TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1953 (5) TMI 35
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....egislative Assembly dated the 30th March 1953 is void on the ground of inconsistency with the provisions of part III of the Constitution, (b) to call for the records of the U.P. Legislative Assembly proceedings dated the 30th March 1953, the proceedings of the privileges Committee dated the 7th, 17th, 25th and the 26th March 1953 and quash the resolution dated the 30th March 1953, (c) to issue a suitable order, writ or direction asking the opposite parties to expunge the above-mentioned resolution of the said Assembly dated the 30th March 1953 from the proceedings of the U.P. Legislative Assembly and (d) to order the payment of costs to the petitioner. 2. I should have been disposed to reject this application on the simple ground that it is not competent to this Court, for reasons to be indicated hereafter, to grant the reliefs asked for, had it not been for the fact that the learned Advocate-General has made it clear that the opposite-parties do not wish to take their stand on the technical ground that the reliefs are not properly framed. Repeatedly this Court has emphasised that a party seeking relief under Article 226 of the Constitution should precisely state what writ, orde....
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....impleads the Speaker and confuses him with the legislature. It is well known that no writ, direction or order restraining the Speaker from allowing a particular question to be discussed or interfering with the legislative processes of either house of the legislature or interfering with the freedom of discussion or expression of opinion in either house can be entertained. On this part of the case, I may quote Article 285 of Mr. Perris's Extraordinary Legal Remedies. It runs as follows: "Under the common law mandamus Is issued in the King's name to inferior Courts, officers, corporations or persons. Being in the King's name, it did not run to himself; 'nor did it run to Parliament', nor to the judiciary, except to such inferior Courts as the higher Courts had the power to review. Under our system of Government the executive power answers to that of the King, the legislative power takes the place of parliament, and the judicial power is vested in Courts established in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Where the force and effect of the common-law writ of mandamus, and its objects and purposes are unchanged, it follows that the writ never i....
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....ication under Article 226 not only to see out in numbered paragraphs the grounds upon which the Court is asked to issue a direction, order or writ but also to specify in the prayer clearly, so far as circumstances permit, the exact nature of the relief sought. Undoubtedly, the prayer for relief in this case has not been framed with due regard to the considerations to which attention has been drawn above. While inviting our attention to the defects in the prayer for relief, the learned Advocate General, however, stated that he did not want a decision on technical grounds alone as not only a question of the status and the dignity of the Speaker but also that of the legislature was involved. While we would have been justified in dismissing this application on the simple ground that the reliefs asked for were neither precisely nor intelligibly stated, I think that having regard to the importance of the case and the issue that it raises and the further fact that the procedure in regard to writ applications is not very well understood, even after the framing of the new High Court Rules, it is not desirable to rest our decision on technical grounds alone. With these preliminary observa....
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....Raj Narain Singh was allowed by the Speaker to make a short statement about the matter & to ask for leave of the House to move his adjournment motion. The applicant thereafter rose in his seat and after a short statement asked for the leave of the House. Objection to leave being granted was taken by the Minister for Home Affairs, Shri Sampurnanand. On that being done, the Speaker asked the members who were prepared to support the motion to rise in their places so that he might be able to find out if the requisite number of thirty-six members was there to support the motion for leave. At that stage there was an intervention by another member, Shri Narain Dutt Tiwari. He requested the Speaker to give his consent under Rule 221 to enable him to move the suspension of Rule 71 (3). Rule 71 (3) requires that at least one-twelfth of the total number of the House, i.e., 36 members must rise in support of the motion for leave before such a motion can be considered if objection is taken by any member to its being taken up. The Speaker was not prepared to allow a consideration of the question of suspension of the rule under Rule 221 as it was a day fixed for the voting of the demands. An assu....
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....bias to the chair. 6. After Shri Raj Narain Singh and Shri Ram Narain Tripathi had been removed from the House, the Speaker drew the attention of the House to the intransigent attitude that they had adopted and observed that, in his opinion, their conduct constituted a breach of the privileges of the House. He did not think that the incident should be ignored. He referred the matter to the Committee of Privileges and suggested that the Committee should examine and Investigate and report on the conduct of the members against whom action had been taken in the interests of order. The privileges Committee met on the 7th, 17th, 24th and 26th March 1953 and submitted its report. On the 17th March the applicant was called upon by it to state whether he was guilty of a breach of privilege of the House. He denied that he had been guilty of any breach. It may be added that according to the applicant it turned down his request to be represented by Counsel. It may also be mentioned that according to the applicant no charges were supplied to him even on his asking for them. The committee was not, however, unanimous in regard to the recommendation for action to be taken against the intransige....
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.... of Parliament cannot be inquired into a Court of law. On this point all the Judges in the two great cases which exhaust the learning on the subject -- 'Burdett v. Abbott' (1811) 14 East 1 (C) and -- 'Stockdale v. Hansard' (1839) 9 Ad and E 1 (D) -- are agreed, and are emphatic. The Jurisdiction of the Houses over their own members, their right to Impose discipline within their walls, is absolute and exclusive. To use the words of Lord Ellen-borough, 'They would sink into utter contempt and inefficiency without it. (1811) 14 East 1 at p. 152' (C)." The facts which have been narrated by me are based upon the affidavits and have not been taken from the proceedings, but I have considered it necessary to state them as fully as I could as they are essential for an understanding of the points and issues which have been raised and the arguments which have been advanced in this case. I am well aware of the observations of Sir Maurice Gwyer, C. J. in --'in the matter of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor ispirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, regarding the relevance for historical purposes, in constitutional cases of parliamentary paper such as....
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....dual members as against the prerogatives of the Crown, the authority of the ordinary Courts of law and the special rights of the House of Lords." Though the Houses have never expressly given up the claim that they and they alone can interpret and determine the extent and limits of their privileges, the position that the Courts have taken consistently is that it is for each House, unless Parliament decrees otherwise by law to determine the limits of the privileges of each House, while allowing each of them within those limits exclusive jurisdiction. The reasons for the importance attaching to privileges of Parliament are not far to seek. In order that a free competition of ideas in regard to the various matters the legislature has to deal with, including a ventilation of grievances through examination of legislative proposals or a reasonable scrutiny of administrative acts, might be effectively possible it is vitally necessary that not only should a member of the legislature not have the fear that he can be penalised for anything that is said or done within the four walls of the legislature, but also that each House should itself have complete control over its proceedings and int....
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.... elsewhere. 11. It must be borne in mind that each House exercises its own privileges without any reference to or dependence on the other. This enjoyment is due, as May points out, at page ...... not to any separate right peculiar to each but solely by virtue of the law and custom of Parliament. Thus both Houses possess privileges, though they are not exactly similar in nature. They are declared, explained and interpreted by each House; their violations or breaches are adjudged and censured by each; but still it is the law of Parliament that is thus administered. While, to repeat what has been said already, neither House has ever expressly renounced the claim not only to be the judge of the breach of its own privileges but of their very existence or limits, the courts have nevertheless consistently taken the view that neither House of Parliament has power by any vote, resolution or declaration to create for themselves new privileges not justified by the known laws and customs of Parliament. Reference may be made here to Article 9 of the Bill of Rights (1688) which confirmed the long standing claim of each House of Parliament to exclude all outside interference within its four....
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....ew privilege cannot in some extreme cases be declared at the instance of a party affected by it to be of no effect. But the position is inescapable, to use the language or Lord Coleridge, C. J., in (1884) 12 QBD 271 (B)', that: "if the House of Commons is,--as for certain purposes and in relation to certain persons it certainly is, and is on all hands admitted to be,--the absolute judge of its own privileges, it is obvious that it can, at least for those purposes and in relation to those persons, practically change or practically supersede the law." 12. I have considered it desirable to state the law relating to privileges before grappling with the questions which this case raises as I think that much of the argument in this case on behalf of the applicant is based upon the assumption that an erroneous decision by Mr. Speaker or the House in respect of a breach of privilege can be the subject-matter of scrutiny by a Court of law. There is nothing startling in the proposition that finality attaches where under cover of it no new privilege is created by the House to a decision of the House in respect of a matter relating to its privileges. On this part of the case, I ....
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....has jurisdiction to interfere with the management in the refreshment Department of the House as mat was a matter which fell within the internal affairs of the House. 'Bradlaugh's case (B)' was, as is well-known, of a duly elected member entitled to take the oath by law prescribed to be taken by the members of the House of Commons being refused to do so by the Speaker who directed the serjeant at arms to exclude him by actual force from the House until he should engage not further to disturb its proceedings. These cases forcibly illustrate the complete degree of internal autonomy which the House of Commons enjoys in a matter relating to its internal affairs. On this part of the case, see Holdworth's History of English Law, Vol. 10, pp. 539-550; Anson's Law and Custom of the Constitution. Vol. 4 (Parliament pages 151-178 also Vol. 6, pp. 268-273 of the Constitution; Keir and Lawson's cases on constitutional law, p. 72.) 13. On the question whether it was wise and statesmanlike to pursue the matter after Shri Raj Narain Singh had been ejected from the House it would be improper for me to express any opinion. Obviously, this Court is not, in any sense whateve....
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....ference to the Committee of Privileges was wrong and consequently the resolution based thereon was also void in so far as it affects the applicant. 14. I have endeavoured to state what the present position in regard to the law relating to privileges of the British House of Commons is as Article 194 declares that the Privileges of each House of the State Legislature and the members thereof shall be, save in respect of matters specified in Clauses 1 and 2 of Article 194, the same as those enjoyed by the British House of Commons and its members. The broad facts on which the learned argument advanced to this Court by Shri Iqbal Ahmad is based have been stated by me in an earlier part of this judgment. What he contends is that under the procedure as it obtains in the British House of Commons under Standing Orders 21 to 24, the Speaker has been invested, with the power to direct a member whose conduct is disorderly in the House, to withdraw from the House and such withdrawal has the effect of suspending him for the rest of the day's sitting. Where, however, a member is guilty of a disorderly behaviour for a second time, or where the speaker thinks it desirable that a more sever....
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.... the Speaker with authority to deal with cases of disorderly behaviour. It is unnecessary to quote it but I would say that clearly the Speaker has under Clause (c) of those rules, the power to carry out his order at any stage of the proceedings. Undeniably the Speaker has been invested with the power under Rule 67 to refer any matter he chooses to the Committee of Privileges. The learned Advocate General has sought to justify the departure from British practice on the ground of its suitability to the peculiar requirements of working parliamentary institutions in a Country which is new to them. On the question whether that reason is a good one or not, it would be improper for me to express any opinion for obviously the matter is capable of being looked at from different angles. There is the point of view that Oppositions are weak in our Legislatures, and that the tendency to associate every person in authority in any capacity with the Government of the day is still wrong. It may well be that naming a member, i.e., submitting him to the judgment of the House at the very time the incident occurs has the merit of not bringing the Speaker into the area of controversy. These are consi....
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....ker or the State legislature. The complaints which Sir Iqbal Ahmad has brought before us, whether justified or not, are of a procedural character. I am unable to agree with the view that the resolution of the House goes beyond a matter of procedure and on this point again I would invite attention to the observations of Stephen J. at p. 285: -- '(1884) 12 QBD 271 (B)'. While there is no doubt that the right of a member to continue to represent his constituency in Parliament gets affected by his suspension for whatever period, yet even on that assumption there is no legal remedy open to a member if his rights get affected by something done within the walls of the legislature. Apart from the cases to which reference has been made, Article 212(2) of the Constitution is decisive on this point. Article 212 is in the following terms: "212, (1) The validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. (2) No officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or....
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....le jeopardy' and purely criminal actions only. I shall deal with each of these points seriatim. 19. I shall first proceed to consider whether Article 194(3) is subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and, if so, whether Article 20(2) governs it. To appreciate this point, it is desirable to reproduce Article 194. "(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of the Legislature, there shall be freedom of speech in the Legislature of every State. (2) No member of the Legislature of a State shall be liable to any proceedings in any Court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in the Legislature or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of a House of such a Legislature of any report, paper, votes or proceedings. "(3) In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of a House of the Legislature of a State, and of the members and the Committees of a House of such Legislature, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by the Legislature by law, and until so defined, shall be those....
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....y between different parts of the Constitution. 22. While it may be admitted that in the case of an ambiguity or inconsistency between different parts of the Constitution, Courts should look into all parts of the Constitution and harmonize them to the utmost extent possible, I do not think that we would be justified in going so far as to say on the basis of speculation that words like 'subject to the provisions of the Constitution' have been used. only where a matter dealt with by an article is also the subject-matter of some other article. It strikes me that whenever the founding fathers intended that a provision of the Constitution, whether it be described as Fundamental or not, should govern it they said so. Incidentally it may be pointed out that the Fundamental rights conceded by our Constitution have not been conceived, of as 'natural, sacred and inalienable' rights which may not be changed at all like the Law of the Medes and Persians, but as rights which can be changed in the exercise of the constituent powers conceded to Parliament by a procedure which is less rigid than that reserved for an amendment of certain other parts of the Constitution. In any ....
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....he Constitution' if the article was not to be subject to the Constitution. 23. Sir Iqbal Ahmad contends that the view that Article 194(3) is not subject to the Constitution is bound to lead to the anomalous position that as long as the Houses do not define their privileges by a law enacted by themselves, their privileges, being the same as those of the British Parliament, will not be subject to the operation of either Article 20(2) or to any other provision of the Constitution, while a law passed relating to them shall be subject to the provisions of the Constitution and thus liable to be declared void, under Article 13(2), on the ground of inconsistency with it. Sir Iqbal Ahmad contends that it could hardly have been the intention of the founding fathers that during the interim period when privileges have not been defined by the statute itself, privileges should not be subject to the Constitution. Now, it strikes me that in declaring that the privileges etc. of the State legislature shall be the same as those of the British Parliament, until so otherwise determined by legislation, the founding fathers followed the precedents created for them by the framers of both the Briti....
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....ut that the State legislatures have not been conceded the right to provide for the due composition of its own body as that is a right which has been specifically and separately dealt with in Part XV, Articles 324 and 329 of the Constitution, the powers of superintendence, direction and control of elections having been vested in an Election Commission. Freedom of speech is the subject-matter of a separate article viz., Article 19(a) of the Constitution. The right to prohibit publication of its proceedings is dealt with under Sub-article (2) of Article 194. It is further contended that some of the privileges of the House of Commons can have no meaning with reference to the Indian Constitution, our being a republican one. There are others again which have either become obsolete or meaningless in Britain or which Parliament has given up itself. For example, it is pointed out that the right to provide for the due composition of its own body has been modified by Parliamentary enactments in Britain which give authority to Courts of law to adjudicate on disputed questions of law. In our own Constitution Articles 324 and 329 deal with election matters. Now, on this basis it is urged that....
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.... the privileges to be the same as those of the British Parliament subject to fundamental rights. This would nullify the fundamental rights granted to the legislature and its members specially treated qua their parliamentary capacity. The article deals with privileges of the Houses and its members; they have been put on a special footing. The entire purpose will be nullified or defeated if the privileges which have been defined to be those of the House of Commons were made subject to fundamental rights. Fundamental rights cannot govern, except of course where it is specifically or by implication intended that they should, various parts of the Constitution. The frame of Article 194, remembering the rules of grammatical construction, cannot be ignored. The omission of the words "subject to any provision of the Constitution" as governing Clauses (2), (3) and (4) of the Article has a significance which cannot be omitted from consideration. 28. As regards the argument that the law when made relating to privileges would be subject to the fundamental rights and thus subject to Article 13(2) whereas privileges as conferred by the Constitution with reference to the British House of Common....
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....continued to be a member of the House of representatives of the Burma legislature. Clearly in that case the Speaker had no power to make that declaration for he was not in any sense a Court. In any event, this was a case of the legislature of a State which was not fully self-governing and can be no authority for a case like this where we are dealing with a 'controlled' legislature possessed of all the privileges which the British House of Commons possesses. 30. I am unable, therefore, to hold that the cases cited above govern this case. From what I have said it will be apparent that, in my opinion, Article 194(3) is not governed by Article 20(2) of the Constitution. 31. I shall now proceed to consider what the exact nature of a resolution of a house of legislature is. It was held in the famous case of --'Stockdale v. Hansard (D)', that a resolution of the House of Commons cannot alter the law of the land. For legislation both under the British Constitution and the Constitution as it obtains in the Uttar Pradesh State three parties are necessary. In our State the parties are the two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor. A resolution is an expression of th....
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.... correct the argument that the resolution in this case is a law subject to the provisions of Article 20(2) or a judgment of a Court of justice such as we conceive Courts of justice to be. The notion of the High Court of Parliament has no application here and it is unnecessary to discuss' the matter at any length. 32. It was contended by Sir Iqbal Ahmad that the word 'law' has been used in Article 13(3) In the widest sense possible as including any ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law. I am inclined to think that even having regard to that very wide language, the resolution cannot be accurately described as a law for it is a mere expression of opinion which can have a binding effect in cases of privileges. 33. Whatever be the position of a resolution of a House, whether it be looked upon as a law or as a judgment of a Court or the expression of an opinion which may practically have the effect of law, the question still remains whether the resolution complained against awarded a punishment for an offence within the meaning which must be attributed to those words in Article 20(2) of the Constit....
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....ve but of a punitive character. Preventive action is in the nature of precautionary action. It is taken in the interests of maintenance of order or the security of the State or the maintenance of essential supplies when necessity compels an authority specifically endowed with power to use it to resort to it. Punitive action, on the other hand, is action for some breach actually committed and has the character of a punishment or a disciplinary order. 'In so large and active an Assembly as the House of Commons', observes May in his Parliamentary Practice "It is absolutely necessary that the Speaker should be invested with authority to repress disorder and to give effect, promptly and decisively, to the rules and orders of the House." "The ultimate authority", Sir J. Erskine May further observes, "upon all points is the House itself, but the Speaker is the executive officer by whom its rules are enforced." May further observes that "the power to punish disorder is regulated partly by practice and partly by standing order." "the change introduced", he continues, "by standing orders may be described briefly as giving the Chair power to deal with minor offenc....
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....end beyond the prorogation, (4) suspension or expulsion of the member. The offences for which punishments can be so inflicted have nowhere been defined but broadly they are for breaches of privilege including contempt of the House or the Speaker as representing the majesty of the House. The order of withdrawal has the effect of suspension and in any case comes within the category of the punishment classifiable in the words 'among others'. Sir Iqbal Ahmad is, therefore, indisputably right when he says that Shri Raj Narain was punished by Shri Speaker when he was forcibly made to withdraw from the House and very properly he does not question the correctness or justice of that order. Indeed, it would have been grossly improper for us to sit in review in any sense over that order. In order to appreciate, however, the point which has arisen under Article 20(2) of the Constitution, it is necessary to appreciate exactly what was done after the reference to the Committee of Privileges by the House. Sir Iqbal Ahmad's argument is that his client was, contrary to established parliamentary practice in Britain, punished a second time by the House on the same set of facts for the ....
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....es practically vested with a judicial character when dealing with Acts of Parliament. To say this, however, is not to say that the House of Commons is a court or even a quasi-judicial tribunal in the sense in which those words are generally understood. I am not prepared, therefore, to hold that the State Legislature is a court of law or of justice except, of course, in the most strictly limited sense that in the exercise of regulating its proceedings it can proceed against a person or even a stranger for breaches of privilege. 38. And this brings me to the question of the exact scope of Article 20(2) of the Constitution. That Article reads as follows : "No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once." It is clear that this Article is based upon the principle of the 'double jeopardy' clause and lays down that no person should be put in jeopardy of his life or liberty more than once. This principle is so well established in the system of law that we administer that it is not surprising that it should have been elevated to the level of a fundamental right. In the case of -- 'Rex v. Barron (No. 2) (1914) 2 KB 570 (K), Lord Reading C. J. qu....
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....secution and punishment for the same offence would be operative also against a subsequent trial for a different offence on the same facts. The important point, however, to note is that the word 'prosecute' has been deliberately introduced in order to make it clear that the bar relates to a punishment by a court of law and not to other types of punishment. The intention of the founding fathers appears to have been not to disturb the existing law which is to be found in Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to the extent of protection against 'double jeopardy' in the criminal law of this country. 40. It strikes me that on a correct reading of the section, having regard to the background of Article 20(2) as discoverable by a reference to Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the word 'and' has been used not in a disjunctive but in a conjunctive sense. To read the word 'and' as 'or' would be to read something into the article which is not there. That being so, it strikes me that Article 20(2) does nothing more than reproduce in effect the provisions of Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is clear that un....
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....herwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under article 372, apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India." Article 372(1) preserves 'subject to the other provisions of the Constitution all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority.' The effect of this Article read with Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code is that Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code continued to be a law on the date the Constitution came into force. Having regard to these considerations, I am driven to the conclusion that Article 20(2) did nothing more than elevate the principle laid down in Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the status of a fundamental law. Bearing these considerations in mind, I am driven to the conclusion that taking the article as a whole, the context indicates that the word 'offence' as used to the Article contem....
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....be, in my opinion, contrary to the intentions of the founding fathers, regard being had to the necessary implications of the scheme of Article 194(3). 45. On an analysis of all the arguments advanced in this case, the conclusion that I have arrived at is that this Court can give no relief to the applicant. With political remedies this Court is not concerned. Important as they are, they lie beyond our sphere. As I have indicated, there are good reasons why this Court should not interfere with the mode in which the legislature conducts its internal affairs. In the ultimate analysis, it is as was hinted at by Lord Coleridge C. J, in --Bradlaugh v. Gossett ', (B) (supra), in an assiduous education of the tremendous forces generated by a vast electorate that remedies against real or supposed highhandedness on the part of any particular legislature lies. With all those matters, which are of a political nature, this Court has no concern. 46. Before parting with this case, I would like to record my thanks to learned counsel for the applicant, Sir Iqbal Ahmad, and the learned Advocate General, Mr. Kanhaiya Lal Misra, for the valued assistance which they rendered in this case to us....
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....mbly being then in session, in order to discuss the situation which had arisen out of the strike which had been organized and indulged in by some of the primary school teachers of the State and the action taken by Government to curb that strike. The petitioner with this idea contacted opposite party No. 1 Sri Atmaram Govind Kher, who is the Speaker of the U.P. Legislative Assembly and he was advised to consult, according to the petitioner, the Treasury Benches, and according to the opposite party No. 1, the Chief Whip of the Assembly. Some parleys appear to have taken place between the petitioner on the one hand and members of Government on the other in order that the petitioner may have facility in moving his contemplated adjournment motion in the House. It also appears that there was no agreement between the majority party and the opposition in regard to this matter. 52. The petitioner, thereafter, sought the permission of the Speaker from the floor of the House to move his adjournment motion. Under the rules of procedure, framed by the U.P. Legislative Assembly, in pursuance of the previsions of Article 208(1), namely, under Rule 68, the consent of the Speaker is necessary to....
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....ned in the suspended rule." It is clear to me that if the petitioner could not get the support of thirty-six members in order to have the opportunity of placing the adjournment motion before the House, the petitioner obviously had less chance of getting the necessary support of the House to carry his motion in regard to the suspension of Rule 71(3). It appears to me that the reason for making this motion of suspension of the rule was to get an opportunity, indirectly, to discuss the same thing as v/as contemplated for discussion if and when the adjournment motion was before the House. I am fortified in this view of mine by the line of action which was taken by the petitioner and some of his supporters when both these questions were before the House. We are, however, not called upon to pronounce upon the appropriateness or otherwise of the action of the petitioner. 53. The Speaker could not allow the adjournment motion to be placed before the House because the requisite support was not forthcoming for the motion. The Speaker further did not wish to let the motion for the suspension of Rule 71(3) to be discussed because of the fact that the day on which these motions were place....
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.... by the petitioner. 55. It is interesting to observe here again, that the resolution was dated the 30th March, 1953, and then the fact that the session of the House ended on the 2nd April, 1953, at 5 p.m. This petition was moved on the 2nd April, 1953, at 10-15 a.m. before us. I am drawing attention to these dates because of the fact that on behalf of the opposite parties an objection was taken to the hearing of this petition on the ground that the petition had become more or less infructuous, inasmuch as the punishment, if there was any punishment, had spent itself out. It was further argued by the learned Advocate-General that any harm that may have accrued by the resolution cannot now be undone by our intervention. 56. This petition was moved before us, as I have said, on the 2nd April, 1953, and we issued notice to the opposite parties because of the importance of this case and the importance of the issues which it raised and also because we thought it proper under the circumstances to decide the questions which were raised concerning the dignity of the Speaker of the House, its privileges and the protection which the petitioner claimed, after deliberation and after havin....
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....sent himself during the remainder of the day's sitting. "(2) If any member is ordered to withdraw a second time in the same session, the Speaker may direct him to withdraw from the meetings of the House and may name him. Similarly, if a member when ordered by the Speaker to withdraw, does not obey the order, the Speaker may name him. As soon as the member is named, the leader of the House shall forthwith make a motion to the effect that the member so named be suspended for the period to be mentioned in the motion: Provided that this period shall in no case be longer than, the remainder of the session: Provided further that the House may at any time, on a motion being made, resolve that such suspension be terminated. "(3) The Speaker shall have full authority to carry out his order or the decisions of the House and may employ or authorise the employment of necessary force at any stage of the proceedings. "(4) The Speaker may in the case of grave disorder arising in the House suspend any sitting for a time to be determined by him". By virtue of the provisions of Sub-rule (1) quoted above, it was contended by Sir Iqbal Ahmad that the Speaker ....
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....ittee of Privileges of the House for consideration and report and that Committee made a report to the House on which the House recorded the resolution of the 30th March, 1953, which is, as I have already stated, being impugned by these proceedings in this Court. The learned Advocate-General argued that the conduct of the proceedings by the Speaker was strictly in accordance with the rules of procedure prescribed. It was contended by the learned Advocate-General in reply to Sir Iqbal Ahmad's contention that it was not obligatory under Rule 189 (2) to name the offending member. It was further contended that apart from the provisions of Rule 189 (2) it was open to the Speaker, under Rule 67, to refer the conduct of the applicant to the Committee of Privileges for examination, investigation and report. I do not consider it necessary, in view of what I shall say presently, to express any opinion as to whether or not the interpretation put by the learned Advocate-General on Rule 189 as also on Rule 67 is correct. 62. The main question which to my mind calls for determination in this application is whether this Court has the power to review the action taken by the Speaker in regard....
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....atter may here be noticed so as to make the category of privileges complete, namely, the right which newspapers claimed, to publish, fair and accurate reports of Parliamentary debates--this right appears to have been conceded once for all by the decision in --'Wason v. Walter (1868) 4 QB 73 (P)'. The privilege here is really a qualified privilege which is familiar as a defence to actions of defamation. It has, however, nothing else but its name on common with Parliamentary privilege. 64. In the case of (1884) 12 Q. B. D. 271 (B)', Stephen J. quoted Lord Denman with approval thus: "Whatever is done within the walls of either assembly must pass without question in any other place". Littledale J. was then quoted thus: "It .is said the House of Commons is the sole Judge of its own privileges; and so I admit as far as the proceedings in the House and some other things are concerned". Stephen J. also quoted with approval the following passage of Patteson J.: "Beyond all dispute, it is necessary that the proceedings of each House of Parliament should be entirely free and unshackled, that whatever is said or done in either House should not be....
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....her contended that Article 194 in its entirety was subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and therefore if the House had by a resolution on any question of privilege contravened any of the Constitutional privileges, then it was not only open to the Court but it was the bounden duty of the Court to declare such resolution 'ultra vires'. 66. If a resolution of the House which does not enjoy the status of law nor has the power to alter the law infringes any constitutional provision or is in the teeth of any constitutional prohibition then obviously such a resolution may not be binding and a remedy may be had against such a resolution. With the aforesaid exception the constitutional provisions, to my mind, give the proceedings in the Legislative sanctity and make them inscrutable to the same extent as the proceedings of the House of Commons. The provisions which to my mind determine this question are the provisions of Article 194(3) and Article 212 of the Constitution. Article 212 is in these words: "(1) The validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity, of procedure. ....
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....mmission of the offence". This, in fact, makes punishment by means of 'post facto' laws, or awarding enhanced punishment under 'post facto' laws, illegal. It was on Clause (2) of Article 20 that reliance was placed * that clause is in these words: * "No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once." * In order to have the protection provided by this clause, it must be found first that the petitioner was 'prosecuted' and "punished" for the same 'offence' more than once. The word 'offence' appears in all the three clauses of Article 20 and, in my judgment the word must bear the same meaning in all the three clauses of the Article. The use of the word 'offence' in Clause (1) of Article 20 makes it perfectly clear to me that by the word 'offence' in Article 20 is meant something which is a violation of a law in force and for the violation of which the law prescribes a penalty. The use of the word 'offence' in Clause (3) also indicates, to my mind, that it has reference to an act in respect of which a person can be accused and where in respect of that accusation there is a....
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....le 189 (1). When the applicant refused to withdraw then the Speaker had him put out of the House under the powers vested in him by Sub-rule (3) of Rule 189. This action of the Speaker was not really punitive action, but was preventive action. Under Rule 189 (1) the Speaker has been given power to preserve order and he has further been armed with the power to direct a member to withdraw if his conduct appears to be disorderly to the Speaker; the Speaker has further been given the power to enforce his decision under Sub-rule (3). He has not been empowered, as such, to punish any member for disorderly conduct. It appears to me, therefore, that the action which the Speaker took was for preserving future order for he could not possibly preserve that order which had already been broken and he had not been given any other power save the power to preserve order under Rule 189(1). Anything that is done in order to safeguard against a future recurrence of the same danger is not punitive action but is preventive action, but what was done by the resolution of the House was to suspend the petitioner for the disorderly conduct for which he had not really been punished earlier. In my judgment ....