Limitation for declaratory suits runs from first accrual of the right to sue; later demand proceedings do not extend time.

Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 requires a declaratory suit to be filed within three years from the date the right to sue first accrues. An initial excise demand that immediately affected the plaintiff's rights constituted the complete cause of action, so limitation began then and was not postponed by a later reminder or revisional step. The doctrine of merger did not apply because the appeal against the original demand was not entertained and was dismissed as time-barred, particularly where the scheme then provided no power to condone delay.

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Issues: Whether the suit for declaration challenging the excise demand was barred by limitation, and whether limitation could be postponed to the later revisional or demand stage when the original demand had already been issued and the appeal against it was dismissed as time-barred.

Analysis: Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 governs a suit for declaration and requires the suit to be filed within three years from the time when the right to sue first accrues. The expression is materially different from the earlier formulation only to the extent that it fixes limitation to the first accrual of the cause of action. The initial demand order itself invaded the plaintiff's rights and therefore furnished a complete cause of action. A later demand or reminder did not erase that first accrual. The doctrine of merger applies only where the original order is carried into a valid appellate or revisional order; it has no application where the appeal itself is not entertained as time-barred, especially when the statutory scheme then contained no power to condone delay.

Conclusion: The suit was barred by limitation because the right to sue first accrued on the initial demand order, and the later proceedings did not postpone the starting point of limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: For a declaratory suit, limitation begins when the right to sue first accrues; an initial adverse demand gives rise to the cause of action, and the doctrine of merger does not apply where the appeal is rejected as time-barred.

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