Legislative privilege shields internal disorder proceedings, and Article 20(2) does not bar disciplinary action within the House.

Legislative control over disorderly conduct, breach of privilege, and the Speaker's measures to maintain order was treated as an internal matter protected by legislative privilege, so writ interference under Article 226 was not available. The constitutional bar under Article 20(2) was held inapplicable because it protects only against criminal prosecution and punishment for the same offence, not disciplinary action within the House; the Speaker's direction to withdraw and the later House resolution were therefore not invalid as double punishment.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could interfere under Article 226 with proceedings of the State Legislature concerning disorderly conduct, breach of privilege, and the Speaker's actions in maintaining order. (ii) Whether the punishment imposed by the House after the member had been ordered to withdraw from the House amounted to a second punishment barred by Article 20(2) of the Constitution.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court could interfere under Article 226 with proceedings of the State Legislature concerning disorderly conduct, breach of privilege, and the Speaker's actions in maintaining order.

Analysis: The power to regulate the conduct of business and maintain order in the Legislature was treated as an internal legislative matter. The constitutional scheme, especially Article 194(3) read with Article 212, protected legislative privilege and barred judicial scrutiny of proceedings on the ground of irregularity of procedure. The Speaker's direction to withdraw a disorderly member, the use of force to enforce that order, and the reference of the incident to the Committee of Privileges were treated as matters within the Legislature's exclusive domain and not fit for judicial interference under writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The challenge to the legislative proceedings was not maintainable and failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the punishment imposed by the House after the member had been ordered to withdraw from the House amounted to a second punishment barred by Article 20(2) of the Constitution.

Analysis: The Court held that Article 20(2) protects against prosecution and punishment for the same offence in the criminal law sense, and does not extend to legislative disciplinary action for breach of privilege. The expression "offence" in Article 20(2) was read as referring to an act made punishable by law and the expression "prosecuted" as referring to judicial proceedings before a court or legal tribunal. The Speaker's immediate direction to withdraw was treated as a disciplinary measure within the House, and the subsequent resolution of the House, even if it resulted in further suspension, did not attract the constitutional bar against double jeopardy.

Conclusion: Article 20(2) did not apply, and the resolution was not invalid on the ground of double punishment.

Final Conclusion: The Court held that the Legislature's privilege and procedure in dealing with disorderly conduct could not be questioned in writ proceedings, and that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy did not invalidate the impugned resolution. The application was dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi: Legislative proceedings concerning maintenance of order and breach of privilege are immune from judicial review for procedural irregularity, and Article 20(2) applies only to criminal prosecution and punishment for the same offence, not to internal legislative discipline.

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