TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2011 (1) TMI 18
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....ial to be stated for adjudication of this petition are that the petitioner, a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, is a merchant exporter and engaged in the export of various engineering goods under Rule 19 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002. It had executed bond with the respondents for exporting the goods by purchasing manufactured excisable goods duty free on the basis of CT-1 issued from time to time by the respondents. It had submitted necessary documents on 28.7.2004 and 19.10.2004 which had been scrutinized by the respondents and thereafter show cause notice No.6 dated 25.7.2005 and show cause notice No.9 dated 30.09.2005 had been served on the petitioner company. The petitioner explained all queries which were made in the aforesaid show cause notices in its replies dated 24.08.2005 and 04.10.2005 and made a prayer to the respondents to drop the proceedings and to withdraw the show cause notices. 3. As put forth, the adjudicator, namely, the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, dealt with the show cause notices jointly and issued an order dated 22.8.2006 making a demand of Rs. 3,29,819/- in terms of the provisions of Section 11-AC of the Act. 4. The ....
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..... To bolster his submissions he has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhau Rao Patil and Anr., (1996) 1 SCC 169, Ramakant Mayekar v. Celine D' Silva, (1996) 1 SCC 399 and Jindal Steel and Power Ltd. and Anr. v. Ashoka Alloy Steel Ltd. and Ors., (2006) 9 SCC 340. 9. Combating the aforesaid submissions Ms. Rajdipa Behura, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 and Mr. Mukesh Anand, learned counsel for the respondent No.2 submitted that the method of computation adopted by the Commissioner of Appeals cannot be faulted with as the memorandum of appeal was presented on 28th November, 2006 which was a Tuesday. It is submitted by them that had it been filed on 27th November, 2006 the benefit of the Saturday and Sunday prior to the Monday, would have enured to the benefit of the petitioner for the purpose of computation of period of limitation. It is their further submission that if the method of computation as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted then every Saturday and Sunday which will come within 60 days of preferring the appeal would stand excluded which the law of extension of period of limitation does not conceive of a....
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.... 29(2) would be attracted, what we have to determine is whether the provisions of this section are expressly excluded in the case of reference to the High Court. 35. It was contended before us that the words "expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of remedy provided therein is such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions ....
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....e position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only upto 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days period." 13. In view of the aforesaid, there can be no scintilla of doubt that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days after expiry of initial 60 days. In the case at hand, the admitted position is that the order passed by the adjudicating officer was received by the petitioner on 29th August, 2006. The appeal was preferred on 28th November, 2006. The Commissioner excluded the date of receipt of the order in-original by the petitioner in terms of provision contained in Section 35-O and took note of the fact that the appeal was presented on the 91st day of the period commencing after the said date of receipt, i.e., one day beyond the condonable period of 30 days and, hence, the same could not have....
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....in the High Court on 16.4.1990. If Section 10 of the General Clauses Act applies, the explanation is obvious and the election petition must be treated to have been presented within time. 14. The question now is: Whether the applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act to the presentation of election petitions under the R.P. Act is excluded? No doubt the R.P. Act is a self-contained code even for the purpose of the limitation prescribed therein. This, however, does not answer the question. It has to be seen whether the context excludes the applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act which is in the part therein relating to the General Rules of Construction of all Central Acts. The legislative history of prescribing limitation for presentation of election petitions in accordance with sub-section (1) of Section 81 is also significant for a proper appreciation of the context. Admittedly, Section 10 of the General Clauses Act applied when by virtue of the requirement in the then existing sub-section (1) of Section 81, the period of limitation was prescribed by Rules framed under The R.P. Act, in Rule 119 of the 1951 Rules. This was expressly provided by Rule 2(6)....
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....g the legal validity of an order passed by the High Court which had quashed the prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that the complaint was filed two days after the expiry of the period of limitation. Their Lordships came to hold that the cause of action to file the complaint accrued on 26.1.1997 which has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation as required under Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and, therefore, the limitation would be counted from 27.1.1997 and the complaint was filed on 26.2.1997 within a period of one month from that day. To arrive at the said conclusion, their Lordships referred to the decision in Saketh India Ltd. & Ors. v. India Securities Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 1. In the said case, their Lordships referred to the decision in Haru Das Gupta v. State of W.B., (1972) 1 SCC 639 wherein it was held thus: "7. The aforesaid principle of excluding the day from which the period is to be reckoned is incorporated in Section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 12(1) specifically provides that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appea....
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....ch the last day for filing it expired was held to be in time. We hold that the cross-objection cannot be dismissed as barred by time." 20. In this context, we may fruitfully refer to the decision in Umedsingh Baliram Raghubanshi v. Shankerlal Jhanaklal & Ors., AIR (35) 1948 Nagpur 63, wherein Hidayatullah, J. (as his Lordship then was), while dealing with the concept of Court closed when period of limitation expires under Section 4 and Article 166 of the Limitation Act, 1908 held as follows: 5. It has been held in 57 ALL. 242 that Ss. 4 and 14, Limitation Act, are not similar in their effect. Whereas under S.14 of the Act the time spent can be excluded, S.4 does not entitle a person to add the days on which the Court is closed to the statutory period. He must do the act on the very next day on which the Court is open. Applying these rulings in the light of the Privy Council case just referred to here, it was imperative for Umed Singh to file his application and make the necessary deposit on 23rd September 1944 when presumably the Court was present. The applicant has been unable to show why he should be excused for not filing his application on 23rd September 1944 and for not ....