TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2017 (6) TMI 1408
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....td. and its sister concerns as "Vidur"; defendant nos. 1 (i) to (iii), being the legal heirs of Late Sh. Pradeep Kumar Khanna, as "Khanna"; defendant no. 2/Tosh Apartments Pvt. Ltd. as "Tosh"; defendant no. 3(i) and (ii), being the legal heirs of Late Sh. L.K. Kaul, as "Kaul"; and defendant no. 4/Bhagwati Developers Pvt. Ltd. as "Bhagwati". 3. During the pendency of this suit, Khanna and Tosh had preferred applications under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, being I.A. No. 608/2013 and I.A. No. 2049/2013 respectively, seeking the rejection of the plaint. By an order dated 31.05.2013, the applications were allowed by this Court and the plaint was rejected as having been filed without disclosing any cause of action. The order dated 31.05.2013 passed by the single judge was assailed by the plaintiffs herein before the Division Bench in appeal [RFA (OS) 61/2013]. 4. Before the Division Bench, learned senior counsel for Tosh had made a statement that he does not press his application under Order VII Rule 11, but instead he would press I.A. No. 4433/2013 pending before the Single Judge. Similarly, counsel for Khanna had also made a statement that he would not press his application und....
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....nd had been leased to the Sudan Embassy since 1962. Later in 1988, Late Sh. Pradeep Kumar Khanna executed an Agreement to Sell dated 13.09.1988 in favour of Tosh for sale of the suit property. The suit property was vacated by Sudan Embassy on 12.05.1992 and the possession was taken over by one, Late Sh. L.K. Kaul. As per the case of Sh. Kaul, the property continued to be in his possession as a mortgagee in consideration of getting the property vacated from Sudan Embassy. Late Sh. Kaul continued to be in possession of the property as a caretaker until he was dispossessed by the receiver appointed by this Court on 18.09.2007. 10. In 1993, Tosh filed a suit, being CS (OS) 425/1993, before this Court for specific performance, damages and injunction based upon the Agreement to Sell dated 13.09.1988. Along with the suit, an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC was also filed. Summons in the said suit were issued on 10.02.1993 and by an interim order dated 18.02.1993 directed Late Sh. Kaul and Late Sh. Khanna not to transfer, alienate or part with possession in any manner or create third party rights in respect of the suit property; the interim order stands confirmed on 31.0....
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....nt suit. Therefore, I am competent to make this statement on their behalf. The plaintiffs have instructed me to withdraw the present suit. Accordingly, I withdraw the suit. The same may be dismissed as withdrawn. RO & AC Sd./- Adv. (D-530/93) Sd./- (NK Goel) ADJ-05 (WEST), THC 1-06-2011 Present : Sh Rajesh Mahendru, advocate for the plaintiffs. None for the proposed LRs of the deceased defendant. I have recorded the statement of the deceased defendant. In view of his statement, the present suit is dismissed as withdrawn. File be consigned to record room. Sd./- 1-6-11 (NK Goel) ADJ-05 (WEST), THC 1-06-2011 (Announced in the open court)" 14. During the pendency of the proceedings before the arbitral tribunal, an I.A. No. 8145/1998 in CS (OS) 425/1993 and Contempt Petition 118/1998 were filed by Tosh alleging violation of the interim injunction order and further seeking an injunction against Late Sh. Khanna and Late Sh. Kaul from handing over/delivering the actual possession of the Suit Property to Vidur based upon the sale deed dated 20.05.1997. Late Sh. Khanna in his reply, contende....
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....ng a direction that they be restrained from taking possession in the garb of the order of the Calcutta High Court. Accordingly, Vidur and Bhagwati were restrained by a Single Judge of this Court by an ex parte ad interim injunction order dated 22.01.2001. 19. When the receiver appointed by the Calcutta High Court went to take possession of the Suit Property, Late Sh. Kaul filed another application I.A. No. 1211/2001 not to dispossess him. On 08.02.2001, this Court restrained Vidur, Bhagwati and the receiver from taking possession of the Suit Property. Late Sh. Kaul also approached the Calcutta High Court, which made its orders subject to the orders of this Court vide order dated 15.02.2001. 20. As per the plaint, Vidur/plaintiffs claim to have learnt of CS (OS) 425/1993, pending before this Court upon notices being received in I.A. No. 625/2001. 21. Thereafter, Vidur filed an application I.A. No. 1861/2008 under Order I Rule 10 of the Code seeking impleadment in CS (OS) No. 425/1993. This application was dismissed by a Single Judge of this Court vide order dated 26.05.2008. An appeal FAO (OS) No. 324/2008 was preferred by Vidur before a Division Bench, which was also dismi....
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....ee of permanent injunction restraining defendant Nos.1(i) to 1(iii) from claiming themselves and representing themselves as owners of land and property No.21, Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi and/or from executing and registering any Sale Deed in favour of any third party or creating any third party interest or entering into any compromise of any nature whatsoever; d) Decree for recovery of possession in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants and/or against their men, agents and associates be passed directing the defendants and/or the Court Receiver appointed by this Hon'ble Court to quit, vacate and deliver the vacant possession of the property to the plaintiffs; e) An enquiry into damages be made by this Hon'ble Court and after ascertaining the quantum of damages suffered by the plaintiffs, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to award damages for such sum as this Hon'ble Court may deed fit and proper; -AND- f) Pass such further or other orders as this Hon'ble Court may deed fit and property." (Emphasis Supplied) 25. In 2014, Tosh filed CS (OS) 864/2014 before this Court seeking a declaration that the Sale Deeds dated 20.05.1997 a....
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.... Order VII Rule 11 of the Code for preferring applications under S. 151. In this background, extensive arguments have been addressed by all sides. SUBMISSIONS OF KHANNA (Applicant in I.A. 12308/2013) 28. In the application I.A. No. 12308/2013, Mr. Sanjeev Anand submits that the present suit is liable to be dismissed at the threshold itself and the suit being frivolous should be being nipped in the bud as held by the Supreme Court in the case of T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Anr.. (1977) 4 SCC 467, paragraph 5 Judgment of the Supreme Court 28.1 While placing strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vidur Impex,1 Mr. Anand contends that the plaintiffs do not have a valid title or interest in the suit property as the transactions under which they claim to have acquired interest in the suit property did not confer any right. It is contended that a declaration has already been made by the Supreme Court on the claim made by the plaintiffs under the six registered sale deeds, which are the basis of the prayers in the present suit. In particular, he refers to the following paragraphs of Vidur Impex1: "6. On 19-2-1997, Respondent 2 executed 6 agree....
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....onclusion and finding that the transactions relied upon by the plaintiffs, i.e. the registered sale deeds, are a nullity. Further that they do not confer any right upon Vidur and it cannot be said that any valid title or interest has been acquired in the suit property. Based on the aforesaid findings of the Supreme Court, it has been urged by Mr. Anand that the plaintiffs have no right in the suit property which is binding on the parties, thus they would have no cause of action or locus standi to seek any declaration under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. He submits that under Section 34, for any person to seek a declaration he has to fulfil a pre-condition of having a subsisting right to the property in question. Suit being Barred by Law 28.3 The second contention of the learned counsel for Khanna is that the suit is barred by law as the plaintiffs are precluded from filing the present suit by Order XXIII Rule 1 (4) of the Code. He submits that Order XXIII Rule 1 enables a plaintiff to abandon his suit or a part thereof. Whenever he abandons his claim, he is presumed to have given up the reliefs sought by him and is precluded from instituting any fresh suit in re....
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....claim for damages, which they intentionally omitted to do and also did not seek leave of the Court to sue subsequently, therefore, the claim for damages in the present suit is barred by the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the Code. Concealment 28.7 Mr. Anand submits that the plaintiffs have deliberately concealed this material fact of instituting the 1997 Suit and its withdrawal in the present suit; for this reason alone, Vidur is disentitled to any relief and the present suit is liable to be dismissed. It was obligatory on the part of the plaintiffs to disclose to this Court the factum of having filed the earlier suit and its withdrawal and also produce the copy of the plaint and withdrawal order as the same are relevant having bearing on the maintainability of the present suit. The plaintiffs deliberately withheld this material fact and vital documents from this Court to gain advantage over the defendants and as such are guilty of playing fraud on this Court as well as on the defendants. The case of the plaintiffs, thus being based on falsehood requires to be summarily rejected at this stage itself. Limitation 28.8 The next contention of learned counsel for Khanna is....
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....and submits that even on the basis of the averments made in the plaint of the present suit it is apparent that the present suit is hopelessly time barred. The plaintiffs have themselves admitted in the plaint (paragraphs 11, 17 and 30) that the cause of action for filing the present suit first arose in the year 2001 when they came to know that the purported six Sale Deeds, i.e. the basis of their title, was being challenged. 28.13 Learned counsel submits that the suit for relief of declaration under Article 58 could be filed only within three years of 1997 and the present suit having been filed in 2012 is hopelessly time barred. It is submitted that the plaintiffs have pleaded subsequent purported cause of action on the passing of the Supreme Court Judgment on 21.08.2012, which is of no relevance and period of limitation is to be construed only from the date when the right to sue first accrued and successive violations will not give rise to fresh cause of action as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Khatri Hotels.17 28.14 Mr. Anand prior to making his submissions upon the relief of possession submits that once it is clear that the plaintiffs/Vidur are not entitl....
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....nt deed dated 19-11-1959 and therefore to be ignored. Consequently we are of the view plaintiffs are not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for in the suit. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Court below. Parties would bear their respective costs." (Emphasis Supplied) 28.18 Thus, it is contended by Mr. Anand that in view of the above position, the plaintiffs neither entitled to declaratory relief nor one of possession. No locus standi 28.19 Mr. Anand submits that the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the present suit as they have no existing right to the suit property; even according to their own pleadings in the plaint and as held by the Supreme Court Vidur Impex.1 28.20 It is submitted that the plaintiffs have themselves pleaded in the plaint that even prior to execution of the Sale Deeds dated 20.05.1997, they have on 18.03.1997 entered into an agreement for sale with Bhagwati. Bhagwati had also instituted arbitration proceedings against the plaintiffs seeking specific performance of the said agreement for sale along with possession of the suit property; the sole arbitrator has passed an award in favour of Bhagwati, which w....
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....use of action for similar reliefs without any leave and liberty; Order XXIII Rule 1 (4) of the Code (iii) Adverse adjudication of locus and source of right by Supreme Court in Vidur Impex;1 and (iv) Suit being barred by the law of limitation. 30.1 In respect of the maintainability of the present application, learned senior counsels submit that the Supreme Court in the case of Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v. Machado Brothers and Ors. (2004) 11 SCC 168 has held that if continuation of a suit would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and interest of justice requires that such suit should be disposed of as having become infructuous, an application under Section 151 CPC is maintainable. 30.2 The submissions in respect of the nature and scope of Vidur Impex1 are similar to the ones led by Mr. Anand. Concealment 30.3 Learned senior counsels further relies that in the case of Oswal Fats & Oils Ltd. v. Additional Commr. (Admn.), Bareilly Division, Bareilly and Ors., (2010) 4 SCC 728, paragraph 20 wherein the Supreme Court came down heavily on the plaintiff therein for not disclosing the relevant document, terming such non-disclosure as part of ....
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....ght of Vidur was definitely denied when Late Sh. Khanna had filed CS (OS) 161/1999 seeking declaration of the Sale Deeds dated 20.05.1997 as null and void. Therefore, the limitation for seeking declaratory relief has expired in 2002. 31. Accordingly, learned senior submit that the suit should be dismissed at the very threshold with heavy costs. SUBMISSIONS OF VIDUR/NON-APPLICANT 32. Mr. Manoj, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, has opposed the applications on the following grounds: Maintainability 32.1 First, that the applications are not maintainable. He substantiates his arguments by contending that the present applications, being under Section 151 of the Code, are not maintainable and accordingly, should be dismissed. 32.2 Mr. Manoj submits that the present applications are not maintainable as Section 151 cannot be used to defeat substantive rights of the plaintiffs without trial or following due procedure. It is submitted that the powers under Section 151 are subject to the following limitations: (i) S. 151 cannot be used when there is an express provision in the Code. State of U.P. and Ors. v. Roshan Singh and Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 488, paragraph 8, K.....
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.... in the previous applications. In order to fortify his submissions, learned counsel has relied upon the decisions in Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar and Anr. AIR 2005 SC 626: (2005) 1 SCC 787, paragraphs 30 - 31 and Aftab Ahmad and Anr. v. Nasiruddin and Anr. AIR 1977 Del 121, paragraph 8 Supreme Court Judgment 32.6 Learned counsel for the plaintiffs further submits that and reliance on the observations made by the Supreme Court in the Vidhur Impex1 is misplaced as the sole issue which arose for consideration before the Apex Court was whether the present plaintiffs were entitled to be impleaded in a suit for specific performance, being CS (OS) No. 425/1993. The ratio of the judgment is that parties in violation of injunction order are not entitled to impleadment in a suit for specific performance. Any observations made by the Supreme Court are not a declaration of law under Article 141 read with Article 136 of the Constitution of India qua the plaintiffs" title. He submits that his stand is vindicated by the fact that the Apex Court did not issue any direction to cancel the registration of sale deeds in question. 32.7 Elaborating his argument, the counsel submits that an....
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....ing on two legal principles, firstly, it operates as res judicata, i.e. the same parties cannot re-agitate the same issue and secondly, its ratio is followed as a precedent, i.e. Rule of Stare Decisis. When a question is not in issue, the decision would not operate as res judicata or as a binding precedent. It can only be treated as obiter dictum. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Arun Kumar Aggarwal v. State of MP and Ors., (2014) 13 SCC 707, paragraphs 24 - 30 and 32 - 34 to submit that obiter dicta lacks the force of law as there is no full investigation or adjudication on that point. Counsel relies on Dalbir Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab (1979) 3 SCC 745, paragraphs 22 and 24 and submits that general observations are only views and not a law. Counsel next relies on Krishena Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. (1990) 4 SCC 207, paragraphs 19 and 20 and submits that concrete decision alone is binding on the parties and only the ratio decidendi has the force of law. In the cases of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. (1992) 4 SCC 363, paragraph 39 and Dr. Nalini Mahajan & Ors. v. Director of Income Tax (Inv.) and Ors., (2002) 98 DLT 525 (DB)....
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....observation made in Vidur Impex.1 The ratio in Thomson Press51 is that sale deeds executed in violation of injunction order are not void but shall be governed by the principles of lis pendens. Emphasis is placed on Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act. Id., paragraphs 50 - 53 Suit being barred by Law 32.15 Learned counsel also submits that the submission of the defendants that the present suit is barred under Order XXIII Rule 1 is misplaced as the same is not applicable in the present case. The said provision applies when the "subject matter" of the two proceedings is the same. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs further submits that the term "subject matter" has not been defined in the Code but the same has been construed as the "same cause of action and relief" in the judgments rendered in the cases of Vallabh Das v. Dr. Madan Lal and Ors.; (1970) 1 SCC 761, paragraph 5 Kasarapu Sujatha and Anr. v. Veera Velli Veera Somaiah; 2008 (3) ALD 525: 2007 SCC OnLine AP 676 The Kartar Singh and Ors. v. Shiv Rattandev Singh and Ors.; AIR 1996 J&K 32 and Inbasagaran and Anr. v. S. Natarajan. (2015) 11 SCC 12, paragraphs 20 - 26 32.16 Learned counsel submits that the prayers in the....
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....the plaintiffs being out of possession or the date of the Sale Deeds/ownership is irrelevant. 32.22 Mr. Manoj relies upon the decision in C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai & Anr. (2007) 14 SCC 183, paragraphs 14 - 19 for the proposition that Article 58 is not applicable and that since the burden under Article 65 is upon the defendants, it is imperative for an issue to be framed in that regard. In respect of "clear and unequivocal threat", counsel relies upon Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan & Ors. (1960) 2 SCR 253: AIR 1960 SC 335, paragraphs 53 and 54 32.23 Further, relying upon Indira v. Arumugam and Anr., (1998) 1 SCC 614, paragraphs 4 and 5 learned counsel submits that unless defendant proves adverse possession, plaintiff cannot be non-suited. With regard to starting point of limitation under Article 65, learned counsel relies upon Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam and Ors. (2007) 14 SCC 308, paragraphs 24 to 26 and Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan & Ors. (2009) 16 SCC 517, paragraph 21 33. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs/non-applicants concludes that in view of the aforegoing submissions, the applications should be dismissed as being frivolous. As an alternative,....
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.... but submits that there are exceptions to the rule. Learned counsel submits that is a particular issue was "necessary" to be decided for adjudicating on the principal issue and was decided, it would have to be treated as "directly and substantially" in issue. He substantiates that if a judgment is based upon the decision on a particular issue, then the decision would be res judicata in a later case. 34.6 Mr. Anand substantiates that if the record of the former trial shows that a judgment could not have been decided without deciding a particular issue, then it shall be considered to be decided for all future actions between the parties. Relying upon judgment in Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E. Edr. v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer and Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 350, paragraphs 10 - 19 learned counsel concludes that the test to be applied is whether the court considers the adjudication of a particular issue as material and essential for its decision and if the answer is in the affirmative, then the particular issue will be treated as "directly and substantially" in issue. In Vidur Impex,1 Mr. Anand submits that the Supreme Court while deciding the issue of impleadment, the right of Vidur was considered....
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....as being hit by the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1 (4) owing to withdrawal of previous suit by Vidur, being CS (OS) 1675/1997;12 (iv) The additional prayer of damages is barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code; (v) The present suit is barred by limitation by application of Articles 58 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963; and (vi) The suit is liable to be dismissed at the threshold itself owing to gross concealment of previous suit on the part of plaintiffs in the present proceedings as well as CS (OS) 425/1993 right upto the Supreme Court. 37. The contentions of the plaintiffs/non-applicants summarized, in seriatim, are as follows: (i) The present applications under Section 151 of the Code are not maintainable owing to the limited scope of the provision; (ii) Substantial rights of the plaintiffs in the suit property cannot be snatched away without following the due process of law; (iii) Applications under Section 151 are not maintainable as being barred by the Principle of "Issue Estoppel"; (iv) The judgment of the Supreme Court in Vidur Impex1 was limited to impleadment application in CS (OS) 425/1993 and by no way effects the title of the ....
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.... If there are express provisions exhaustively covering a particular topic, then they might give an implication that no power shall be exercised in derogation to those provisions, in such circumstances resorting to S. 151 is not permissible. At the same time, the Supreme Court has also held that "[w]hatever limitations are imposed by construction on the provisions of Section 151 of the Code, they do not control the undoubted power of the Court conferred under Section 151 of the Code to make a suitable order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court." Supra n.62, paragraph 5 44. A Full Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Padam Sen & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1961) 1 SCR 884 had come to the conclusion that inherent power under S. 151 could not be exercised by the Additional Munsif to appoint a commissioner to seize the books of accounts of the plaintiff therein. The Apex Court observed as follows: "8. ...The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Sec....
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.... law. The operative field of power being thus restricted, the same cannot be risen to inherent power. The inherent powers of the court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on it. If there are express provisions covering a particular topic, such power cannot be exercised in that regard. The section confers on the court power of making such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice of the court. Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked when there is express provision even under which the relief can be claimed by the aggrieved party. The power can only be invoked to supplement the provisions of the Code and not to override or evade other express provisions. The position is not different so far as the other statutes are concerned. Undisputedly, an aggrieved person is not remediless under the Act." (Emphasis Supplied) 47. In Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar,38 the Supreme Court observing that the power under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is analogous to S. 151 of the Code, again held that the "powers can be used provided there is no prohibition for passing such an order under the provisions of CrPC and there is no provision under which the party can se....
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....2 SCC 256] and Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj [(2010) 8 SCC 1 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 212] ]. We may summarise them as follows: (a) Section 151 is not a substantive provision which creates or confers any power or jurisdiction on courts. It merely recognises the discretionary power inherent in every court as a necessary corollary for rendering justice in accordance with law, to do what is "right" and undo what is "wrong", that is, to do all things necessary to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its process. (b) As the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, Section 151 recognises and confirms that if the Code does not expressly or impliedly cover any particular procedural aspect, the inherent power can be used to deal with such situation or aspect, if the ends of justice warrant it. The breadth of such power is coextensive with the need to exercise such power on the facts and circumstances. (c) A court has no power to do that which is prohibited by law or the Code, by purported exercise of its inherent powers. If the Code contains provisions dealing with a particular topic or aspect, and such provisions either expressly or by necessary implicati....
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....only be invoked when the suit is barred from the pleadings filed by the plaintiff himself and the submissions of the defendant or any other material produced by the defendant cannot be looked into.72 (See Arjan Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1987 Del 165, paragraph 12; Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. v. Asst. Charity Commissioner and Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 137; Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510, paragraph 25; Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede and Company, (2007) 5 SCC 614, paragraph 25 and 33; Wings Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. v. Praveen Bhasin, MANU/DE/ 3472/2016, paragraph 21 and Kuldeep Singh Pathania v. Bikram Singh Jaryal, (2017) 5 SCC 345, paragraphs 6 - 8) 51. The question as to whether Order VII Rule 11 exhausts the powers of the Court to dismiss the suit/reject the plaint arose before a Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court in Temple of Thakur Shri Mathuradassji v. Shri Kanhaiyalal & Ors., 2008 (1) ILR (Raj) 619: 2008 (3) W LC (Raj) 534 wherein the appellant temple and some persons acting on its behalf had filed petition, suit and application, one after the other, in order to deny a party to the benefit of his decree. The c....
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....son on the ground that it cannot be dismissed since there is no provision under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is virtually denying an aggrieved party his right to crush the frivolous litigation without suffering the trial of suit." (Emphasis Supplied) 52. A Division Bench of this Court was also faced with a similar issue in Aniruddha Dutta & Ors. v. Bhawani Shankar Basu & Ors., 2012 (127) DRJ 46 (DB) wherein the appellants had challenged the judgment of a Single Judge of this Court in two suits, both revolving around the exclusion of certain heirs from the will of one Ms. Nirod Bala Basu after lapse of 38 years. Dismissing the appeals, Justice Pradeep Nandrajog, delivering the opinion for the bench, observed as follows: "28. A Court of record has every inherent power to prevent the abuse of its process and Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not the complete reservoir of the power to nip a frivolous suit when it is still in the stage of infancy. The inherent powers of a Court of record, and we highlight that Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not confer, but saves the inherent power of a Court also constitutes the reservoir of the power of a Co....
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....e Code and if there is no such prohibition then the court will consider whether such power should be exercised or not on the basis of facts mentioned in the application. ... 31. For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that continuation of a suit which has become infructuous by disappearance of the cause of action would amount to an abuse of the process of the court, and interest of justice requires that such suit should be disposed of as having become infructuous. The application under Section 151 CPC in this regard is maintainable." (Emphasis Supplied) 55. From the aforegoing, it is clear that the Apex Court has also accepted that Order VII Rule 11 is not exhaustive and frivolous suits may be dismissed as nipped in the bud by relying upon S. 151 of the Code. 56. Therefore, both this Court and the Rajasthan High Court have categorically held that Order VII Rule 11 is not the complete reservoir of power under which a frivolous suit may be nipped in the bud. The view has been accepted by the Supreme Court in Machado Brothers.23 Even otherwise, I am of the view that the Court cannot be helpless and be forced to continue a vexatious suit, wh....
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.... final objection raised by the non-applicants/plaintiffs for non- maintainability of the application is that the same are barred by the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code or the Principle of "Issue Estoppel". Mr. Manoj has submitted that once the grounds had been urged in the applications filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code and the applications given up as not pressed, the same cannot be urged again under the present applications. I am unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel as when the previous applications were heard by this Court, the Learned Single Judge observed that such contentions could not be gone into as it required analysis of averments and documents beyond the plaint. This is also evident from the judgment dated 31.05.2013 of this Court, wherein it was held that as per the plaint, the cause of action was said to have arisen after the observations of the Supreme Court in Vidur Impex1 which is impermissible in law (paragraph 23). The Single Judge had also expressly stated that "whether or not the observations made by the Supreme Court in respect of the sale deed being relied upon by the plaintiffs herein to get a declaration of title in thei....
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....e Judge had decided applications under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code in favour of the applicants and the plaintiffs had filed an appeal before the Division Bench. The order sheets of the appeal4 show that the appeal was hotly contested. During the hearing of the appeal, parties agreed to a consent order. The appellant/plaintiff herein agreed that the applicants would not press the applications under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, but would press/file applications under Section 151 of the Code. No objection was raised that such applications would not be maintainable and incase the plaintiff/appellant had raised such an objection, there would have been no reason for the applicants to agree for such an order, more particularly when the Single Judge had decided the applications under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code in their favour and no prudent person would give up the favourable order. 64. Therefore, the present applications are maintainable. JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT 65. The next aspect to be considered, which has been hotly contested by the parties, is the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vidur Impex,1 i.e. whether the Supreme Court has sealed the fate of t....
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....servation made in a prior decision on a legal question which arose in a manner not requiring any decision and which was to an extent unnecessary, ought to be considered merely as an obiter dictum. We are further of the view that a ratio of the judgment or the principle upon which the question before the Court is decided must be considered as binding to be applied as an appropriate precedent. 27. The Constitution Bench in SAIL case, decided on the limited issue surrounding the absorption of contract workers into the principal establishment pursuant to a notification issued by the appropriate Government under Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Abolition and Regulation) Act, 1970. The conclusion in para 125 of SAIL case, inter alia, states that on issuance of a notification under Section 10(1) of the Contract Labour (Abolition and Regulation) Act, 1970 passed by the appropriate Government would not entail the automatic absorption of contract workers operating in the establishment and the principal employer will not be burdened with any liability thereof. The issue surrounding workmen employed in statutory canteens and the liability of principal employer was neither argued nor....
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....for instance, determine the question of the constitutionality of a statute, although it is not absolutely necessary to the disposition of the case, if the issue of constitutionality is involved in the suit and its settlement is of public importance. An expression in an opinion which is not necessary to support the decision reached by the court is dictum or obiter dictum. 'Dictum' or 'obiter dictum' is distinguished from the holding of the court in that the so-called 'law of the case' does not extend to mere dicta, and mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis. As applied to a particular opinion, the question of whether or not a certain part thereof is or is not a mere dictum is sometimes a matter of argument. And while the terms 'dictum' and 'obiter dictum' are generally used synonymously with regard to expressions in an opinion which are not necessary to support the decision, in connection with the doctrine of stare decisis, a distinction has been drawn between mere obiter and 'judicial dicta', the latter being an expression of opinion on a point deliberately passed upon by the court." (emphasis supplied) Further at pp. 525 ....
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.... 29 defines the expression "obiter dicta" or "dicta" thus: "Dicta are opinions of a Judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without argument or full consideration of the point, are not the professed deliberate determinations of the Judge himself; obiter dicta are opinions uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside for the time from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects; it is mere observation by a Judge on a legal question suggested by the case before him, but not arising in such a manner as to require decision by him; 'obiter dictum' is made as argument or illustration, as pertinent to other cases as to the one on hand, and which may enlighten or convince, but which in no sense are a part of the judgment in the particular issue, not binding as a precedent, but entitled to receive the respect due to the opinion of the Judge who utters them; discussion in an opinion of principles of law which are not pertinent, relevant, or essential to determination of issues before court is 'obiter dictum'." 29. The concept of "dicta" has also been considered in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 2....
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.... ... Practice notes, being directions given without argument, do not have binding judicial effect. Interlocutory observations by members of a court during argument, while of persuasive weight, are not judicial pronouncements and do not decide anything." 31. In MCD v. Gurnam Kaur [(1989) 1 SCC 101], and Karnataka SRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty [(2003) 7 SCC 197], this Court has observed that: "12. ... Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement, having the weight of authority." 32. In State of Haryana v. Ranbir [(2006) 5 SCC 167], this Court has discussed the concept of the "obiter dictum" thus: "13. ... A decision, it is well settled, is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. The distinction between a dicta and obiter is well known. Obiter dicta is more or less presumably unnecessary to the decision. It may be an expression of a viewpoint or sentiments which has no binding effect. See ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla [(1976) 2 SCC 521] . It is also well settled that the statements which are not part ....
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....mines their rights and liabilities; while (ii) is the precedent, i.e. the ratio decidendi. 74. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Krishena Kumar48 was seized in the question whether D.S. Nakara and Ors. v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305 had held that both pension retirees and PF retirees formed a homogenous class preventing any further classification among them. Justice K.N. Saikia, answering the question in the negative, held that the doctrine of precedent is limited to what was necessarily involved in the decision. The relevant paragraphs read as under: 19. The doctrine of precedent, that is being bound by a previous decision, is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. It does not mean that this Court is bound by the various reasons given in support of it, especially when they contain "propositions wider than the case itself required". This was what Lord Selborne said in Caledonian Railway Co. v. Walker's Trustees [(1882) 7 App Cas 259 : 46 LT 826 (HL)] and Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem [1901 AC 495, 502 : 17 TLR 749 (HL)] . Sir Frederick Pollock has also said : "Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words ....
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....same court, or in other courts of equal or lower rank in subsequent cases where the very point is again in controversy unless there are occasions when departure is rendered necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. It should be invariably applied and should not ordinarily be departed from where decision is of long standing and rights have been acquired under it, unless considerations of public policy demand it. But in Nakara it was never required to be decided that all the retirees formed a class and no further classification was permissible." (Emphasis Supplied) 75. In the often-quoted judgment in Sun Engineering,49 the Supreme Court was interpreting the scope of reassessment of "escaped income" under S. 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The High Courts had rendered contradictory decisions relying upon one line observations made in CIT v. V. Jagan Mohan Rao. (1969) 2 SCC 389 Few High Courts opined that the entire assessment is reopened by relying upon the observation to the effect that "the previous under-assessment is set aside and the whole assessment proceedings start afresh"; while other High Courts opined that reassessm....
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....ll exposition of the law on a question when the question did not even fall to be answered in that judgment."" (Emphasis Supplied) 76. A Division Bench of this Court in Nalini Mahajan50 in respect of precedential value of decisions, observed as follows: "92. It is well known that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. (See Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44. 93. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. K. Ramakrishnan, 202 ITR 997, it has been stated: "The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in an Act of Parliament, (See the judgment of Lord Reid in the appeal from the above decision-Goodrich v. Paisner, [1957] AC 65 (HL) at page 88). We have to remember that the words in a judgment are not used after weighing the pros and cons of all conceivable situations that may arise. They constitute just the reasoning of the judges in the particular case, tailored to a given set of facts and circumstances. What is made relevant and binding is only the ratio decidendi and no more. The careful drafting-perhaps with reference to analogous statues-the m....
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....ivision Bench of the Apex Court was confronted with an observation made in Namdi Francis Nwazor v. Union of India and Anr.88 as to whether incriminating material found in a bag being carried amounted to a "search" mandating compliance of S.50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. In Namdi Francis Nwazor (1998) 8 SCC 534 it was observed that "if that person is carrying a handbag or the like and the incriminating article is found therefrom, it would still be a search of the person of the accused requiring compliance with Section 50 of the Act." Id., paragraph 3 The Division Bench in Ranbir87 held the same to be an orbitur as the facts before the Court in Namdi Francis Nwazor88 did not warrant such observations as the bag in question therein was not being carried but had already been checked in and the accused was later called back for the search (paragraph 11). The Division Bench went on to hold it was not necessary for the Bench in Namdi Francis Nwazor88 to make any further observation and therefore, the view being unnecessary was a mere orbitur. 79. Justice M. Jagannadha Rao giving the opinion for the Division Bench of the Supreme Court in Sajjadanashin Sayed65 ....
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.... issue was "necessary" to be decided for adjudicating on the principal issue and was decided, it would have to be treated as"directly and substantially" in issue and if it is clear that the judgment was in fact based upon that decision, then it would be res judicata in a latter case (Mulla, p. 104). One has to examine the plaint, the written statement, the issues and the judgment to find out if the matter was directly and substantially in issue (Ishwer Singh v. Sarwan Singh [AIR 1965 SC 948] and Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa [(1976) 4 SCC 780 : AIR 1976 SC 1569] ). We are of the view that the above summary in Mulla is a correct statement of the law. 19. We have here to advert to another principle of caution referred to by Mulla (p. 105): "It is not to be assumed that matters in respect of which issues have been framed are all of them directly and substantially in issue. Nor is there any special significance to be attached to the fact that a particular issue is the first in the list of issues. Which of the matters are directly in issue and which collaterally or incidentally, must be determined on the facts of each case. A material test to be applied is wh....
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....latium and interest would be payable under the Act, at the outset, we will dispose of the objection raised by Shri Vaidyanathan that Hari Krishan Khosla case is not a binding precedent nor does it operate as ratio decidendi to be followed as a precedent and is per se per incuriam. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates-(i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various obse....
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....broad principles which can be culled out are: (i) The ratio decidendi of a decision of a Court alone is binding and not mere orbitur dictum. The only exception is that the orbitur of the Supreme Court is binding upon subordinate courts in the absence of any direct pronouncement on the aspect. Otherwise, orbitur carries only persuasive value. (ii) Not everything said by a judge is binding, it is only points which were raised and decided by the Court and not aspects which were never before the Court as the same constitute mere orbitur. (iii) The prime test to ascertain whether a particular issue was decided is that of necessity, i.e. whether the issue was directly in issue and not collaterally or incidentally in issue. (iv) If a particular expression or opinion was not necessary and was made only "by the way", the same would be orbitur and not binding. (v) It must also be remembered that it is not permissible to dissect a single line from a judgment as judgments are tailored to a particular set of facts. Accordingly, all observations should be adjudged in their context and not isolated therefrom. 84. Now, we must proceed to cull out the....
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....h [CS (OS) 425/1993]. (ii) They entered the foray upon execution of the Agreements to Sale and Sale Deeds in their favour and between them. (iii) Since these transactions were in clear violation of the injunction order passed by this Court, "they did not have any legal sanctity" and "did not confer any right upon the appellants [Vidur] or Bhagwati Developers." (iv) Vidur had no subsisting right in the Suit Property after execution of the Agreement of Sale in favour of Bhagwati. 89. It was the findings in (ii), (iii) and (iv) above that led the Supreme Court to come to the conclusion that the presence of Vidur or Bhagwati was not at all necessary. Id., paragraph 42 The Apex Court went on to hold that the application for impleadment was highly belated and Vidur had knowledge of the lis pending between Khanna and Tosh for years. 90. Accordingly, it is clear that the adjudication of the nature of the right of Vidur and Bhagwati in the Suit Property was deemed necessary by the Supreme Court of India and in this background, it had observed that the sale transactions did not have any legal sanctity and did not confer any right in the Suit Property. It cann....
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....don his suit or abandon a part of his claim: Provided that where the plaintiff is a minor or other person to whom the provisions contained in Rules 1 to 14 of Order XXXII extend, neither the suit nor any part of the claim shall be abandoned without the leave of the Court. ... (3) Where the Court is satisfied,- (a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject- matter of such suit or such part of the claim. (4) Where the plaintiff- (a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule (1), or (b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3), he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim....
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.... a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of that suit on such terms as it thinks fit. The term imposed on the plaintiff in the previous suit was that before bringing a fresh suit on the same cause of action, he must pay the costs of the defendants. Therefore we have to see whether that condition governs the institution of the present suit. For deciding that question we have to see whether the suit from which this appeal arises is in respect of the same subject- matter that was in litigation in the previous suit. The expression "subject-matter" is not defined in the Civil Procedure Code. It does not mean property. That expression has a reference to a right in the property which the plaintiff seeks to enforce. That expression includes the cause of action and the relief claimed. Unless the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are the same as in the first suit, it cannot be said, that the subject-matter of the second suit is the same as that in the previous suit. ... Mere identity of some of the issues in the two suits do not bring about an identity of the subject-matter in the two suits. As observed in Rukhma Bai v. Mahadeo Narayan, [ILR 42 Bom 155] the expr....
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....on for the Court, held as under: "7. ... Mr.Issar has contended that there were different prayers and cause of action was different for filing the two suits, therefore, the provisions of Order 23 Rule 1(4) will not be applicable. We have reproduced prayer clause of both the suits above. It cannot be said that in the sum and substance the prayers sought in the both the suits were not identical. The Court cannot go merely to the form or headings, Court must go to the substance of the prayer to determine as to whether the prayers are identical or different. Cause of action will also depend on the prayers sought in the suit as relief claimed and the cause of action are on the basis of which relief cannot be granted or rejected to the plaintiffs and for the purposes of cause of action of the facts pleaded have to be looked as a bundle of facts in the collective capacity which give right to a claim. Each fact cannot be looked into isolation. We entirely agree with the reasoning of the learned single Judge that if the relief claimed in subsequent suit though not expressly stated but was implicit in the previous plaint by the reason of the bundle of fact pleaded constitute the sam....
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....ate bench of this Court in Jaideep Bajaj34 has held that when a previous suit for injunction in respect of a property was withdrawn without reserving liberty, a subsequent suit could not have been filed for partition and cancellation of relinquishment deed in respect of the same property as being barred by the provisions of Order II Rule 2 and Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code. The relevant paragraphs read as under: "7. Order 2 Rule 2 (2) CPC provides that if the plaintiff omits to sue in respect of any portion of his claim he shall not afterwards sue in respect of portion so omitted. The plaintiff's claim for partition basically depends upon his prayer for cancelling the relinquishment deed dated 18.4.2002. Unless the relinquishment deed is cancelled the plaintiff can lay no claim on any part of the suit property. Although cancellation of relinquishment deed is shown as prayer (b) and partition as prayer (a), the principal relief is cancellation of relinquishment deed. He did not make this claim in the previous suit. In the previous suit he alleged that the defendant had not fulfilled her part of the agreement leading to the relinquishment and is now proceeding to take p....
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....the cause of action of the previous suit. It again stipulates the cause of action to be identical in both the suits. 107. In Inbasagaran,56 the Supreme Court was dealing with a situation where the first suit filed by the plaintiff was filed seeking injunction against the defendant from illegal dispossession, while the plaintiff had sought specific performance of the agreement for sale in respect of the same property once the condition precedent had been fulfilled. The Court held that for the subsequent suit to be barred under Order II Rule 2, the cause of action should be the same. Also see Gurbux Singh v. Bhoorala, AIR 1964 SC 1810, paragraph 6 Observing that cause of action consists of a bundle of facts which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to get relief from the court, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the subsequent suit was not barred as being based on a different cause of action. 108. The term "cause of action" means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to traverse in order to support his right to the judgment. See Read v. Brown, (1888) LR 22 QBD 128 (CA) and Mohd. Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian, AIR 1949 PC 78 109. F....
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....efused to implead the plaintiff as necessary party in Suit No.425/1993. The cause of action is continuing as the threat to the Plaintiffs' right, title and interest qua the suit property continues unabated." 112. Even in the present suit the plaintiffs have derived their title from the Sale Deeds dated 20.05.1997 and are aggrieved by the denial of possession by Khanna. Both the suits are premised in the ownership in the Suit Property having been transferred pursuant to the Sale Deeds and possession of the property being denied to the plaintiffs. The rejection of the impleadment application by this Court or dismissal of SLP by the Supreme Court cannot give rise to a fresh cause of action. Accordingly, it is clear that the cause of action in both the suits was identical. 113. From the perusal of paragraphs 26 and 28 of the plaint, it is evident that the plaintiffs have claimed damages owing to loss occasioned by being deprived of the Suit Property despite payment of the entire sale consideration. The claim is based on the same cause of action as the 1997 Suit and the plaintiffs having failed to sue in the previous suit are precluded from claiming them today. Accordingly, the cl....
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....point any person including the Bailiff to comply with the order passed by this Hon"ble Court as prayed in (b)(i) with the help of police. d) Decree for recovery of possession in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants and/or against their men, agents and associates be passed directing the defendants and/or the Court Receiver appointed by this Hon"ble Court to quit, vacate and deliver the vacant possession of the property to the plaintiffs. c) A decree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his servants, agents, employees and/or anyone acting under him from transferring or letting out or creating in any manner third party interest and from changing the nature or character of the portion marked "A" in Blue ink in any manner whatsoever. c) Pass a decree of permanent injunction restraining defendant nos.1(i) to 1(iii) from claiming themselves and representing themselves as owners of land and property No.21, Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi and/or from executing and registering any Sale Deed in favour of any third party or creating any third party interest or entering into any compromise of any nature whatsoever. d) Award costs of the present proc....
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.... of action accrues. However I am of the opinion that once the plaintiff, besides suing for declaration of title also sues for recovery of possession of immovable property on the basis of title, the limitation for such a suit would be governed by the limitation provided for the relief of possession and not by limitation provided for the relief of declaration. To hold otherwise would tantamount to providing two different periods of limitation for a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property based on title i.e. of three years if the suit besides for the said relief is also for the relief of declaration of title and of twelve years as aforesaid if no relief of declaration is claimed. A relief of declaration of title to immovable property is implicit in a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property based on title inasmuch as without establishing title to property, if disputed, no decree for the relief of possession also can be passed. Thus, merely because a plaintiff in such a suit also specifically claims the relief of declaration of title, cannot be a ground to treat him differently and reduce the period of limitation available to him from that provided of twelve ....
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....as held that if the suit has been filed for possession as a consequence of declaration of the plaintiff's title, Article 58 will have no limitation; F. Boya Pareshappa Vs. G. Raghavendra Nine MANU/AP/3549/2013 where the High Court of Andhra Pradesh while reiterating the earlier view further reasoned that Part V of the Schedule to the Limitation Act specifically deals with category of suits relating to immovable property and having regard to the categorisation made in the Schedule, the limitation provided in Article 65 in Part V is to prevail over Article 58 contained in Part III; it was further reasoned that under Section 27 of the Limitation Act, the right in immovable property stands extinguished after the expiry of the period prescribed for filing of suit for possession thereof; therefore, if the period falls short of the requisite period of 12 years, the right over an immovable property will not get extinguished; thus when a person has a right over an immovable property which right is not extinguished, he can lay the suit in respect of immovable property, even praying for the relief of declaration, at any time within the period of 12 years at the end of which only his ....
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....y the Vendor in the said premises but in the meanwhile, a portion of it is occupied by some unauthorised occupant. AND WHEREAS thus the Vendor is the absolute owner and in the possession of said property. He is in actual physical possession of part of the property and is in legal possession of the remaining part of the property which is in unauthorised occupation of the occupants. The Vendor is fully empowered and competent to sell and dispose of the said property at his discretion. No other person has any right, title or interest of any nature whatsoever in the said property. ... 2. That the physical possession of vacant portion and legal possession of occupied portion of the said property has been handed over by Vendor to Vendee and Vendee has taken over the same, occupied and assumed the physical and legal possession. ... 13. That hereinafter, the Vendee shall be entitled to recover possession from the occupants and shall also be entitled to recover damages for unauthorised use and occupation, whether pertaining to past, present or future and further shall be entitled to retain the possession so recovered. If need be or so required by....
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.... affirmed in my view by the judgment of the Madras High Court in Bhagyathammal v. Dhanabagyathammal and Ors. AIR 1981 Mad 303 paragraph 10 127. Even the plaintiffs do not seem to subscribe their own view as the plaintiffs continued to prosecute the 1997 Suit well after the acceptance of their title by Vidur in 2001 till 2011. 128. Further paragraph 30 of the present plaint, disclosing the cause of action, which has been extracted in paragraph 110 aforegoing, specifically states that the cause of action "arose on and from 20th day of May 1997 and on 30th day of May 1997 when Pradeep Kumar Khanna executed and registered Sale Deeds in favour of the plaintiffs after taking full consideration." Since that date, the possession remained to be hostile to the right of the plaintiffs sought to be enforced today. The pendency of CS (OS) 425/1993, the impleadment application filed therein, the rejection thereof, the dismissal of appeal and the dismissal of the SLP cannot give rise to any fresh cause of action. 129. In the 1997 Suit, it had been averred by the plaintiffs themselves that the cause of action to file the suit arose on 15.07.1997, when Khanna failed to hand over possession....
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....ve bearing on the adjudication of the issues raised in the case. In other words, he owes a duty to the court to bring out all the facts and refrain from concealing/suppressing any material fact within his knowledge or which he could have known by exercising diligence expected of a person of ordinary prudence. If he is found guilty of concealment of material facts or making an attempt to pollute the pure stream of justice, the court not only has the right but a duty to deny relief to such person." 136. One may also refer to M/s Seemax Constructions;25 R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commr.; (1917) 1 KB 486 (DC&CA) State of Haryana & Ors. v. Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd. and Ors.; (1977) 2 SCC 431 Vijay Kumar Kathuria (Dr.) v. State of Haryana and Ors.; (1983) 3 SCC 333 Welcom Hotel v. State of A.P.; (1983) 4 SCC 575 G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka; (1991) 3 SCC 261 Agricultural and Processed Food Products v. Oswal Agro Furane; (1996) 4 SCC 297 Union of India v. Muneesh Suneja; (2001) 3 SCC 92 Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI; (2007) 8 SCC 449 Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank of India; (2008) 2 SCC 326 K.D. Sharma v. SAIL; (2008) 12 SCC 481 G. Jayashree v. Bhagwandas S. Patel; (2009) 3....