TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1998 (4) TMI 512
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.... of 4 years, revision proceedings were initiated. But it was completed beyond the period of 4 years by the order impugned herein. The petitioner challenges the same on the following contentions: 1.. The power under section 21 exercised should be initiated and completed within a period of 4 years. 2.. The basic factual requirements under section 21 do not exist in the case. 3.. As regards the first contention is concerned, I am of the view that the question is no more res integra. This Court as early as in S. Subha Rao v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [1967] 19 STC 257 (Mys) which was followed in Keshawa Trading Company v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [1986] 62 STC 102 (Kar) has taken the view that the proceedings under secti....
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....oing of which cannot be demanded as an absolute right of the party asking it to be done. The proposition for the exercise of judicial discretion is always based on a given state of facts and addresses itself to the favour of the judge. It is not based on the right of the party seeking to have the thing done, founded in the law applicable to the facts involved, but is always an appeal ex gratia.": Alden v. Hinton 6 DC 217, 223. "'Exercise' is put to action......." (vide: Words and Phrases-Permanent Edition-Vol. 15A, page 356). On these meanings that are apposite in the context, the term 'exercisable' must, at any rate, mean taking action or doing something, if not doing something with which aspect, we are not concerned in these cases. ....
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....ragraph 1327). If the repository of a statutory power should exercise it reasonably, we are unable to understand the dichotomy in the said process-that the initiation of the proceedings should be within a reasonable time, but the rendering of the final order can be at any time, arbitrarily. No such distinction can be drawn. The said distinction has no legal basis to stand on. It is true that in Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. v. CIT [1982] 134 ITR 318 (MP), a case which arose under the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, a Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that, in the absence of any statutory provision prescribing any period of limitation for the completion of an assessment it cannot be held that the assessment must be made within....
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....even in the absence of a fetter in that behalf in the statute concerned. In our view, both "termini" stand on the same footing. If suo motu revisional proceedings can be invoked only within a reasonable time, by the same logic, the proceedings themselves should be rendered or passed within a reasonable time. The repository of statutory power should be reasonable, that means that Damocles' sword should not hang endlessly at the caprice of any statutory authority." Their Lordships were of the opinion that if the initiation is done within a reasonable time, there is no reason why the same should not be directed to be completed within the same period. But in view of the Division Bench ruling of this Court on the same subject in Subba Rao v. ....