TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1973 (11) TMI 75
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....he period during which the assessment proceedings relating to the dealer remained stayed under the order of any civil or other competent court had to be excluded. As assessment for the year 1952-53 was completed by the Sales Tax Officer long after the expiry of four years after the end of that year, the assessee filed an appeal before the appellate authority, inter alia, on the ground that the assessment order was barred by time. It appears that during the pendency of the assessment proceedings, which had been Initiated within time, the assessee filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court and on 22nd July, 1954, obtained an order staying the assessment proceedings. That stay order remained in force up to 30th April, 1959. Accordingly, in view of the explanation to section 21(2) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, after excluding the period during which the assessment proceedings remained stayed under the orders of the High Court, the assessment order could be made by 3rd February, 1962. However, the assessee again obtained an order from the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, on 16th December, 1960, staying further assessment proceedings pending against ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....nsel appearing for the department, on the other hand, contended that while computing the limitation provided under section 21, the entire period between 16th December, 1960, to 7th May, 1961, and that between 16th December, 1960, to the date on which the order dated 23rd January, 1961, vacating the stay order passed by the Judge (Revisions), i.e., 5 months and 24 days, was communicated to the Sales Tax Officer, had to be excluded. The assessment, therefore, could be made up to 27th June, 1962. Thus the assessment made on 23rd June, 1962, was within limitation. As stated earlier, according to the explanation to section 21(2), as It stood at the relevant time, where the assessment proceedings relating to any dealer remained stayed under the orders of any civil or competent court, the period during which the proceedings remained stayed has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation for assessment provided therein. The period during which the proceedings were stayed under the order dated 23rd January, 1961, passed by the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, can be excluded only if it is held that the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, is a civil or other competent court within the mea....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... decision which is binding on both the parties. In the circumstances, it cannot be disputed that while performing his duties under the Act the Judge (Revisions) acts judicially and makes an order which determines the rights of the parties. Accordingly, the revising authority appointed under the U.P. Sales Tax Act can be regarded as a court. Learned standing counsel further pointed out that the expression "court" has been defined in the Evidence Act as including all Judges and Magistrates and all persons except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence, and contended that a Judge (Revisions) appointed under the U.P. Sales Tax Act is legally authorised to take evidence and, as such, he is a court within the meaning of that expression. In support of this submission the learned counsel relied upon the following observations appearing in the judgment of Mahajan, J., in the case of Bharat Bank v. Employees of Bharat BankA.I.R. 1950 S.C. 188 at 195. : "As pointed in Halsbury's Laws of England, the word 'court' originally meant the King's palace but subsequently acquired the meaning of (1) a place where justice was administered, and (2) the person or persons who administer it. In....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....questions of law after hearing the arguments on behalf of the parties. Further, the decision given by him disposes of the whole matter on findings upon the disputed facts and application of the law of the land to the facts so found. Accordingly, the proceedings before the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, fulfil the four tests laid down in Cooper's case[1937] 2 K.B. 309. , and they are judicial proceedings. Since the proceedings before the Judge (Revisions) are judicial proceedings as distinguished from quasi-judicial proceedings, he should be considered to be a court and not a tribunal. We are unable to accept the submission that merely because the proceedings before the Judge (Revisions) can be said to be judicial proceedings, he becomes a court properly so called. In Bharat Bank's caseA.I.R. 1950 S.C. 188., the question which the learned judges of the Supreme Court were required to consider was whether an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act was a court or tribunal within the meaning of article 136 of the Constitution which enables the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination or order in any case or matte....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a court as distinguished from a quasijudicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a court" and urged that the Judge (Revisions) determines the rights of parties by a definitive judgment and that the parties are entitled as of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. He is therefore a court as explained by Venkatarama Ayyar, J. He suggests that the view expressed by Mahajan, J., on this point in Bharat Bank's caseA.I.R. 1950 S.C. 188. stands modified. Aforementioned observations made by Venkatarama Ayyar, J., are preceded by the observations that there has been considerable discussion in the courts in England and Australia as to what are the essential characteristics of a court as distinguished from a tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions, vide Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation[1931] A.C. 275., R. v. London County Council[1931] 2 K.B. 215., Cooper v. Wilson[1937] 2 K.B. 209., Huddart Parker and Co. v. Moorhead[1909] 8 C.L.R. 355. and Rola Company ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....e tribunals with many of the trappings of a court which, nevertheless, are not courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial powers." Learned Judges further approved the following negative proposition enunciated by Lord Sankey at page 297 in Shell Company's case [1931] A.C. 275 at 283.: "In that connection it may be useful to enumerate some negative propositions on the subject: (1) A tribunal is not necessarily a court in the strict sense because it gives a final decision. (2) Nor because it hears witnesses on oath. (3) Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide. (4) Nor because it gives decision which affects rights of subjects. (5) Nor because there is an appeal to a court. (6) Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body." Similarly in Smt. Ujjam Bai's case(2), Hidayatullah, J., described the sales tax authorities thus: "The taxing authorities are instrumentalities of the State. They are not a part of the Legislature; nor are they a part of judiciary. Their functions are the assessment and collection of taxes, and in the process of assessing taxes they follow a pattern of action, which is co....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ng the function of Registrar under section 48 read with section 6(2) of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, is a court" and urged that as the Judge (Revisions) appointed under the U.P. Sales Tax Act performs his functions in the same manner, he should also be considered to be a court. It is significant to note that the Supreme Court held the Registrar exercising powers under section 48 of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act to be a court not merely because he was to perform his duties in the same manner in which civil court performs its functions, but also because under the Act he was required to discharge the duties and functions which would otherwise have fallen on ordinary civil and revenue courts of the land. The function of the appellate and the revisional authorities appointed under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, on the other hand, is to check the action of the assessing authority in connection with the assessment and collection of sales tax which is not the ordinary judicial power of the State. It follows that the Judge (Revisions) or the Appellate Tribunal have not been appointed to discharge the duties which would otherwise have fallen on the ordinary civ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....e tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions. Merely because the administrative tribunals have the trappings of a court they are not court in the sense of exercising judicial power. The tribunal is not necessarily a court in the strict sense because it gives a final decision nor because it hears the witnesses on oath, nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide, nor because it gives decision which affects the right of subjects, nor because there is appeal to a court, nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body...............Unless judicial power is vested a tribunal does not become a judicial tribunal or court, and that by the mere fact that a tribunal is clothed with some of the judicial functions, it does not attain the status of a court. The decisions of courts are arrived at usually by the application of objective standards which are fixed, i.e., in accordance with the principles of procedure and the mode of taking evidence in the manner laid down In the case of administrative authorities and very often they are not bound to observe the judicial procedure, though on the principles of natural justice they....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....se is that strictly speaking the expression "court" does not cover the authorities like the Judge (Revisions) appointed under the U.P. Sales Tax Act and that such authorities are in fact tribunals which are expected to perform their functions in a quasi-judicial manner. It may be that sometimes the expression court is loosely used so as to cover tribunals expected to act in a quasi-judicial manner. His observations cannot be interpreted to mean that, properly speaking, a quasi-judicial tribunal which does not perform any judicial functions of the State can be equated with "court" properly so called. Learned standing counsel then contended that the observation of Dwivedi, J., clearly indicates that even though a tribunal is not strictly covered by the expression "court", but it is possible that in some statutes the expression "court" is used in a wider sense so as to include within its ambit not only the authorities which are strictly courts but also tribunals which are expected to function in the same manner in which courts function. According to him, the ambit of the expression "court", as used in a particular enactment, will depend upon the context in which it has been used. H....