TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1994 (12) TMI 331
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.... unless the existing structures proposed to be removed were in fact removed. It was also stated in the IOD that it was given exclusively for the purposes of enabling the party to proceed further with arrangements of obtaining "No Objection" Certificate from the Housing Commissioner under Section 13(bb) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act. In pursuance of the IOD granted by the Corporation, the Company initiated proceeding for eviction of the tenants from the existing structures on the property in question. Ultimately in August 1979, the tenants were evicted and old structures were demolished. In the meantime, in 1975, the State Legislature of Maharashtra enacted the Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Act, 1974 (Maharashtra Act No. IV of 1975) to provide for the establishment of an authority for the purpose of planning, coordinating and supervising the proper, orderly and rapid development of the areas falling within ,hat region. The said Act came into force with effect from 26-1-1975. Section 13 of the Act provides: "13. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, except with the previous permission of the A....
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....opolitan Region Development Authority (hereinafter described as 'BMRDA) under Section 13(2) of the Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for permission to undertake the above development with the FSI of 2.45. The said application was received by the BMRDA on 15-7-1977. The permission was refused by the Metropolitan Authority under Section 13(3) of the Act on 8-9-1977. The respondent-Company preferred an appeal to the State Government under Section 13(4) of the Act on 19-9-1977 which was allowed by the State Government on 23-2-1978. Accordingly, the respondent-Company was given a commencement certificate under Sections 344 and 345 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act on 31-3-1980. 7. Soon thereafter a writ petition was filed by the residents of Colaba challenging the above order of the State Government under Section 13(3) of the Act allowing the appeal of the respondent-Company against the order of the Metropolitan Authority. By a judgment dated 5-4-1984 passed by the Bombay High Court, the order of the State Government as well as the order passed by the Metropolitan Authority under Section 13(3) of the Ac....
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....thority passed under Section 13(3) had been set aside. There was a direction to pass a fresh order, that direction was not carried out at all. BMRDA applied for certified copy of the judgment on 18-4-1984; on 24-5-1984 the Company communicated the operative part of the order dated 5-4-1984 to BMRDA. The Executive Committee of the BMRDA sat on 18-7- 1984 and again on 24-7-1984 and finally decided to reject the application of the respondent-Company under Section 13(2) of the Act on 17-9-1984. The BMRDA had no jurisdiction to pass any order under Section 13(3) of the Act on 17-9-1984, as the requisite period of 60 days provided by under Section 13(3) had expired by that time. It was held by Division Bench that the order dated 17-9-1984 refusing to grant permission passed by the Authority was illegal. The said order was passed beyond the statutory period of 60 days, therefore, permission shall be deemed to have been granted by the Authority in terms of Section 13(3) of the Act. 12.The contention of the appellant in this appeal is that in the first place the writ petition should not have been entertained. The writ petitioner had an adequate alternative statutory remedy. The writ peti....
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.... the order. The stay of the operation of the order, however, did not lead to such results. 16.It is true that the order dated 17-9-1984 after being quashed did not remain in suspended animation. That would have been the case, had the order been merely stayed. That, however, does not mean that the Metropolitan Authority had failed to pass an order within 60 days of the receipt of the application. 17.As a matter of fact, the application received by the Metropolitan Authority on 15-7-1977 was disposed of by an order dated 8-9-1977 within the requisite period of 60 days. Therefore, there is no question of the deeming provision coming into operation in this case at all. The order passed by the Metropolitan Authority may have been quashed by the High Court but the fact remains that an order was actually passed within the requisite period of time. The deeming provision would have come into operation only if no order was passed within 60 days of the receipt of the application on 15-7-1977. 18.After the High Court quashed the order passed by the Metropolitan Authority on 17-9-1984, a fresh order had to be passed under the direction of the Court and not on the basis of any fresh app....
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....12) of Section 132 ridiculous and useless. It cannot be said that what the notified authority could direct under Section 132 could not be done by a court which exercises its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. To hold otherwise would make the powers of courts under Article 226 wholly ineffective. The court in exercising its powers under Article 226 has to mould the remedy to suit the facts of a case." 21. Mr Nariman next drew our attention to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of R. v. Paddington Valuation Officer3. In particular we were referred to the judgment of Salmon, L.J. wherein it was observed: "I am not altogether satisfied that there would be any power to grant mandamus and keep the 1963 valuation list in force by the simple expedient of postponing certiorari until after a new list had been prepared. No doubt it would be convenient, if possible, to follow this course, were the appeal to be allowed; indeed grave inconvenience, if not 2 (1975) 4 SCC 568 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 346: (1974) 96 ITR 390 3 (1966) 1 QB 380: (1965) 2 All ER 836 chaos would follow if the 1956 valuation list were to be revived which both the appellants and respondents at ....
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....er that was passed may have become null and void in law but the fact of the matter is that an order had actually been passed, otherwise there would have been no question of issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing of that order. 25.In the case of Supdt. of Taxes v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust5 this Court dealt with the question whether a notice under Section 7(2) of the Assam Taxation (On Goods Carried by Road or Inland Waterways) Act, 1961 was 4 (1898) 1 QB 802 5 (1976) 1 SCC 766: 1975 Supp SCR 365 valid. The prescribed period of limitation under the Act was two years from the expiry of the relevant period. There was a difference of opinion on this point. The majority view was that the State was guilty of laches even though the State was restrained by an order from taking any action under the Act. The State did not pray for modification of the order. The State followed the policy of inactivity. Therefore, the notice under Section 7(2) issued in that case was held invalid. 26.In the instant case, there is no question of any inactivity. The appellant had passed an order within 60 days, which was ultimately quashed by the High Court. The deeming clause u....