2003 (8) TMI 33
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ct are reproduced hereinbelow: "Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.-Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." Mr. Dipak Deb, learned counsel, appearing in support of the application, submitted before us that in making an application under section 5 of the limitation Act a party was not required to explain the cause of delay within the period prescribed by limitation and that it had consistently been held by the courts, and in par....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ip went on to observe that the law allowed the appellant 90 days' time to file the appeal and if he filed the appeal on the 91st day, he was only required to explain how the delay of one day should be accounted for. In view of such difference between the two learned judges the question was referred to Suhrawardy J. (as his Lordship then was). The learned third judge agreed with the view expressed by Mitter J., and observed as follows: "The question is what is the meaning of the words 'within such period'. To my mind it means 'within the period which ends with the last day of the prescribed period' that is to say before the expiration of the last day for limitation. If the Legislature intended that the defaulting party should satisfy t....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....to mean that the explanation has to cover the whole of the period of delay. The Supreme Court went on to observe that the contention that if sufficient cause had been shown for not making the application within the period prescribed, then the application could be made any time thereafter, was not correct. In fact, in our view, the decision seems to go against the submissions made by Mr. Deb and the decisions cited by him. Mr. Deb thereafter made the submissions from a different angle relating to sufficiency of cause and the meaning of such expression as explained and interpreted by the Supreme Court in various cases. In this regard, Mr. Deb firstly referred to the decision in the case of State of West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah M....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....rs on the merits. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice, that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of the courts. While on the question, we may also refer to the Bench decision of this court in the case of State of West Bengal v. West Bengal Judicial Service Association [1990] 2 CLJ 73, wherein it was observed that the Government will have to be treated as a favoured litigant, particularly when the Department was manned by persons who are highly interested in seeing that the writ petition succeeded. On the aforesaid note Mr. Deb submitted that the courts were required to ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... wait until the last date of limitation for filing an appeal, but when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause shown must establish that because of some events or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. Mr. Bajoria urged that the expression used in connection with the expression "within such period," must mean to include the period prescribed by limitation. The decision relied upon by Mr. Deb in support of his first contention that no explanation was required to be given for the period comprising the period of limitation, apparently supports Mr. Deb's submissions. The only discordant note appears to hav....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....the earlier period which had lapsed. As noticed thereinbefore, in the case of Sitaram Ramcharan [1959-60] 17 FJR 379 ; AIR 1960 SC 260 the Supreme Court observed that the whole of the period of delay was required to be explained, which to us would indicate even the period prescribed by the law of limitation. In our view, any explanation sought to be given for the delay in filing the appeal or application beyond the period of limitation would have to be considered in the facts of each case, particularly when the cause of delay for the period subsequent to the prescribed period of limitation has to be linked with the period during the period of limitation. In our view it would be rather impractical to expect the Governmental authorit....
TaxTMI