TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1955 (8) TMI 38
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.... Anyhow disputes arose about the succession to the jagir on the death of Pratapsingh. Eventually the dispute was confined to Purshottam Singh on the one hand, and Narain Singh opposite party, on the other. The matter was enquired into by the Additional Jagir Commissioner, and he made a report on 1 -9 -1953. In this report, the Additional Jagir Commissioner said that Purshotamsingh would be entitled to succession if the rule of Muris -ala was ignored; but that if the rule of Muris -ala was applied, Narainsingh would be entitled to succeed. This report was sent to the Government, and eventually the Revenue Minister recommended to His Highness the Rajpramukh that Narain Singh should be recognised and this was done. 3. The applicant raised a number of contentions in his application, but the main contention was that after the coming into force of the Constitution of India on 26 -1 -1950, Art. 7(3) of the Covenant under which His Highness the Rajpramukh exercised the power of recognising succession was abrogated. It is also said that His Highness the Rajpramukh was exercising quasi -judicial functions when exercising his powers under Art. 7(3) of the Covenant, and the principles....
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....s that Covenant must be deemed to have come into force before Ordinance No. 1 of 1949, for this Ordinance was issued by His Highness the Rajpramukn in pursuance of the powers conferred on him by the Covenant. Therefore we have to see the effect of Art. VII(3) on S. 107 of the Qanoon Mal Mewar, and we cannot substitute the Rajpramukh in place of Shriji Hazur in that section at the moment at which the covenant creating the present State of Rajasthan came into force. We have, therefore, first to consider the effect of the Covenant on the laws of the covenanting State existing at the moment when the covenant came into force. It is obvious that the covenant being the Constitution of the new State would abrogate any law not consistent with it. The covenant provided by Art. VII(3) that the exclusive jurisdiction to recognise succession would be in the Rajpramukh of the new State. This provision was clearly inconsistent with the provision in S. 10, of the Qanoon Mal Mewar, modified by the United State of Rajasthan Administration Ordinance (No. 1 of 1948) of the former State of Rajasthan, by which the Rajpramukh of the former State was substituted in place of the Ruler. In Art. VII....
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....hadur Singh's case (A) fully applies to the facts of this case. 5. It was next urged that apart from the provisions of Qanoon Mal Mewar, the Rajpramukh had power under Art. VI(2) of the Covenant of the present State of Rajasthan to make a decision regarding succession to jagir. We are of opinion that Art. VI (2) does not help the opposite parties. It provides that, after the administration has been made over by the Ruler of the Covenanting State to the Rajpramukh, all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler which appertain or are incidental to the Government of the Covenanting State shall vest in the United State, and shall thereafter be exercisable only as provided by this Covenant or by the Constitution to be framed thereunder, and that all duties and obligations of the Ruler pertaining or incidental to the Government of the Covenanting State shall devolve on the United State and shall be discharged by it. 6. It is clear however that rights, authority and jurisdiction have to be exercised as provided by the Covenant, and there is a specific provision in Art. VII (3) how the right to recognise succession would be exercised. In the face of that specific ....
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....e civil Court. It would, therefore, be not right to say that after the coming into force of the Constitution the power of recognition of succession to jagirs would still be a matter covered by the executive power conferred on the Governor or the Rajpramukh under Art. 154. Such a question has to be decided in the civil Courts unless there is an express or implied bar. 7. Then it was urged that the jagirs were grants by the Rulers, and as such it was for the State to recognise succession to jagirs. There is, in our opinion, no such principle of law that succession to a grant can only be recognised by the grantor. Whatever might have been the original incidents of a jagir, it is clear that by the time the Constitution came into force in 1950, succession to jagirs was recognised in every State, though the jagirdar was not an absolute owner of the jagir, and there were certain restrictions on his dealing with the jagir and on his right to adopt a son. But there was certainly a limited right to succession to jagirs subject to payment of certain succession fees etc., and the laws of most of the covenanting States provided that the forum for recognising succession was either some ....
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....ourts or officers, or by the Rajpramukh, in cases or proceedings arising out of, or under, the laws of the covenanting States providing for the resumption of Jagirs in those States and the recognition of succession to the rights and titles of Jagirdars therein shall be valid and shall be deemed always to have been valid and shall not be liable to be called in Question in any Civil Court. We are not concerned here with orders passed by authorities other than the Rajpramukh. So far as the Rajpramukh is concerned, it is provided that final decisions by the Rajpramukh in cases or proceedings arising out of or under the laws of the covenanting States for recognition of succession to jagirs shall be valid, and shall not be liable to be called in question in any suit. The contention on behalf of the applicant is that this section cannot validate the decisions of the Rajpramukh, and cannot override the effect of this Court's decision in - 'Bahadur Singh's case (A)'. In support of this contention, two arguments are advanced before us. In the first place it is contended that the decision in the present case was not given in any case or proceeding arising out of or under....
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....nferred by that Article being inconsistent with Art. 154 could not be exercised by the Rajpramukh. Therefore, when S. 3 validates the decisions of the Rajpramukh given under the provisions of the now abrogated Art. 7(3), it is doing indirectly the same thing which is inconsistent with the Constitution, namely validating executive decisions of the Rajpramukh which he could not arrive at under his executive functions as contained in Art. 154 of the Constitution. There would be force in this argument, if these decisions of the Rajpramukh can still be called executive decisions after their validation under S. 3 of the Ordinance. As we look to S. 3, we feel that it is really in two parts. It was decided in Bahadur Singh's case (A) that there was no forum provided for the decision of disputes relating to succession to jagirs except of course a civil Court under S. 9, Civil P.C., after 25 -1 -50. What S. 3 of the Ordinance, in our opinion, does is firstly to provide a forum retrospectively for the decision of such disputes, and then to say that the decisions given by such authorities would be valid and would be deemed to have always been valid, and would not be liable to be call....
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....f Government. Further, S. 6 provides forum for institution or disposal of new cases, and appeals therefrom right up to the Board of Revenue, and it is obvious that this forum is also a quasi -judicial tribunal. If, therefore, the Rajpramukh was a quasi -judicial tribunal in the matter of this decision which has been validated by S. 3 of the Ordinance, the question arises whether the Rajpramukh violated the principles of natural justice in deciding this matter and if he did, whether this Court has power to interfere in spite of S. 3 of the Ordinance. 11. So far as the power of this Court is concerned, it is enough to say that S. 3 of the Ordinance, when it says that the final decision of the Rajpramukh shall not be liable to be called in question in any civil Court, does not bar the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. That jurisdiction cannot be barred by any legislation by any State, and can only be taken away by an amendment of the Constitution, even though this Court may be exercising civil jurisdiction when dealing with a matter of this kind. As, therefore, the Rajpramukh is to be treated as a quasi -judicial tribunal for purposes of the....
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....t such a question as though it were a trial. They have no power to administer an oath, and need not examine witnesses. They can obtain information in any way they think best always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view. 14. In 'Local Government Board v. Arlidge',, 1915 AC 120 (D) there was an appeal before the Local Government Board. The law provided that the procedure on any such appeal shall be such as the Local Government Board might by rules determine, provided that the rules shall provide that the Board shall not dismiss any appeal without having first held a public local enquiry. It was then held that an appellant to the Local Government Board was not entitled as of right, as a condition precedent to the dismissal of his appeal, to be heard orally before the deciding officer. The observations of Lord Loreburn in 'Board of Education v. Rice (C)' were approved even in a case of appeal. In 'Mohandas Mulji Sicka v. Collector of Bombay',, AIR 1948 Bom 63 (E) these two cases were relied on, and the order of the Collector dismissing the....