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Issues: Whether the show-cause notice invoking the extended limitation under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was sustainable where the normal limitation under Section 73 had expired.
Analysis: The annual-return due dates stood extended under Section 44(1) and Rule 80, and the limitation exclusion granted during the pandemic resulted in the three-year period under Section 73 expiring on 28.02.2025 for all the relevant financial years. The notice dated 13.06.2025 was therefore beyond the ordinary limitation. Invocation of Section 74 required the Assessing Officer's satisfaction, founded on facts disclosed in the notice, that fraud, willful misrepresentation, or suppression had caused the tax shortfall or excess input-tax credit. The omitted Explanation 2 to Section 74 could not be invoked. A bare recital of suppression, without foundational facts demonstrating a deliberate device to evade tax or avail excess credit, did not establish such satisfaction. The audit objection having been placed before the Public Accounts Committee also showed the absence of departmental satisfaction. A protective demand is not a statutorily recognised measure under the GST regime.
Conclusion: The notice under Section 74 and the consequential order-in-original were unsustainable and were set aside; the Department may initiate fresh proceedings under Section 74, if warranted, on properly stated foundational facts and by passing an order before 28.02.2027.
Extended limitation for GST demand - foundational facts of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression - Willful Misrepresentation - Suppression of Facts
Limitation for GST demand under Section 73 - Limitation for initiating demand proceedings for the subject financial years where the due dates for annual returns had been extended and the pandemic exclusion applied - HELD THAT: - The extensions granted for furnishing annual returns altered the commencement of the statutory limitation. Giving effect to the exclusion of the pandemic period, the three-year limitation u/s 73 stood extended to the same terminal date for the first two financial years, while for the third year it remained unchanged; the impugned notice was issued after expiry of that limitation. [Paras 5, 6, 7]
The notice could not be sustained within the ordinary limitation under Section 73.
Satisfaction for invocation of Section 74 - Foundational facts of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression - whether the SCN can be sustained based on the extended period of five years as available u/s 74 which can be availed by the Department only if there is an allegation of fraud/willful misrepresentation/ facts/suppression? - HELD THAT: - Proceedings under Sections 73 and 74 require the Assessing Officer's satisfaction; for Section 74, such satisfaction must extend to fraud, wilful misrepresentation or suppression causing the alleged tax shortfall or input tax credit mismatch. Audit objections cannot substitute that satisfaction. The notice contained only a bald assertion of availment of input tax credit without documentary evidence and suppression of facts, without disclosing foundational facts from which a deliberate device to evade tax or avail excess credit could be inferred. Mechanical recital of the statutory expressions cannot justify recourse to the extended period. [Paras 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]
The show-cause notice and the consequential order were set aside; the Department was left at liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings under Section 74, if warranted, on a notice disclosing foundational facts and within the available extended period.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the impugned show-cause notice and consequential order were set aside, subject to liberty to the Department to proceed afresh in accordance with Section 74 and the applicable extended limitation.
Alternative statutory remedy in disputed questions of fact - Service of show cause and hearing notices - Exercise of writ jurisdiction against an adjudication order where service of the show cause notice, hearing notice and order was disputed
HELD THAT:- The Special Leave Petition was dismissed, the Court declining to interfere with the impugned High Court order [2026 (8) TMI 1498 - DELHI HIGH COURT]
Issues: Whether an applicant claiming GST budgetary support must be afforded an opportunity to explain an apparent discrepancy between its declaration and the Chartered Accountant certificate before its claim is concluded.
Analysis: The declaration stated a higher input tax credit figure than the Chartered Accountant certificate furnished at the respondents' direction. The certificate disclosed the figure claimed to be the actual eligible credit, yet the proceedings were concluded by relying on the declaration without seeking an explanation for the discrepancy. The absence of a specific provision permitting post-filing revision did not dispense with the obligation to act fairly where the discrepancy was apparent from the record. A declaration is not invariably conclusive where the claimant asserts an error and seeks to substantiate it with supporting material.
Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to explain and substantiate the alleged error in the declaration before the claim could validly be concluded.
Fair hearing in budgetary support claims - Opportunity to explain discrepancy in input tax credit declaration
Validity of concluding a budgetary support claim by relying on the input tax credit declaration despite an apparent discrepancy with the Chartered Accountant certificate furnished at the respondents' direction, without affording the claimant an opportunity to explain the discrepancy - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the matter was not one of post-conclusion rectification in the ordinary sense. The defect was anterior: the proceedings had been concluded without considering the discrepancy apparent between the declaration and the Chartered Accountant certificate, and without permitting the petitioner to explain an asserted error in the declaration. Fairness required the officer to call for an explanation and consider supporting material; only upon finding that explanation unsatisfactory could the claim be concluded on merits. [Paras 8, 10, 11, 12, 13]
The impugned order was set aside to the extent challenged, and the respondents were directed to afford the petitioner an opportunity to explain and substantiate the asserted mistake in the declaration before deciding the claim.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed to the limited extent of the challenge. The claimant was permitted to produce supporting documents, and the respondents were required to reconsider the matter after granting a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
Issues: Whether the petitioner's cancelled GST registration could be considered for revocation upon filing the pending returns and fulfilling statutory requirements.
Outcome: The petitioner was directed to apply for revocation within one week, and the respondents were directed to promptly communicate any required compliance and consider revocation after such compliance.
Revocation of GST registration cancellation for non-filing of returns
HELD THAT: - The Court found no impediment to consideration of revocation where the petitioner has furnished the outstanding returns. If such returns remain unfiled, the petitioner must be afforded time to file them; upon compliance with statutory requirements, the revocation application must be considered favourably and without delay. [Paras 3]
The petitioner was directed to apply for revocation, and the respondents were directed to communicate any required statutory compliance and thereafter consider the application for revocation within the stipulated time.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed and disposed of with directions for prompt consideration of revocation of the cancelled GST registration upon compliance with the required statutory formalities.
Issues: Whether the accused should be enlarged on bail pending investigation into alleged fraudulent input tax credit claims.
Analysis: The material investigation concerning the accused was substantially complete; the accused had remained in custody since 16.06.2026; and certain co-accused had already been granted bail. Balancing these circumstances against the nature and gravity of the allegations, further custodial detention was not considered necessary for the investigation.
Outcome: Bail granted on furnishing the prescribed bond and surety and complying with the monthly appearance requirement before the investigating officer until submission of the charge sheet.
Bail - alleged fraudulent input tax credit claims - seeking bail by an accused alleged to have operated a firm used for fraudulent availment of input tax credit - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that, though the firm stood registered in the name of the accused's wife, it was operated by the accused. Material investigation concerning him was almost complete, some co-accused had been enlarged on bail, and the period of detention, balanced against the nature and gravity of the allegations, did not warrant further custodial detention in the interest of investigation. [Paras 7, 8]
The accused was enlarged on bail subject to furnishing bond and surety and appearing before the Investigating Officer monthly until submission of the charge-sheet.
Final Conclusion: The bail application was disposed of by granting bail subject to the stipulated bond, surety and investigation-cooperation conditions.
Issues: Whether an adjudicating authority may confirm a tax demand exceeding the demand proposed in the show cause notice.
Analysis: Section 75(7) prohibits confirmation of a demand exceeding that proposed in the show cause notice. The confirmed demand was substantially higher than the proposed demand, contrary to the mandatory statutory restriction.
Conclusion: An adjudication order confirming a demand beyond the show cause notice is without jurisdiction and cannot stand.
Adjudication beyond show cause notice - Mandatory limitation on confirmation of tax demand
Validity of an adjudication order confirming tax demand in excess of the demand proposed in the show cause notice - HELD THAT: - The statutory restriction against confirming a demand exceeding that proposed in the show cause notice is mandatory. An adjudicating authority is consequently without jurisdiction to confirm a demand beyond the proposed demand. [Paras 2, 3, 4]
The adjudication order was set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the adjudication order, which had confirmed a demand beyond that proposed in the show cause notice, and remitting the matter for fresh decision.
Issues: Whether input tax credit for Financial Year 2018-19 could be denied where the return was filed on 23.10.2019 in light of Section 16(5).
Analysis: Section 16(5) overrides the limitation in Section 16(4) and permits a registered person to avail input tax credit relating to Financial Years 2017-18 to 2020-21 through a return filed up to 30.11.2021. The return for Financial Year 2018-19 was filed on 23.10.2019, within the period preserved by that provision.
Conclusion: The claimed input tax credit could not be denied under Section 16(5), in favour of the assessee.
Input tax credit u/s 16(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - Entitlement to input tax credit on a return filed for Financial Year 2018-19 within the period preserved by section 16(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017
HELD THAT: - Section 16(5), notwithstanding section 16(4), entitles a registered person to take input tax credit relating to the specified financial years where the return under section 39 was filed up to 30.11.2021. As the return for Financial Year 2018-19 had been filed on 23.10.2019, denial of the claimed input tax credit was impermissible. [Paras 5, 6]
The Order-in-Original denying input tax credit was set aside and quashed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside and quashing the impugned Order-in-Original, as the petitioner was entitled to the claimed input tax credit under section 16(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Validity of Proceedings u/s 153C - limitation provided under the third proviso to Section 153B(1) - as per HC [2025 (11) TMI 1854 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] notices and proceedings under Section 153C for A.Y. 2014-15 to A.Y. 2019-20 are time-barred and quashed
HELD THAT:- We do not find a good ground to interfere with the impugned judgment in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the special leave petition is dismissed.
Issues: Whether an addition under section 56(2)(vii)(b) for the difference between stamp-duty value and purchase consideration could be made in the hands of a joint purchaser who had not contributed to the purchase consideration.
Analysis: Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 presumes equal interest in jointly acquired property only in the absence of evidence regarding the respective contributions. The evidence showed that the entire consideration was paid by the husband, while the assessee, though named as a co-purchaser, made no contribution. The Revenue neither rebutted this evidence nor conducted enquiry against the husband. The respective contribution towards acquisition is material for determining the person chargeable on the alleged benefit under section 56(2)(vii)(b).
Conclusion: The addition under section 56(2)(vii)(b) could not be sustained in the hands of the assessee and was deleted.
Addition u/s 56(2)(vii)(b) for the difference between stamp-duty value and purchase consideration - Deemed income on acquisition of immovable property for inadequate consideration by joint purchasers - Beneficial interest in jointly acquired property determined by contribution to consideration
HELD THAT: - Where evidence established that the entire purchase consideration was paid by the other joint purchaser, the presumption of equal interest in the property did not apply. The respective contributions of joint purchasers must be considered for determining liability on the difference between the stamp duty value and consideration; consequently, the provision could not be invoked against a co-owner who had contributed no amount towards the purchase.
Even for the purpose of making addition u/s 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act, the Revenue shall consider the respective shares which the purchasers advanced shall be taken into account. Precisely in the present case, if at all addition has to be made i.e., in the husband as the husband who has paid the entire sale consideration. Invocation of the provision of Section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act against the Assessee who has not contributed any amount for the purchase of the immovable property cannot be sustained. Accordingly, addition made by the Assessing Officer which has been confirmed by the Ld. CIT(A) is hereby deleted.[Paras 8]
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the addition made in the assessee's hands on account of the difference between stamp duty value and purchase consideration was deleted.
Issues: Whether reassessment initiated solely on a revenue audit objection, without fresh tangible material after the original scrutiny assessment, was valid.
Analysis: The reopening was founded only on verification of the existing assessment record and the revenue audit objection. No new fact or tangible material, external to the original assessment record, was available to support the belief that income had escaped assessment. Reassessment on matters already examined in the original assessment amounted to an impermissible change of opinion under Section 147.
Conclusion: The reassessment was invalid; the addition made in the reassessment was deleted in favour of the assessee.
Reassessment on audit objection without fresh tangible material - Change of opinion in reassessment proceedings
Validity of reassessment where it was initiated solely on the Revenue audit objection and further verification of records already examined in the original scrutiny assessment - HELD THAT: - Section 147 does not empower the Assessing Officer to reopen a completed assessment merely on a change of opinion. Reassessment must be founded on tangible material coming to the Assessing Officer after the original assessment and outside the existing record. An audit objection, without new facts or fresh tangible material, concerning matters already examined in the original assessment, could not validly found the reopening. [Paras 8]
The reassessment was held invalid; the addition made in the reassessment was deleted and the appeal was allowed.
Final Conclusion: The reassessment founded solely on an audit objection and existing assessment records was invalid as a mere change of opinion. The addition made in reassessment was deleted and the appeal was allowed.
Issues: Whether penalty for failure to obtain or furnish a tax-audit report was sustainable where the accounts had been audited within time and the audit report was produced during assessment proceedings.
Analysis: Section 44AB requires the prescribed assessee to obtain an audit report by the specified date, while section 271B permits, but does not mandate, imposition of penalty for non-compliance. Section 273B excludes penalty where reasonable cause is established. The audit report was available on record and had been furnished to the lower authorities during assessment proceedings. Since the audit had been completed within the prescribed period and the report was made available before completion of assessment, mere non-furnishing of the report with the return did not establish a failure to comply with section 44AB.
Conclusion: The penalty under section 271B was not sustainable and was deleted in favour of the assessee.
Penalty u/s 271B - delayed furnishing of tax audit report - Completion of tax audit within prescribed time - Levy of penalty for failure to furnish the tax audit report with the return, where the accounts had been audited within the prescribed period and the report was produced during assessment proceedings
HELD THAT: - Section 271B employs the expression "may direct"; consequently, penalty is not automatic. Where the audit had actually been completed within the prescribed time and the audit report was made available to, and considered by, the Assessing Officer before completion of assessment, delayed furnishing of the report did not establish non-compliance with section 44AB. [Paras 8, 9]
The penalty under section 271B was deleted.
Final Conclusion: The assessee's appeal was allowed and the penalty for delayed furnishing of the tax audit report was deleted.
Issues: (i) Whether the section 143(1)(a) adjustment reducing business loss due to a GST refund mismatch should be reconsidered on additional evidence; (ii) Whether the deletion of addition under section 68 for trade payables was sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether the section 143(1)(a) adjustment reducing business loss due to a GST refund mismatch should be reconsidered on additional evidence.
Analysis: The additional documentary material was material to the correct accounting and tax treatment of the GST refund and went to the root of the dispute. Its admission under Rule 29 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963 required factual verification by the Assessing Officer, as it had not been examined by the lower authorities.
Conclusion: The adjustment was set aside and remitted to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication on merits after admitting and verifying the additional evidence, in favour of the assessee procedurally.
Issue (ii): Whether the deletion of addition under section 68 for trade payables was sustainable.
Analysis: The outstanding balances represented trade liabilities arising from purchases. Reconciliations and supporting material established the creditors and the genuineness of the transactions; the Revenue produced no contrary material to displace those findings. Non-compliance with notices under section 133(6), without a finding that the underlying purchases were fictitious or non-genuine, did not justify treating the trade payables as unexplained cash credits under section 68.
Conclusion: The deletion of the addition for trade payables was sustained, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The GST-refund mismatch remains open for fresh factual determination on the additional evidence, while the deletion of the trade-payable addition remains intact.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 68 cannot be invoked for trade payables where the identity of creditors and genuineness of purchase liabilities are established through reconciliations and supporting material; non-response to verification notices alone is insufficient.
Additional evidence on GST refund mismatch - Unexplained cash credit - trade payables arising from purchases
Additional evidence on GST refund mismatch - Adjustment reducing the returned business loss on account of a mismatch concerning GST refund reported in the tax audit report - HELD THAT: - The additional documentary evidence, produced for the first time before the Tribunal, was found vital to proper adjudication and to verification of the assessee's claim regarding the accounting and tax treatment of the GST refund. Since the evidence required verification by the lower authority and the Revenue did not object to its admission, the issue could not be decided on merits by the Tribunal. [Paras 9]
The impugned order on this issue was set aside and the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication after granting opportunity of hearing.
Unexplained cash credit - trade payables arising from purchases - Addition as unexplained cash credit in respect of outstanding trade payables arising from purchases, despite reconciled differences in creditor balances - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that reconciliations of the differences between the creditors' books and the assessee's books had been furnished before the lower authorities. The appellate authority had considered those reconciliations and the other documentary evidence, together with the legal position governing application of the unexplained cash credit provision, before holding the addition unsustainable. As the Revenue brought no contrary material or judicial precedent to controvert that finding, no infirmity was found in its order. [Paras 14, 15]
Deletion of the addition relating to the trade payables was upheld and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The assessee's appeal was allowed for statistical purposes by remanding the GST refund mismatch adjustment for fresh adjudication. The Revenue's appeal against deletion of the addition for trade payables was dismissed, rendering the assessee's cross-objection infructuous.
Issues: (i) Whether reassessment could validly be initiated when approval for the order under section 148A(d) and notice under section 148 was obtained from the authority under section 151(i), although approval under section 151(ii) was required; (ii) Whether penalty under section 271B was sustainable on the basis of an unreconciled aggregate of share and alleged derivative transactions, and despite the assessee's reasonable cause under section 273B.
Issue (i): Whether reassessment could validly be initiated when approval for the order under section 148A(d) and notice under section 148 was obtained from the authority under section 151(i), although approval under section 151(ii) was required.
Analysis: Approval under section 151 is a substantive jurisdictional safeguard for issuance of a notice under section 148. Under the substituted reassessment regime, where more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, approval must be obtained from the higher specified authority under section 151(ii). TOLA extended the period during which the authority under section 151(i) could grant approval only until 30.06.2021; it did not continue that authority's competence in July 2022. Approval by the Principal Commissioner, instead of the authority specified in section 151(ii), was not curable under section 292B.
Conclusion: The approval was not granted by the competent specified authority. The order under section 148A(d), notice under section 148, reassessment order, and consequential addition were invalid and quashed, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether penalty under section 271B was sustainable on the basis of an unreconciled aggregate of share and alleged derivative transactions, and despite the assessee's reasonable cause under section 273B.
Analysis: Section 44AB applies only where the Revenue establishes that the assessee carried on a business and that its sales, turnover or gross receipts exceeded the prescribed threshold. The aggregate relied upon combined purchases, delivery-based share sales and an unverified alleged derivative figure; purchases alone could not constitute turnover. No primary material established intraday or derivative transactions, systematic share-trading activity, or the legally relevant turnover. The Revenue could not reverse the burden by requiring the assessee to prove absence of day trading. The consistent disclosure of shares as investments and income as capital gains, without assessment of the transactions as business income, also constituted reasonable cause under section 273B.
Conclusion: The prerequisites for section 44AB were not established and, independently, reasonable cause was proved. Penalty under section 271B was unsustainable and deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The reassessment lacked the mandatory jurisdictional sanction, and the alleged audit default was unsupported by proof of a taxable share-trading business or legally computed turnover.
Ratio Decidendi: Mandatory statutory preconditions must be strictly fulfilled: sanction from the authority specified under section 151 is indispensable for reassessment jurisdiction, and audit-default penalty requires proof of business activity and legally determinable turnover, subject to reasonable cause.
Validity of Reassessment proceedings - sanction by competent specified authority - Penalty for failure to obtain tax audit - unproved share-trading turnover - Reasonable cause for non-audit
Validity of Reassessment proceedings - sanction by competent specified authority - Jurisdictional precondition for reassessment - Validity of reassessment where approval for issuance of notice was obtained from the Principal Commissioner after the period requiring sanction under section 151(ii) had elapsed - HELD THAT: - Applying Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal [2024 (10) TMI 264 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] Tribunal held that sanction under section 151 is a substantive safeguard and a jurisdictional precondition for assumption of reassessment jurisdiction. TOLA extended only until 30.06.2021 the period during which the authority under section 151(i) could grant approval; it did not preserve that authority's competence thereafter. As the order under section 148A(d) and consequential notice under section 148 were issued in July 2022, approval was required from the higher authority specified under section 151(ii). Approval by the Principal Commissioner was neither substantial compliance nor a curable defect under section 292B. [Paras 38, 39, 40, 41, 42]
The reassessment and the resultant addition were quashed for want of valid jurisdiction.
Penalty u/s 271B for failure to obtain tax audit-unproved share-trading turnover - Reasonable cause for non-audit - Levy of penalty for failure to obtain tax audit on the basis of an unreconciled aggregate of share purchases, delivery-based sales and alleged derivative transactions - HELD THAT: - For penalty under section 271B, the Revenue had first to establish that the assessee carried on a business and that the legally relevant sales, turnover or gross receipts of that business exceeded the prescribed limit. The aggregate relied upon combined purchases, delivery-based sales and alleged derivative transactions; purchases could not by themselves constitute turnover. Neither the existence of a systematic share-trading business nor the alleged futures and options transactions was established from primary material, and no legally relevant turnover was computed. Further, the consistent disclosure of shares as investments and the resulting income as capital gains furnished a bona fide and reasonable basis for the assessee's belief that tax audit provisions did not apply. [Paras 52, 53, 54, 55, 56]
The conditions for applicability of section 44AB were not established and, in any event, reasonable cause was proved; the penalty was deleted.
Final Conclusion: The reassessment was annulled for want of approval from the competent specified authority. The penalty for failure to obtain tax audit was deleted because business activity and legally relevant turnover were not established and reasonable cause was shown.
Issues: (i) Whether additional evidence supporting commission paid to daily deposit agents should be admitted and the related disallowance reconsidered; (ii) Whether estimated interest on loans classified as non-performing assets was sustainable; (iii) Whether interest income could be estimated uniformly at 15% on different categories of loans.
Issue (i): Whether additional evidence supporting commission paid to daily deposit agents should be admitted and the related disallowance reconsidered.
Analysis: The evidence comprising party-wise commission details, identity particulars and tax-deduction details was relevant to the claim of business expenditure. Its non-admission at the first appellate stage was unjustified, as the evidence had not been examined by the lower authorities.
Conclusion: The additional evidence was admitted and the commission-disallowance issue was restored for fresh determination, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether estimated interest on loans classified as non-performing assets was sustainable.
Analysis: Interest derived from credit facilities provided to members was accepted as eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). Any estimated interest addition would correspondingly enhance the eligible deduction, rendering the adjustment revenue neutral.
Conclusion: The estimated interest addition on non-performing asset loans was deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether interest income could be estimated uniformly at 15% on different categories of loans.
Analysis: Housing, mortgage, personal, deposit-backed and overdraft facilities carried different interest rates. A uniform ad hoc rate of 15% disregarded those differences; moreover, any resultant enhancement of eligible business income would qualify for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i).
Conclusion: The estimated interest addition based on a uniform 15% rate was deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The commission claim requires fresh verification on the admitted material, while both estimated-interest adjustments are unsustainable.
Ratio Decidendi: An estimated addition that merely enhances business income otherwise fully eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) is revenue neutral; interest cannot be estimated uniformly where loan categories carry different rates.
Admission of relevant additional evidence in disallowance of commission expenditure - Deduction u/s 80P on enhanced income of co-operative credit society - Ad hoc estimation of interest on loans carrying differential rates
Disallowance of commission paid to daily deposit collection agents where supporting additional evidence was not admitted by the first appellate authority - HELD THAT: - The additional evidence, comprising material relevant to substantiate the commission claim, had not been examined by the lower authorities. The refusal to admit such evidence was unjustified when it was directly relevant to the controversy. [Paras 6]
The additional evidence was admitted and the issue was restored to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer for fresh consideration in accordance with law.
Estimated interest on non-performing loans - Deduction under section 80P on enhanced income - Addition of estimated interest on loans to members on which no interest had been charged, stated to be non-performing loans - HELD THAT: - The assessee, being a co-operative society providing credit facilities to its members, was eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) in respect of the interest income from those activities. An estimated addition of such interest would correspondingly enhance the eligible deduction and was therefore revenue neutral. [Paras 7]
The estimated interest addition was deleted.
Ad hoc estimation of interest income - Differential interest rates on loan categories - Deduction under section 80P on enhanced income - Addition of interest income by applying a uniform rate to housing, mortgage, personal, deposit-backed and overdraft or cash-credit loans carrying differential rates of interest - HELD THAT: - A uniform ad hoc interest rate could not be applied to all loan categories when the loans carried differential rates and that material fact had been ignored. Further, any enhancement of interest income from credit facilities to members would increase the income eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i). [Paras 8, 9]
The estimated interest addition was deleted.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed. The commission disallowance was remanded for fresh consideration after admitting the additional evidence, while both estimated interest additions were deleted.
Issues: (i) Whether unsecured loans supported by confirmations, tax particulars, audited financial statements, ledger accounts and banking records could be treated as unexplained cash credits under section 68; (ii) Whether an ad hoc disallowance of 30% of business expenditure was sustainable merely because no business receipts were shown during the year; (iii) Whether interest on the impugned borrowings was disallowable solely because the underlying loans had been treated as non-genuine; (iv) Whether the current-year business loss could be set off against income assessed under the head "Capital Gains".
Issue (i): Whether unsecured loans supported by confirmations, tax particulars, audited financial statements, ledger accounts and banking records could be treated as unexplained cash credits under section 68.
Analysis: Section 68 requires credible evidence of the creditor's identity, financial capacity and the genuineness of the particular transaction. The lender-wise material established the identified creditors, their audited financial position and the banking trail of the loans, with subsequent repayments and interest also supporting the transactions. General Investigation Wing information could warrant deeper enquiry but, absent lender-specific adverse findings, a contrary fund trail, repudiation by creditors, or evidence disproving the documents, it could not displace the primary evidence. Material proposed to be relied upon against the assessee also required effective confrontation.
Conclusion: The addition of unsecured loans as unexplained cash credits under section 68 was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether an ad hoc disallowance of 30% of business expenditure was sustainable merely because no business receipts were shown during the year.
Analysis: Absence of receipts in a particular year does not by itself establish closure or abandonment of business. Expenditure incurred to maintain a continuing business establishment may retain its business character during commercial inactivity. The assessment identified no particular expense as fictitious, personal, inflated or unrelated to business, rejected no books, vouchers or ledger entries, and disclosed no rational basis for selecting 30% of the aggregate expenditure.
Conclusion: The estimated disallowance of business expenditure was arbitrary and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether interest on the impugned borrowings was disallowable solely because the underlying loans had been treated as non-genuine.
Analysis: The interest disallowance rested exclusively on the earlier treatment of the underlying loans as non-genuine. There was no independent finding that the interest was not paid, was excessive or fictitious, or that the borrowings were used for non-business purposes. Deletion of the section 68 addition removed the sole foundation of the interest disallowance.
Conclusion: The disallowance of interest on the borrowings was deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether the current-year business loss could be set off against income assessed under the head "Capital Gains".
Analysis: The gain on sale of the property was accepted as assessable under the head "Capital Gains". The loss claimed was a current-year business loss, rather than a brought-forward loss governed by the separate regime under section 72. Following recomputation after deletion of the business-expense and interest disallowances, the correct current-year business loss was required to be determined and considered for inter-head adjustment under section 71(2).
Conclusion: The eligible current-year business loss was directed to be set off against capital gains in accordance with section 71(2), in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The reassessment computations require revision by excluding the deleted cash-credit addition and consequential interest and business-expenditure disallowances, and by granting the statutory adjustment of the recomputed current-year business loss against capital gains.
Unexplained cash credits - evidentiary burden for corporate loan creditors - Ad hoc disallowance of business expenditure during commercial inactivity - Interest expenditure on loans treated as non-genuine - Set-off of current-year business loss against capital gains
Unexplained cash credits - evidentiary burden for corporate loan creditors - Addition for unexplained cash credits in respect of loans from thirteen corporate creditors - HELD THAT: - The assessee furnished confirmations, tax particulars, audited financial statements, ledger accounts and bank records to establish the identity, financial capacity and genuineness of the loan creditors. Once such primary material was produced, the Revenue was required to displace it by lender-wise examination or independent, transaction-specific material. General investigation information concerning alleged accommodation-entry providers, without correlation with the particular credits or proof that the documentary trail was false, could not sustain the addition. [Paras 8, 10, 11, 12]
The addition under section 68 was deleted.
Ad hoc disallowance of business expenditure during commercial inactivity - disallowance of business expenditure solely because no business receipts were shown during the year - HELD THAT: - Absence of business receipts in a particular year does not by itself establish cessation or abandonment of business. Where expenditure details and ledger accounts were furnished, allowability had to be examined with reference to the nature of each expense. No particular item was found fictitious, personal, inflated or unrelated to business, and no rational basis was given for disallowing a fixed fraction of the aggregate expenditure. [Paras 16]
The ad hoc disallowance of business expenditure was deleted.
Interest expenditure on loans treated as non-genuine - Disallowance of interest paid on two loans solely because the underlying loans had been treated as unexplained cash credits - HELD THAT: - The interest disallowance rested entirely on the earlier treatment of the underlying loans as non-genuine. Since the addition in respect of those loans was deleted and there was no independent finding that the interest was not paid, was fictitious or excessive, or related to non-business use of funds, the foundation for the disallowance did not survive. [Paras 17]
The consequential interest disallowance was deleted.
Set-off of current-year business loss against capital gains - Set-off of current-year business loss against capital gains arising from sale of commercial property - HELD THAT: - The assessee accepted assessment of the gain from sale of the property under the head 'Capital Gains'. A current-year loss under the head 'Profits and gains of business or profession', unlike a brought-forward business loss governed by a separate regime, is eligible for inter-head adjustment under section 71(2), subject to applicable statutory conditions. The business result required recomputation after deletion of the disallowances. [Paras 18, 19]
The Assessing Officer was directed to recompute the current-year business loss and allow its eligible set-off against capital gains.
Final Conclusion: The appeal concerning the unexplained cash-credit addition was allowed. In the connected appeal, the ad hoc expenditure and consequential interest disallowances were deleted, while the gain remained assessable as capital gains subject to eligible set-off of recomputed current-year business loss.
Issues: (i) Whether payment for a restricted end-user software licence constituted royalty under Article 12(3) of the India-USA DTAA, attracting withholding tax; (ii) Whether the entire payment for supply, installation and training of a video-conferencing system constituted fees for technical services under the India-Germany DTAA.
Issue (i): Whether payment for a restricted end-user software licence constituted royalty under Article 12(3) of the India-USA DTAA, attracting withholding tax.
Analysis: Article 12(3) distinguishes consideration for use of, or the right to use, copyright from consideration for use of a copyrighted product. The licence was non-exclusive, non-transferable and non-sublicensable; ownership, copyright and all intellectual-property rights remained with the supplier. The licensee was prohibited from commercial exploitation, modification, sublicensing, reverse engineering, creation of derivative works and unauthorised copying. The arrangement therefore granted only a limited facility to use software internally and did not transfer any right comprised in the copyright.
Conclusion: The software payment was not royalty under Article 12(3) of the India-USA DTAA; no withholding-tax obligation or consequential default liability arose in respect of that payment, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the entire payment for supply, installation and training of a video-conferencing system constituted fees for technical services under the India-Germany DTAA.
Analysis: The contemporaneous order confirmation established that the predominant consideration was for identified video-conferencing equipment and allied products, rather than for clinical research or independent technical services. Installation, setup and training were separately priced at 890. The record did not sufficiently establish that this separately identified service component was confined to routine installation or operational demonstration. In view of the limited amount and the assessee's acceptance of treaty-rate withholding on that component, the service element was confined to 890 without deciding whether such services would generally constitute fees for technical services.
Conclusion: Treatment of the entire payment as fees for technical services was unsustainable. Consideration for equipment and non-service components must be excluded, and withholding tax may be restricted to 890 for installation, setup and training at the applicable treaty rate, partly in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The software licence remains outside the royalty provision, while the German transaction is taxable only to the limited extent of the separately identified service consideration; consequential default liability requires recomputation.
Royalty - licence to use copyrighted software without transfer of copyright rights - Fees for technical services-supply of video-conferencing equipment with installation and training
Royalty-licence to use copyrighted software without transfer of copyright rights - Withholding tax on non-resident software payments - Characterisation of payment for a non-exclusive, non-transferable and non-sublicensable licence to use software for internal business purposes as royalty under the India-USA DTAA - HELD THAT: - The agreement reserved title, copyright and all proprietary rights in the software to the licensor and prohibited commercial exploitation, sublicensing, modification, creation of derivative works, reverse engineering and copying except for backup purposes. The assessee therefore acquired only the facility to use a copyrighted article as an end-user, and not any right in the copyright or other intellectual-property right contemplated by Article 12(3). The specialised nature of the software or its use in engineering or manufacturing processes could not, by itself, render the payment royalty. [Paras 5, 6, 7, 8]
The software payment was not royalty; consequently, no obligation to deduct tax or consequential liability as assessee in default survived in respect of that payment.
Fees for technical services-supply of video-conferencing equipment with installation and training - Characterisation of the payment to a German supplier for a video-conferencing system, associated products, installation, setup and training as fees for technical services - HELD THAT: - The contemporaneous order confirmation established that the transaction was predominantly for procurement of identified video-conferencing equipment and allied products, rather than for clinical research trials or independent technical services. The entire payment could not be treated as fees for technical services on an assumed factual premise. However, the document separately stipulated consideration for installation, setup and training, and there was insufficient material to establish that those services were confined to routine installation and operational demonstration. The assessee accepted withholding on that separately identified service component; the conclusion was confined to the facts and was not a precedent on the characterisation of incidental installation, commissioning or training services generally. [Paras 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]
The payment attributable to equipment and other non-service components was directed to be excluded from fees for technical services, and withholding-tax liability was restricted to the separately identified installation, setup and training component at the applicable India-Germany DTAA rate, with consequential recomputation.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed. The software payment was held not liable to withholding as royalty, while the payment for video-conferencing equipment was excluded from fees for technical services except for the separately identified installation, setup and training component.
Issues: (i) Whether an addition under Section 68 for differential share-sale proceeds could be sustained where the long-term capital gain had been declared under the Income Disclosure Scheme, 2016, and the assessment was unabated without incriminating material found in the assessee's search; (ii) Whether disallowance of short-term capital loss and an estimated commission addition could be made under Section 153A in an unabated assessment on the basis of a third-party search statement.
Issue (i): Whether an addition under Section 68 for differential share-sale proceeds could be sustained where the long-term capital gain had been declared under the Income Disclosure Scheme, 2016, and the assessment was unabated without incriminating material found in the assessee's search.
Analysis: The long-term capital gain from the share sale had been declared under the Income Disclosure Scheme, 2016, and the tax thereon had been paid. The impugned addition was founded on investigation material concerning the company whose shares were sold, rather than on material found during the search of the assessee. For an unabated assessment under Section 153A, an addition requires incriminating material unearthed in the assessee's search.
Conclusion: The Section 68 addition was impermissible, and its deletion was sustained in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether disallowance of short-term capital loss and an estimated commission addition could be made under Section 153A in an unabated assessment on the basis of a third-party search statement.
Analysis: The disallowance and commission addition were based on a statement recorded during a search of a third party, not on incriminating material found in the assessee's search. As the assessment had not abated, such extraneous material could not support additions under Section 153A.
Conclusion: The disallowance of short-term capital loss and the estimated commission addition were unsustainable, and their deletion was sustained in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The deletions of all impugned additions for both assessment years remain effective.
Ratio Decidendi: In an unabated assessment under Section 153A, additions can be made only on the basis of incriminating material found during the search of the assessee.
Income Disclosure Scheme, 2016 - immunity from further taxation - Unabated assessment under section 153A - addition based on incriminating material
Addition u/s 68 in respect of differential sale proceeds of shares, after the corresponding long-term capital gain had been declared under the Income Disclosure Scheme, 2016 - HELD THAT: - Once the long-term capital gain from sale of shares had been declared under the Income Disclosure Scheme, 2016 and tax paid thereon, the assessee was entitled to immunity from further taxation of that income. [Paras 8]
The deletion of the addition for Assessment Year 2014-15 was upheld.
Unabated assessment under section 153A - addition based on incriminating material - Additions in unabated search assessments for alleged bogus capital gains or short-term capital loss from share transactions, founded on third-party investigation material rather than material found in the assessee's search - HELD THAT: - In an unabated assessment under section 153A, no addition can be made without incriminating material found during the search conducted in the assessee's case. The impugned additions were founded on investigation material and a statement recorded in third-party proceedings, and not on incriminating material recovered from the assessee as relying on ABHISAR BUILDWELL P. LTD [2023 (4) TMI 1056 - SUPREME COURT] [Paras 8]
The deletions of the additions for both assessment years were sustained.
Final Conclusion: The Department's appeals were dismissed and the deletions sustained. The cross-objections, having not been pressed, were also dismissed.
Issues: Whether the reassessment notice issued for AY 2017-18 was barred by limitation.
Analysis: The extended period for issuing a reassessment notice, computed under the applicable reassessment framework and the binding principles governing surviving limitation, expired on 11.06.2022. The notice issued on 27.07.2022 was therefore beyond the available period of limitation.
Conclusion: The reassessment notice was time-barred, and the reassessment order was quashed.
Limitation for reassessment notice under amended reassessment regime - validity of the reassessment notice for A.Y. 2017-18 issued after expiry of the surviving limitation period
HELD THAT: - Applying the observations of the Supreme Court in RAJEEV BANSAL [2024 (10) TMI 264 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] regarding the surviving period for issuance of notice, the Tribunal held that the extended due date had expired on 11-06-2022. The notice issued on 27-07-2022 was consequently beyond limitation, as three years had elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. [Paras 9]
The reassessment notice was held time-barred and the reassessment order was quashed; the assessee's cross-objection was allowed and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The reassessment notice having been issued beyond the surviving limitation period, the reassessment order was quashed. The Revenue's appeal was dismissed and the assessee's cross-objection was allowed.
Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment was valid where it was initiated on the basis of investigation-wing information without independent verification; (ii) Whether the additions for unexplained cash credit and alleged commission expenditure were sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether the reassessment was valid where it was initiated on the basis of investigation-wing information without independent verification.
Analysis: The recorded reasons merely reproduced investigation-wing information and the annexure did not identify the assessee's actual transactions with the named entities. The material showed that the assessee had obtained only one loan of Rs. 20 lakh through banking channels. There was no independent enquiry, verification, or analysis by the Assessing Officer before reopening.
Conclusion: The reassessment founded on borrowed satisfaction was void ab initio, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the additions for unexplained cash credit and alleged commission expenditure were sustainable.
Analysis: The assessee produced lender confirmation, ledger accounts, bank statements evidencing receipt and repayment, and evidence of interest payment with tax deduction. The material established that only Rs. 20 lakh was received as loan, while the other Rs. 20 lakh represented reversal of a payment to another creditor. The additions also relied on third-party statements without granting the requested cross-examination. No independent adverse material rebutted the documentary evidence.
Conclusion: The addition under Section 68 and the consequential addition for alleged commission under Section 69C were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The reassessment and the consequential impugned additions could not be sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment cannot rest solely on unverified investigation-wing information without independent application of mind, and an unexplained-credit addition cannot survive where reliable banking and lender evidence remains unrebutted and adverse third-party statements are used without cross-examination.
Reassessment based on borrowed satisfaction - Unexplained cash credit - loan transactions through banking channels
Validity of reassessment founded on investigation-wing information without independent verification by the Assessing Officer - HELD THAT: - The reasons referred to an annexure which merely named certain entities and did not identify the assessee's transactions with them. The Assessing Officer reproduced the investigation-wing report without making an independent enquiry, analysis or verification of the material received. The reopening was thus founded on borrowed satisfaction. [Paras 5, 6, 7]
The reassessment order was held void ab initio and was quashed.
Unexplained cash credit - loan transactions through banking channels - Right to cross-examine adverse witnesses - HELD THAT: - The material showed that the assessee had received only the recorded loan through banking channels, paid interest thereon with tax deduction and repaid it through banking channels; the alleged further credit was a reversal of payment to another creditor. Documentary evidence and lender confirmation corroborated the transaction, but no adverse material was brought to displace it. Further, statements of third parties were used without affording the assessee the requested opportunity to cross-examine them, and the Assessing Officer could not require the assessee to produce such witnesses. [Paras 8, 10, 11, 12]
The unexplained cash-credit addition was held unsustainable and was quashed.
Commission expenditure alleged in relation to unexplained credit - commission-expenditure addition consequential to the alleged unexplained cash credit - HELD THAT: - Since the underlying cash-credit addition was unsustainable, the consequential addition for alleged commission expenditure could not survive. [Paras 12]
The commission-expenditure addition was also held unsustainable and was quashed.
Final Conclusion: The reassessment, the unexplained cash-credit addition and the consequential commission-expenditure addition were quashed. The appeal was allowed.
Issues: Whether renewal approval under Section 80G could be denied solely because the society's objects referred to maintaining places of worship, despite the absence of actual religious expenditure or exclusionary religious activity.
Analysis: For renewal of approval, the actual activities and financial records for the immediately preceding years must be examined; long-term objects in the governing document, by themselves, do not establish that the institution conducts prohibited religious activity. Section 80G(5B) recognises the relevance of the extent of religious expenditure. The financial records disclosed no expenditure on religious activities, while the objects and activities principally concerned education, medical facilities, public welfare and cohesion among communities. Maintenance of places of worship of different faiths, without discrimination, exclusion, propagation of a particular faith, or proselytisation, does not by itself make the activity religious for this purpose. The Essential Religious Practices test may broadly assist in identifying genuinely religious activity; the predominant object and proportionality of expenditure remain material.
Conclusion: The society was not shown to be engaged in prohibited religious activity, and approval under Section 80G could not be refused on the basis of its stated objects alone.
Approval u/s 80G for institutions with religious objects - Predominant-object and actual-activities test - Essential Religious Practices test
Eligibility of a society for approval under section 80G where its objects include construction or maintenance of places of worship, alongside educational, medical and public-utility activities - HELD THAT: - Denial of approval merely from references to religious objects in the memorandum was unjustified, particularly on renewal, without examining the applicant's recent financials and identifying actual religious expenditure. The financial records disclosed no expenditure on the alleged religious activities, while the bye-laws showed charitable objects directed towards social cohesion, education and medical facilities. The determination must rest on the institution's predominant and actual intent, including whether an activity discriminates on grounds of religion, promotes a particular faith to the exclusion of others, or involves proselytisation. In the absence of a statutory definition, the Essential Religious Practices test may broadly guide the inquiry; secular public-utility activities associated with places of worship do not by themselves establish a prohibited religious activity. [Paras 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]
The rejection of approval was held erroneous, the appeal was allowed, and the prescribed authority was directed to grant approval.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed. The society was held entitled to approval under section 80G, as its actual activities and predominant objects were charitable rather than prohibited religious activities.
Issues: Whether the addition of a credit under Section 68, based solely on the creditor's comparatively low declared income despite documentary evidence and without independent verification, was sustainable.
Analysis: The assessee produced the sale agreement, banking records, ledger account, and the creditor's PAN and address, thereby furnishing basic material supporting the identity of the creditor and the genuineness of the transaction. A low declared income, without further enquiry or contrary material, was insufficient to conclusively negate creditworthiness. The requested verification through statutory powers was not undertaken. The requirement to explain the source of the creditor's funds under the later proviso to Section 68 was not applicable to the assessment year in question.
Conclusion: The Section 68 addition was unsustainable and was deleted in favour of the assessee.
Unexplained cash credit - creditworthiness of purchaser - Source of source - prospective applicability of proviso to section 68
Addition as unexplained cash credit in respect of an advance received from the purchaser under an agreement for sale, based solely on the purchaser's comparatively low declared income - HELD THAT: - The assessee furnished the agreement for sale, banking records, ledger account, and the purchaser's PAN and address, and also sought independent verification by exercise of the Assessing Officer's powers under sections 131 and 133(6). The Assessing Officer made no such enquiry. Low declared income of the purchaser, without further enquiry or material disproving the documented transaction, could not conclusively establish absence of creditworthiness. Further, the requirement to explain the source of the source under the proviso to section 68 was applicable from Assessment Year 2023-24 and did not govern the year in question. [Paras 11, 12, 13]
The addition under section 68 was held unsustainable and deleted.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the addition made under section 68 was deleted.
Issues: Whether the ex parte first-appellate order was sustainable where the assessee was allowed less than fifteen days under each of the hearing notices to respond and substantiate the claims.
Analysis: Section 250(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires a reasoned appellate determination. Although several notices were issued, each afforded less than fifteen days for compliance. An opportunity of hearing must be real, reasonable and effective, rather than a formal opportunity created merely by issuance of notices. The inadequate time prevented effective representation and production of supporting evidence.
Conclusion: The ex parte appellate adjudication was vitiated by denial of reasonable opportunity and was required to be set aside for fresh de novo consideration through a speaking order under Section 250(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Ex parte first-appellate order - Effective opportunity of hearing in faceless appellate proceedings - Speaking appellate order
Validity of the ex parte disposal of the first appeal where the assessee was allowed less than fifteen days to respond to each of the hearing notices - HELD THAT: - The opportunities afforded through the notices were held to be neither real, reasonable nor effective, since each allowed less than fifteen days for compliance. Such paper opportunities did not enable the assessee to produce evidence and effectively support the claims made in the return, resulting in denial of reasonable opportunity and breach of natural justice. [Paras 5, 6, 7, 8]
The ex parte appellate order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the NFAC for de novo adjudication by a speaking order in accordance with section 250(6), without any finding on the merits.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. The first appellate order was remitted for fresh adjudication after affording the assessee a real and reasonable opportunity of hearing.
Issues: Whether the suit seeking rights in property purchased by a father in the names of his minor sons was barred by the Prohibition of Benami Properties Act, 1988 and liable to rejection of plaint.
Analysis: The 2016 amendments, insofar as declaratory, procedural, curative and machinery-oriented, apply retrospectively; therefore, the exception in Section 2(9) for property acquired by an individual in the name of a child applied to the transaction. Independently, under the unamended Section 4(3)(b), a father's relationship with his minor children is a guardian-ward fiduciary relationship, bringing the transaction within the fiduciary-capacity exception to the statutory bar.
Conclusion: The suit is not barred under the Prohibition of Benami Properties Act, 1988 and is not liable to rejection of plaint.
Suit seeking rights in property purchased by a father in the names of his minor sons - Retrospective operation of declaratory and procedural benami-law amendments - Guardian-ward fiduciary relationship in benami property transactions - Rejection of plaint barred by law
Maintainability of a suit concerning property allegedly purchased by a father in the names of his minor sons, in the face of the statutory bar against benami claims - HELD THAT: - The declaratory provision defining and excepting acquisitions in the name of a child was held retrospectively applicable, since the amended provisions relied upon were declaratory in nature and not penal.
Though the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manjula [2026 (5) TMI 593 - SUPREME COURT] has now conclusively held that the amendment would be retrospective except in penal provisions, but even if the unamended provisions are seen, then also the transaction would be saved in terms of unamended Section 4(3)(b) of Act of 1988.
The alleged acquisition by the father in the names of his minor sons consequently fell within the statutory exception. Independently, under the unamended law, the relationship of guardian and ward was fiduciary; therefore, the transaction was protected by the exception for property held by a person standing in a fiduciary capacity. [Paras 9, 11, 14, 15]
The suit was not barred by the Prohibition of Benami Properties Act, 1988, and rejection of the plaint was rightly refused.
Final Conclusion: The revision was dismissed. The refusal to reject the plaint was sustained because the asserted transaction was protected under both the amended and unamended statutory regimes.
Release of seized gold jewellery - Statutory time-limit for show-cause notice - Waiver of show cause notice and personal hearing - Show cause notice before confiscation of goods - Non- compliance with Section 124
HELD THAT:- Petitioner has fairly stated that in identical matter Special Leave Petition [2026 (6) TMI 77 - SC ORDER] has been dismissed by a coordinate Bench of this Court. In such view of the matter, the special leave petitions are dismissed.
Advance licence obtained by misrepresentation or fraud is voidable until cancelled - validity of imports under an endorsed transferable advance licence where licensing authority has not cancelled or suspended the licence - authority and duty of licensing authority to suspend or cancel licences obtained by fraud - liability for customs duty where importer is transferee who imported under a valid advance licence - penalty under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act for acts or omissions rendering goods liable to confiscation - confiscation and duty demands vis-a -vis goods imported under a licence later alleged to have been fraudulently obtained
HELD THAT:- We are of the view that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the High Court [2011 (1) TMI 1303 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] in passing the impugned Judgment and Order.
Even otherwise, as fairly pointed out that this Appeal can be disposed of on the ground of low tax effect.
Issues: (i) Correction of the collective weight of the seized gold articles; (ii) Whether further proceedings could be initiated after expiry of the statutory period for issuing a show-cause notice; (iii) The period for which warehousing charges were payable.
Issue (i): Correction of the collective weight of the seized gold articles.
Analysis: The detention record was clarified to reflect that the gold bangle and gold chain collectively weighed 233 grams, rather than 273 grams.
Conclusion: The collective weight of the seized articles stands corrected as 233 grams.
Issue (ii): Whether further proceedings could be initiated after expiry of the statutory period for issuing a show-cause notice.
Analysis: Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 requires issuance of a show-cause notice and an opportunity of hearing following detention. The prescribed six-month period, including the permissible extension on compliance with formalities, had elapsed; consequently, the continued detention was impermissible. Permitting further proceedings would prolong the matter and cause undue hardship.
Conclusion: No further proceedings in respect of the seized articles were permitted, and the direction for their release remained operative.
Issue (iii): The period for which warehousing charges were payable.
Analysis: The earlier release direction required payment of applicable customs duty and warehousing charges calculated at the rates prevailing on the date of detention. The payable period for warehousing charges was clarified.
Conclusion: Warehousing charges are payable only up to 26 November 2025.
Final Conclusion: The corrected detention particulars and clarifications preserve the release framework for the seized articles, subject to payment of the applicable duty and the specified warehousing charges.
Ratio Decidendi: Upon expiry of the maximum statutory period for issuing a show-cause notice under Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962, continued detention of seized goods is impermissible.
Release of detained gold articles after expiry of notice period - Warehousing charges on release of detained goods
Clarification of the release order concerning the weight of the detained gold articles, the scope for further departmental proceedings, and the period for which warehousing charges were payable - HELD THAT: - The Court corrected the collective weight of the gold bangle and gold chain in the release order. Having regard to its earlier determination that the period for issuance of a show-cause notice had elapsed, the Court held that permitting further proceedings would unnecessarily prolong the matter and cause undue harassment. The release remained conditional upon payment of applicable customs duty and warehousing charges, which were confined to the period up to the original release order. [Paras 8, 11, 14, 15]
The review petition was disposed of with the correction and clarifications; the detained articles were to be released subject to payment of applicable duty and warehousing charges up to the original release order, and subject to any order in a Supreme Court SLP.
Final Conclusion: The Court disposed of the review petition after correcting the recorded weight of the detained gold articles and clarifying the conditions of release. No further clarification preserving future departmental proceedings was granted.
Issues: (i) Whether the Revenue appeal was maintainable where the amount involved was below the monetary threshold prescribed for departmental appeals; (ii) Whether amendment of exported shipping bills from "NO" to "YES" for pursuing MEIS benefit was permissible under Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962.
Issue (i): Whether the Revenue appeal was maintainable where the amount involved was below the monetary threshold prescribed for departmental appeals.
Analysis: No customs duty, interest, fine or penalty was involved. Even treating the asserted MEIS entitlement as the disputed amount, its value was Rs. 47,19,103/-, below the Rs. 50,00,000/- threshold prescribed for Customs appeals before CESTAT. The dispute did not fall within any identified exception to the monetary-limit policy, and Section 131BA required due regard to such Board instructions.
Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable under the applicable monetary-limit instruction, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether amendment of exported shipping bills from "NO" to "YES" for pursuing MEIS benefit was permissible under Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962.
Analysis: Section 149 permits post-export amendment where it is supported by documentary evidence existing at the time of export. During the relevant export period, the provision contained no prescribed limitation period; the subsequently introduced restriction could not be applied retrospectively. Repeated "NO" declarations, delay, and possible fiscal consequences were relevant to discretion but did not create an absolute bar. Amendment of the shipping bills does not itself confer MEIS benefit, which remains subject to independent scrutiny by the competent authority under the applicable scheme.
Conclusion: Amendment under Section 149 was legally permissible, subject to the statutory requirement of contemporaneous documentary evidence, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The appellate order permitting the respondent to seek amendment of the shipping bills remains operative, while entitlement to MEIS benefit must be determined independently by the competent authority.
Ratio Decidendi: A post-export amendment of customs documents under Section 149 cannot be denied solely because it may facilitate a fiscal incentive claim or because a later-introduced limitation period is invoked; the governing test is whether contemporaneous documentary evidence supports the amendment under the law applicable at the time of export.
Monetary threshold for departmental Customs appeals - Post-export amendment of shipping bills for MEIS claim
Monetary threshold for departmental Customs appeals - Maintainability of the Departmental appeal against amendment of shipping bills where no Customs duty, interest, fine or penalty was involved and the disputed MEIS entitlement was below the prescribed monetary threshold - HELD THAT: - The Board's monetary-limit instructions issued under the statutory scheme require regard to be had to the circumstances in which departmental appeals are filed. The appeal was below the applicable threshold, and the Revenue did not establish that the dispute concerning amendment of shipping bills fell within any specified exception. Continuing such an appeal would defeat the object of limiting Government litigation and concentrating departmental resources on qualifying matters. [Paras 12, 13, 14]
The Departmental appeal was not maintainable under the applicable monetary-limit policy.
Post-export amendment of shipping bills for MEIS claim - Contemporaneous documentary evidence for amendment - Prospective operation of limitation for shipping-bill amendment - Permissibility of amending exported shipping bills from "NO" to "YES" to enable pursuit of MEIS benefit under Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962 - HELD THAT: - Section 149, as applicable when the exports were made, permitted post-export amendment upon contemporaneous documentary evidence and contained no prescribed limitation period. A subsequently introduced time restriction could not be retrospectively applied. Repeated "NO" declarations and delay were relevant to the proper officer's discretionary assessment of the asserted contemporaneous intention, but did not constitute an absolute legal bar; nor did the fiscal consequence of amendment place it outside Section 149. Amendment merely enables presentation of corrected shipping bills, while eligibility for MEIS remains for the competent authority to determine independently under the applicable scheme. [Paras 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]
The order permitting the respondent to seek amendment of the shipping bills was sustained, subject to independent determination of MEIS eligibility by the competent authority.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal was dismissed as being below the applicable monetary threshold and, independently, on merits. The amendment of the shipping bills was sustained without conferring any automatic entitlement to MEIS benefit.
Issues: (i) Whether imported natural rubber latex balloons were classifiable as toy balloons under Customs Tariff Heading 9503 rather than as inflatable rubber articles under Customs Tariff Heading 4016 or festive or entertainment articles under Customs Tariff Heading 9505; (ii) Whether penalties for wilful misclassification and wrongful availment of customs-duty exemption were sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether imported natural rubber latex balloons were classifiable as toy balloons under Customs Tariff Heading 9503 rather than as inflatable rubber articles under Customs Tariff Heading 4016 or festive or entertainment articles under Customs Tariff Heading 9505.
Analysis: Heading 4016 is a residual, material-based heading for vulcanised-rubber articles not covered elsewhere, whereas Heading 9503 provides the specific functional classification for toys. The HSN Explanatory Notes expressly include toy balloons in Heading 9503 and are a safe guide to tariff interpretation. Under Rule 1 of the General Rules for Interpretation, the terms of the heading and applicable notes govern classification before recourse to general or residual entries. The explanation inserted by Notification No. 02/2021-Customs also clarifies that toy balloons made of natural rubber latex fall under Heading 9503. Heading 9505 covers festive and carnival articles but does not include latex toy balloons; prior classification of differently described decorative or foil balloons did not govern the classification of the goods in issue.
Conclusion: The balloons are classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading 9503 as toy balloons, against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether penalties for wilful misclassification and wrongful availment of customs-duty exemption were sustainable.
Analysis: The record showed that identical goods had initially been classified under Heading 9503, followed by changes to Headings 4016 and 9505. The proprietor admitted requesting suppliers to alter classification in shipping documents. The change from Heading 9503 to Heading 4016 was linked to avoiding BIS requirements, and the goods were described by a supplier as toy latex balloons. The inconsistent classifications and incorrect availment of exemption established malafide intent rather than a bona fide classification dispute.
Conclusion: The penalties are sustainable, against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The reclassification, consequential differential-duty liability, and penal consequences remain enforceable.
Ratio Decidendi: Where goods are specifically covered by a functional tariff heading and the HSN Explanatory Notes, classification under that specific heading prevails over a general, material-based residual heading.
Classification of natural rubber latex toy balloons - Specific functional tariff classification over residual material-based classification - Penalty for deliberate misclassification to evade customs duty
Classification of imported natural rubber latex balloons as toy balloons under CTH 9503 OR as other inflatable articles of vulcanised rubber under CTH 4016 OR festive articles under CTH 9505 - HELD THAT: - The HSN Explanatory Notes are a safe and internationally accepted guide for tariff interpretation. They specifically include toy balloons in Heading 9503; consequently, recourse to the general or residual material-based heading for vulcanised rubber articles, or to the general festive and entertainment articles heading, was impermissible. Under GRI 1, the specific functional classification prevailed, and the notification clarification also supported classification of natural rubber latex toy balloons under Heading 9503. [Paras 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]
The reclassification under CTH 95030090 was sustained, and classification under CTH 4016 or CTH 9505 was rejected.
Penalty for deliberate misclassification to evade customs duty - HELD THAT: - The appellants had earlier classified the goods under CTH 9503 and thereafter caused the classification on shipping documents to be changed. The change from CTH 9503 to CTH 4016 was made to avoid conformity with BIS standards, and the record also disclosed incorrect availment of exemption and other conduct evidencing mala fide intent. The plea that there was no intention to evade duty was therefore not accepted. [Paras 15]
The penal consequences imposed in the impugned orders were upheld.
Final Conclusion: The impugned orders confirming the reclassification, consequential duty demand, interest and penalties were upheld. The appeals were dismissed.
Issues: (i) Whether enhancement of the declared customs value of imported wall paper from USD 2.2 per kg to USD 3.5 per kg was lawful; (ii) Whether the assessment of a separate Bill of Entry could be quashed because no speaking order was issued following remand.
Issue (i): Whether enhancement of the declared customs value of imported wall paper from USD 2.2 per kg to USD 3.5 per kg was lawful.
Analysis: The declared transaction value was rejected under Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007 on the basis of higher values of comparable imports available in the National Import Database. The reassessment under Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 applied Rule 5 by relying on contemporaneous imports of wall paper at the same commercial level, quantity and country of origin. Of the comparable imports, USD 3.5 per kg was the lowest value. The prior self-assessed import relied upon was not comparable in time, and the available import documents did not establish a material difference in the description or specifications of the goods.
Conclusion: The enhancement of value to USD 3.5 per kg was valid, against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the assessment of a separate Bill of Entry could be quashed because no speaking order was issued following remand.
Analysis: Section 17(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 requires issuance of a speaking order. The assessment had already been remanded with a direction to issue such order after affording a personal hearing. In those circumstances, the pending obligation to issue the directed speaking order did not justify quashing the assessment; recourse lay before the concerned customs authority for implementation of the remand direction.
Conclusion: Quashing of the assessment was not warranted, against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The comparable-import valuation stands sustained, while the separate remanded assessment remains subject to issuance of the required speaking order by the competent customs authority.
Ratio Decidendi: Once a declared transaction value is validly rejected on reasonable doubt, customs value may be redetermined from the lowest reliable contemporaneous transaction value of comparable imports satisfying the prescribed criteria.
Customs valuation of imported wall paper based on contemporaneous similar goods - Speaking order in customs assessment after remand
Rejection of declared transaction value - Transaction value of contemporaneous similar goods - Enhancement of the declared customs value of imported wall paper on the basis of contemporaneous imports of similar goods - HELD THAT: - The declared transaction value could be rejected under Rule 12 where higher import values of identical goods recorded in the National Import Database gave the assessing officer reasonable doubt as to its truth or accuracy. The comparable imports relied upon were found to be at the same commercial level, in comparable quantity and from the same country of origin, and the lowest value among the contemporaneous imports had been adopted under Rule 5. The appellant's earlier self-assessed import did not displace those factual findings, particularly when the invoices and packing lists did not specify the size or thickness of the wall paper. Case followed JKC GENERAL TRADING COMPANY THR. ITS PARTNER [2025 (12) TMI 719 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] [Paras 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]
The enhancement of value and the order upholding it were sustained.
Speaking order on customs assessment - Non-issuance of a speaking order on the assessment of imported wall paper despite an earlier remand directing such order after personal hearing - HELD THAT: - Section 17(5) requires the customs officer to issue a speaking order. While noting that no speaking order had been passed despite the earlier remand, the Tribunal held that the assessment could not be quashed on that ground when the appellant remained free to approach the concerned authorities for issuance of the speaking order. [Paras 10]
The direction permitting the appellant to pursue issuance of a speaking order before the competent authorities was upheld.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal found no infirmity in the enhancement of the customs value of the imported wall paper or in the treatment of the pending speaking-order requirement. The appeal was dismissed.
Issues: (i) Whether drawback of Rs. 1,810/- with interest was recoverable from the appellants; (ii) Whether penalties under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable; (iii) Whether penalties under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether drawback of Rs. 1,810/- with interest was recoverable from the appellants.
Analysis: Drawback processing through the Indian Customs EDI System credits the sanctioned amount to the bank account of the IEC holder reflected in the shipping bill. Since no shipping bill was filed using the appellants' IEC, no drawback could have been credited to them. Recovery of wrongly paid drawback is an execution process and may be undertaken, with applicable interest, only if evidence establishes that drawback was actually paid to them.
Conclusion: Drawback and interest were not recoverable from the appellants in the absence of evidence that any drawback had been paid to them.
Issue (ii): Whether penalties under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.
Analysis: A penalty under Section 114 requires an act or omission rendering goods liable to confiscation under Section 113. Goods that have already been taken out of India cease to be "export goods" within Section 2(19) and become exported goods. Section 113 permits confiscation only of export goods; therefore, the finding that the already exported garments were liable to confiscation could not be sustained.
Conclusion: The penalties under Section 114(iii) were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether penalties under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.
Analysis: Section 114AA requires knowing or intentional making, signing, using, or causing the use of a materially false or incorrect declaration, statement, or document. The false shipping bills were filed by the freight forwarder using another entity's IEC. The record did not establish that the appellants made any customs declaration or document, or possessed knowledge or intent concerning the false documents.
Conclusion: The penalties under Section 114AA were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The drawback recovery and the impugned penalties lacked the necessary factual and statutory foundation.
Recovery of drawback from non-recipient exporter - Confiscation of goods after export u/s 113 - Penalty for knowingly using false customs documents
Recovery of drawback from non-recipient exporter - Recovery of claimed drawback and interest from the garment exporter whose goods were shipped under another entity's IEC - HELD THAT: - Drawback processing through ICES results in credit to the bank account of the IEC holder. As no shipping bill was filed in the exporter's name, no drawback could have been credited to it. Recovery of wrongly paid drawback is an execution proceeding and does not require adjudication; however, repayment with applicable interest would arise if the department establishes that any drawback was actually paid to the exporter. [Paras 10]
The recovery of drawback and interest from the exporter was unsustainable in the absence of evidence that it received the drawback.
Confiscation of goods after export under section 113 - Penalty for improper export - Penalty on the garment exporter and its directors for acts alleged to have rendered the garments liable to confiscation under section 113 - HELD THAT: - Section 113 applies only to export goods, namely goods intended to be taken out of India. Upon being taken outside India, the garments ceased to be export goods and became exported goods, which are not liable to confiscation under that provision. The finding of confiscability was therefore contrary to section 113, and the consequential penalty under section 114 could not survive. [Paras 12, 13, 14]
Penalty on the garment exporter and its directors for alleged use of false shipping bills and documents in exports made through another entity's IEC - HELD THAT: - The appellants neither made nor filed any declaration, statement or document before Customs. The false shipping bills had been filed by the freight forwarder in the name of an unrelated IEC holder. Although export using another person's IEC contravened the foreign trade law, there was no evidence that the appellants knowingly or intentionally made or used a materially false customs declaration, statement or document. [Paras 16, 17]
The penalties under section 114AA were set aside.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed and the impugned order was set aside with consequential relief.
Issues: (i) Whether foreign customs declarations received through an overseas enquiry were admissible and attracted the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Customs Act, 1962, and whether the importer's statements under Section 108 could establish undervaluation; (ii) Whether rejection of the declared transaction value and redetermination of value complied with the sequential valuation rules; (iii) Whether penalty equal to the differential duty was imposable under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962.
Issue (i): Whether foreign customs declarations received through an overseas enquiry were admissible and attracted the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Customs Act, 1962, and whether the importer's statements under Section 108 could establish undervaluation.
Analysis: The foreign declarations were received from the Hong Kong Consulate following an overseas enquiry initiated through official channels and were supported by authenticated English translations and a comparative chart. Documents received from outside India during investigation fall within Section 139(ii), which attaches a presumption of correctness unless rebutted. The importer's objections concerning copies, absence of signatures, stamps and the original-language documents did not displace that presumption; no contrary translation or evidence was produced. Section 3(2) of the Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act, 1948 did not require attestation of every foreign document. The test report, discrepancies in quantity and brand, and voluntary statements recorded under Section 108 further supported the undervaluation; such statements are substantive evidence when voluntarily made to Customs officers.
Conclusion: The foreign declarations and Section 108 statements validly established misdeclaration and undervaluation, in favour of Revenue.
Issue (ii): Whether rejection of the declared transaction value and redetermination of value complied with the sequential valuation rules.
Analysis: Misdeclaration concerning quantity and brand, together with the evidence of substantially higher values declared before foreign customs authorities, provided sufficient grounds to reject the transaction value under Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007. The redetermined value was based on values of identical goods supplied by the same exporter, and the applicable rules were applied sequentially after rejection of the declared value.
Conclusion: Rejection of the transaction value and redetermination of customs value were valid, in favour of Revenue.
Issue (iii): Whether penalty equal to the differential duty was imposable under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962.
Analysis: The sustained differential-duty demand arose from wilful misdeclaration and undervaluation. Section 114A prescribes a penalty equal to the duty determined in such circumstances.
Conclusion: Penalty equal to the differential customs duty was properly sustained, in favour of Revenue.
Final Conclusion: The differential-duty liability and corresponding equal penalty determined at the original stage remain enforceable.
Ratio Decidendi: Foreign customs documents obtained through official investigative channels attract the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Customs Act, 1962 unless rebutted, and may support rejection and redetermination of declared transaction value when corroborated by voluntary Customs statements and material discrepancies.
Demand of differential customs duty - foreign customs declarations received through an overseas enquiry - Presumption as to overseas customs documents - Rejection and re-determination of transaction value for import undervaluation - Mandatory penalty for customs duty evasion
Evidentiary value of declarations received from foreign Customs authorities and admissions made by the importer concerning undervaluation of imported kitchenware - Presumption as to overseas customs documents - Admissibility of statements under customs summons - HELD THAT: - The declarations obtained through the Consulate pursuant to an overseas enquiry were documents received from outside India in the course of investigation and attracted the presumption under Section 139(ii). The department established that they were received through proper channels and were accompanied by authenticated English translations; the importer produced no material to disprove their contents. The Tribunal further treated the importer's statements recorded by Customs officers under Section 108 as admissible evidence, Customs officers not being police officers, and found that the admissions corroborated the undervaluation. [Paras 7, 8, 9]
The foreign Customs declarations and the importer's admissions were held sufficient evidence of undervaluation; the contrary finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) was rejected.
Rejection of transaction value for misdeclaration - Sequential customs valuation - Validity of rejection and re-determination of the transaction value of imported urea-formaldehyde kitchenware on account of misdeclaration of quantity and brand and established undervaluation - HELD THAT: - The discrepancies found on examination concerning quantity and brand furnished sufficient grounds to reject the declared transaction value under Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation Rules. Once the transaction value stood rejected, valuation was required to proceed sequentially under Rules 4 to 9. The re-determination was based on the value of identical goods received from the same exporter, and the Tribunal held that the prescribed sequential process had been followed. [Paras 10]
The re-determined value and the consequential differential customs duty demand were upheld.
Penalty for differential customs duty evasion arising from wilful misstatement and suppression in the import declarations - HELD THAT: - Having upheld the differential customs duty demand, the Tribunal held that the penalty prescribed under Section 114A was mandatory and equal to the duty determined. [Paras 10]
The penalty imposed by the original adjudicating authority was sustained.
Final Conclusion: The departmental appeals were allowed, the orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) were set aside, and the differential customs duty demands and corresponding mandatory penalties were restored.
Issues: Whether interest is payable on refund of redemption fine paid for release of confiscated goods, from the date of deposit until actual refund.
Analysis: The redemption fine, having been set aside, constituted a revenue deposit rather than a refund of customs duty. The interest mechanism under Section 27A, applicable to delayed refunds of duty and triggered by the date of refund application, did not govern such a deposit. Applying the principles governing restitution of amounts deposited during investigation or adjudication, interest was compensatory for the period during which the Department retained money not legally due.
Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to interest at 12% per annum on the refunded redemption fine from the date of revenue deposit until actual payment.
Interest on refund of redemption fine - Compensatory interest on revenue deposit - Entitlement to interest on redemption fine refunded after the confiscation - HELD THAT: - The amount paid for redemption of the goods, once the confiscation and redemption fine were set aside, was a revenue deposit and not a refund of duty governed by the statutory scheme for delayed duty refunds. The absence of a specific provision prescribing interest on refund of such deposit did not defeat the claim, since interest is compensatory for the period during which the Department retained an amount not legally payable. The authorities concerning interest on duty refunds under the Customs Act were therefore inapplicable.
In view of the facts and circumstances and relying upon the judgment of M/s Parle Agro Pvt. Ltd. [2021 (5) TMI 870 - CESTAT ALLAHABAD] upheld by the Allahabad High Court [2025 (11) TMI 2024 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] and M/s Riba Textiles Ltd. [2022 (3) TMI 693 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT] I set aside the impugned order and allowed the appeals of the appellant and hold that the appellant is entitled to interest @ 12% from the date of the revenue deposit till the actual payment.[Paras 6, 8, 9]
Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed. Interest at 12% per annum was directed on the refunded redemption fine from the date of revenue deposit until actual payment.
Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable without an established contravention or failure to comply with a statutory obligation; (ii) Whether a detention and demurrage waiver certificate was required for the period of Customs-attributable delay in permitting re-export.
Issue (i): Whether penalty under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable without an established contravention or failure to comply with a statutory obligation.
Analysis: Section 117 is attracted only where a contravention, abetment, or failure to comply with a duty imposed by the Customs Act is established and no separate penalty is prescribed. The recorded findings showed that the re-export request was bona fide, the goods were unobjectionable upon examination, the proposed transhipment failed owing to non-availability of a coastal vessel, and the requisite no-objections were available. No contravention or statutory failure by the appellant was identified. Discretion to impose penalty must be exercised rationally, fairly and proportionately; it cannot be a mechanical imposition of the statutory maximum.
Conclusion: The penalty under Section 117 was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether a detention and demurrage waiver certificate was required for the period of Customs-attributable delay in permitting re-export.
Analysis: The goods continued to remain detained despite payment of the penalty under protest, and the Let Export Order was issued only subsequently. Detention and demurrage liability cannot be imposed upon an importer or exporter for a period attributable to delay or omission by Customs authorities, particularly where adjudication has concluded without duty, fine or penalty.
Conclusion: A certificate waiving detention and demurrage charges up to the date on which the Let Export Order was issued and made available was directed to be issued in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The monetary consequence imposed for the re-export request was removed, and Customs was required to extend statutory waiver protection against charges arising from its delay.
Ratio Decidendi: A discretionary customs penalty requires an established contravention and a rational, proportionate exercise of power; where Customs-attributable delay causes detention after adjudication favours the importer or exporter, the statutory waiver certificate must be issued.
Penalty u/s 117 for unestablished customs contravention - Detention and demurrage waiver for customs-attributable delay
Penalty for unestablished customs contravention - Judicial exercise of penalty discretion - Validity of penalty under the residual penalty provision in respect of re-export of a technical-grade mono ammonium phosphate consignment - HELD THAT: - Penalty under the residual provision is attracted only upon a finding of contravention of the Act, abetment of such contravention, or failure to comply with a statutory duty where no separate penalty is prescribed. The adjudicating authority recorded that the re-export request was bona fide, the goods were unobjectionable on examination, the intended transhipment failed for want of a coastal vessel, and the requisite no-objections were available, yet identified no contravention or statutory failure by the appellant. Statutory discretion to impose penalty must be exercised reasonably, rationally and proportionately; it does not authorise mechanical imposition of the statutory maximum. [Paras 12, 15, 18, 19, 23]
The penalty was held arbitrary, disproportionate and unsustainable, and was set aside in toto.
Detention and demurrage waiver for customs-attributable delay - Entitlement to waiver of detention and demurrage charges where re-export was delayed by Customs authorities - HELD THAT: - The continued detention of the goods after the appellant had sought re-export and complied with the imposed condition could not be disregarded where the delay in permitting re-export was attributable to Customs authorities. Detention and demurrage charges for such period cannot justly be fastened upon the importer or exporter, particularly when the adjudication ultimately resulted in no penalty. [Paras 24, 25, 27]
The jurisdictional Customs authority was directed to issue a waiver certificate under the Handling of Cargo in Customs Areas Regulations, 2009, for detention and demurrage charges up to the issuance and availability of the let export order.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed by setting aside the penalty and directing issuance of a detention and demurrage waiver certificate for the period of Customs-attributable delay in permitting re-export.
Issues: Whether a provisional-release order imposing conditions without affording a personal hearing and without considering the pending request for re-test could be sustained.
Analysis: The right to seek re-test is material to classification and the eventual adjudication. The governing re-test procedure and the request for provisional release required consideration. A decision on provisional release is adjudicatory in character and requires adherence to principles of natural justice, including consideration of the applicant's contentions and an effective opportunity of hearing. The order neither recorded a hearing nor addressed the pending re-test request or the basis on which the stipulated conditions were considered viable.
Conclusion: The provisional-release order could not stand and a fresh reasoned determination is required after granting the assessee a personal hearing and permitting supporting evidence.
Provisional release of seized goods - non affording a personal hearing and without considering the pending request for re-test - non observance of natural justice - Audi Alteram Partem
HELD THAT: - It is seen that in decision in Mohini Jewellers [2023 (8) TMI 755 - KERALA HIGH COURT] has held that the Act of adjudicating authority in deciding an application for provisional release is adjudicating procedure and not a ministerial act and therefore the adjudicating authority is bound to adhere to the elementary principles of natural justice by adverting to the contentions raised in an application seeking provisional release and afford the applicant an opportunity of being heard.
An application for provisional release entails an adjudicatory procedure and is not a ministerial act; the applicant must therefore be afforded an opportunity of hearing and its contentions must be considered. The impugned order did not indicate that the importer had been heard, refer to a request for provisional release, or consider the pending request for re-test, the result of which could bear upon adjudication. [Paras 7, 8, 9, 10]
The provisional release order was set aside and the customs authority was directed to grant a personal hearing, permit evidence, and pass a reasoned fresh order on provisional release in accordance with prevailing instructions and judicial pronouncements.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed by setting aside the provisional release order and remitting the matter for a fresh reasoned decision after affording the importer a personal hearing.
Issues: Whether redemption fine and penalty imposed for import of goods treated as e-waste should be reduced after the entire consignment was re-exported and was never cleared for home consumption.
Analysis: The goods were treated as e-waste on the basis of the Chartered Engineer's report and were permitted to be re-exported. The consignment was in fact re-exported in compliance with that direction and did not enter domestic circulation. The classification rested only on the Chartered Engineer's report, which was not conclusive evidence for classification of the imported goods. These circumstances warranted reduction of the monetary consequences.
Conclusion: The redemption fine and penalty were reduced to Rs. 50,000 each.
Redemption fine and penalty on re-export of misdeclared imported goods - Quantum of redemption fine and penalty where imported goods declared as mixed metal scrap were treated as e-waste, re-exported, and not cleared for home consumption
HELD THAT: - The finding that the goods were e-waste rested only on the Chartered Engineer's report, which was held not to be conclusive evidence for classification. As the goods had already been re-exported in compliance with the order and had not entered home consumption, the redemption fine and penalty required substantial reduction. [Paras 7, 8]
The redemption fine and penalty were each reduced to Rs. 50,000, and the appeal was partly allowed.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was modified by substantially reducing the redemption fine and penalty in view of re-export of the goods and the inconclusive basis for their classification.
Issues: Whether the rejection of the declared transaction value and the consequential demand of differential customs duty, interest, confiscation, redemption fine and penalties for alleged undervaluation were sustainable.
Analysis: The unsigned and unauthenticated parallel invoices allegedly produced by the overseas supplier could not attract the statutory presumption and lacked evidentiary value. The computer printouts recovered from electronic devices were inadmissible because the requirements governing admissibility of electronic records were not fulfilled. The statements relied upon were uncorroborated, inconsistent, and did not establish any additional payment by the importer to the overseas supplier. No independent evidence, including banking evidence or evidence of contemporaneous imports, substantiated the alleged undervaluation. The earlier assessments had accepted the declared value and had attained finality; the Revenue did not produce reliable evidence sufficient to displace that value. The materially identical investigation had also been decided against the Revenue.
Conclusion: The allegation of undervaluation was not sustainable; the rejection and redetermination of assessable value, differential duty demand, interest, confiscation, redemption fine and penalties were set aside.
Undervaluation of imported heavy earth-moving machinery - Admissibility of unauthenticated electronic invoices - Corroboration of alleged extra remittances
Rejection of the declared value of imported heavy earth-moving machinery on the basis of unsigned invoices, computer printouts and uncorroborated statements alleging undervaluation - HELD THAT: - Unsigned and unauthenticated invoices could not attract a presumption u/s 139. The computer-generated invoices were inadmissible, as the statutory safeguards u/s 138C(2) for electronic records had not been satisfied. The statements relied on were neither independently corroborated nor supported by admissible evidence establishing additional payment by the appellant to the overseas supplier. The same investigation and substantially identical evidence had already been found insufficient to sustain allegations of undervaluation in connected proceedings, and no contrary material justified a departure from that view.
We find that the very same issue in respect of proceedings arising from the very same investigation and substantially the same evidentiary material has already been decided by this Tribunal in the case of Shri Ranaji Ganguly [2025 (2) TMI 1286 - CESTAT KOLKATA] wherein held that the allegation of undervaluation could not be legally sustained. Also see ABHIJIT RAY BURMAN [2025 (12) TMI 833 - CESTAT KOLKATA] [Paras 10, 11, 13, 14]
The allegation of undervaluation was unsustainable; the redetermination of value, differential duty, interest, confiscation, redemption fine and penalties were set aside.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed with consequential relief. The impugned orders against the appellant were set aside.
Issues: Whether the winding-up petition could validly be transferred to the National Company Law Tribunal despite prior asset sales and liquidation steps.
Analysis: Section 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 permits transfer of winding-up proceedings to the National Company Law Tribunal after determining whether liquidation has reached an irreversible stage. Admission of a winding-up petition, appointment of a liquidator, possession of assets, or sale of assets by secured creditors outside the winding-up process does not, by itself, establish corporate death. The company retained assets under the custody of the receiver and the official liquidator, and the liquidation steps taken were limited. A financial creditor holding more than half of the financial debt could seek revival through the time-bound rehabilitative framework under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
Conclusion: The winding-up proceedings had not reached an irreversible stage, and their transfer to the National Company Law Tribunal for possible revival was valid.
Transfer of winding-up proceedings for corporate revival - Irreversible stage of winding up - Transfer of the winding-up petition to the National Company Law Tribunal at the instance of a financial creditor, despite sales of certain assets outside the winding-up proceedings
HELD THAT: - A financial creditor may seek transfer for revival within the time-bound rehabilitative framework of the IBC. Transfer is to be declined only where winding up has reached an irreversible stage; admission of the winding-up petition, appointment of a liquidator, or possession of assets does not by itself establish such irreversibility. The sale of assets by secured creditors outside the winding-up proceedings likewise did not preclude transfer where assets remained available and revival remained possible. The limited steps taken by the Official Liquidator did not amount to corporate death. We are fortified by the decision of the Supreme Court in A. Navin Chandra Steels Pvt. Ltd. [2021 (3) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT] [Paras 8, 9, 10, 11]
The order transferring the winding-up petition to the National Company Law Tribunal was upheld.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, and the transfer of the winding-up petition to the National Company Law Tribunal for consideration under the IBC framework was sustained.
Issues: (i) Whether the corporate debtor's application for initiation of CIRP under Section 10 was liable to be rejected as a malicious use of the insolvency process; (ii) Whether the monetary penalty imposed upon the corporate debtor required interference on proportionality grounds.
Issue (i): Whether the corporate debtor's application for initiation of CIRP under Section 10 was liable to be rejected as a malicious use of the insolvency process.
Analysis: Section 10 permits a corporate debtor to seek insolvency resolution, but the Adjudicating Authority must assess whether the application is a bona fide attempt at resolution and is not being used to frustrate creditor recovery. The filing followed commencement of recovery measures, while substantial hypothecated plant and machinery was found missing, no satisfactory explanation or supporting fixed-asset records were furnished, and the corporate debtor had no meaningful receivables or immovable assets. These circumstances supported the finding that the application sought a moratorium to obstruct recovery proceedings rather than to achieve genuine resolution.
Conclusion: The rejection of the Section 10 application was justified; the application was initiated with malicious intent and amounted to abuse of the insolvency process. This issue was decided against the appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether the monetary penalty imposed upon the corporate debtor required interference on proportionality grounds.
Analysis: A penalty for fraudulent conduct must be supported by reasons demonstrating the nature and magnitude of the conduct and must conform to the principle of proportionality. The record did not disclose reasons justifying the quantum of Rs. 10 lakh, notwithstanding the finding of malicious intent.
Conclusion: The penalty was excessive and was reduced from Rs. 10 lakh to Rs. 5 lakh. This issue was decided in favour of the appellant.
Final Conclusion: The finding that the insolvency application was a mala fide attempt to secure protection from creditor recovery remains operative, while the financial sanction is recalibrated to a proportionate amount.
Ratio Decidendi: An application for corporate insolvency resolution may be rejected where the surrounding conduct establishes that it is a fraudulent or malicious device to defeat creditor recovery, and any resulting penalty must be reasoned and proportionate.
Corporate applicant's insolvency application - bona fide invocation - Penalty for malicious insolvency application - proportionality
Corporate applicant's insolvency application - bona fide invocation - Malicious intent to defeat secured recovery proceedings - Maintainability of the corporate applicant's application for initiation of insolvency resolution where it was filed after recovery action had commenced and hypothecated plant and machinery were found missing - HELD THAT: - Proof of debt and default does not require automatic admission of an application by a corporate applicant. The Adjudicating Authority is duty-bound to sift the material on record to determine whether the application is a genuine effort to resolve indebtedness or is intended to derail recovery proceedings. The unexplained removal of hypothecated assets during recovery proceedings, coupled with the timing of the application after coercive action under the SARFAESI Act had begun, established that the application was intended to secure a moratorium and defeat the creditors' recovery process rather than achieve resolution. [Paras 23, 25]
The dismissal of the application for malicious intent was sustained.
Penalty for malicious insolvency application - proportionality - Quantum of penalty imposed for filing the insolvency application with malicious intent - HELD THAT: - A penalty for fraudulent or malicious conduct must be supported by reasons reflecting the magnitude of the fraudulent act and the basis for the quantum imposed. The principle of proportionality applies, and the impugned order did not provide reasons justifying the penalty imposed. [Paras 26, 27]
The penalty was reduced.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed. The dismissal of the corporate applicant's insolvency application was affirmed, while the penalty was reduced.
Issues: Whether admission of an application for initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process could be sustained when the outstanding financial debt on the date of the admission order was below the statutory default threshold.
Analysis: The admitted payment records showed that the corporate debtor had repaid Rs. 2.25 crore of the principal debt before the admission order. The remaining amount of Rs. 93,88,310 was below the threshold of Rs. 1 crore. The financial creditors had received those payments but had not placed that material fact before the Adjudicating Authority before the order was made. Consequently, the prerequisite default amount for admission under Section 7 was not present on the relevant date.
Conclusion: The admission of the insolvency application was legally unsustainable and was set aside, in favour of the appellant.
Minimum default threshold for corporate insolvency - Part repayment before admission of insolvency application - Maintainability of the financial creditors' application for initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process after repayments reduced the outstanding default below the statutory threshold - HELD THAT: - The admitted payments made before admission of the application left only the balance amount due, which was below the threshold of rupees one crore. The financial creditors ought to have apprised the Adjudicating Authority of those payments; had that occurred, the insolvency application might not have been admitted. The admission order consequently could not withstand legal scrutiny. [Paras 16, 17, 18]
The admission order was set aside and the appeal was allowed; any CIRP costs were directed to be borne by the appellant.
Final Conclusion: The corporate insolvency admission was set aside because the default outstanding on the date of admission was below the statutory threshold.
Issues: Whether the interest on the balance financial debt, fixed at 9% per annum in the final insolvency appellate judgment, should be substituted by the contractual default rate of 3% per month.
Analysis: Rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 preserves inherent powers but does not warrant reopening a final adjudication merely to reach a different conclusion on facts already considered. The prior direction fixing interest at 9% per annum was a conscious exercise of judicial discretion after accounting for repayment of the entire principal and a substantial part of interest. Although contractual terms ordinarily bind the parties, the relief in proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 must accord with the insolvency-resolution objective and cannot convert closed insolvency proceedings into a mechanism for recovery of disputed enhanced contractual interest. A default rate of 3% per month, producing a substantially enlarged claim after discharge of principal, was disproportionate in the circumstances. Liberty to seek modification did not itself establish entitlement to modification.
Conclusion: The contractual default interest of 3% per month was not substituted for the judicially fixed interest of 9% per annum on the balance amount.
Modification of judicially awarded interest in insolvency proceedings - Insolvency proceedings not a recovery forum for contractual default interest - Judicial discretion in award of interest
Modification of interest awarded on the balance loan dues after repayment of the principal amount by substituting the contractual default rate for the judicially fixed rate - HELD THAT: - The earlier direction awarding interest formed part of a final adjudication rendered after considering the loan terms, the repayment of the entire principal and a substantial part of interest, and the circumstances in which the insolvency admission was set aside. Contractual terms are ordinarily binding, but a judicial forum may mould relief having regard to the nature of the proceedings and the surrounding circumstances.
The contractual default rate could not be mechanically enforced through modification, since the surviving dispute concerned the quantum of interest after the insolvency proceedings had ceased to survive; permitting enhanced penal interest would effectively convert proceedings under the Code into a recovery mechanism.
The liberty granted by the Supreme Court only enabled the Financial Creditor to seek modification and did not establish any entitlement to it. Any contractual claim for enhanced interest could be pursued before the competent forum contemplated by the loan agreement.
We find that the direction awarding interest at 9% per annum strikes a fair balance between the competing rights of the parties. It ensures that the Financial Creditor is compensated for the delayed payment, while at the same time recognising the undisputed fact that the Corporate Debtor had already repaid the entire principal amount together with a substantial portion of the interest even before the appeal was finally decided.
Replacing that rate with contractual default interest of 3% per month would convert the corporate insolvency resolution proceedings which have been closed by this Tribunal, into a recovery proceeding, which would be contrary to the objectives of the Code. [Paras 40, 42, 43, 44, 45]
No ground for modifying the interest rate of 9% per annum was made out, and the application seeking substitution of the contractual default rate was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The application for enhancement of interest to the contractual default rate was dismissed. The previously awarded interest at 9% per annum on the balance amount was maintained.
Issues: (i) Whether post-CIRP transfers from the corporate debtor's bank account to recipients for pre-CIRP work violated the moratorium and warranted remittance; (ii) Whether the alleged availability of the former remedy under Section 74 barred recourse to the Tribunal's jurisdiction for enforcing the moratorium.
Issue (i): Whether post-CIRP transfers from the corporate debtor's bank account to recipients for pre-CIRP work violated the moratorium and warranted remittance.
Analysis: The transfers were admittedly made after commencement of CIRP and during the moratorium, without the Resolution Professional's knowledge. The bank records established that funds credited to the corporate debtor were subsequently transferred to the appellant. Publication of the CIRP commencement and the statutory public announcement gave rise to deemed knowledge of the moratorium. The assertion that the funds were held in trust was unsupported, as no trust relationship or identifiable trust fund was established. The fact that underlying work related to a pre-CIRP period did not validate a post-moratorium disposition of the corporate debtor's assets.
Conclusion: The transfers violated the moratorium under Section 14(1)(b), and the direction to remit the amount with interest was valid, against the appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether the alleged availability of the former remedy under Section 74 barred recourse to the Tribunal's jurisdiction for enforcing the moratorium.
Analysis: The contention based on Section 74 had neither been urged before the adjudicating authority nor raised as a ground in appeal. Further, Section 74 had been omitted with effect from 06.04.2026. In any event, the contention did not displace the established fact of transactions undertaken during the moratorium or invalidate recourse to enforce the statutory prohibition.
Conclusion: The former Section 74 remedy did not bar recourse under Sections 60(5) and 14(1)(b), against the appellant.
Final Conclusion: The recovery directions enforcing the moratorium over the corporate debtor's assets remain legally sustainable.
Ratio Decidendi: A post-CIRP transfer of the corporate debtor's funds during a subsisting moratorium is prohibited unless a legally established exception applies; pre-CIRP origin of the underlying transaction and an unproved claim of trust do not remove the transfer from the moratorium.
Moratorium-prohibition on transfer of corporate debtor's assets - Public announcement of CIRP-deemed knowledge of moratorium - Remedy for violation of moratorium
Moratorium-post-CIRP transfer of corporate debtor's funds - Public announcement of CIRP-deemed knowledge of moratorium - Trust claim over funds held by corporate debtor - Remittance of funds transferred from the corporate debtor's account during the moratorium period, claimed to relate to pre-CIRP work and to be held in trust - HELD THAT: - The transactions were established from the corporate debtor's bank records as having occurred during the moratorium, without the Resolution Professional's knowledge. Public announcement and publication of the CIRP proceedings gave rise to deemed knowledge of the moratorium; ignorance of the proceedings was therefore unavailable as a defence. The assertion that the funds were held in trust was unsupported, as no trust relationship or basis for treating the transferred funds as trust money was established. Transfer or disposal of the corporate debtor's assets during moratorium attracted the prohibition under Section 14(1)(b). [Paras 18, 19, 20, 24, 25]
The direction to remit the funds transferred during the moratorium was upheld.
Remedy for violation of moratorium - Availability of proceedings under Section 60(5) read with Section 14(1)(b), notwithstanding the appellant's belated reliance on Section 74 of the Code - HELD THAT: - The contention founded on Section 74 had neither been pleaded nor urged before the adjudicating authority, and no finding on that provision existed. Further, Section 74 had been omitted by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026. The earlier decision relied upon by the appellant was rendered when Section 74 was in force and was held inapplicable. On the established facts of a moratorium breach, recourse under Section 14(1)(b) was available.
Because of the stipulations contained under Section 13(1)(b) to be r/w Section 15, which makes it mandatory to cause a publication, which is to be read with provisions of Regulation No. 6 as contained under the IBBI Insolvency Corporate Persons Regulation, 2016. The declaration made thereof would be in public domain and it would be leading to a deeming inference and knowledge to the appellant about the imposition of moratorium. For the aforesaid reasons, we don’t find any merits in the company appeal and the company is accordingly dismissed.[Paras 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]
The challenge to the maintainability of the proceedings under Section 60(5) read with Section 14(1)(b) was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The company appeal was dismissed. The direction for remittance of funds transferred from the corporate debtor during the moratorium was sustained.
Issues: Whether a CIRP admitted under Section 9 can be closed by the Appellate Tribunal on the basis of a settlement reached after admission, before constitution of the Committee of Creditors.
Analysis: The settlement was executed after commencement of CIRP and expressly recognised that closure was subject to compliance with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The amended Section 12A imposes a non obstante statutory framework for withdrawal of an admitted application and bars withdrawal before constitution of the Committee of Creditors. The authorities relied upon concerned settlements completed before admission of CIRP and predated or did not attract the amended statutory position.
Conclusion: The post-admission settlement could not justify closure of CIRP in the appeal; the IRP may seek withdrawal before the Adjudicating Authority under Section 12A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
Withdrawal of corporate insolvency resolution process after admission - Statutory bar on withdrawal before constitution of committee of creditors
Withdrawal of the corporate insolvency resolution process following a post-admission settlement between the operational creditor and the corporate debtor - HELD THAT: - The amended Section 12A, applicable to the case, makes the procedure for withdrawal more stringent and, by its non obstante clause, prohibits withdrawal of an application admitted under Sections 7, 9 or 10 before constitution of the committee of creditors.
The precedents concerning settlements reached before admission to the corporate insolvency resolution process were held inapplicable, since the settlement here was executed after admission and the parties themselves acknowledged that closure was subject to compliance with the Code and the prescribed procedure. [Paras 4, 5]
The IRP was left at liberty to apply before the Adjudicating Authority under Section 12A, which was requested to decide such application within 15 days in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The appeal and settlement application were disposed of without terminating the CIRP. The parties were required to pursue withdrawal before the Adjudicating Authority through the procedure prescribed by Section 12A.
Issues: (i) Whether a sale process for corporate-debtor assets initiated during the resolution-plan implementation stage could validly be completed by the liquidator after commencement of liquidation; (ii) Whether former employees established a legally sustainable challenge to the aircraft sale on allegations of undervaluation, absence of fresh valuation, and irregularity, notwithstanding protection of their dues under the liquidation waterfall.
Issue (i): Whether a sale process for corporate-debtor assets initiated during the resolution-plan implementation stage could validly be completed by the liquidator after commencement of liquidation.
Analysis: The proposed sale had been approved through the resolution process, and directions for its completion had already been sustained in prior appellate proceedings. After liquidation commenced, the Stakeholders' Consultation Committee adopted the earlier sale decision and approved completion of the process. The liquidation framework permits the liquidator to take custody and control of assets and sell them; it contains no prohibition against completing a sale process validly initiated before liquidation. The sale was also carried forward under continuing judicial supervision.
Conclusion: The liquidator could validly complete the pre-liquidation sale process during liquidation. This issue is against the appellants.
Issue (ii): Whether former employees established a legally sustainable challenge to the aircraft sale on allegations of undervaluation, absence of fresh valuation, and irregularity, notwithstanding protection of their dues under the liquidation waterfall.
Analysis: The allegations did not disclose material irregularity or illegality in the sale process. The sale had proceeded from an earlier competitive process and was completed after the relevant stakeholder approval. The former employees' entitlement was confined to payment of their admitted dues in the statutory order of priority. Their interests had already been protected through the liquidation distribution mechanism, and no material was shown to demonstrate an unlawful diminution of the liquidation estate.
Conclusion: The former employees failed to establish any illegality or material irregularity warranting interference with the completed sale; their dues remain payable in accordance with the statutory waterfall. This issue is against the appellants.
Final Conclusion: The completed sale remains valid, and employee claims are to be addressed through the statutory liquidation distribution framework.
Ratio Decidendi: A liquidator may complete a sale process lawfully initiated before liquidation where it is adopted through the liquidation process and no material illegality or irregularity in the sale is established; employee dues are governed by the statutory liquidation waterfall.
Continuation of pre-liquidation asset sale process - Employee claims under liquidation waterfall
Challenge by former employees to the sale of aircraft assets during liquidation, where the sale process had commenced during the corporate insolvency resolution process and was subsequently adopted by the Stakeholders' Consultation Committee - HELD THAT: - The decision to sell the aircraft had been approved during the insolvency process and its completion had been upheld in earlier proceedings. The Adjudicating Authority had also held that the Code did not bar the liquidator from continuing a sale process initiated before liquidation. The Stakeholders' Consultation Committee adopted the earlier decision, and the appellants failed to show any material irregularity or illegality in the completed sale process. As former employees, their concern was confined to receipt of their dues in accordance with the statutory waterfall under Section 53 of the Code. [Paras 38, 39]
No illegality in the sale of the aircraft or in the impugned order was established; the appeal was dismissed, with the appellants' dues to be dealt with under the Section 53 waterfall mechanism.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed for failure to establish any material irregularity or illegality in the aircraft sale. The former employees' dues remain payable in accordance with the liquidation waterfall mechanism.
Issues: Whether the personal guarantor's application under Section 94 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was within limitation on the basis of one-time settlement proposals made by the guarantor.
Analysis: The limitation period for a personal guarantor to initiate proceedings under Section 94 commences upon invocation of the guarantee. Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 permits a fresh limitation period only where the acknowledgment in writing is signed by the party against whom the relevant right is asserted. An OTS proposal made by the guarantor is a unilateral admission and cannot be relied upon by that guarantor to extend limitation. The guarantee was invoked on 10.09.2019, whereas the Section 94 application was instituted only on 18.12.2025, beyond the applicable three-year period under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Conclusion: The Section 94 application was barred by limitation; the guarantor's OTS proposals did not extend the limitation period in the guarantor's favour.
Limitation for personal guarantor's insolvency application - Acknowledgment of liability under the Limitation Act - Unilateral acknowledgment of liability
Maintainability of the personal guarantor's insolvency application filed after invocation of the guarantee, on the basis that the guarantor's one-time settlement proposals extended limitation - HELD THAT: - For an application by a personal guarantor, limitation commences upon invocation of the guarantee. Section 18 of the Limitation Act permits a fresh limitation period only upon a written acknowledgment by the party against whom the asserted right is claimed; a party cannot extend limitation through its own unilateral acknowledgment. An OTS proposal by the guarantor is an admission which the creditor may use against the guarantor, but which the guarantor cannot invoke for personal benefit. [Paras 39, 40, 41, 42, 43]
The Section 94 application was barred by limitation, and its dismissal was upheld.
Final Conclusion: The appeal and the application challenging the auction notice were dismissed, as the personal guarantor's insolvency application was time-barred.
Issues: Whether an allottee who accepted possession, paid the demanded amounts and secured registration of the unit could subsequently seek refund of a common-area charge.
Analysis: The corporate debtor was undergoing CIRP, during which the resolution professional completed construction and offered possession. The allottee accepted possession after payment of the demanded amount, and the sub-lease was registered in the allottee's favour. Objections concerning the demand were required to be raised before acceptance of possession and registration, rather than through a later refund application.
Conclusion: The allottee was not entitled to seek a subsequent refund after accepting possession and making payment; rejection of the refund application was upheld.
Refund claim after acceptance of possession - Maintainability of a home allottee's claim for refund of charges after accepting possession, making payment and registering the unit - HELD THAT: - The Corporate Debtor was undergoing CIRP and the Resolution Professional had completed construction and offered possession while running it as a going concern. Having accepted possession, paid the demanded amount and obtained registration of the unit, the allottee could not subsequently seek refund; any objection to the charge ought to have been raised before taking possession and registration. [Paras 8, 9]
The rejection of the refund application was upheld.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, as the allottee's post-possession claim for refund was not entertainable.
Issues: (i) Whether the recording and communication of reasons to believe for search, freezing and adjudication complied with the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; (ii) Whether property may be frozen under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 when its holder is not named as an accused in the scheduled offence or money-laundering case; (iii) Whether continued freezing of the bank accounts and fixed deposits was sustainable without specific evidence, quantification and a finding that the properties were involved in money laundering; (iv) Whether filing of a prosecution complaint before the Special Court ousted the appellate jurisdiction to direct release of seized records or frozen property.
Issue (i): Whether the recording and communication of reasons to believe for search, freezing and adjudication complied with the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Analysis: Reasons to believe under Section 17 had been recorded, as reflected in the material and the impugned order. There is no statutory requirement that those recorded reasons must be furnished to the affected person. The notice under Section 8(1) incorporated the relevant reasons; moreover, Section 8(1) does not require the Adjudicating Authority to separately record reasons in the manner contended.
Conclusion: The challenge based on absence or non-communication of reasons to believe fails and is against the appellants.
Issue (ii): Whether property may be frozen under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 when its holder is not named as an accused in the scheduled offence or money-laundering case.
Analysis: The statutory reach of proceedings concerning proceeds of crime is not confined to persons named as accused in the scheduled offence. Property held by any person involved in a process or activity connected with proceeds of crime may be proceeded against. The subsequent prosecution complaint also named the individual appellant as accused.
Conclusion: Absence of the property holder's name in the FIR, chargesheet or ECIR does not by itself invalidate freezing; this issue is against the appellants.
Issue (iii): Whether continued freezing of the bank accounts and fixed deposits was sustainable without specific evidence, quantification and a finding that the properties were involved in money laundering.
Analysis: The material contained only general allegations concerning involvement in bribery, without identifying particular transactions, establishing receipt or possession of proceeds of crime, or quantifying proceeds attributable to the appellants. The alleged digital material was not produced and no concrete evidence linked the frozen assets to tainted funds. The explanations of lawful sources, supported by returns and business records, remained unrebutted. Section 8(2) requires a written finding, after adjudication, whether all or any property referred to in the notice is involved in money laundering. The impugned order authorised retention merely to facilitate investigation and did not record the required property-specific finding.
Conclusion: Continued freezing of the accounts and fixed deposits was unsustainable; this issue is in favour of the appellants.
Issue (iv): Whether filing of a prosecution complaint before the Special Court ousted the appellate jurisdiction to direct release of seized records or frozen property.
Analysis: A challenge to the confirmation order preserves the appellate jurisdiction under Section 26(4). The filing of a prosecution complaint does not displace that jurisdiction or prevent adjudication of the legality of continued retention or freezing. Proceedings for final consequences under Sections 8(7) and 8(8) remain subject to the deemed embargo while the confirmation order is under challenge.
Conclusion: Filing of the prosecution complaint did not oust appellate jurisdiction; this issue is in favour of the appellants.
Final Conclusion: The statutory preconditions for retaining and continuing the freezing of the identified properties were not established, and the impugned order could not be sustained against the appellants.
Ratio Decidendi: Continued retention or freezing under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 requires specific material linking the property to proceeds of crime and a written adjudicatory finding that the property is involved in money laundering; investigative necessity alone is insufficient.
Continued freezing of property under the PMLA - recording and communication of reasons to believe for search, freezing and adjudication complied with the Prevention of Money Laundering Act
Recording and communication of reasons to believe under the PMLA - Validity of the seizure, freezing and adjudication proceedings on the ground of non-recording or non-communication of reasons to believe - HELD THAT: - The reasons to believe under Section 17 had been recorded, as reflected in the respondent's reply and the impugned order. Their communication to the appellants after recording was not mandatory. The show-cause notice itself incorporated the reasons to believe under Section 8(1), and the Adjudicating Authority was not required to record reasons under that provision in the manner contended. [Paras 27]
The challenge founded on absence, non-recording or non-communication of reasons to believe was rejected.
Freezing of property held by a person not arraigned in the scheduled offence - Requirement that the holder of property must be an accused in the scheduled offence or in money-laundering proceedings before the property can be seized or frozen - HELD THAT: - Attachment, seizure or freezing is not confined to property held by a person arraigned in the scheduled offence or for money laundering. The statutory scheme extends to any person involved in a process or activity connected with proceeds of crime, the object being attachment and confiscation of such proceeds irrespective of the name in which they are held. [Paras 28]
The objection based on the appellants not being named in the FIR, charge-sheet or ECIR was rejected.
Proof of proceeds of crime in the hands of the property holder - Statutory finding that property is involved in money-laundering - Continued freezing of the appellants' bank accounts and fixed deposits, and retention of digital devices, without specific evidence connecting the property with proceeds of crime and without the statutory finding that the property was involved in money laundering. - HELD THAT: - The material relied upon contained only general and non-specific allegations concerning alleged bribery, without identifying a transaction from which the appellants derived proceeds of crime or quantifying the proceeds available in their hands. Allegations that the appellants acted as intermediaries or participated in a general practice of bribery did not establish that the frozen assets constituted proceeds of crime. The appellants' explanations of the sources of the bank balances and fixed deposits were not specifically rebutted. Further, the Adjudicating Authority permitted retention and continued freezing solely on the stated necessity of ongoing investigation, without recording the mandatory finding that all or any of the properties referred to in the notice were involved in money laundering. Retention or continued freezing cannot rest merely on the need to facilitate investigation. [Paras 31, 32, 33, 34]
The continued freezing and retention were held unsustainable, and the impugned order was set aside qua the appellants.
Appellate Tribunal's jurisdiction after filing of prosecution complaint - Effect of filing a prosecution complaint before the Special Court on the Appellate Tribunal's jurisdiction to decide an appeal against continued retention or freezing of property. - HELD THAT: - The filing of a prosecution complaint does not oust the Appellate Tribunal's jurisdiction to examine the Adjudicating Authority's finding under Section 8(2) and to confirm, modify or set aside the order appealed against. Challenge to the confirmation order operates as an embargo on conclusion of the consequential proceedings until that order attains finality. [Paras 35]
The respondent's objection that only the Special Court could decide the fate of the seized records and properties was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed and the order permitting continued freezing of the appellants' bank accounts and fixed deposits, and retention of the seized devices, was set aside qua the appellants.
Clearing and Forwarding services - service tax - limitation u/s 73 - penalty under subsection 4A of Section 73 - acknowledgement of debt u/s 18 of the Limitation Act, 1936 - order of remand - Estoppel against law (no estoppel against statute) - HELD THAT:- We see no reason to entertain the appeals challenging the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court [2026 (2) TMI 289 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT].
Issues: Whether an asserted error in the earlier judgment could be rectified through review.
Analysis: The observations in the earlier judgment were found to be fact-specific and consistent with its overall findings. Review jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 does not permit rectification merely because the earlier judgment is alleged to be incorrect.
Conclusion: An allegedly incorrect judgment cannot be rectified in review proceedings.
Review jurisdiction - error in judgment - Maintainability of review of the earlier judgment on the asserted error concerning the statutory provision under which the show-cause notice was issued - HELD THAT: - The Court held that its observations in the earlier judgment were founded on the facts and were consistent with the judgment as a whole. It further held that even an incorrect judgment cannot be rectified in review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. [Paras 3, 4]
The review application was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The review application was rejected, with no order as to costs.
Issues: Whether interest on refund of a pre-deposit under Section 35FF is payable for the entire period from the date of deposit until the actual refund, including the period attributable to the appellant's delay in seeking refund.
Analysis: Section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944 mandates interest on a pre-deposit required to be refunded consequent to an appellate order, running from the date of payment until the date of refund. The provision does not qualify this entitlement by reference to the cause of delay in refund. Although the appellant delayed for over five years in furnishing the High Court judgment and seeking refund, the statutory language governs regardless of hardship, fairness, neglect, or the party responsible for the intervening delay.
Conclusion: Interest under Section 35FF is payable to the appellant for the entire period from the date of pre-deposit until the date of actual refund, including the period of delay attributable to the appellant.
Interest on refund of pre-deposit - Entitlement to interest on refunded service-tax pre-deposit for the period during which the appellant delayed seeking refund after succeeding before the High Court - HELD THAT: - Section 35FF mandates interest from the date of pre-deposit until its refund, without making the entitlement dependent on the cause of the intervening delay. The appellant's unexplained delay in forwarding the High Court judgment and seeking refund could not curtail the statutorily prescribed period of interest; considerations of fairness or equity cannot override the provision. [Paras 6, 10]
The appellant was held entitled to interest for the entire period from payment of the pre-deposit until its refund, including the period of delay attributable to the appellant.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the impugned order was modified to grant interest on the refunded pre-deposit for the entire period until refund.
Issues: (i) Whether a statutory welfare board facilitating deployment of ex-servicemen as guards to banks, without profit or commercial activity, provides taxable security agency service; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of service tax.
Issue (i): Whether a statutory welfare board facilitating deployment of ex-servicemen as guards to banks, without profit or commercial activity, provides taxable security agency service.
Analysis: The appellant was constituted under statute to undertake welfare activities for ex-servicemen. It merely facilitated deployment of guards and collected remuneration for onward payment to them, without earning profit or carrying on commercial business. Fees collected by a public authority in discharge of statutory functions were not liable to service tax. The activity did not satisfy either the definition of security agency or the taxable category of security agency service.
Conclusion: The appellant did not render taxable security agency service; the demand was unsustainable on merits, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of service tax.
Analysis: The finding that the appellant acted under a bona fide belief arising from legal interpretation, which justified waiver of penalty, negated the ingredients required for the extended period. Revenue did not establish fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade tax.
Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was invalid, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The service-tax demands fail both because the activity was outside the taxable security-agency category and because the extended limitation period was unavailable.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory welfare body which merely facilitates deployment of personnel and passes remuneration to them without commercial profit-making activity is not a security agency; a bona fide interpretative belief and absence of suppression preclude invocation of the extended limitation period.
Security agency service - statutory welfare board providing ex-servicemen guards without commercial activity - Extended limitation for service tax demand - absence of suppression or intent to evade
Security agency service - statutory welfare board providing ex-servicemen guards without commercial activity - Liability of a statutory welfare board to service tax as a security agency for facilitating deployment of ex-servicemen as guards to banks - HELD THAT: - The Board was constituted under statute and performed welfare functions for ex-servicemen. It merely facilitated the deployment of guards and collected their remuneration for disbursement to them, without earning profit or carrying on a commercial business of providing security services. Its activities consequently did not fall within the statutory definitions of security agency or security agency service. [Paras 6, 7, 8, 9]
The demand under the category of security agency service was unsustainable on merits.
Extended limitation for service tax demand - absence of suppression or intent to evade - Validity of invoking the extended period where non-payment arose from a bona fide understanding of taxability and the ingredients of suppression or intent to evade were not established - HELD THAT: - The finding that the appellant acted under a bona fide belief based on legal interpretation was inconsistent with invocation of the extended period. As Revenue failed to establish fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade tax, the longer limitation period could not be invoked.
As relying on M/S INDIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CE & S.T., CHANDIGARH [2025 (3) TMI 333 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH] we are of the considered view that the services rendered by the appellant as statutory board cannot be subject to service tax under the category of security agency service and they do not fall in the definition of security agency as prescribed under law, therefore, on merit, we are of the considered view that the impugned orders are not sustainable and are liable to be set aside and we do so.[Paras 10, 11]
Invocation of the extended period of limitation was held bad in law.
Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside and all the appeals were allowed with consequential relief, as the appellant was not liable to service tax as a security agency and the extended period was unavailable.
Issues: (i) Whether a municipal corporation was liable to service tax on advertisement tax or licence fee collected for permitting display of advertisements before 1 July 2012; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the demand.
Issue (i): Whether a municipal corporation was liable to service tax on advertisement tax or licence fee collected for permitting display of advertisements before 1 July 2012.
Analysis: During the relevant period, the taxable entry for selling of space for advertisement required a service to be provided by a person. A sovereign local body was not covered by the term "person" before that expression was defined under the service-tax law. Further, the amount collected under the municipal law for display of advertisements was advertisement tax, a statutory levy authorised by Article 243X of the Constitution of India, and not consideration for a taxable service.
Conclusion: The municipal corporation was not liable to service tax on the advertisement tax or licence fee collected during the relevant period, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the demand.
Analysis: The dispute concerned interpretation of the charging provisions, and no suppression with intent to evade tax could be attributed to a government local body. The adopted ruling held that the extended limitation period was therefore unavailable.
Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was invalid, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The service-tax demand was unsustainable; consequently, no interest or penalties could survive.
Ratio Decidendi: Before the relevant statutory definition of "person" took effect, a sovereign municipal corporation collecting advertisement tax as a statutory levy was not providing a taxable service, and extended limitation cannot rest on alleged suppression in such an interpretative dispute.
Service tax liability of local bodies for sale of advertisement space - Statutory advertisement tax as consideration for taxable service - Extended limitation against public undertakings
Service tax liability of local bodies for sale of advertisement space - Liability of a municipal corporation to service tax on amounts collected for permitting display of advertisements before the definition of "person" was introduced in the Finance Act, 1994 - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that its earlier final order in the appellant's own case [2026 (7) TMI 96 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH], concerning the identical service and the same legal position, squarely governed the dispute. The earlier ratio treated a municipal corporation as not falling within "person" for the relevant pre-negative-list period and, consequently, outside the taxable-service provision for sale of space for advertisement. [Paras 7]
The demand for service tax was held unsustainable.
Statutory advertisement tax as consideration for taxable service - Whether advertisement tax levied by a municipal corporation under its statutory authority could be subjected to service tax as consideration for sale of space for advertisement? - HELD THAT: - By applying the ratio in the appellant's own earlier case, the Tribunal accepted that the levy collected as advertisement tax was a statutory levy and not consideration chargeable to service tax. [Paras 7]
The statutory levy could not sustain the impugned service-tax demand.
Extended limitation against public undertakings - Invocation of the extended limitation period for the service-tax demand against a municipal corporation on an issue involving legal interpretation - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal followed its earlier ruling in the appellant's own case, which held that suppression with intent to evade tax could not be alleged against a government local body where the dispute turned on interpretation of law. [Paras 7]
The extended period was unavailable; interest and penalties consequently did not survive.
Final Conclusion: Following the binding ratio in the appellant's own earlier case, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and allowed the appeal with consequential relief.
Issues: Whether collection of adda-fee by a management contractor operating and maintaining State-regulated bus terminals under a concession agreement constitutes taxable Support Services of Business or Commerce.
Analysis: Service tax is a contract-based levy, requiring examination of the contractual nexus between the service provider and the recipient. The concession arrangement was between the appellant and the State Government/PUNBUS; no contract existed between the appellant and individual bus operators. The bus terminals were public-utility infrastructure developed and operated under State regulation, and the appellant's collection of adda-fee was authorised under the concession arrangement in consideration of its investment, rather than consideration for support provided to bus operators. The applicable precedent had determined that such collection, absent a direct contractual relationship with bus operators, is not Business Support Service.
Conclusion: Collection of adda-fee under the State concession arrangement did not constitute Support Services of Business or Commerce; service tax was not payable by the appellant.
Business Support Service - service tax under the category of “Support Services of Business or Commerce” - Contractual nexus for service tax levy - Adda-fee collection under State concession agreement
Liability to service tax as Support Services of Business or Commerce on collection of adda-fee by a management contractor operating and maintaining State bus terminals - HELD THAT: - Service tax is a contract-based levy, requiring examination of the contractual relationship between the service provider and recipient. The appellant's agreement was with the State undertaking for development, operation and maintenance of public bus-terminal infrastructure, and no contract existed with bus operators for provision of support services. Collection of adda-fee under the State concession arrangement, therefore, did not constitute Business Support Service rendered to bus operators.
The Tribunal followed Rohan And Rajdeep Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE & ST, Ludhiana [2026 (2) TMI 236 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH] wherein the Tribunal, after considering all the submissions and facts, has held that the collection of adda-fee under a State concession agreement, in the absence of a direct contractual relationship with bus operators, does not constitute “Business Support Service”. [Paras 6, 7]
The service-tax demand under Support Services of Business or Commerce, with consequential interest and penalties, was set aside and the appeal was allowed on merits.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed on merits. The limitation issue was left undecided.
Issues: (i) Whether rental income from the leased premises qualified for exemption under clause 9(b) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012; (ii) Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation and the consequential demand and penalty were sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether rental income from the leased premises qualified for exemption under clause 9(b) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012.
Analysis: The exemption for renting of immovable property applies only where the service is provided to or by an educational institution. The lease deed identified the lessee as a registered society and permitted office, commercial, education, counselling, research and hostel uses; it did not establish that the lessee was an educational institution or that the premises were exclusively used for education. The later certificate issued by Amity University did not establish any legal connection between the University and the lessee and was not available when the impugned order was made. The assessee did not discharge the burden of establishing eligibility, and exemption notifications require strict interpretation.
Conclusion: The rental service did not qualify for the exemption. This issue is decided against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation and the consequential demand and penalty were sustainable.
Analysis: Extended limitation requires more than non-payment of tax and depends on a positive act indicating intent to evade payment. The asserted bona fide belief in exemption was not accepted because the assessee failed to establish that the tenant was an educational institution or that the premises were rented for the qualifying educational purpose. However, the recoverable demand could not extend beyond five years reckoned from the last date for filing the service-tax return.
Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period was valid, but the portion of demand beyond five years was set aside; the balance demand was sustained and the penalty was reduced proportionately. This issue is partly in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The exemption claim fails, while tax recovery and the related penalty stand confined to the period legally recoverable within the applicable limitation.
Exemption for renting immovable property to an educational institution - Extended limitation for non-payment of service tax
Eligibility for exemption on renting of immovable property claimed to have been provided to an educational institution - HELD THAT: - The exemption was available only where the renting service was received by an educational institution. The lease deed described the lessee as a registered society and permitted office, commercial, education, counselling, research and hostel use; it did not establish that the lessee was an educational institution or that the premises were rented exclusively for educational purposes. The subsequent certificate issued by a university neither established the tenant's status nor its connection with the tenant. Since the burden of proving exemption eligibility lay on the assessee and exemption notifications required strict construction, the claim failed. We draw our support from the decision of M/s Dilip Kumar and Company[2018 (7) TMI 1826 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] [Paras 6, 7, 9, 10]
The denial of exemption was upheld.
Invocation of the extended period for recovery of service tax on the renting service - HELD THAT: - Invocation of the extended period requires a positive act evidencing intent to evade tax and cannot rest on mere non-payment. The plea of bona fide belief based on exemption was not accepted because the assessee had failed to establish that the tenant was an educational institution or that the premises were rented for educational use. See PUSHPAM PHARMACEUTICALS COMPANY[1995 (3) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT]. [Paras 11, 12]
The extended period was held rightly invoked; however, the demand beyond five years was set aside, the remaining demand was confirmed, and the penalty was proportionately reduced.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed. While the exemption denial and invocation of the extended period were sustained, the demand beyond five years was set aside and the penalty was proportionately reduced.
Issues: (i) Whether a DTH recharge-voucher distributor is liable to service tax under Business Auxiliary Services on commission forming part of the maximum retail price on which the DTH operator has discharged service tax; (ii) Whether the equivalent penalty is sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether a DTH recharge-voucher distributor is liable to service tax under Business Auxiliary Services on commission forming part of the maximum retail price on which the DTH operator has discharged service tax.
Analysis: The commission received by the distributor formed part of the predetermined maximum retail price of the vouchers, and service tax had already been discharged by the DTH operator on that entire value. A further levy on the commission would result in double taxation. The arrangement was also revenue-neutral because any tax paid by the distributor would be available as Cenvat credit to the operator.
Conclusion: The distributor is not liable to service tax on such commission.
Issue (ii): Whether the equivalent penalty is sustainable.
Analysis: The penalty was consequential to the unsustainable demand of service tax on the commission.
Conclusion: The equivalent penalty is not sustainable.
Final Conclusion: The demand of service tax, interest and equivalent penalty relating to the distribution commission stands set aside.
Ratio Decidendi: Where service tax has been paid by the principal operator on the maximum retail price inclusive of the distributor's commission, the same commission cannot again be subjected to service tax in the distributor's hands.
Service tax on commission from DTH recharge-voucher distribution - Business Auxiliary Services - Double taxation of commission embedded in MRP - Service tax liability and equivalent penalty on commission received for distribution of DTH recharge vouchers where service tax had been discharged by the DTH operator on the maximum retail price inclusive of such commission
HELD THAT: - Where the DTH operator has discharged service tax on the maximum retail price of recharge vouchers, which includes the distributor's commission, a separate levy of service tax on that commission amounts to double taxation. The identical issue having been decided in Kumar's Electronics [2019 (6) TMI 852 - CESTAT CHENNAI] that decision was held applicable on all fours. [Paras 7]
The demand under Business Auxiliary Services, with interest and the equivalent penalty, was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the service-tax demand on the distributor's commission, together with interest and equivalent penalty, was set aside with consequential relief in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether the extended limitation period for recovery of service tax was validly invocable.
Analysis: Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 prescribed an eighteen-month limitation period, extendable to five years only where non-payment resulted from fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade tax. The notice contained no evidence of an agreement or other material establishing the alleged service relationship, nor any positive evidence of deliberate suppression, wilful misstatement, fraud, or intent to evade service tax. The Revenue, bearing the burden to establish the conditions for invoking the extended period, failed to do so. Once the demand was found time-barred, merits could not be adjudicated; the interest and penalty being consequential could not survive.
Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable and the service-tax demand was wholly barred by limitation, in favour of the assessee.
Extended period of limitation for service-tax demand - Adjudication on merits of time-barred demand
Extended period of limitation for service-tax demand - Suppression of facts with intent to evade tax - Invocation of the extended limitation period for service tax alleged to be payable under reverse charge on services received from the overseas recording-service provider - HELD THAT: - The extended period under the proviso to section 73(1) is attracted only upon fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade tax. The show-cause notice neither identified the statutory limb of Business Auxiliary Service allegedly attracted nor contained evidence establishing the alleged service relationship. It also disclosed no positive act evidencing fraud, wilful suppression or misstatement with intent to evade payment of service tax.
Revenue has failed to adduce any evidence or establish that the respondent engaged in wilful or deliberate suppression of material facts, and there is nothing on record to suggest that the appellant acted with any intention to mislead the authorities or evade payment of service tax. Decisions abound, and a reference to the Judgements of the Apex Court in CCE v. H.M.M. Ltd [1995 (1) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT], Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Company [1995 (3) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT], Stemcyte India Therapeutics Ltd [2025 (7) TMI 1007 - SUPREME COURT], Uniworth Textiles [2013 (1) TMI 616 - SUPREME COURT] and Bharat Hotels Ltd [2018 (2) TMI 23 - DELHI HIGH COURT] would amply suffice.[Paras 15, 16, 17]
The extended period was unavailable; the service-tax demand was wholly barred by limitation and was set aside, along with consequential interest and penalty.
Adjudication on merits of time-barred demand - HELD THAT: - Once the demand was held time-barred, there was no occasion to examine its merits. The Tribunal followed the binding principle that adjudication on merits after holding the demand barred by limitation is impermissible. [Paras 18, 19, 20]
The Tribunal refrained from deciding the classification and taxability dispute on merits and allowed the appeal on limitation.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed as the service-tax demand was wholly barred by limitation. The impugned order, together with the consequential interest and penalty, was set aside.
Issues: (i) Whether the consideration for transfer of Know-How and other Assets was taxable as Intellectual Property Right Service under Sections 65(55a), 65(55b) and 65(105)(zzr) of the Finance Act, 1994. (ii) Whether penalties under Sections 77(1)(a), 77(2) and 78(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 were sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether the consideration for transfer of Know-How and other Assets was taxable as Intellectual Property Right Service under Sections 65(55a), 65(55b) and 65(105)(zzr) of the Finance Act, 1994.
Analysis: Intellectual Property Right Service required both a right recognised as intellectual property under a law in force in India and a temporary transfer or permission to use that right. Know-How was not shown to be a distinct intellectual property right recognised under Indian law. Further, the agreement, read as an integrated whole, transferred title, property and risk in the Assets absolutely and restrained the transferor from post-completion use or disclosure of the Know-How. The five-year royalty was expressly part of the sale consideration and constituted deferred consideration; its linkage to future sales did not convert the completed sale into a continuing licence. The customs-valuation treatment could not determine taxability under the distinct statutory scheme governing service tax.
Conclusion: The consideration was not taxable as Intellectual Property Right Service; Know-How was not a recognised intellectual property right for this levy, and the agreement effected a permanent outright transfer. The finding is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether penalties under Sections 77(1)(a), 77(2) and 78(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 were sustainable.
Analysis: The penalties were founded on the alleged service-tax liability and obligation to register. As the demand failed on merits, those underlying obligations did not survive. The bona fide and arguable interpretation of the law, together with prior correspondence with the Department, also constituted reasonable cause under Section 80.
Conclusion: The penalties under Sections 77(1)(a), 77(2) and 78(1) were unsustainable and liable to be waived. The finding is in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: No service-tax liability arose from the outright transfer of the Assets, and the consequential interest and penalties could not subsist.
Ratio Decidendi: A transaction falls within Intellectual Property Right Service only where the right is recognised under Indian law and is temporarily transferred or licensed; deferred consideration for an absolute transfer does not alter the permanent character of that transfer.
Taxability of technical Know-How under Intellectual Property Right Service - Permanent transfer versus temporary licensing of intellectual property rights - Penalties for non-registration in respect of non-taxable Intellectual Property Right Service
Technical Know-How as intellectual property right - Permanent transfer of intellectual property rights - Taxability of consideration under the Asset Sale and Purchase Agreement for Know-How and related assets as Intellectual Property Right Service - HELD THAT: - For levy under Intellectual Property Right Service, the property must be an intellectual property right recognised under Indian law and the transaction must involve only a temporary transfer or permission to use it. Know-How was not shown to be recognised as a distinct intellectual property right under any law in force in India. Independently, the Agreement, read as a whole, effected an absolute sale: title, property and risk passed to the appellant, while the transferor was restrained from using or disclosing the Know-How. The royalty linked to future gross sales was expressly part of the sale consideration and its deferred mode of payment did not convert the completed sale into a continuing licence. The customs valuation treatment could not determine service-tax classification under a distinct enactment. [Paras 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]
The transaction was a permanent, outright transfer falling outside Intellectual Property Right Service; the service-tax demand was set aside in its entirety.
Penalty for non-registration and non-filing of service-tax returns - Reasonable cause for waiver of penalty - Sustainability of penalties for alleged failure to obtain registration and comply with service-tax requirements in respect of the impugned transaction - HELD THAT: - As the demand itself failed, there was no underlying obligation to obtain registration or discharge service tax in respect of the transaction. In any event, the appellant's bona fide and arguable interpretation of law and its correspondence with the Department constituted reasonable cause for waiver of penalties. [Paras 20]
The penalties imposed under Sections 77(1)(a), 77(2) and 78(1) were held unsustainable and were set aside.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether the final order dismissing the statutory appeal as time-barred disclosed a mistake apparent from the record warranting rectification.
Analysis: Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994 prescribes a two-month period for appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals), with power to condone delay only for a further one month. An interim order entertaining the appeal before the Tribunal could not condone, or confer jurisdiction to condone, delay in filing the original appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals). Where the appeal was filed beyond both the prescribed and condonable periods, sufficient cause, hardship, or time spent seeking departmental documents could not enlarge the statutory outer limit. Hearing the matter on merits or reserving it for orders likewise could not create jurisdiction. Rectification jurisdiction extends only to patent and self-evident errors and cannot be used to review or reopen a concluded decision on merits.
Conclusion: No mistake apparent from the record was established in the final order; rectification was unavailable.
Mistake apparent from the record warranting rectification - Statutory outer limit for condonation of appeal delay - final order dismissing the statutory appeal as time-barred - Rectification of mistake not a substitute for review - Jurisdiction of Commissioner (Appeals) to condone delay
Statutory outer limit for condonation of appeal delay - Jurisdiction of Commissioner (Appeals) to condone delay - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that condonation of delay, if any, in filing the appeal before it was distinct from delay in filing the original appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals). Where the statute prescribes a normal limitation period and a further specified condonable period, the first appellate authority lacks jurisdiction to condone delay beyond that outer limit; sufficient cause, equity or hardship cannot enlarge a jurisdiction withheld by statute. Proceedings on merits before the Tribunal, including an interlocutory condonation order, could not confer such jurisdiction. [Paras 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]
The appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) having been filed beyond the maximum condonable period, its dismissal as time-barred was legally sustainable.
Maintainability of the rectification application seeking reconsideration of the dismissal of the appeal as time-barred - HELD THAT: - Rectification jurisdiction is confined to correcting a patent and self-evident mistake apparent from the record and cannot be employed to review, re-hear or secure a fresh adjudication on merits. Since the final order conformed to the statutory limitation and the binding law governing the outer condonable period, no mistake apparent from the record was established. [Paras 12, 13, 15]
No rectifiable error was found in the final order.
Final Conclusion: The rectification application was dismissed, the Tribunal holding that the final order disclosed no mistake apparent from the record and that the statutory limitation governing the first appeal could not be extended.
Issues: (i) Whether penalties for non-payment of differential service tax and improper filing of returns were liable to be waived on account of reasonable cause; (ii) Whether the adjudicated service-tax computation and appropriation, based on reconciled records and Chartered Accountant certificates, warranted interference.
Issue (i): Whether penalties for non-payment of differential service tax and improper filing of returns were liable to be waived on account of reasonable cause.
Analysis: The dispute concerned the applicability of the post-01.06.2007 Composition Scheme to ongoing construction projects that had commenced before that date. The applicable valuation position attained clarity only upon the Supreme Court decision referred to in the order. The differential tax, interest and reversal of CENVAT credit had been discharged before adjudication and were appropriated. This established a bona fide interpretational doubt and reasonable cause within Section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.
Conclusion: Penalties under Sections 76 and 77 of the Finance Act, 1994 are not sustainable and stand waived in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the adjudicated service-tax computation and appropriation, based on reconciled records and Chartered Accountant certificates, warranted interference.
Analysis: The computation was supported by the CENVAT register, GAR-7 challans, credit-reversal details, reconciliation charts and Chartered Accountant certificates. The alleged discrepancy between tax-payment figures and ST-3 returns was explained as reversal of CENVAT credit upon sale of capital goods. The adjudication had addressed the nature of non-construction income and the project-wise reconciliation.
Conclusion: The adjudicated computation and appropriation disclose no infirmity and are sustained against the Revenue.
Final Conclusion: The tax and interest consequences remain undisturbed, while the penal consequences are removed because the assessee established reasonable cause for the default.
Ratio Decidendi: Where an interpretational uncertainty regarding service-tax valuation is clarified subsequently and the assessee discharges the differential tax, interest and credit reversal, such bona fide circumstances constitute reasonable cause for waiver of penalties under Section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.
Waiver of penalty for reasonable cause - Service tax composition scheme for ongoing works contracts - Verification of service tax liability based on reconciled records
Waiver of penalty for reasonable cause - Service tax composition scheme for ongoing works contracts - Penalty for short-payment of service tax and improper filing of returns in relation to ongoing construction projects taxed under the composition scheme - HELD THAT: - The dispute concerning applicability of the valuation scheme to projects commenced before 01.06.2007 attained clarity only upon the Supreme Court decision Nagarjuna Construction Company Limited vs. Union of India [2012 (11) TMI 404 - SUPREME COURT] . The assessee's initial adoption of the composition scheme therefore constituted reasonable cause; it had also paid the differential tax and interest and reversed the inadmissible Cenvat credit before adjudication. [Paras 7, 8]
The penalties under Sections 76 and 77 of the Finance Act, 1994 were set aside by extending the benefit of Section 80.
Verification of service tax liability based on reconciled records - Validity of determination of short-paid service tax on the basis of the assessee's reconciliations, Cenvat records, challans and Chartered Accountant certificates - HELD THAT: - The adjudicating authority had examined the Cenvat register, GAR-7 challans, reversal of Cenvat credit and reconciliation charts furnished with the Chartered Accountant certificate. The further certificate explained the nature of the questioned income, and no infirmity was found in the determination or appropriation made in the impugned order. [Paras 12]
The Revenue's appeal was dismissed and the impugned order was upheld.
Final Conclusion: The assessee's appeal was allowed and the penalties were deleted on the ground of reasonable cause. The Revenue's appeal challenging the determination of service tax liability was dismissed.
Issues: (i) Whether periodic royalties paid after 1 April 2016 under a mining lease executed on 16 August 2005 could be subjected to service tax under reverse charge following the expansion of taxability of services provided by Government; (ii) Whether suppression of facts or intent to evade was established so as to warrant penalty.
Issue (i): Whether periodic royalties paid after 1 April 2016 under a mining lease executed on 16 August 2005 could be subjected to service tax under reverse charge following the expansion of taxability of services provided by Government.
Analysis: Under Sections 66B and 66D(a)(iv) of the Finance Act, 1994, the relevant taxable event is when the service is provided or agreed to be provided. The assignment of the right to use the natural resource occurred under the mining lease executed in 2005, before 1 April 2016, when such Government service was brought within the taxable net. Subsequent periodic royalty payments did not alter the time at which the underlying service was agreed to be provided. The Point of Taxation Rules govern the time for payment of tax and do not determine whether a service is taxable. The settled treatment of pre-1 April 2016 agreements was applicable on materially identical facts.
Conclusion: Periodic royalty payments under the pre-1 April 2016 mining lease were not liable to service tax under reverse charge. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether suppression of facts or intent to evade was established so as to warrant penalty.
Analysis: The extracted iron ore was used as an input in the assessee's own manufacturing operations, and any service tax paid would have been available as CENVAT credit. This revenue-neutral position did not support an allegation of suppression of facts or intent to evade tax.
Conclusion: Suppression of facts or intent to evade was not established, and no penalty was imposable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The pre-levy date of the mining-right assignment governed taxability, while the revenue-neutral nature of the transaction negated penal consequences.
Ratio Decidendi: A subsequent expansion of service-tax liability cannot apply to an assignment of rights under an agreement entered before the levy became applicable; periodic payments under that agreement do not shift the taxable event.
Taxable event for assignment of mining rights - Revenue neutrality and penalty for suppression
Taxable event for assignment of mining rights - Reverse-charge service tax on royalty - Liability to service tax under reverse charge on periodic royalty paid for iron ore mining rights granted under a lease executed before 1 April 2016 - HELD THAT: - The said issue was considered in the case of S.R. Traders [2023 (5) TMI 766 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] wherein it was held that amounts paid to the Government towards periodical charges for assignment of the right to use natural resources would not be exigible to Service Tax even after 01.04.2016, where the agreements conferring such rights had been entered into prior thereto
For service-tax levy, the taxable event is the time at which the service is provided or agreed to be provided. The assignment of the right to use the natural resource occurred under the mining lease executed before the service became taxable; subsequent periodic royalty payments could not attract the later levy. The Point of Taxation Rules govern the date for payment of tax and do not determine whether a service is taxable. [Paras 9, 10, 11]
The demand of service tax and consequential interest on the royalty payments was held unsustainable and was set aside.
Revenue neutrality and penalty for suppression - Penalty for alleged suppression in relation to service tax on royalty paid for captive iron ore mining rights - HELD THAT: - The extracted iron ore was used as an input in the appellant's own manufacturing facility, and any service tax paid would have been available as CENVAT credit. The transaction was therefore revenue neutral, and suppression of facts or intent to evade service tax could not readily be sustained. [Paras 12, 13]
No penalty was imposable.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief.
Issues: Whether rejection of a Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme declaration on the basis of a summons allegedly evidencing a pending inquiry or investigation was legally sustainable.
Analysis: Section 106(2) of the Finance Act, 2013 permits rejection only where a qualifying inquiry, investigation or audit was pending on 1 March 2013. The summons merely sought annual reports, foreign-currency expenditure details, royalty agreements and returns; the requested material was promptly supplied. No suppression, mischief, defined investigative purpose, or consequential demand for tax, interest or penalty was shown. The summons was therefore routine and roving in nature, and did not acquire the character of an investigation under Section 106(2). The prescribed period for action under the Scheme could not be disregarded by creating an alternative departmental timeline, and no notice under Section 111 of the Finance Act, 2013 was issued within the stipulated period.
Conclusion: The rejection of the declaration was unjustified; the declaration was entitled to acceptance and a discharge certificate in Form VCES-3 was required to be issued.
Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme - rejection of declaration on basis of routine summons - Inquiry or investigation-scope of summons for information
Validity of rejection of the VCES declaration on the footing that the summons issued to the declarant constituted a pending inquiry or investigation under Section 106(2) of the Finance Act, 2013 - HELD THAT: - The summons, issued for production of annual reports, foreign-currency expenditure details and royalty agreements, was routine and roving in nature; it disclosed neither any identified mischief nor suppression by the declarant. It therefore could not assume the character of an inquiry or investigation within Section 106(2) so as to defeat an otherwise valid VCES claim. The prescribed time limits governing departmental action under the scheme were binding, and the absence of any follow-up notice alleging a substantially false declaration further supported the conclusion that rejection was unjustified. [Paras 9, 10]
The rejection of the VCES declaration and the appellate order affirming it were set aside; the appeal was allowed and the Designated Authority was directed to issue the discharge certificate in Form VCES-3 within 30 days.
Final Conclusion: The VCES declaration was held wrongly rejected, since the routine summons did not amount to a pending inquiry or investigation under Section 106(2). The Designated Authority was directed to issue the discharge certificate.
Issues: (i) Whether refund of accumulated CENVAT credit under Rule 5 can be denied when the original availment of credit was not challenged under Rule 14; (ii) Whether general insurance, works contract, and commercial or industrial construction services qualify as input services for refund of credit attributable to exported business support and information technology software services.
Issue (i): Whether refund of accumulated CENVAT credit under Rule 5 can be denied when the original availment of credit was not challenged under Rule 14.
Analysis: Rule 5 provides for refund of unutilised credit attributable to exports, whereas Rule 14 governs recovery of credit wrongly taken or utilised. The eligibility of credit already availed cannot be reopened at the refund stage where the Department did not dispute its availment under Rule 14.
Conclusion: Refund could not be denied by reassessing the admissibility of unchallenged CENVAT credit at the Rule 5 stage. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether general insurance, works contract, and commercial or industrial construction services qualify as input services for refund of credit attributable to exported business support and information technology software services.
Analysis: The applicable definition of input service in Rule 2(l) was exhaustive during the disputed period. The refund rejection rested solely on an alleged absence of nexus with exported output services, while the identified services had been recognised as input services under the applicable framework.
Conclusion: General insurance, works contract, and commercial or industrial construction services were eligible input services, and the related refund could not be rejected for want of nexus. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The denial of refund of accumulated credit attributable to the exported services was set aside, with consequential relief in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: Where CENVAT credit has not been challenged through the statutory recovery mechanism, its eligibility cannot be revisited to deny export-related refund under Rule 5; services falling within the applicable input-service definition remain eligible for such refund.
Refund of unutilised Cenvat credit on exported services - Eligibility of unchallenged Cenvat credit at refund stage - Input service nexus for exported output services
Eligibility of unchallenged Cenvat credit at refund stage - Denial of refund of unutilised Cenvat credit relating to exported business support and information technology software services where the availment of credit had not been challenged - HELD THAT: - Where the Department had not disputed availment of Cenvat credit under Rule 14 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, it could not deny refund of that credit by resort to Rule 5. Tribunal treated the issue as settled by the decisions cited before it. [Paras 7]
The refund could not be rejected by reassessing the eligibility of credit at the refund stage.
Input service nexus for exported output services - General insurance, construction and works contract services as input services - Refund of credit on general insurance, commercial or industrial construction and works contract services denied for alleged absence of nexus with exported output services - HELD THAT: - The applicable definition of input service during the disputed period was exhaustive, and the services in question had been held to be input services in the decisions relied upon. Refund had been denied solely on the asserted lack of nexus with exported services. [Paras 8, 9]
The denial of refund on these input services was unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether the notional cost of buyer-supplied drawings and designs, and royalty paid by the buyer to its foreign collaborator, is includible in the assessable value of automobile components under Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000.
Analysis: Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 permits adoption of transaction value where the buyer and manufacturer are unrelated and price is the sole consideration. Rule 6 permits addition only of the money value of additional consideration flowing directly or indirectly from the buyer to the manufacturer. Buyer-supplied drawings or designs are includible only where they are used in, or necessary for, production and relieve the manufacturer of an expense otherwise required to be incurred by it.
Analysis: The drawings supplied at the vendor-selection stage were only specifications enabling prospective vendors to understand requirements and quote prices. They were not detailed manufacturing drawings used for production; the manufacturer remained responsible for preparing the detailed designs required for manufacture. No consideration in addition to the agreed price flowed from the buyer after selection of the manufacturer. The buyer's royalty payment to its foreign collaborator was not consideration flowing to the manufacturer and had no nexus with the manufacture or clearance of the components.
Conclusion: The notional value of the drawings and designs and the buyer's royalty payment are not includible in the assessable value; the demand, interest and penalty based on such inclusion cannot be sustained.
Assessable value - buyer-supplied drawings and designs - Additional consideration under Central Excise valuation
Whether the cost of drawings, designs or royalty paid by MSIL to Suzuki Motor Corporation Japan can be added to the assessable value of the goods manufactured and supplied by the Appellant under Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation Rules, 2000? - HELD THAT: - Rule 6 applies only where goods or services supplied by the buyer constitute additional consideration and are used in, or necessary for, production of the goods. Specification drawings supplied to prospective vendors at the vendor-selection stage merely communicate the buyer's requirements; they are not detailed manufacturing drawings and do not relieve the manufacturer of the cost of producing the goods.
Royalty paid by the buyer to its foreign collaborator likewise does not constitute additional consideration flowing to the manufacturer where it has no nexus with manufacture or clearance of the components. Cases followed M/s Precision Tech Enterprises [2025 (1) TMI 731 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH] and Denso India Private Limited [2024 (3) TMI 686 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] [Paras 6, 7]
The cost of the drawings and designs and the buyer's royalty payment were not includible in the assessable value; the impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the demand, interest and penalty founded on inclusion of the buyer's specification drawings, designs and royalty payment in the assessable value were set aside.
Issues: Whether reversal of Cenvat credit was payable on clearance of used refractory bricks as waste and scrap under Rule 3(5A) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.
Analysis: Rule 3(5A) applies where capital goods are cleared as waste and scrap, while Rule 3(5) concerns goods removed as such. The refractory bricks were inputs used in manufacture and, after use, had become waste; they could not be characterised as capital goods or as goods removed as such. The settled treatment of waste arising from used refractory materials also did not support duty liability where such waste was not specified or classifiable in the tariff.
Conclusion: Rule 3(5A) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 was inapplicable; no reversal of Cenvat credit, duty demand, interest, or penalty was sustainable against the assessee.
CENVAT credit reversal on clearance of used refractory-brick waste and scrap - Scope of Rule 3(5A) in relation to capital goods - Used refractory bricks as inputs and not capital goods -
HELD THAT: - Rule 3(5A) applies where capital goods are cleared as waste and scrap. The refractory bricks, though credit had been availed on them, were used in manufacture and thereafter became waste and scrap; they were inputs and could not be treated as capital goods. The Tribunal further noted that the settled Tribunal view treated waste and scrap of used refractory materials as not attracting duty where not specified under the Central Excise Tariff. See Vasavadutta Cement [2003 (3) TMI 503 - CEGAT, BANGALORE] and Century Cement [2017 (3) TMI 1071 - CESTAT NEW DELHI].[Paras 13, 14, 15]
Rule 3(5A) was held inapplicable; no reversal of CENVAT credit was payable, and the consequential demand and penalty were unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal allowed with consequential relief. The demand for reversal of CENVAT credit, interest and penalty was held unsustainable.
Issues: Whether the deposited amount representing interest was liable to be returned to the applicant following dismissal of the review petition.
Analysis: The review petition between the same parties had already been dismissed, and the applicant's repeated representations to the State were taken into account. The deposited sum of Rs. 30 crores was found to pertain only to interest.
Conclusion: The respondent-State was directed to return the deposited interest amount of Rs. 30 crores to the applicant within eight weeks.
The State of Rajasthan was directed to return the amount deposited towards interest within eight weeks following dismissal of the review petition, and the Miscellaneous Application was disposed of.
TaxTMI