1990 (7) TMI 117

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....ation that the levy of central excise was without the authority of law. The levy was made by an order dated 4-3-1975 and despatched to the plaintiff on 22-3-1975. In essence, the controversies centred round the inclusion of the cost of paper covering in the rectangular aluminium strips. The assessing authority in the order Extn. 81 took the view that duty was leviable only under Item 27(b). According to the appellant, duty was imposable only under Item No. 68 relating to rectangular aluminium conductors. 3. The levy was complained against in an appeal, filed belatedly on 10-1-1976. The appeal was rejected as barred by time. A revision suffered the same fate by order dated 19-3-1977 served on the plaintiff on 30-4-1977. 4. Soon thereaf....

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.... defendants contended that demand had been made even earlier on 15-5-76 by the service of Ext. 85 order. According to the court below, the notice Ext. A7 dated 25-5-77 had in turn referred to the earlier order Ext. B5. That was issued on 15-5-1976. 9. The court below took the view that the cause of action should be reckoned from the date of demand Ext. B5 on 15-5-1976. The plaintiff could not pick and choose a date on which the right to sue had accrued. It applied Article 113 of the Limitation Act and non-suited the plaintiff. It is now clear that in the relevant Article applicable to a suit of this nature is Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. That article reads as follows: Description of suit Period of limitation  Tim....

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....s is the date when that right was first denied or the trespass took place :....." It is difficult to assume that Ext. B5 would not furnish a cause of action. That order had all the power and potency to invade the plaintiff's rights. Such an invasion can be treated as the sine qua non of cause of action. Doubtless a cause of action arose on that date in that view of the matter. May be, in the scheme of a taming statute like the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, further demands or reminders might arise, if there had been modification of the order by the superior statutory authorities, or if there be non-payment after the original demand. Assuming that causes of action would arise on such occasions of renewed or further demands, that will....