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Issues: (i) Whether a temple holding muafi Devasthani is to be treated as a public religious institution, and whether the deity installed therein is a juristic person falling within the disabled categories under Section 168(2) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. (ii) Whether an agricultural lease granted without an express term was determinable by notice and had ceased to be in force within Section 168(4) of the Code so as to justify ejectment.
Issue (i): Whether a temple holding muafi Devasthani is to be treated as a public religious institution, and whether the deity installed therein is a juristic person falling within the disabled categories under Section 168(2) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959.
Analysis: A rent-free grant to a temple gives rise to a presumption that the institution is public and religious unless the contrary is pleaded and proved. The word "person" in Section 168(2) is of wider import and includes a juristic or artificial person. A deity cannot act except through human agency and is therefore a juristic person suffering from disability within the meaning of the provision. On that footing, the temple and the deity fall within the protected classes contemplated by Section 168(2).
Conclusion: The temple was presumed to be a public religious institution, and the deity was held to be a juristic person within the disabled category under Section 168(2).
Issue (ii): Whether an agricultural lease granted without an express term was determinable by notice and had ceased to be in force within Section 168(4) of the Code so as to justify ejectment.
Analysis: The expression "on the lease ceasing to be in force" in Section 168(4) is wide enough to include contractual determination, including efflux of time and termination by notice, and is not confined to the automatic cessation contemplated by the second proviso to Section 168(2). Where no term is expressed, an agricultural lease is to be treated as a lease from year to year. Such a lease may be determined by reasonable notice requiring the lessee to stop cultivation from the beginning of the ensuing agricultural year. On the facts, the notice made the lease cease to be in force from 1 July 1964.
Conclusion: The lease was validly determined by notice, had ceased to be in force under Section 168(4), and ejectment was justified.
Final Conclusion: The writ challenge failed because the lessee's occupation stood lawfully terminated and the ejectment order was sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: A temple receiving a muafi Devasthani grant is presumed to be a public religious institution, a deity is a juristic person within Section 168(2), and an agricultural lease without a fixed term is from year to year and may be terminated by reasonable notice, falling within the expression "on the lease ceasing to be in force" in Section 168(4).
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