TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (12) TMI 821
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....counsel for the applicant/appellant would submit that the delay occurred as the appellant was indisposed and on recuperation, he promptly filed the appeal. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent, referring to the provisions of Section 42 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 [PMLA] would submit the appeal should be filed within 60 days from the date of communication of the order and the said period, on showing sufficient cause, is extendable for a further period not exceeding 60 days. As the appellant failed to file the appeal within the stipulated period and no sufficient cause is shown, the delay in filing cannot be condoned. 4. Before adverting to the merits of the submissions made on either side, it is ....
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....ented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the initial period of sixty days, may allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. It is, thus, clear that an appeal has to be filed within sixty days and, on showing sufficient cause, the High Court can condone the delay up to a further period not exceeding sixty days. The usage of the words "not exceeding sixty days" in the aforesaid proviso, enjoins the High Court from entertaining an appeal filed beyond 120 days. 6. Apropos of the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the provisions of PMLA, it is becoming to refer to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as under: "29. Savings.- (1) *** ....
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....f the Limitation Act, 1963. 9. At this juncture, it is propitious to refer to a Supreme Court decision in the case of Ketan V. Parekh v. Special Director, Directorate of Enforcement and another (2011) 15 SCC 30, wherein, while interpreting Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, which also uses the words "not exceeding sixty days" and is akin to Section 42 of the PMLA, it has been held as under: "17. The question whether the High Court can entertain an appeal under Section 35 of the Act beyond 120 days does not require much debate and has to be answered against the Appellants in view of the law laid down in Union of India v. Popular Construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470; Singh Enterprises v. CCE, (2008) 3 SCC 7....
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.... 32. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory." [emphasis supplied] 11. It needs to be emphasised that while interpreting the period of l....