1975 (8) TMI 140 - HC - Indian Laws

Temple Deemed Public Religious Institution, Lessee's Liability for Eviction

The court held that the temple was deemed a public religious institution, and the deity qualified as a disabled Bhumiswami. Fosuram was determined to be a ... Bhumiswami - juristic or artificial person - disabled Bhumiswami - muafi Devasthani presumed to be a public religious institution - automatic cessation of lease under the second proviso - lease ceasing to be in force - contractual determination of lease (effluxion of time / specified event) - year-to-year agricultural lease determinable by notice - ejectment on contravention of a material termBhumiswami - juristic or artificial person - disabled Bhumiswami - Status of the deity (idol) and scope of 'person' in entry (v) and application of entry (viii) of Section 168(2) of the Code - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the word 'person' in entry (v) of Section 168(2) includes juristic, artificial or conventional persons and is not confined to natural persons. An idol or deity installed in a temple is within the category of a 'disabled' Bhumiswami for the purposes of entry (v) because it cannot act by itself and must operate through human agency; this physical incapacity falls within 'otherwise' in entry (v). Consequently, where land is a muafi Devasthani (a rent-free grant to a temple), the deity qualifies as a Bhumiswami within the meaning of entry (v) and entry (viii) of Section 168(2).The deity is a Bhumiswami within entries (v) and (viii) of Section 168(2); 'person' includes juristic persons; the idol is a disabled Bhumiswami.Muafi Devasthani presumed to be a public religious institution - Presumption as to the character of muafi Devasthani and burden of proof - HELD THAT: - The Court held that land admitted to be muafi Devasthani (a rent-free grant to a temple) is to be presumed a public religious institution for the purposes of entry (viii) of Section 168(2), and the burden lies upon the party alleging that the institution is private to plead and prove that fact. In the present case no specific or proved allegation of privacy was made by petitioners.Muafi Devasthani is presumed to be a public religious institution unless the contrary is specifically alleged and proved.Automatic cessation of lease under the second proviso - lease ceasing to be in force - Scope and effect of the second proviso to Section 168(2) and its relation to 'lease ceasing to be in force' in Section 168(4) - HELD THAT: - The Court construed the second proviso to Section 168(2) as creating an automatic, mandatory mode of cessation: when the disability determining entitlement ceases (for example death, remarriage, attaining majority), any lease granted under Section 168(2) ipso facto ceases to be in force after one year of such determination, regardless of contractual terms. That statutory cessation is one species of 'the lease ceasing to be in force' contemplated by Section 168(4). The proviso is not exhaustive of all modes by which a lease may cease to be in force; it effects a statutory, automatic termination in specified circumstances but does not exclude other modes of cessation.The second proviso effects automatic statutory cessation of a lease on determination of the disability and is one form of 'lease ceasing to be in force' within Section 168(4), but it is not the sole mode of cessation.Contractual determination of lease (effluxion of time / specified event) - year-to-year agricultural lease determinable by notice - ejectment on contravention of a material term - Whether 'on the lease ceasing to be in force' in Section 168(4) includes contractual cessation and the determinability of year-to-year agricultural leases by notice - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the phrase 'on the lease ceasing to be in force' in Section 168(4) is wide enough to include contractual determination of lease (for example effluxion of a fixed term or termination upon the happening of a specified event). Accordingly, leases granted under Section 168(2) may cease by contractually agreed events and thereby fall within Section 168(4). The Court further held that in the State, when agricultural leases are granted without an express term they are to be deemed year-to-year (agricultural year) leases, and such year-to-year leases are determinable by reasonable notice given in advance requiring the lessee to desist from cultivation from the first day of the ensuing agricultural year (1st July). Separately, a lessee under Section 168(2) may be ejected under Section 168(4) either for contravention of any material term or condition of the lease (even before expiry) or when the lease has ceased to be in force by statutory or contractual means.Section 168(4)'s reference to lease cessation embraces contractual termination (effluxion of time / specified event) as well as statutory cessation; year-to-year agricultural leases (where no term is expressed) are determinable by notice to desist from the next agricultural year; lessee is ejectable for contravention of material term or on lease cessation.Public, religious or charitable institution - Question as to the precise grammatical and legal scope of the expression 'public, charitable or religious institution' in entry (viii) of Section 168(2) - HELD THAT: - The Court expressly refrained from giving a final, considered ruling on whether the phrase is to be read as encompassing distinct categories 'public', 'religious' and 'charitable' or whether 'public' qualifies the religious and charitable purposes (i.e., 'public religious' and 'public charitable' purposes). The question was left open for future determination.Left open - no final determination made on the grammatical/semantic scope of 'public, charitable or religious institution' in entry (viii) of Section 168(2).Final Conclusion: The petition was dismissed: the Court upheld the Board of Revenue's conclusion that the deity was a disabled Bhumiswami within Section 168(2), that the muafi Devasthani temple is presumed public religious institution absent proof to the contrary, and that the year-to-year lease held by Fosuram ceased to be in force from 1 July 1964 under Section 168(4) (permitting ejectment); the question about the precise reading of 'public, charitable or religious institution' in entry (viii) was left open. Issues Involved:1. Status of the land as 'muafi Devasthani' and its implications.2. Legal status of Fosuram as a lessee or an occupancy tenant.3. Interpretation of 'public, charitable or religious institution' under Section 168(2)(viii) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code.4. Whether an idol or deity qualifies as a 'disabled person' under Section 168(2)(v).5. Conditions under which a lease ceases to be in force under Section 168(4) and the second proviso to Section 168(2).6. Validity of the notice given to Fosuram to desist from cultivation.Detailed Analysis:1. Status of the Land as 'Muafi Devasthani':The land in question was identified as 'muafi Devasthani,' meaning it was a rent-free grant to a temple. The court presumed that the temple was a public religious institution within the meaning of entry (viii) of Section 168(2) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code unless proven otherwise. The burden of proof lay on the party alleging it to be a private institution. The petitioners failed to prove or even allege that the temple was a private institution.2. Legal Status of Fosuram:The Board of Revenue held that Fosuram was a lessee under an oral lease from year to year. The petitioners contended that Fosuram had become an occupancy tenant, but this was rejected. The Khasra entries showed the land as 'muafi Devasthani,' and Fosuram was recorded as a sub-tenant in the kistabandi Khatauni of 1963-64. The only status Fosuram could have had at the commencement of the Code was that of a lessee of a disabled Bhumiswami.3. Interpretation of 'Public, Charitable or Religious Institution':The petitioners argued that the Bhumiswami deity did not fall under the expression 'public, charitable or religious institution' within the meaning of Section 168(2)(viii). The court noted that the expression could be misleading due to a misplaced comma but did not find it necessary to express a considered opinion on this matter. It was held that the temple was a public religious institution, and the deity was a disabled Bhumiswami.4. Deity as a 'Disabled Person':The court held that an idol or deity is a 'disabled person' within the meaning of Clause (v) of Section 168(2). The term 'person' in this context includes juristic or artificial persons. The idol, being unable to act on its own, had to act through human agency, thus qualifying as a person with physical disability.5. Conditions for Lease Cessation:The second proviso to Section 168(2) states that any lease made in pursuance of this sub-section shall cease to be in force after one year of the determination of the disability by death or otherwise. The court clarified that this proviso is not exhaustive of the conditions under which a lease ceases to be in force. The expression 'on the lease ceasing to be in force' in Section 168(4) includes both statutory cessation under the second proviso and contractual determination, such as by effluxion of time or the happening of a specified event.6. Validity of Notice to Fosuram:The lease was determined by a notice (Ex. P-1) calling upon Fosuram to desist from cultivating the land from July 1, 1964. The court held that the lease ceased to be in force on this date within the meaning of Section 168(4). Consequently, Fosuram was liable to be ejected on the application of the Bhumiswami deity.Conclusion:The court concluded that:1. The temple was presumed to be a public religious institution.2. The deity is a disabled Bhumiswami.3. Fosuram was a lessee from year to year.4. The lease ceased to be in force on July 1, 1964, and Fosuram was liable to be ejected.The petition was dismissed, and the petitioners were ordered to pay Rs. 150 as costs to the first respondent. The outstanding amount of the security deposit was to be refunded to the petitioners.