cause" is to exclude only that extent of period which would once again put the litigant back into the last day on which, he could have filed the appeal or application, would, in our opinion, gravely misconstrue the entire mechanism of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Thus, the expression "within such period" for this reason also cannot be possibly construed to mean the period from the last day of expiry of the limitation, till the actual date of filing of appeal or the application, as understood by Rewa Coal Fields (supra). The phrase "extension" used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not a misnomer. 113. It is for t....
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....fficient cause" is the first ingredient for the purpose of condonation of delay. Insofar, as what is meant by the phrase "sufficient cause", neither Section 5 nor the Limitation Act itself provide any guidance on what its constituent elements ought to be. Instead, Section 5 leaves the task of determining appropriate reasons for seeking condonation of delay to judicial interpretation and exercise of discretion upon the facts and individual circumstances of each case. 117. While there is no arithmetical formula, through decades of judicial application, certain yardsticks for judging the sufficiency of cause for condonation of delay have evolved. Mere good cause is not sufficient enough to turn back the clock and allow resuscitation of a claim otherwise barred by delay. The court ought to be cautious while undertaking such an exercise, being circumspect against condoning delay which is attributable to the applicant. Although the actual period of delay might be instructive, it is the explanation for the delay which would be the decisive factor. 118. The court must also desist from throwing the baby out with the bathwater. A justice-oriented approach must be prioritised over techn....
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....condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowe....
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....ndency to perceive delay as a nonserious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 122. The exceptional provision of condonation of delay on grounds of "sufficient cause" is couched as a manifestation of substantive justice. This Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. v. Special Deputy Collector (LA), reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513, summarized the principles governing the exceptions imagined under "sufficient cause" vis-à-vis substantive justice as under: - "26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense w....
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....strued with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. 126. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. 127. The expression "sufficient cause" must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. i. Length of the delay may be instructive but not determinative. 128. When it comes to condonation of delay, the length of delay is immaterial, and what matters is the acceptability of the explanation. A short delay may still warrant dismissal if unsupported by s....
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....proach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter case, no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in this regard. The court has to exercise the discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression "sufficient cause", the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance. ii. Technical Considerations vis-à-vis Substantive Justice. 135. In construing "sufficient cause" it must be borne in mind that rules of procedure are handmaids of justice. Procedural rigidity should not become an instrument of injustice. In the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, this balance assumes special significance. Courts have repeatedly underscored that while limitation provisions are founded on sound principles of finality and certainty, their application cannot be divorced from the overarching objective of ensuring that liti....
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....ver, at the same time, the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. 141. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker....
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....rt ought to refrain from interfering with the subjective view taken by the High Court. 146. In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel drew are attention to three decisions of this Court in Sheo Raj Singh (D) Tr. Lrs. v. Union of India, reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531, Manjunath Anandappa urf. Shivappa Hanasi v. Tammanasa & Ors. reported in (2003) 10 SCC 390 and Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha reported in (1980) 2 SCC 593. 147. The expression "may be admitted" vests in the court a discretion, the exercise of which is pre-conditioned to the proof of a "sufficient cause" for the failure to file the appeal or application, as the case may be, within the prescribed period of limitation. It enables a court to either admit or reject any appeal or application, for being barred by limitation, even if "sufficient cause" is shown to its satisfaction. The idea behind vesting the courts with such discretion is to ensure that the power to condone any delay in the filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, is exercised only to advance substantial justice, where no prejudice or injustice would meted from such delay being condoned. Condonation of delay....
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....lly different from that under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, under which an order excusing delay is not final, and is liable to be questioned by the respondent at a later stage. (Vide the decision of the Privy Council in Krishnasami Pandikondar v. Ramasami Chettiar.) 151. In Shanti Prasad Gupta v. Dy. Director of Consolidation reported in 1981 Supp SCC 73, this Court held since the issue, whether there is a sufficient cause or not is a question of fact, where an order has been made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by the lower court in the exercise of its discretion allowing or refusing an application to extend time, it cannot be interfered with in revision, unless the lower court has acted with material irregularity or contrary to law or has come to that conclusion on no evidence. The relevant observations read as under: - "3. We find that Contention (1) is not correct. The order against which Gian Chand Bansari went in revision before the Director did not fall within the purview of Section 9-A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and, as such, was not appealable under Section 11 of that Act. We however find a good deal of force in the second contention of ....
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....bstantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause."" (Emphasis supplied) 153. In Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini reported in (2003) 10 SCC 691 this Court held that the finding of the court below on the question of availability of "sufficient cause" ought to be given weight and should not normally be interfered with in superior jurisdiction. The relevant observations read as under: - "9. The courts have to adopt a justice-oriented approach dictated by the uppermost consideration that ordinarily a litigant ought not to be denied an opportunity of having a lis determined on merits unless he has, by gross negligence, deliberate inaction or something akin to misconduct, disentitled himself from seeking the indulgence of the court. The opinion of the trial Judge allowing a prayer for setting aside abatement and his finding on the question of availability of "sufficient cause" within the meaning of sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of Order 22 and of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deserves to be given weight, and once arrived at would ....
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....sed by the lower court the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the exercise of that discretion. In dealing with the matter raised before it at the appellate stage the appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of the discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it may have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. As is often said, it is ordinarily not open to the appellate court to substitute its own exercise of discretion for that of the trial Judge; but if it appears to the appellate court that in exercising its discretion the trial court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts then it would certainly be open to the appellate court to interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion. This principle is well established; but, as has been observed by Viscount Simon, L.C., in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Johnston ....
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....e misreading of facts, serious errors of law on the face of the order, jurisdictional failure, and any other defects of like nature, the appellate court would be justified to intervene. The relevant observations read as under: - "72. Once we assume that the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to enquire into the alleged misconduct was exercised, was there any ground under Article 226 of the Constitution to demolish that holding? Every wrong order cannot be righted merely because it is wrong. It can be quashed only if it is vitiated by the fundamental flaws of gross miscarriage of Justice, absence of legal evidence, perverse misreading of facts, serious errors of law on the face of the order, jurisdictional failure and the like." (Emphasis supplied) 158. Deciding whether there was any proper and judicious exercise of discretion to condone the delay or not, is a slippery slope. Despite lengthy cautionary tales from this Court of judicial restraint in wantonly interfering with the subjective view of a court below, having been preached for time immemorial, it is plausible for an appellate court to falter in adhering to the same. 159. We are in complete agreement with the d....
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....sfied. 164. This would necessarily entail the appellate court to look into the material on record, the contents of the explanation that had swayed the mind of the court below. However, the extent to which the court sitting in appeal is to look into the same is confined to ascertaining whether the view taken by the court below is forthcoming and plausible or not. The observations "but if it appears to the appellate court that in exercising its discretion the trial court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts then it would certainly be open to the appellate court to interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion" made in Manjunath Anandappa (supra) bolster this view. Thus, the appellate court must see if the material on record inspires confidence for accepting the plea of "sufficient cause" and the explanation offered in that regard for the entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of filing. If the lower court had accepted the explanation capriciously or without proper legal material to support its decision, then the same may be interfered with. 165. However, we again at the cost of repetition, make it....
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....opinion on the exercise of discretion, once it is satisfied that the view of the court below in accepting the plea of sufficient cause was plausible. If it is found that in exercising the discretion to condone the delay, the court below had lost sight of a general rule or misdirected itself as to the applicability of the rule, then it will be deemed to have misdirected itself as to the law applicable to the case, and the appellate court will interfere and remit the case or itself exercise the discretion. 169. To sum up, the appellate court cannot embark upon an inquiry to enter a finding based on its likes or dislikes. The true test is to see, if it had been up to the appellate court, could the delay have been plausibly condoned for the same reason that was assigned by the court below, by looking into the material on record to see if the ingredients of Section 5 of the Limitation Act were fulfilled or not. If the ingredients of the provision is found to not have been fulfilled, the appellate court can and ought to interfere with the order of the court below. 170. However, if the aforesaid is answered in an affirmative, all that remains to be seen is that the discretion that w....
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....ntalities, where no one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously, would lead to grave miscarriage of public justice. Thus, it held that in such circumstances, the correct approach to be adopted is to be pragmatic and condone the delay without insisting upon explaining every day's delay. The relevant observations read as under: - "2. It is now settled law that when the delay was occasioned at the behest of the Government, it would be very difficult to explain the day-to-day delay. The transaction of the business of the Government was being done leisurely by officers who had no or evince no personal interest at different levels. No one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously. As a fact at several stages, they take their own time to reach a decision. Even in spite of pointing at the delay, they do not take expeditious action for ultimate decision in filing the appeal. This case is one of such instances. It is true that Section 5 of the Limitation Act envisages explanation of the delay to the satisfaction of the court and in matters of Limitation Act made no distinction between the State and the citizen. Nonetheles....
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....delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a d....
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....nd the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra [1987 Supp SCC 339] this Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law. 14. In G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer [(1988) 2 SCC 142] it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, s....
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...." should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would al....
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....cess of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process.' [ As observed in State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752, p. 760, para 15.]" (See also Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma [(1996) 10 SCC 634], State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC 132] .) 10. It is manifest that though Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 envisages the explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the court, and makes no distinction between the State and the citizen, nonetheless adoption of a strict standard of proof in case of the Government, which is dep....
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....would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. [...]" (Emphasis supplied) 178. What can be discerned from the aforesaid is that, the position of law, as it originally stood, was that there existed a marked difference in a case where the delay was attributable to a private litigant and a case where the delay was occasioned on part of the State or its instrumentalities. This distinction was founded on the impersonal character of public authorities, where no one public officer has any vested individual interest in diligently espousing the State's cause. This resultantly rendered the actions of the State and its instrumentalities qualitatively different from those of private individuals who are motivated to act in their own cause. 179. Unlike a private litigant, where the State or any of its instrumentalities happens to be the litigant in a lis, the decision to prefer an appeal or file an application is seldom the result of a singular will; rather, it emerges from a collective exercise involving procedural compliance, legal opinion, administrative authorisation and responsible officers bound ....
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...., as denial could prejudice public interest, frustrate legitimate claims, or impact the public exchequer. The jurisprudence therefore evolved to give primacy to public interest over procedural rigidity. 183. However, the aforesaid understanding was never intended to be accepted as an immutable proposition or treated as gospel truth. This is particularly evident from a catena of other decisions of this Court that were rendered around the same time. 184. Long before the decision of K.V. Ayisumma (supra) this Court in State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 had observed that irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private person, the provisions of law applicable are the same and as such same consideration that is shown by courts to a private party when he claims the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should also be adopted towards the State. The expression "sufficient cause" cannot be construed too liberally, merely because the party is the Government and the courts are not bound to accept readily whatever has been stated on behalf of the State to explain the delay. The relevant observations read as und....
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....sidered the same on merits and expressed an opinion, one way or the other. That, unfortunately, is lacking in this case." (Emphasis supplied) 185. Similarly in Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P. reported in 2011 SCC OnLine SC 403 this Court deprecated the High Court in condoning the delay in filing of the appeal therein, that was occasioned not by any unavoidable circumstance, but by the sheer inefficiency and ineptitude of the Government Pleaders concerned, merely because the party seeking condonation happened to be the State. In doing so, this Court observed that concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation, particularly in cases where the court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. The relevant observations read as under: - "26. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High Court proceeded to condone the delay. In our opinion, such a course was not open to the High Court, given the pathetic explanation offered by the respondents in the application seeking condonation of delay. This is especially so in view of the remarks made by the....
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....e purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, should be understood in its proper context and true spirit. 187. This Court in Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra) explicitly held that the State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be put on the same footing as a private party for the purposes of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It observed that an individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants, bound by bureaucratic methodology. Thus, it held that although equality before law is sacrosanct, equality does not mandate a refusal to recognise institutional realities. 188. However, what is equally significant to note is that the aforesaid observations of this Court in Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra) were accompanied by a clear message to the State and all its instrumentalities, that a leisurely and lethargic approach cannot continue for all times to come. It had urged the State and all public authorities to constitute legal cells to examine t....
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.... that filing of appeals or application as the case may be, is undertaken expeditiously, and the officer responsible for pursuing such action is made personally liable for lapses, if any. ii. Shift in jurisprudence on Condonation of Delay after the decision of Postmaster General. 192. However, despite the aforementioned exhortations of this Court in Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra), the same largely remained unheeded as the State and its instrumentalities continued to approach the courts after significant delays under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as though it were a license for indolence and institutional lethargy. 193. It was in this backdrop, particularly, the persistent disregard to the laws of limitation by the States and its instrumentalities that compelled this Court in Postmaster General (supra) to deviate from the earlier practice of extending unwarranted leniency governmental agencies, and to emphasise that the law of limitation binds the State no less than the ordinary litigant. The said decision is in three parts: - (i) First, This Court held that claims of the Government and its functionaries being an impersonal machinery and inherited with ....
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.... (Emphasis supplied) (iii) Lastly, as regards the earlier line of thought that if meritorious causes advanced by the State or any of its instrumentalities are dismissed on the ground of delay, the resultant hardship would ultimately fall upon the public exchequer and thereby the public at large, was emphatically rejected by this Court. It held that condonation of delay is a matter of exception and cannot be treated as an anticipated privilege accruing to governmental bodies by reason of their hierarchical structure or bureaucratic methodology. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Thus, the plea of public interest cannot by any stretch be used as a carte blanche for official inaction. It observed that Government departments, far from being entitled to presumptive indulgence, are in fact under a higher obligation to discharge their functions with diligence, vigilance, and scrupulous regard to limitation. The relevant observations read as under: - "29. [...] The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation ....
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....enging the said order the respondent State after about one year filed another objection on 15-9-2011 under Section 47 of the Code which was finally rejected by the executing court. It was only after a writ of attachment was issued by the executing court that the respondent preferred a civil revision against the first order dated 17-8-2010 along with a petition for condonation of delay. Curiously enough in the application for condonation of delay no sufficient cause has been shown which would entitle the respondent to get a favourable order for condonation of delay. True it is, that courts should always take liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay, particularly when the appellant is the State but in a case where there are serious laches and negligence on the part of the State in challenging the decree passed in the suit and affirmed in appeal, the State cannot be allowed to wait to file objection under Section 47 till the decree-holder puts the decree in execution. As noticed above, the decree passed in the year 1967 was in respect of declaration of title and permanent injunction restraining the respondent State from interfering with the possession of the suit propert....
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....s/petitions have to be filed as per the statutes prescribed. 3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [LAO v. Katiji]. This position is more than elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [...] 4. A reading of the aforesaid application shows that the reason for such an inordinate delay is stated to be only "due to unavailability of the documents and the process of arranging the documents". In para 4, a reference has been made to "bureaucratic process works, it is inadvertent that delay occurs". xxx xxx xxx 6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorised earlier as "certificate cases". The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of ....
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....t through the decisions cited supra the position is clear that, by and large, a liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay. The consideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the status of the party, namely, the Government or the public bodies so as to apply a different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to render even-handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating "sufficient cause" to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the courts based on the fact situation. In Katiji [LAO v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107] the entire conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept in focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight of is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay in a case wher....
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....eral (supra). It observed that no case under Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be said to be made out where there is no reason or excuse given in respect of the period for which condonation is sought. The relevant observations read as under: - "3. A reading of the aforesaid shows that there is no reason much less sufficient and cogent reason assigned to explain the delay and the application has also been preferred in a very casual manner. We may notice that there are number of orders of this State Government alone which we have come across where repeatedly matters are being filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed. We have been repeatedly discouraging such endeavours where the Governments seem to think that they can walk in to the Supreme Court any time they feel without any reference to the period of limitation, as if the statutory Law of Limitation does not exist for them. 4. There is no doubt that these are cases including the present one where the Government machinery has acted in an inefficient manner or it is a deliberate endeavour. In either of the two situations, this Court ought not to come to the rescue of the petitioner. No doubt, some leewa....
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....he leeway which was at one point extended to the Government/public authorities on account of innate functional inefficiencies is no more the norm, particularly in the wake of the decision of Postmaster General (supra). The relevant observations read as under: - "3. We have repeatedly discouraged State Governments and public authorities in adopting an approach that they can walk in to the Supreme Court as and when they please ignoring the period of limitation prescribed by the statutes, as if the Limitation statute does not apply to them. In this behalf, suffice to refer to our judgments in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 84] and State of Odisha v. Sunanda Mahakuda [State of Odisha v. Sunanda Mahakuda, (2021) 11 SCC 560 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 300 : (2022) 2 SCC (L&S) 393] . The leeway which was given to the Government/public authorities on account of innate inefficiencies was the result of certain orders of this Court which came at a time when technology had not advanced and thus, greater indulgence was shown. This position is no more prevalent and the current legal ....
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.... as under: - "25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. xxx xxx xxx 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. xxx xxx xxx ....
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....ng aside the impugned order and condoning the delay in filing of the appeal, held that interest of justice would be better served, if the delay is condoned and the matter is allowed to be heard on merits, as otherwise it would be the public interest which would likely suffer if the State is non-suited on the ground of delay. We have gone through the decision multiple times. Nowhere has this Court in Koting Lamkang (supra) referred to or taken note of the change in position of law by the decision of Postmaster General (supra). Thus, in our considered opinion, this decision falls smack of and is in teeth of the ratio laid in Postmaster General (supra) that has been consistently followed. 206. In Inder Singh (supra) there was a delay of 1537-days in filing of the Second Appeal by the respondent state therein. While the First Appellate Court refused to condone the delay for want of sufficient cause, the High Court on the other hand, condoned the delay. In appeal, this Court whilst affirming the condonation of delay by the High Court observed that the respondent state therein had demonstrated "sufficient cause" for the delay by virtue of having pursed a Review Petition, which itself ....
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.... discretionary order of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation would be the question. Law is fairly well-settled that "a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below". If any authority is required, we can profitably refer to the decision in Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa, which in turn relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha where it has been held that: "an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong"." 34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated 21-12- 2011. It was rendered at a point of time when the decisions in Katiji, Ramegowda, Chandra Mani, K.V. Ayisumma and Lipok AO were holding the field. It is not that the said decisions do not hold the field now, having been overruled by any subsequent decision. Although there have been some decisions in the recent past [State of....
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....onation. The relevant observations read as under: - "8. It is correct that condonation of delay cannot be a matter of course; it is also correct that in seeking such condonation the State cannot claim any preferential or special treatment. However, in a situation where there has been no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides this Court has always taken a broad and liberal view so as to advance substantial justice instead of terminating a proceeding on a technical ground like limitation. Unless the explanation furnished for the delay is wholly unacceptable or if no explanation whatsoever is offered or if the delay is inordinate and third-party rights had become embedded during the interregnum the courts should lean in favour of condonation. Our observations in Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. and Amalendu Kumar Bera v. State of W.B. do not strike any discordant note and have to be understood in the context of facts of the respective cases." (Emphasis supplied) 210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly where the State or any of i....
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....ariably accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. 214. What has been conveyed in so many words, by the decision of Postmaster General (supra) is that while excuses premised solely on bureaucratic lethargy cannot, by themselves, constitute sufficient cause, there may nonetheless be circumstances where the explanation offered, though involving bureaucratic procedures, reflects a genuine and bona fide cause for the delay. In such instances, the true test is whether the explanation demonstrates that the State acted with reasonable diligence and whether the delay occurred despite efforts to act within time. Where such bona fides are established, the Court retains the discretion to condone the delay. 215. In other words, Postmaster General (supra) does not shut the door on condonation of delay by the State in all cases involving bureaucratic processes. The real distinction lies between a case where delay is the result of gross negligence, inaction, ....
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....sm, must be one of circumspection and reluctance. The courts ought to loathe in accepting such explanations as "sufficient cause". They should apply their minds carefully, be slow in condoning delays on such reasons, and exceptional instances, where the explanation is found to be genuine, reflective of reasonable vigilance and promptitude in conduct, and free from gross negligence, deliberate inaction, lack of bona fides, or casual indifference, should such an explanation be accepted. iv. Whether exercise of discretion in view of the earlier position of law may be interfered with? 220. Before we close this issue, we may address ourselves on one contention, vociferously canvassed on behalf of the respondents herein. It was submitted that since, in the present case the discretion to condone the delay was exercised by the High Court in 2017, and prior to the decisions of Bherulal (supra) and University of Delhi (supra), the High Court cannot be faulted with accepting the explanation offered by the respondents, tune with the decisions earlier occupying the field. Accordingly, it was urged that the exercise of discretion by the High Court must be tested on the anvil of the decisio....
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....e delay, which involves, first, looking into the existence of a "sufficient cause" and secondly, into the exercise of discretion itself, where the first test is satisfied. This threshold test, involves ascertaining whether the order passed by the court below is not vitiated due to any material irregularity, want of evidence, extraneous considerations, failure to take into consideration any relevant fact, or being contrary to the law of the land (emphasis). 225. Where, however, the law, during the pendency of the appeal, has undergone a shift, there the court sitting in appeal, would not only be bound by the change in position of law, but would be well empowered to interfere with the lower courts decision, on that ground alone, notwithstanding the fact, that when the original decision was rendered, that was not the position of law. If any authority is required, in this regard, one may profitably refer to the decision of this Court in Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Raj Kumar Arora & Ors. reported in [2025 INSC 498] wherein one of us (J.B. Pardiwala J.) held that a decision of the court which either overrules or results in a change in position of law, generally operates ret....
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....lowing limitation periods to lapse. 229. Public interest is best served by ensuring efficiency and diligence in governmental functioning, rather than by condoning its lapses as a matter of course. Thus, a liberal inclination towards the State or any of its instrumentalities, in matters of condonation of delay, cannot be adopted, merely on the presumption that, if the delay is not condoned, public interest runs the risk of suffering, by a meritorious matter being thrown out. Public interest lies not in condoning governmental indifference, but in compelling efficiency, responsibility, and timely action. 230. To permit condonation of delay to become a matter of course for the Government would have the deleterious effect of institutionalising inefficiency. It would, in substance, incentivise indolence and foster a culture where accountability for delay is eroded. If the State is assured that its lapses will invariably be excused under the rubric of "public interest," there would remain little incentive for its officers to act with vigilance or for its instrumentalities to streamline procedures for timely action. The consequence would not be the advancement of public interest but ....
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....sult flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. Even if the statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party the court has no choice but to give full effect to the same. It is based on the legal maxim dura lex sed lex i.e., "the law is hard but it is the law". The relevant observations read as under: - "12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. 'A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.' The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consiste....
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....ed. She further submitted that the delay was on account of the deliberate negligence on the part of the officers, and in such circumstances the interest of respondent no. 1, as an instrumentality of State, must not be put to a disadvantage. She further brought to the notice of this Court that the respondent no. 1 had already taken disciplinary action against the erring delinquent officials. 238. The learned Senior Counsel also contended that the suit filed by the appellant was one for possession, however, the First Appellate Court proceeded to erroneously grant the relief of compensation, aggrieved by which the respondent no. 1 had to prefer second appeal before the High Court. She submitted that the persons who were found to be in unlawful possession of the suit property had nothing to do with the respondent no. 1, and that it would be very harsh to recover such compensation from the respondent no. 1, which functions on public exchequer. 239. Indisputably, there was a gross and inordinate delay of almost 11-years in filing the second appeal. The respondent no. 1 maintains that the delay was on account of five erring officials, including an Executive Engineer who was designat....
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....me to himself. This is more apparent from the fact that the disciplinary proceedings against the concerned Executive Engineer allegedly responsible for the delay was initiated only on 10.03.2017, while the application for condonation of delay was filed exactly a month before i.e., on 10.02.2017. It appears to us that the respondent no. 1 took such coercive actions only to ingratiate itself before the High Court to demonstrate its bona fides and butter its cries of vigilance. 243. It was urged by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents herein that the deliberate inaction or mala fides on the part of the officials cannot be imputed to the State or its instrumentalities, since the Government cannot carry on business upon principle of distrust. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in G. Ramegowda, Major (supra). 244. In G. Ramegowda, Major (supra) this Court observed that due to the impersonal nature of the Government, it would be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Thus, where a government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered ow....
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.... finality without an examination of their merits. The High Court noticed that the Government Pleader who was in office till December 15, 1970 had applied for certified copies on July 20, 1970, but the application was allowed to be dismissed for default. In one case, however, he appears to have taken away the certified copy even after he ceased to be a Government Pleader." (Emphasis supplied) 245. As already discussed in the earlier parts of this judgment, State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. G. Ramegowda, Major (supra) itself acknowledges that, ordinarily there is "no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel or agents". Even if "there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal". The relevant observations read as under: - "14. The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements....
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....spirit of equality before law as guaranteed under our Constitution. Allowing such latitude would further distort incentives for the Government and encourage more laxity by the bureaucracy in its general functioning, thereby undermining quality governance." (Emphasis supplied) 249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration. 250. As far back as 1996, this Court in Chandra Mani (supra) held that where the case requires an appeal or application to be filed, despite the delay, then prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Thus, even if for a moment, we accept that, mala-fide actions of few off....
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....tained by us, it would allow the State-machineries a leeway to systematically orchestrate delays in the guise of laxity exhibited by their authorities. Given the majesty and colossality a State-machinery would hold against a private litigant, it would be grossly unfair to a litigant, who would be perpetually entangled in the clutches of litigation, if enormous delays, like that of almost 11 years in the present case, are permitted to be condoned. This Court has never turned a blind eye to the gradients of substantive justice. 255. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 11-years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started in 1989. We are in 2025. Almost 36 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. The High Court has made a mockery of justice by condoning this delay of 3966 days and once again ....
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....is being adopted in what we have categorised earlier as "certificate cases". The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the officer concerned responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straightaway the counsel appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation. 7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal a....
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....of the fact that the precedents and authorities it relied upon by it had delays of two-digits, or even that of single-digit, more particularly the delay in those cases was supported by sufficient cause. The present case, however, stands on a very different footing, owing to such an enormous delay. Hence, we are not inclined to accept the condonation of the delay by the High Court. V. CONCLUSION 261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who al....