1994 (12) TMI 331 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court clarifies statutory remedy, deems permission, and orders appeal under Section 13(3) (3)

The Supreme Court held that the High Court should not have entertained the writ petition as the petitioner had already availed of an alternative statutory ... Deemed grant of permission - statutory limitation for administrative decision - effect of quashing on time-barred deeming provisions - alternative statutory remedy and writ jurisdiction - fresh order under court direction not subject to original time limit - consequential order treated as original for appeal purposesAlternative statutory remedy and writ jurisdiction - Whether the writ petition by residents was maintainable when an alternative statutory remedy (appeal) existed and had been availed of and was pending. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the point is of substance and the writ petition ought not to have been entertained because there was an adequate alternative remedy under the statute which had in fact been invoked and was pending. Where an appellant has an alternative statutory remedy and has availed it, invoking writ jurisdiction for essentially the same relief is improper; the existence and actual invocation of the statutory appeal rendered the writ petition unsuitable for adjudication by the High Court in these circumstances. [Paras 12, 13]Writ petition was not maintainable insofar as the petitioner had an adequate alternative statutory remedy which was being pursued.Deemed grant of permission - effect of quashing on time-barred deeming provisions - statutory limitation for administrative decision - Whether the deeming provision in Section 13(3) (permission deemed granted if no order is passed within 60 days) operated after the High Court quashed an order and directed reconsideration, so as to deem permission granted. - HELD THAT: - The Court construed sub-section (3) to operate only if the Metropolitan Authority failed to pass any order within 60 days of receipt of the application. In the present case an order had in fact been passed within 60 days (8-9-1977) though it was later quashed. Quashing an order does not mean no order was ever passed; it restores the parties to the position as if the order were void, but it does not convert the prior act into a non-event for purposes of the statutory deeming provision. Consequently, the deeming fiction could not be invoked on the basis that the authority later, after quashing, failed to pass a fresh order within 60 days counted from the original receipt date. The statute's time-limit was satisfied by the initial order; any fresh order pursuant to a quashing direction is governed by the appellate or court direction rather than by the original 60-day period. [Paras 14, 16, 17, 26]Deeming provision in Section 13(3) did not operate after quashing; because an order was in fact passed within 60 days, permission could not be deemed to have been granted by reason of subsequent quashing.Fresh order under court direction not subject to original time limit - consequential order treated as original for appeal purposes - Whether a fresh consequential order required by a court's direction must be passed within the original statutory period of 60 days and how such consequential order is to be treated for purposes of appeal and limitation. - HELD THAT: - The Court reaffirmed the principle that the statutory time-limit applicable to the initial decision is satisfied once an order is passed within that period; any subsequent order required by a court or appellate direction need not be confined to the original statutory period but must be passed within a reasonable time or within any time fixed by the court. Moreover, the consequential order made after quashing must be treated as an order under Section 13(3) for the purpose of appeal, and the limitation for filing an appeal shall run from the date of that fresh consequential order. [Paras 18, 19, 20, 28]A fresh order made pursuant to a court's direction is not bound by the original 60-day limit; the consequential order is to be treated as an order under Section 13(3) for appeal purposes, with limitation counted from the date of that fresh order.Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the High Court judgment setting aside the Metropolitan Authority's action and holding the permission deemed granted is set aside. The writ petition was improperly entertained in view of an available and availed statutory appeal; the deeming provision did not apply because an order had been passed within 60 days; and any fresh consequential order pursuant to the court's direction is not subject to the original 60-day period though it will be treated as an order under Section 13(3) for appeal and limitation purposes. No order as to costs. Issues Involved:1. Jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the writ petition.2. Applicability of the statutory time-limit for deemed permission.3. Validity of the Metropolitan Authority's order under Section 13(3) of the BMRDA Act.Summary:Jurisdiction of the High Court to Entertain the Writ Petition:The appellant contended that the writ petition should not have been entertained by the High Court as the writ petitioner had an adequate alternative statutory remedy, which was already availed by filing an appeal before the statutory authority. The Supreme Court agreed, stating, 'This is a case, where there is not only the existence of an alternative remedy but the writ petitioner actually had availed of that remedy. The writ petitioner's appeal before the statutory authority was pending. In that view of the matter this writ petition should not have been entertained.'Applicability of the Statutory Time-Limit for Deemed Permission:The respondent-Company argued that permission must be deemed to have been granted as the Metropolitan Authority did not refuse permission within 60 days as required by Section 13(3) of the Act. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, clarifying that the statutory fiction of deemed permission arises only if there is a failure on the part of the Metropolitan Authority to pass an order within 60 days of the receipt of the application. The Court stated, 'No question of this time-limit arises when the Appellate Authority quashes the order and directs a fresh order to be passed.' The Court further noted, 'The application received by the Metropolitan Authority on 15-7-1977 was disposed of by an order dated 8-9-1977 within the requisite period of 60 days. Therefore, there is no question of the deeming provision coming into operation in this case at all.'Validity of the Metropolitan Authority's Order under Section 13(3) of the BMRDA Act:The respondent-Company contended that the Metropolitan Authority had no jurisdiction to pass any order dealing with the application under any provision except Section 13(3). The Supreme Court agreed, stating, 'The consequential order passed by the Metropolitan Authority after it was quashed by the High Court must be treated as an order under Section 13(3) of the Act for the purpose of appeal and the limitation must be counted from the date of the fresh order.' However, the Court clarified that the time-limit for passing an order under Section 13(3) does not apply to the fresh order that has to be passed after the appellate order or the High Court's direction.Conclusion:The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment under appeal dated 15-6-1994, and stated, 'The appellant will be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.' The related Civil Appeals Nos. 9153-54 of 1994 were also allowed in view of the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 9152 of 1994.