Section 5 inapplicable: no condonation beyond 120 days for PMLA appeals u/s 42, Section 29(2)

The HC, interpreting Section 42 of PMLA read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is inapplicable to appeals under PMLA beyond the statutorily prescribed outer limit of 120 days. The proviso to Section 42, by allowing filing only "within a further period not exceeding sixty days," was construed as expressly excluding any further enlargement of time. Relying on analogous statutory schemes with similar "but not thereafter" formulations, the HC ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to condone a 116-day delay beyond the prescribed period and dismissed the condonation application.

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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1.1 Whether an appeal under Section 42 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 can be entertained and delay condoned beyond the outer limit of 120 days prescribed therein.

1.2 Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to condone delay in filing an appeal under Section 42 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 beyond the period specified in that provision.

1.3 Consequential relief regarding return of the original order-in-original to enable the appellant to pursue other remedies, if any.

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2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1 & 2: Condonation of delay and applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Section 42 PMLA

Legal framework

2.1 Section 42 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 provides that an appeal to the High Court must be filed within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, and the proviso authorises the High Court, on being satisfied of "sufficient cause", to allow it to be filed "within a further period not exceeding sixty days".

2.2 Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 stipulates that where a special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from that in the Schedule, Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

2.3 The Court considered Supreme Court precedents interpreting similarly worded limitation provisions containing expressions such as "not exceeding" or "but not thereafter", including decisions under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, the Electricity Act, 2003, and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked beyond the maximum condonable period prescribed.

Interpretation and reasoning

2.4 From the text of Section 42 PMLA, the Court held that the scheme of limitation is two-fold: (i) an initial period of sixty days for filing the appeal, and (ii) an additional, condonable period "not exceeding sixty days" upon showing sufficient cause.

2.5 The expression "not exceeding sixty days" in the proviso to Section 42 was construed as prescribing an outer limit of 120 days (60 + 60) for institution of an appeal, beyond which the High Court is statutorily precluded from entertaining an appeal.

2.6 Reading Section 42 of PMLA with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the Court held that the specific language of the proviso to Section 42-especially the phrase "not exceeding sixty days"-constitutes an express exclusion of the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act beyond the said outer limit.

2.7 Reliance was placed on the decision under Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, which uses similar wording and in which it was held that the High Court cannot entertain an appeal beyond 120 days; and on the decision under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003, where the Supreme Court held that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days and that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked beyond that period.

2.8 The Court further noted that in relation to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Supreme Court has held that the words "but not thereafter" exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, reinforcing the principle that where the statute uses restrictive expressions, the power to condone delay is confined to the period expressly specified and no further.

2.9 On this settled legal position, the Court held that it had no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the maximum condonable period of sixty days in addition to the initial sixty days, and that any delay beyond 120 days under Section 42 PMLA is statutorily non-condonable, irrespective of the cause shown.

Conclusions

2.10 The Court concluded that an appeal under Section 42 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 must be filed within an absolute outer limit of 120 days from the date of communication of the order of the Appellate Tribunal.

2.11 Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked to condone delay beyond this outer limit, as the expression "not exceeding sixty days" in the proviso to Section 42 PMLA expressly excludes such extension.

2.12 As the delay in filing the appeal was 116 days (i.e., beyond the initial 60 days and exceeding the maximum condonable period of a further 60 days), the Court held that the delay was not condonable in law and dismissed the application for condonation of delay, resulting in rejection of the appeal at the stage of scrutiny.

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Issue 3: Return of original order-in-original

Interpretation and reasoning

3.1 After dismissal of the application for condonation of delay, a request was made for return of the original order-in-original to enable the appellant to pursue any other remedies available under law.

Conclusions

3.2 The Court permitted the prayer and directed that the original order-in-original be returned to the counsel for the appellant, after retaining a photocopy on record.

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