TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1975 (8) TMI 140
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....December 6, 1966 directed ejectment of the non-applicants. They appealed. By his order dated June 22, 1966. the Collector allowed the appeal and dismissed the application. The respondent-Mandir preferred a second appeal, which was allowed by the Additional Commissioner by order dated March 10, 1967. He restored the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. The non-applicants (petitioners herein) filed a revision before the Board of Revenue, which was dismissed by order dated September 30, 1967. Their review application was also dismissed by order dated February 28, 1970. They have now moved this court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ to set aside the orders of the Board of Revenue and the Additional Commissioner. There is no dispute that the land in question was muafi Devasthani held by the deity. The Board of Revenue has held that Fosuram was a lessee under ah oral lease from year to year. Fosuram was directed by the lessor to desist from cultivation from July 1, 1964, after cutting the Rabi crop (of Sambat 2020). The lease stood terminated on July 1, 1964 by virtue of Section 168 (4) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, inasmuch as Fosuram was a lessee of a disabled Bhum....
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....it was said:-- "Undoubtedly, the comma after the word 'public' is misplaced and misleading because it gives an idea that instead of two purposes, namely, religious or charitable, there is a third independent purpose which can be a public purpose. The word 'public' in the definition is used in contradistinction to 'private'. That is to say in the case of a private religious trust this Act will not apply. There can be nothing like a private charitable trust because a trust which is charitable must necessarily be a public trust." Now, it must be recalled that this was said while dealing with the definition of 'public trust' as contained in Section 2 (4) of the M. P. Public Trust Act, 1951. The question in that case was whether 'Maloji Rao Narsingh Rao Shitole Litigation Conduct, Cost and Benefit Trust', could bring a suit for eviction of a tenant under the provisions of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The expression 'public trust' there is defined as follows:-- "Public trust means an express or constructive trust for a public, religious or charitable purpose and includes a temple, a math, a mosque, a church, a w....
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....sp; (i) a widow; or (ii) an unmarried woman: or (iii) a married woman who has been deserted by her husband; "or (iv) a minor; or (v) a person subject to physical or mental disability due to old age or otherwise; or (vi) a person detained or imprisoned under any process of law; or (vii) a person in the service of Armed Forces of the Union; or (viii) a public, charitable or religious institution; or (ix) a local authority or a co-operative society; may lease the whole or any part of his holding." Each category of Bhumiswami enumerated in Sub-section (2) of Section 168 refers to a person who is by his very nature unable to cultivate the land himself. There is nothing to confine the word 'person' to human beings. The word 'person' in this clause refers not only to a natural person but also to a juris....
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....travention of any material term or condition of the lease. In our view this- contention cannot be accepted. The second proviso to Section 168 (2) has a very special object. The Code aims at abolition of intermediaries. It does not contemplate leases which may create subordinate relationship between the Bhumiswami and the tiller of the soil. It is on the ground of necessity and public policy that exceptions have been made in Section 168 itself but at the same time checks and balances have been provided to prevent any abuse of the exceptions. Now the second proviso really aims at preventing a mischief; for instance, where a widow having granted a lease, remarries; or a minor on whose behalf a lease was granted, attains majority. A lease, in either of these cases cannot continue from year to year, nor can it continue for the agreed term of the lease; it shall, by operation of the second proviso, ipso facto, cease to be in force after one year of the widow getting remarried or a minor attaining majority and so on. Likewise, where any such lessor died, the lease cannot be continued by the heirs of the deceased beyond the period of one year after the death of the lessor. It will autom....
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.... It is not the correct reading of the second proviso that it is exhaustive of the conditions in which a lease shall cease to be in force for the purposes of Sub-section (4). In Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661, S. R. Das Actg. C. J. speaking for the court said (at p. 674):-- "It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when--Heydon's case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a was decided that --'..... for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered : 1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act. 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. 3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth, and 4th. The true reason of the remedy, and then the office of all the Judges is always to ma....
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....he meaning of Sub-section (4), Under Sub-section (4), a lessee can be ejected on the application of the Bhumiswami (i) on the ground of contravention of any material term or condition of the lease or (ii) on the lease ceasing to be in force. Under the first, the Bhumiswami has to prove that there was a term or condition of the lease which was material and then to prove that there has been contravention of it by the lessee. The second proviso comes into play when the lease ceases to be in force by efflux of time for which the lease was granted or for any other reason which in the eye of law, means cessation of the lease. Where a lease has been granted for a fixed term, it will cease to be in force on the expiry of that term. On the ground of contravention of any material term or condition, the lessee can be ejected even before the lease ceases to be in force, that is even before the expiry of the lease period, or the happening of the event on which it was agreed that the lease would cease to be in force. The lessor and the lessee can always agree that the lease will stand determined on the happening of an event or on the expiry of a term certain, whichever is earlier. There is....
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....would be repugnant to the context and the intention of the Legislature. For the above reasons, we must hold that the expression 'the lease ceasing to be in force' in Sub-section (4) of Section 168 is not restricted to 'the automatic and statutory cessation of the lease by virtue of Sub-section (2) of that section, but is wide and comprehensive enough to include also every case where the lease ceases to be in force under the contract. Where a lease is from year to year it is determinable by notice given reasonably in advance, calling upon the lessee to desist from cultivating the land from the first day of the ensuing agricultural year and calling upon him to return the possession to the lessor on the ensuing first day of July. On the basis of the continuous and consistent practice and traditions in all the parts of this State, it can be said that where the period of lease is not expressly agreed to between the parties, the lease must be deemd to be from year to year (year meaning agricultural year). The conclusions we have reached above may be summed Up thus:-- (1) In the case of a muafi Devasthani (i.e. rent free grant to a temple), the temple must be pr....