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2001 (2) TMI 131

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....led by the plaintiff was alleged to have been barred by limitation in view of the same having been filed more than 12 years after the date of dispossession of the plaintiff. A plea Of the defendant having acquired title by adverse possession was also raised in the written statement. The trial court, on an evaluation of oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, found that ownership in the suit property vested in the plaintiff and the defendant had forcibly occupied the disputed area of 110 x 80 ft. some time in the year 1980-81. The defendant's plea of adverse possession was negatived and the suit filed by the plaintiff was held to have been filed within the period of limitation. On these findings the suit was decreed in its entirety. The defendant preferred an appeal. The learned Additional District judge held that in so far as ownership over the suit land is concerned, the same vested in the plaintiff. However, he found that the possession of the land was given to the plaintiff by the State Government on November 6, 1968, but the plaintiff has not shown to have taken any steps for dispossessing the defendant and the plea raised by the plaintiff of the defendant h....

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.... abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question." The High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and if it does so it acts illegally and in abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on court. The existence of a substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended section 100 of the Code. (see Ksititish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh, Kumar Purkait, AIR 1997 SC 2517 ; [1997] 5 SCC 438 ; Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami, AIR 1997 SC 1041 ; [1997] 4 SCC 713 and Kondiba Dagadu Kadan v. Savithribai Sopan Gujar, AIR 1999 SC 2213 ; [1999] 3 SCC 722). At the very outset we may point out that the memorandum of second appeal filed by the plaintiff-appellant before the High Court suffered from a serious infirmity. Section 100 of the Code, as amended in 1976, restricts the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear a second appeal only on a "substantial question of law involved in the case". An obligation i....

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....a long period. Reasons, of course, are not required to be stated for formulating any question of law under sub-section (4) of section 100 of the Code ; though such reasons are to be recorded under the proviso to sub-section (5) while exercising power to hear on any other substantial question of law, other than the one formulated under sub-section (4). The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means-of having substance, essentials real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradiction with technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the Legislature bas chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of genera] importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as section 109 of the Code or article 133(l)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be beard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. T. Ram Ditta, AIR 1928 PC 172....

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....the appellant to certificate under (the then) section 110 of the Code. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be "substantial", a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involved in the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirety new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the fasts and circumstances of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not ; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation ....

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....on the facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial judge. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact (see Madhusudan Das v. Smt. Narayani Bai, AIR 1983 SC 114). The rule is-and it is nothing more than a rule of practice-that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial judge on a question of fact. (see Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1951 SC 120). Secondly, while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its....