TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2005 (10) TMI 85
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.... the proof of export within prescribed period of 180 days of export nor could he submit the same during the pendency of the adjudication proceeding, which culminated in orders in Original dated 20-1-2002 and dated 28-3-2003, served on the petitioner on 2-1-2003 and 31-3-2003 respectively. 4. The petitioner, for the reasons stated in the petition, details of which are not necessary, could not file appeals against the aforesaid orders before the Commissioner of Central Appeals (Appeals) (the Appellate Authority) within a stipulated period of 30 days. The delayed appeals were filed. In one of the appeals, there was a delay of about 202 days; whereas in another appeal, there was delay of about 194 days. The Appellate Authority not being empowered to condone delay beyond the period of 30 days, excluding the period prescribed for filing appeal, refused to condone delay vide its order dated 30th January, 2004. 5. Not being satisfied with the aforesaid order refusing to condone delay, petitioner carried revision application to the Government of India and the said revision application also came to be rejected with the result revisional authority upheld the order of the Appellate Autho....
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....delay in filing appeal in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. He thus submits that considering the peculiar facts of the case delay should be condoned and appeal should be remitted back to the first Appellate Authority for consideration on merits. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Company - 1996 (84) E.L.T. 401 (S.C.). ^110. On the other hand, Shri Rana, learned senior Counsel appearing for the Revenue, opposed the contentions of the petitioner. He submits that there is no power to condone delay with the first Appellate Authority beyond the prescribed. He submits, there is no justification in reading powers in favour of the authorities under the Act. He further submits that there is no justification in indirectly seeking application of provisions of the Limitation Act to such power of condonation of delay. The issue: 11. The issue that falls for consideration is whether the authorities discharging duties under the Act has power to condone delay beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the Act and, whether provisions of the Limitation Act would apply to the proceedings under the provisions of ....
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.... the delay in filing the application under section 34. The said contention was opposed by the respondents contending that section 34 plainly and expressly excluded the operation of section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Apex Court after considering the scope of section 29(2) and the applicability of the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, and after reviewing the case law, concluded that the history and scheme of 1996 Act supports the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under section 34 to challenge the award is absolute and unextendable by the court under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court after referring to the Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 1995, which preceded the 1996 Act, noted that one of its main objectives was the need to minimise the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process. The Apex Court also referred to the term "expression exclusion" which may follow from the scheme and object of the special or local law by referring to the following observations in the case of Hukumdev Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra - (1974) 2 SCC 133. Even in a case where special law does not exclude the ....
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.... out providing for either extension of time or application of section 5 of the Limitation Act or its principles can be read together harmoniously. Such reading does not lead to any absurdity or unworkability of frustrating the object of the Act. At any rate, in the light of three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav case (1974) 2 SCC 133 and subsequently followed in Anwari Basavaraj Patil case (1993) 1 SCC 636 even though special or local law does not state in so many words expressly that section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the proceedings under those Acts, from the Scheme of the Act and having regard to various provisions such express exclusion could be gathered." 16. In the case of Kirtoskar Penumatic Company (cited supra), the Apex Court was considering the scope of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court ruled that the power conferred by Articles 226/227 is designed to effectuate the law, to enforce the Rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accordance with law. It cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law. In par....