TaxTMI Updates e-Newsletter
Jun 04,2020

Section 171 of the CGST Act, 2017 - commensurate reduction in prices - anti-profiteering - transaction value and discounts (Section 15) - Methodology and Procedure under Rule 126 of the CGST Rules, 2017 - DGAP investigation under Rules 129 and 133 of the CGST Rules, 2017 - deposit to Consumer Welfare Fund under Rule 133(3)(c) - penalty under Section 171(3A) of the CGST Act, 2017

Section 171 of the CGST Act, 2017 - commensurate reduction in prices - anti-profiteering - Whether the Respondent failed to pass on the benefit of reduction in the rate of tax to recipients and has profiteered. - HELD THAT: - The Authority examined the impact of GST implementation and subsequent rate reduction on the impugned product and applied Section 171(1) which mandates that any reduction in rate of tax must be passed on by way of commensurate reduction in prices. The DGAP compared state wise average basic price (after discount) for the pre GST period with transaction wise basic price (after discount) for the period 01.07.2017 to 31.12.2018 and computed profiteering. The Respondent's contention that discounts/rebates/credit notes constituted passing of benefit was rejected because those rebates were for logistics, service and operational items and not discounts linked to the invoices as required; further, post supply discounts are excludable from transaction value only where statutory conditions are satisfied, which were not met. Having considered the DGAP report and submissions, the Authority found contravention of Section 171 and accepted the DGAP's computation of profiteering. [Paras 21, 22, 23, 24, 40]

Respondent has profiteered; amount determined as Rs. 4,53,949/- for the period 01.07.2017 to 31.12.2018.

Transaction value and discounts (Section 15) - Whether Section 15 (transaction value) is applicable for determining price/discounts in the anti profiteering computation. - HELD THAT: - The Authority held that GST is chargeable on the actual transaction value after excluding discounts that meet statutory conditions. For the purpose of determining profiteering under Section 171, the correct base is the basic price after allowable discounts (i.e., transaction value) and not the basic price before discount. Post supply discounts can be excluded only if they are established by an agreement at or before the time of supply, specifically linked to the invoice, and the recipient reverses attributable ITC; these conditions were not satisfied in this case, rendering the Respondent's claimed post supply rebates inapplicable for excluding from profiteering computation. [Paras 17, 20, 30]

Section 15 is applicable; discounts not meeting statutory conditions cannot be excluded and the DGAP's use of basic price after discount for computation is correct.

Methodology and Procedure under Rule 126 of the CGST Rules, 2017 - Whether the absence of a single prescribed mathematical methodology invalidates the anti profiteering determination or the Rules delegating methodology to the Authority are unconstitutional. - HELD THAT: - The Authority concluded that Section 171(1) provides the principal contours (benefit to be passed by way of commensurate reduction in prices for each supply/SKU) and that no single formula can suit all sectors; Rule 126 properly empowers the Authority to determine detailed Procedure and Methodology. The Authority has notified the Procedure and Methodology and may apply case specific computations. Consequently, the Respondent's challenge to Rule 126 and to the computation methodology was rejected as untenable. [Paras 31, 36]

Delegation to the Authority to determine methodology is valid; absence of a uniform mathematical formula does not invalidate determinations.

DGAP investigation under Rules 129 and 133 of the CGST Rules, 2017 - Whether the DGAP exceeded his jurisdiction in conducting further investigation under Rule 133(4) beyond the initial scope. - HELD THAT: - The Authority found that the initial investigation contrasted pre GST and post GST tax applicability for the product and that invoices used were illustrative to compute base price; the referral back under Rule 133(4) permitted collection of further evidence and analysis. The DGAP's expanded investigation to assess supplies beyond the single retailer (used as a basis earlier) was within the scope of the Rules and lawful. [Paras 11, 38]

DGAP's reinvestigation under Rule 133(4) was within jurisdiction and proper.

Penalty under Section 171(3A) of the CGST Act, 2017 - deposit to Consumer Welfare Fund under Rule 133(3)(c) - Remedies and consequential directions flowing from the finding of profiteering. - HELD THAT: - Having determined profiteering, the Authority directed the Respondent to reduce prices as per Rule 133(3)(a), deposit the profiteered amount with interest at 18%-half to the Central Consumer Welfare Fund and half to State CWFs-within three months and directed initiation of a show cause notice under Section 171(3A) for imposition of penalty. Commissioners CGST/SGST are directed to supervise compliance and DGAP to report within three months. [Paras 41, 42, 43]

Respondent directed to deposit Rs. 4,53,949/- with interest into CWFs as ordered and to face a show cause for penalty; compliance to be monitored by Commissioners and DGAP.

Anti-profiteering - Whether issues relating to other products supplied by the Respondent should be further investigated. - HELD THAT: - The Authority observed that the Respondent supplied several other products impacted at GST introduction and recorded that, since contravention was established for the product under inquiry, it is necessary to examine profiteering in respect of other impacted products. The DGAP was directed to investigate those products and submit a detailed report under Rule 133(5). [Paras 45]

Directed further investigation by DGAP into other impacted products supplied by the Respondent.

Final Conclusion: The Authority held that M/s Phillips India Ltd. contravened Section 171(1) by not passing on the benefit of tax reduction and profiteered Rs. 4,53,949 for the period 01.07.2017 to 31.12.2018; it directed reduction of prices, deposit of the profiteered amount with 18% interest into central and state Consumer Welfare Funds, issuance of a show cause notice for penalty under Section 171(3A), and further investigation by the DGAP into other impacted products.

Best judgment assessment - estimation of income - revision under section 263 - prejudicial to the interest of Revenue - reliance on audit objection - perversity in findings - remand for fresh assessment

Best judgment assessment - estimation of income - perversity in findings - Sustainability of the assessment order which estimated net profit at 8% of turnover without any supporting material and allowed deductions of interest and depreciation thereafter. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the Assessing Authority raised the declared net profit from 1.56% to 8% by reference to unspecified 'market standards' without any material, evidence or comparison to justify adoption of that rate. The assessment order merely recorded alleged discrepancies in vouchers and then recomputed profits at 8% without adducing supporting material or demonstrating that books were properly rejected. The High Court described the assessment as arbitrary and bereft of a basis to stand, and observed that even the fact-finding exercise required when making a best judgment assessment had not been properly undertaken. In view of these defects and the absence of a reasoned foundation for the estimation, the Court concluded that the assessment could not be sustained and that the matter required fresh consideration by the Assessing Authority. [Paras 10, 11, 12]

Assessment order estimating profit at 8% is unsustainable for want of any basis; the matter is remitted to the Assessing Authority for fresh assessment in accordance with law.

Revision under section 263 - reliance on audit objection - prejudicial to the interest of Revenue - remand for fresh assessment - Validity of the Principal Commissioner's revisional order under section 263 passed largely on the basis of the audit objection and whether that revisional order should be upheld. - HELD THAT: - The Revenue argued that the Principal Commissioner was justified in invoking section 263 on the basis that once a net profit rate of 8% was adopted there was no justification for allowing further deductions for interest and depreciation, relying also on an audit objection and precedent. The Tribunal had set aside the revisional order, but the High Court did not decide the substantial questions of law framed. Instead, having found the underlying assessment to be vitiated by lack of basis, the Court observed that it could not meaningfully adjudicate the validity of the revisional exercise without directing fresh assessment. The Court therefore declined to answer the questions of law on the correctness of the revisional order based on the audit objection and remitted the matter for fresh consideration by the Assessing Authority. [Paras 9, 13]

Questions regarding the validity of the revisional order under section 263 (including reliance on audit objection) are not answered; the matter is remitted for fresh assessment and appropriate reconsideration.

Final Conclusion: The High Court set aside the assessment order, the revisional order under section 263 and the Tribunal's order for AY 2011-12, and remitted the matter to the Assessing Authority to pass fresh assessment orders in accordance with law; the substantial questions of law raised were not decided and the appeal is disposed of accordingly.

Adjudication under the Indian Stamp Act (Section 47A(1)) - appeal under Section 47A(5) of the Indian Stamp Act - remand for fresh consideration by the appellate forum - failure to consider relevant statutory adjudication

Adjudication under the Indian Stamp Act (Section 47A(1)) - appeal under Section 47A(5) of the Indian Stamp Act - failure to consider relevant statutory adjudication - remand for fresh consideration by the appellate forum - Whether the appellate authorities failed to consider the adjudication under Section 47A(1) of the Indian Stamp Act and the subsequent determination in the appeal under Section 47A(5), and whether the matter requires remand for fresh consideration in light of those adjudications. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the orders of the CIT(A) and the ITAT did not deal with the adjudication carried out under Section 47A(1) of the Indian Stamp Act nor with the subsequent appeal under Section 47A(5) which resulted in revision of the site value. The statutory adjudication by the competent stamp authority, and the decision in the appeal increasing the site value, are matters that bear directly on the valuation relied upon by the tax authorities. Although the Assessing Officer and lower appellate authorities considered the voluntary statement and its retraction, they failed to advert to or adjudicate the specific ground raised about the stamp adjudication. In these circumstances the High Court held that the omission was material and that the concurrent orders could not stand without fresh consideration of the stamp adjudication and the appeal decision by the ITAT. Consequently the Court set aside the ITAT order and remanded the matter to the ITAT 'B' Bench for that purpose.

ITAT order dated 08.11.2019 set aside; matter remanded to the ITAT 'B' Bench for fresh consideration of the adjudication under Section 47A(1) and the appeal under Section 47A(5) of the Indian Stamp Act (including the Chief Revenue Officer/Inspector General of Registration's order dated 11.02.2013).

Final Conclusion: T.C. No.150/2020 is partly allowed: the ITAT order is set aside and the matter remanded to the ITAT 'B' Bench for fresh consideration of the statutory stamp adjudication and the consequent appeal; T.C.A. No.139/2020 is dismissed as a consequence; no costs.

Condonation of delay in filing income-tax returns - power under Section 119(2)(b) to admit claims after expiry of time for avoiding genuine hardship - power under Section 119(2)(c) to relax requirements for claiming deductions where default was due to circumstances beyond assessee's control - reliance on mistake of legal/advisory counsel as sufficient cause for delay - requirement of audited accounts and audit report for claiming deduction under Section 80IAB - remand for merits examination by Assessing Officer of entitlement to deduction

Condonation of delay in filing income-tax returns - power under Section 119(2)(b) to admit claims after expiry of time for avoiding genuine hardship - reliance on mistake of legal/advisory counsel as sufficient cause for delay - Validity of the 2nd respondent's rejection of the petitioner's applications under Section 119(2) to condone delay in filing returns for AYs 2012-13 and 2013-14 - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the petitions rejected by the Board under Section 119(2) and the explanations offered by the petitioner that belated filing resulted from advice of its Chartered Accountant and confusion arising from amendment to Section 115JB and paucity of funds. While the Board found the petitioner had not produced corroborative documents and rejected the plea of mistaken advice, the High Court observed that the condition for exercise of power under Section 119(2)(b)/(c) is to avoid genuine hardship and that condonation would only permit the Assessing Officer to examine the claim on merits. Noting that the delay had not been satisfactorily explained but recognising that the petitioner had put its claim for deduction in jeopardy, the Court concluded that the impugned rejection must be set aside and the matter referred back so that the Assessing Officer may consider the claim on merits rather than mechanically refusing relief for delay. The Court thereby exercised supervisory jurisdiction to remit the matter for merits examination rather than directing automatic allowance of the deduction. [Paras 30, 31, 32, 33]

Impugned order rejecting the applications under Section 119(2) is set aside and the matter is remitted for merits examination by the Assessing Officer.

Requirement of audited accounts and audit report for claiming deduction under Section 80IAB - remand for merits examination by Assessing Officer of entitlement to deduction - Whether the petitioner is otherwise entitled to deduction under Section 80IAB where returns were filed belatedly and audit/report requirements are involved - HELD THAT: - The Court recognised that substantive entitlement to deduction under Section 80IAB depends on compliance with statutory requirements including audit and furnishing of the auditor's report as required by Sub section (7). The judgment emphasises that condoning delay under Section 119(2) does not itself entitle the assessee to the deduction; it merely enables the Assessing Officer to scrutinise and decide the claim on merits, including verification of statutory audit compliance. Consequently, the question of entitlement was not decided on merits by the High Court but remanded to the Assessing Officer for independent examination and adjudication within the statutory framework. [Paras 23, 24, 31, 33, 34]

Entitlement to deduction under Section 80IAB is left open and remitted to the Assessing Officer for decision on merits after examining compliance with audit/reporting requirements.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order dated 31.05.2016 rejecting applications to condone delay is set aside. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax is directed to examine the petitioner's claim for deduction under Section 80IAB for AYs 2012-13 and 2013-14 on merits (including verification of audit/report compliance) and pass appropriate orders within three months.

Cash credit under section 68 - burden of proof on assessee to establish identity, genuineness and creditworthiness - disallowance of expenditure for want of business nexus - deductibility under Section 57(1)(iii) - set-off of income against expenses

Cash credit under section 68 - burden of proof on assessee to establish identity, genuineness and creditworthiness - Addition made under section 68 in respect of unsecured loans from Navratna Organizers & Developers P. Ltd. and Navratna (Kaivanna) Association - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined whether the assessee had discharged the onus under section 68 by proving identity of the lenders, genuineness of transactions and creditworthiness. The assessee produced bank evidence showing receipt through banking channels, confirmations from the alleged lenders containing names, addresses and PANs, copies of the lenders' accounts and assessment orders of the lenders for the relevant year for verification. Having considered the materials placed on record and the fact of receipt through banking channel, the Tribunal held that the assessee satisfied the requirements under section 68 and discharged the primary onus cast upon it. Consequently the addition treating the credits as unexplained was held to be unjustified and deleted. [Paras 6, 9]

Addition under section 68 deleted; assessee's claim regarding the unsecured loans is accepted.

Disallowance of expenditure for want of business nexus - deductibility under Section 57(1)(iii) - set-off of income against expenses - Disallowance of expenses claimed (and alternate claim for set-off of interest income against such expenses) - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted the concurrent findings of the AO and the CIT(A) that the assessee was not shown to be carrying on a business of building maintenance and that the claimed expenditures lacked a demonstrated nexus with the interest income declared. The assessee's case that the expenses related to maintenance of a building and were funded from maintenance deposits was not pleaded or supported with verifiable details before the AO and was first advanced later, limiting verification. The interest received was assessed as income from other sources and the AO/CIT(A) found the expenditures were not directly connected to earning that interest; accordingly Section 57(1)(iii) principles were applied. In absence of satisfactory evidence of business nexus or verifiable linkage for set-off, the disallowance was held to be justified and the alternate set-off claim rejected. [Paras 7, 10, 11]

Disallowance of the claimed expenses upheld; alternate claim for set-off rejected.

Final Conclusion: Appeal partly allowed: addition under section 68 deleted; disallowance of expenses and alternate set-off claim upheld, resulting in a partly in favour and partly against the assessee for Asstt.Year 2004- 05.

Show cause notice under Section 274 for penalty under Section 271(1)(c) - failure to specify whether penalty is for concealment of particulars of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars - defective notice vitiates penalty proceedings - rule of following view favourable to the assessee where conflicting precedents exist - principle of natural justice in penalty proceedings

Show cause notice under Section 274 for penalty under Section 271(1)(c) - failure to specify whether penalty is for concealment of particulars of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars - defective notice vitiates penalty proceedings - Whether the penalty imposed under Section 271(1)(c) can be sustained where the show cause notice under Section 274 did not specify whether the charge was concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the show cause notice issued by the Assessing Officer did not specify or strike out which of the two alternative charges under Section 271(1)(c) (concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars) was being alleged. Following the coordinate bench decision which applied the view of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in Manjunatha Cotton & Ginning Factory and subsequent dismissal of the Department's SLP, the Tribunal observed that where two judicial views exist the one favourable to the assessee should be followed. The Tribunal rejected the argument that mere linguistic defects or that the charge can be discerned from the assessment order cure the defect in the notice; on the facts the omission was a material defect which vitiated the penalty proceedings. Respectfully following the coordinate bench, the Tribunal concluded that imposition of penalty could not be sustained and directed deletion of the penalty confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals). [Paras 3, 4]

Imposition of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) deleted and the appeal allowed.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal deleted the penalty confirmed by the CIT(A) because the show cause notice under Section 274 failed to specify whether the penalty was for concealment of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars; appeal allowed.

Characterisation of income as capital gain or business income - treatment of shares as investment portfolio versus stock-in-trade - consistency and binding effect of CBDT circulars on tax treatment of share transfers - disallowance under section 14A and Rule 8D - principle of apportionment of expenditure for non-taxable income - effect of admission/agreement before the Assessing Officer

Characterisation of income as capital gain or business income - treatment of shares as investment portfolio versus stock-in-trade - consistency and binding effect of CBDT circulars on tax treatment of share transfers - Long term gains on sale of the shares in question are to be treated as capital gains and not as business income. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined earlier decisions in the assessee's own cases and subsequent authoritative clarifications by the CBDT which instructed that listed shares held for more than twelve months (and unlisted shares in specified situations) should be accepted as capital assets where the assessee treats them as such. Having regard to the Tribunal's later consistent rulings (for assessment years 2008 09 to 2012 13 and immediately preceding years) and the CBDT circulars which aim to reduce litigation and require acceptance of long term treatment where shares are held for over 12 months and shown as capital assets, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities and held that the purchases and sales in question constituted investment activity assessable under the head capital gains rather than business income.

Order of lower authorities set aside; long term capital gains held to be chargeable as capital gains and not as business income.

Disallowance under section 14A and Rule 8D - principle of apportionment of expenditure for non-taxable income - Disallowance computed under section 14A read with Rule 8D was correctly made and upheld. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal applied the principle that expenditure attributable to non taxable income (dividend) must be disallowed by apportionment under section 14A. Reliance was placed on Supreme Court authority rejecting a dominant purpose test and endorsing apportionment. The assessee's contention that its strategic holding (control) in a company should exclude it from disallowance was rejected. The AO and CIT(A) correctly computed the disallowance in accordance with Rule 8D(2)(iii) and the assessee's attempt to restrict disallowance proportionately to dividend sourced from a single holding was found untenable. Accordingly, the additional disallowance was confirmed.

Appeal on this ground dismissed; disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D confirmed.

Effect of admission/agreement before the Assessing Officer - Admitted 10% disallowance of business promotion expenses stood and was upheld. - HELD THAT: - The record shows that the assessee's authorised representative expressly conceded inability to segregate non business expenditure and offered 10% of business promotion expenses as disallowance. The Tribunal held that an order founded on such admission/agreement could not be assailed in appeal in the absence of particulars or supporting material to overturn the admission. In these circumstances the AO's and CIT(A)'s confirmation of the ad hoc 10% disallowance was proper.

Ground rejected; disallowance of Rs. 15,48,318 (10%) upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed: the Tribunal holds the contested long term gains to be taxable as capital gains (order of lower authorities set aside), while confirming the additions/disallowances under section 14A read with Rule 8D and the agreed 10% disallowance of business promotion expenses; other grounds are dismissed.

Guideline value under Section 50C - deeming provision - first proviso to Section 50C - retrospective application of clarificatory amendment - market value versus guideline value - specific performance/right to enforce agreement

First proviso to Section 50C - retrospective application of clarificatory amendment - Whether the first proviso to Section 50C, introduced by Finance Act, 2016 with effect from 01.04.2017, operates retrospectively as a clarificatory provision applicable to transactions where the agreement of sale preceded the date of registration. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the object and effect of the first proviso to Section 50C and held that Parliament intended the proviso to clarify the existing law rather than create new rights. The proviso recognizes that where an agreement for sale exists prior to execution and registration of the sale deed, the agreed price on the date of the agreement should be given effect for the purposes of Section 50C, rather than automatically adopting the guideline value on the later date of registration. The Tribunal reasoned that this clarification does not alter the character of past transactions carried out in reliance on the law as it stood but merely records the legal position that a purchaser's right to enforce a prior agreement precludes the vendor from claiming additional consideration on account of a later rise in guideline value. For these reasons the Tribunal concluded that the proviso is retrospective in operation as a clarificatory amendment and is therefore applicable to the facts of the present case. [Paras 3]

The first proviso to Section 50C is retrospective in operation as a clarificatory amendment and applies to agreements executed before 01.04.2017.

Guideline value under Section 50C - market value versus guideline value - specific performance/right to enforce agreement - Whether, in the facts of this case, the guideline value to be adopted for computing capital gain is that prevailing on the date of the agreement for sale or on the date of execution/registration of the sale deed. - HELD THAT: - Applying the clarified position embodied in the first proviso, the Tribunal observed that once an agreement for sale is entered into, the purchaser acquires the right to enforce the agreement specifically and the vendor cannot claim further consideration merely because guideline value increased before registration. While guideline value is a tool to guide the Sub-Registrar and may not always reflect true market value, the deeming mechanism of Section 50C requires adoption of guideline value only where it is higher than the agreed price; however, where there is a prior enforceable agreement, the relevant date for adopting guideline value is the date of the agreement. The CIT(A) had accordingly directed the Assessing Officer to adopt the guideline value as on the date of the agreement (04.08.2012) and compute capital gains thereafter. The Tribunal found no error in that conclusion. [Paras 3]

The guideline value for computation of capital gains is to be adopted as on the date of the agreement for sale (and not the later date of registration) where a prior agreement exists and is enforceable; the CIT(A)'s direction is confirmed.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal for AY 2014-15, confirming the CIT(A)'s direction to adopt the guideline value as on the date of the agreement for sale under the clarificatory first proviso to Section 50C.

Disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D(ii) - no disallowance where no exempt income/dividend is earned - matching concept - binding precedent of the jurisdictional High Court and Supreme Court - judicial discipline to follow binding decisions

Disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D(ii) - no disallowance where no exempt income/dividend is earned - matching concept - Whether disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D(ii) can be made where the assessee did not earn any exempt dividend income in the relevant year. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found it undisputed that the assessee did not earn any dividend or other exempt income in the year under appeal. Applying the matching concept, the Tribunal followed the Madras High Court's decision in Redington India Ltd., which held that expenditure relating to exempt income should be matched to the year in which that income is earned and that in a year where no exempt income is earned there cannot be a disallowance. The Tribunal noted that the Madras High Court's view was reiterated in Chettinad Logistics Pvt. Ltd., and that the Revenue's appeal in Chettinad Logistics was dismissed by the Apex Court, thereby affirming the principle. Consequently, the CIT(A)'s reliance on a belief that the Apex Court had overruled Redington was incorrect. Given the absence of exempt income and the binding precedential position, the Tribunal held that no disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D(ii) could be sustained for the year under consideration. [Paras 4]

The disallowance made by the Assessing Officer under Section 14A read with Rule 8D(ii) is deleted.

Final Conclusion: The orders of the authorities below are set aside and the appeal of the assessee is allowed, with the deletion of the Section 14A disallowance for assessment year 2017-18.

Provisional release under Section 110A - Discretionary jurisdiction of adjudicating authority - Appellate power to confirm, modify or annul and to fix terms of release - Scope of interference under Section 130 - substantial question of law and perversity - Admissibility and evidentiary value of statements recorded under Section 108/138B - Requirement of a registered Bill of Entry for licit import - Executive circulars cannot supplant statute

Appellate power to confirm, modify or annul and to fix terms of release - Provisional release under Section 110A - Whether the Tribunal could itself order provisional release and fix its terms instead of remanding the matter to the adjudicating authority. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the Tribunal, under its statutory power to "confirm, modify or annul" the adjudicating authority's order, is competent to direct provisional release and fix terms thereof rather than mandating a remand. Section 129B(1) vests the Tribunal with wide powers and remand is an alternative, not a mandatory course. The Court further found that remand here would have been futile because the ADG's order was effectively a refusal to consider provisional release (rendering Section 110A otiose) and thus the Tribunal did not usurp jurisdiction by fixing terms. Consequently the Tribunal's exercise in directing provisional release and stipulating conditions was within its jurisdiction and not a substitution of discretion impermissibly exercised by it. [Paras 54, 56, 57]

Tribunal had power to direct provisional release and fix terms; quashing the ADG's order was upheld.

Scope of interference under Section 130 - substantial question of law and perversity - Provisional release under Section 110A - Whether the High Court should interfere with the Tribunal's discretionary grant of provisional release in exercise of Section 130. - HELD THAT: - The Court reiterated that appeals under Section 130 lie only on substantial questions of law and that findings of fact by the Tribunal are final unless perverse. Provisional release under Section 110A is a discretionary, interlocutory exercise; appellate interference is limited to cases of perversity, irrationality, ignoring material evidence or misapplication of law. The Court applied these standards and proceeded to examine whether the Tribunal's discretion in this case suffered from such vices. [Paras 37, 38, 43, 61]

Interference is permissible only for perversity or where a substantial question of law arises; ordinary discretionary exercise of provisional release will not be disturbed.

Requirement of a registered Bill of Entry for licit import - Provisional release under Section 110A - Validity of provisional release in respect of the seized gold/jewellery where imports were supported by a registered Bill of Entry versus where they were supported by an unregistered/unsigned Bill of Entry. - HELD THAT: - The Court differentiated between two categories of airport-seized jewellery. For the quantity covered by a duly registered, signed and apprised Bill of Entry (25400.06 g), the Tribunal's finding that the assessing officer had examined documents and satisfied himself that the goods were identical to goods earlier exported for exhibition stood unchallenged and was not perverse; provisional release was therefore permissible. By contrast, the quantity covered by an unregistered, undated and unsigned Bill of Entry (25299.68 g) lacked the fundamental statutory prerequisite of a registered Bill of Entry under Section 46; treating that quantity as licit for provisional release by clubbing it with the lawful consignment was legally untenable and amounted to a perverse exercise of discretion. The Court set aside the Tribunal's direction to release the unregistered quantity. [Paras 69, 72, 79, 80, 81]

Provisional release upheld for goods covered by a registered Bill of Entry (25400.06 g); provisional release set aside for goods covered only by an unregistered/unsigned Bill of Entry (25299.68 g).

Admissibility and evidentiary value of statements recorded under Section 108/138B - Scope of interference under Section 130 - substantial question of law and perversity - Whether statements recorded during investigation (under Section 108) could be used in opposition to provisional release without being admitted in adjudication. - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that statements recorded under Section 108 are subject to the procedural safeguards and relevancy rules in Section 138B; such statements acquire probative value only after being admitted in evidence in adjudication (or when conditions in clause (a) of Section 138B(1) apply). Accordingly, statements recorded in investigation cannot be used as a standalone basis to refuse provisional release. The Tribunal therefore rightly declined to treat those investigative statements as conclusive to deny provisional release of the registered consignment. [Paras 76, 77]

Investigative statements not admitted in adjudication cannot, by themselves, justify refusal of provisional release; reliance on them at this interlocutory stage is unsustainable.

Executive circulars cannot supplant statute - Provisional release under Section 110A - Whether Circular 35/2017 (restricting provisional release for certain categories) can be applied to deny provisional release when Section 110A contains no such exclusions. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that para 2 of Circular 35/2017 purporting to categorically exclude certain classes of goods from provisional release is contrary to the statutory language of Section 110A, which permits provisional release of 'any goods, documents or things'. An executive instruction cannot curtail a statutory provision; accordingly the Circular insofar as it purports to render categories ineligible for provisional release is void and unenforceable. [Paras 51, 52]

Circular 35/2017 cannot be read to override Section 110A; categorical exclusions in the Circular are void.

Provisional release under Section 110A - Security and terms for provisional release - Whether the Tribunal's prescribed security (bond and Bank Guarantee) for provisional release was adequate and what modification, if any, was required. - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that the impugned order did not adequately record reasoning for selecting the Bank Guarantee fixed by the Tribunal. Considering the value as reckoned in the Show Cause Notice and precedents dealing with bank guarantees in provisional release matters, the Court found the Bank Guarantee of Rs. 1.25 crores inadequate. In the interests of revenue protection, the Court modified the terms to require a bond for the full value of the goods and a Bank Guarantee with auto-renewal for Rs. 10 crores (over 30% of the reckoned value), and ordered safeguards including open premises and weekly account statements to prevent diversion or misuse. [Paras 83, 84, 86, 87]

Terms modified: respondent to furnish bond for full value and a Bank Guarantee of Rs. 10 crores with auto-renewal; premises open to inspection and weekly accounts to be furnished.

Final Conclusion: The High Court upheld the Tribunal's power to direct provisional release and to fix terms; it affirmed provisional release of the goods seized from the respondent's workshop and of 25,400.06 g of airport-seized jewellery supported by a registered Bill of Entry, but quashed the Tribunal's direction to release 25,299.68 g of jewellery unsupported by a registered Bill of Entry. The Court held that CBEC Circular 35/2017 cannot override Section 110A, refined the security conditions (full-value bond and a Rs. 10 crore Bank Guarantee with auto-renewal), and imposed safeguards including open premises for inspection and weekly utilization accounts; appeal disposed accordingly.

Customs valuation - application of Customs Valuation Rules sequentially - use of DGOV guideline / LME minus discount as sole basis for re-determination - contemporaneous import data as basis for redetermination - principles of natural justice - right to cross examination - effect of consent letter on maintainability of appeal / aggrieved person

Customs valuation - application of Customs Valuation Rules sequentially - use of DGOV guideline / LME minus discount as sole basis for re-determination - contemporaneous import data as basis for redetermination - Validity of enhancement of declared value of imported aluminium scrap by applying DGOV guideline (LME minus discount) without relying on contemporaneous import data or applying the Customs Valuation Rules sequentially. - HELD THAT: - The adjudicating authority enhanced the declared value not on the basis of any contemporaneous import data or other evidentiary material showing misdeclaration, but solely by applying the DGOV guideline (LME price less discount band). The Tribunal held that DGOV guidelines cannot override the statutory Customs Valuation Rules and that, before rejecting a declared transaction value, the authority was required to apply the Valuation Rules sequentially (including consideration of transaction value of identical or similar goods and contemporaneous imports). Prior Tribunal and Supreme Court precedents establish that LME prices are only indicative and cannot be the sole basis for enhancement in the absence of corroborative contemporaneous import evidence. The Tribunal found the method of re-determination adopted in the impugned orders to be arbitrary, not supported by material, and contrary to the statutory valuation scheme, and noted that identical reasoning had been rejected in the appellant's earlier Tribunal order dated 01.10.2019 which applied squarely to the present imports. For these reasons the enhancement based on the DGOV/LME methodology was held unsustainable. [Paras 4]

Enhancement of value based solely on DGOV guideline / LME minus discount without application of the Customs Valuation Rules and without contemporaneous import evidence is unsustainable; the enhancements are set aside.

Effect of consent letter on maintainability of appeal / aggrieved person - customs valuation - Whether a consent letter given by the importer at the time of reassessment precludes the importer from being an aggrieved person entitled to appeal under Section 128(1) when the assessing authority has not followed statutory valuation principles. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court authority (Century Metal Recycling Pvt. Ltd.) to hold that a consent letter does not validate an assessment if the assessing authority failed to follow the valuation process required by law. Even where the importer had given a consent letter to expedite clearance, the enhancement founded solely on DGOV guidelines and not on the statutory Valuation Rules could not be sustained; consequently the existence of a consent letter did not preclude the appellant from being an aggrieved person or from appealing the assessment that was not made in accordance with statutory principles. [Paras 5, 6]

Consent letter does not bar appeal where assessment/valuation is not carried out in accordance with the Customs Valuation Rules; appeal is maintainable and the enhancement is liable to be set aside.

Final Conclusion: Impugned orders enhancing the declared value were quashed and the appeals allowed; the re determinations based solely on the DGOV/LME methodology (without contemporaneous evidence and without following the Valuation Rules) were set aside, with consequential reliefs to the appellant.

Classification of goods - conformity to Indian Standards (IS 1459) - burden of proof on the Revenue - re classification under tariff heading - evidentiary requirement for specification compliance

Classification of goods - conformity to Indian Standards (IS 1459) - burden of proof on the Revenue - re classification under tariff heading - evidentiary requirement for specification compliance - Whether the imported product was rightly re classified as Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) under CTH 27101910 - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the test reports produced by CRCL Kandla and CRCL New Delhi and the BIS specification for Superior Kerosene Oil (IS 1459). Classification as SKO requires conformity to all parameters in the standard. The test records before the authorities did not include results for three essential parameters from Table 1 of IS 1459 - burning quality (char value and bloom on glass chimney) and colour (Saybolt) - and no evidence was led by the Revenue to establish those parameters by test or otherwise. Although sulphur content was treated as satisfied on the supplier's report, the absence of evidence on the other two parameters was material. The Tribunal applied the settled principle that the burden of proof for classification rests on the Revenue and that the Revenue must adduce proper evidence to establish classification different from that claimed by the importer. In view of the missing test results and the Revenue's failure to discharge the onus, the impugned re classification and consequent confiscation/penalty could not be sustained. [Paras 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]

Impugned orders of re classification, confiscation and penalty set aside; appeals allowed.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal held that the Revenue failed to prove that the imported product met all specifications of IS 1459 for Superior Kerosene Oil; the re classification and consequent orders were set aside and the appeals allowed.

Duty on inter-unit transfers between EOUs - permissibility of DTA sale of goods similar to exported goods - repacking and relabeling as manufacture - reading Foreign Trade Policy and Customs notifications in harmony

Duty on inter-unit transfers between EOUs - reading Foreign Trade Policy and Customs notifications in harmony - Demand of duty on imported or domestically procured inputs transferred from one EOU unit to another sister EOU unit - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the recipient unit was itself an EOU entitled to procure inputs by import or on CT-3 certificates under the FTP and Customs notifications. There was no allegation or proof that the transferred goods were diverted to the domestic market; transfers were made after permission of the Development Commissioner and the appellants furnished a Chartered Accountant certificate correlating transfer and receipt and paid duty for items found deficient with interest. Applying the principle that FTP provisions and Customs notifications must be read in harmony, and following the Tribunal's decision in Sunil Kumar Jain upheld by the Supreme Court, the demand based on inter-unit transfer is not sustainable.

Demand in respect of transfers of inputs to the sister EOU is not sustained and is set aside.

Permissibility of DTA sale of goods similar to exported goods - Foreign Trade Policy application to agricultural products - Whether the appellants could clear for DTA goods described as similar to exported goods (notably olives and related preserved vegetable products) - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the FTP 2004-2009 and CBEC Circular No.7/2006 make clear that EOUs may sell in DTA goods similar to the exported goods and that 'similar goods' need not be identical to exported items. The appellants' LOP and prior export of olives under the same LOP supported that DTA clearance of such items was permissible. Reliance on the Tribunal decision in Nishith Impex supported the conclusion that the DTA sale of the contested products could not be interdicted on the ground advanced by the department.

DTA clearance of goods similar to exported goods (including olives) is permissible; the demand on this ground is not sustained.

Repacking and relabeling as manufacture - liberal interpretation of 'manufacture' for EOUs - Whether repacking/relabeling of imported unlabelled processed jams amounted to mere trading (liable to duty) or constituted manufacture/excisable activity exempt for EOUs - HELD THAT: - The appellants had imported unlabelled processed jams in bulk and undertaken repacking and labeling prior to clearance for export or DTA. The Tribunal applied CBEC Circular No.314/30/97-CE which endorses a broader view of 'manufacture' for purposes of exemptions available to EOUs, and relied on earlier judicial decisions recognizing repacking/relabeling as amounting to manufacture. On that basis the activity was held to fall within the ambit of manufacture as liberally interpreted, and the objection that the activity amounted to trading was rejected.

Repacking and relabeling undertaken by the appellants amount to manufacture; the demand on alleged trading of jams is not sustained.

Final Conclusion: All demands made in the Order-in-Original were found unsustainable on the merits: demands relating to inter-unit transfers to an EOU, DTA clearance of goods similar to exports, and repacking/relabeling being treated as trading were set aside and the appeal is allowed.

Enhancement of assessable value - transaction value - contemporaneous import data - DGOV valuation alert/circular - Section 14 of the Customs Act - Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation Rules - sequential application of Customs Valuation Rules - consent letter and provisional assessment

DGOV valuation alert/circular - contemporaneous import data - enhancement of assessable value - Enhancement of customs assessable value based solely on DGOV valuation alert/circular without reliance on contemporaneous import data is illegal. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the enhanced value (USD 1587 PMT) was computed from the LME/base-metal price adjusted by the discount in the DGOV circular rather than on any contemporaneous import data, despite the consent letter's reference. Citing Supreme Court and Tribunal precedents, the Tribunal reiterated that invoice/transaction value is the starting point under Section 14 and may be departed from only upon cogent reasons supported by evidence of contemporaneous imports or other corroborative material. Enhancement based purely on DGOV alerts or LME data, without enquiries establishing comparable imports or recording certain reasons, is without authority of law and cannot sustain the re assessment. [Paras 4]

Enhancement effected on the basis of DGOV circular without contemporaneous import evidence is illegal and set aside.

Transaction value - Section 14 of the Customs Act - Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation Rules - Assessing authority must follow the statutory valuation regime under Section 14 and Rule 12 before rejecting declared transaction value; reasons and material must be recorded and communicated where required. - HELD THAT: - Relying on Supreme Court authority, the Tribunal emphasised that Section 14 deems transaction value to be the assessable value unless exceptions in the Rules apply. Before discarding the declared invoice price, the Department must gather and rely on contemporaneous import data or other material, give cogent reasons showing that price is not the sole consideration, and, where required, communicate reasons to the importer under Rule 12. Failure to apply the valuation rules sequentially and to record/disclose reasons vitiates the assessment. [Paras 4]

Assessment must conform to Section 14 and Rule 12; absent the requisite enquiries and recorded reasons, the declared transaction value stands.

Consent letter and provisional assessment - enhancement of assessable value - A consent letter given by the importer (often to expedite clearance) does not preclude the importer from challenging the subsequent enhancement of value. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal accepted precedent holding that consent obtained under commercial pressure (to avoid delays, demurrage, or detention) does not amount to an irrevocable waiver of statutory rights. The absence of mandatory communication of grounds under Rule 12 and instances of coercion mean that a clearance on enhanced value does not bar appellate remedy; importers retain the right to challenge assessment orders. [Paras 4]

Consent to enhanced valuation, particularly given under compulsion to secure clearance, does not foreclose challenge to the assessment.

Final Conclusion: Appeals allowed; impugned orders enhancing assessable value (based on DGOV circular/LME data without contemporaneous import evidence or required statutory procedure) set aside and declared invoice/transaction values restored with consequential relief, if any.

Transaction value - related persons influence on price - deductive value - computed value - sequential application of valuation rules (Rule 3(4)) - identical and similar goods - adjustments for commercial level and quantity - admission of additional evidence under Rule 23 - prohibition on arbitrary enhancement (Rule 9(2))

Admission of additional evidence under Rule 23 - Admission of additional evidence certified by Chartered Accountant and supplier's computed value certificates - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the Miscellaneous Application for taking on record certificates confirming the deductive value and computed value issued by the supplier and a Chartered Accountant. Finding that these documents were based on the record and went to the root of the controversy, the Tribunal exercised its power in the interests of justice and admitted the additional evidence. [Paras 26]

Additional evidence admitted; Miscellaneous Application allowed.

Deductive value - computed value - transaction value - sequential application of valuation rules (Rule 3(4)) - Whether the transaction value in a sale between related persons must be accepted when the importer demonstrates that the declared value closely approximates the deductive or computed value and whether lower authorities erred in applying Rule 4 without first dealing with Rule 3(3) - HELD THAT: - Under Rule 3(3)(b) an importer in a related party transaction can establish that the declared transaction value is acceptable by demonstrating close approximation to the deductive or computed value. The Tribunal found that the appellant had furnished deductive value calculations and computed value certificates which were on record and not rebutted by the Revenue. The lower authorities proceeded to re determine value under Rule 4 despite availability of deductive value, in contravention of Rule 3(4) which permits moving to Rules 4-9 only if value cannot be determined under sub rule (1). Since deductive/computed value evidence was available and not rejected by a reasoned order, the Tribunal held that the transaction value could not be discarded without appropriately considering that evidence. [Paras 17, 18, 28]

The deductive and computed value evidence must be considered; application of Rule 4 by lower authority without exhausting Rule 3 was impermissible and requires re determination.

Identical and similar goods - adjustments for commercial level and quantity - prohibition on arbitrary enhancement (Rule 9(2)) - Whether goods imported by Authorised Stocking Distributors (ASD) are comparable to appellant's imports and whether adjustments for commercial level/quantity justified the 77% enhancement - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal analysed the nature of imports and found that many goods (RF products, made to order items and certain non RF products) imported by the appellant were not imported by ASDs and thus were not identical or similar for purposes of Rules 4-5. Where imports overlapped, the Tribunal noted substantial differences in commercial level and quantity-appellant's imports were much larger, involved stocking, warehousing and promotion costs not incurred by ASDs-so simple parity with ASD import prices was not justified. Further, Rule 4/5 adjustments must be supported by demonstrated evidence of reasonableness and accuracy; arbitrary across the board enhancement is barred by Rule 9(2). [Paras 19, 20, 21, 27, 28]

ASD imports are not universally comparable; the 77% enhancement lacks reasonable basis and arbitrary enhancement is impermissible.

Transaction value - deductive value - Interim quantum adjustment, modification of enhancement and remand for re determination on deductive/computed value basis - HELD THAT: - Having admitted the additional evidence and held that Rule 3 required consideration of deductive/computed value, the Tribunal modified the impugned blanket enhancement. It reduced the enhancement from 77% to 20% for the period 2013 14 to 2016 17, held that no enhancement was required for 2017 18, and directed remand to the Deputy Commissioner, SVB to re determine any adjustment in transaction value on the basis of the deductive and computed values. As an interim arrangement until re determination, the Tribunal restricted loading to 15% of invoice value, reflecting the average observed price difference and to avoid unintended consequences of the impugned order. [Paras 27, 28, 29]

Enhanced loading modified to 20% for 2013 14 to 2016 17, nil for 2017 18; matter remanded to Deputy Commissioner, SVB to re determine adjustment on deductive/computed value basis; interim loading limited to 15%.

Final Conclusion: Additional evidence admitted; Tribunal held that the deductive and computed value evidence on record must be considered before discarding transaction value in related party imports; the blanket 77% enhancement was unjustified and was modified (20% for 2013 14 to 2016 17; no enhancement for 2017 18), the matter remanded to the Deputy Commissioner, SVB for re determination on the deductive/computed value basis, with an interim loading capped at 15%.

Condonation of delay - appeal within 90 days under Section 9C(2) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 - limitation and exclusion of time spent in inappropriate forum - presumption of knowledge of Gazette notification - bonafides of delay explanation

Condonation of delay - appeal within 90 days under Section 9C(2) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 - presumption of knowledge of Gazette notification - bonafides of delay explanation - limitation and exclusion of time spent in inappropriate forum - Whether delay in filing the appeal should be condoned and the appeal admitted despite being filed beyond 90 days from the Gazette notification - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the appellant's claim that it became aware of the final notification only in the second week of May 2017 and that requests for inspection of the Designated Authority's public file and disclosure statements prevented timely filing. The Delhi High Court rejected that explanation, holding that a Gazetted notification is presumed known, that provisional duties were in force and known to the appellant, and that the appellant's request for documents appeared to be an after the fact alibi; those findings attained finality on dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's observation that time spent in inappropriate forums may be excluded for limitation purposes was considered; however, even after excluding the limited periods spent in the High Court and Supreme Court, the appellant could at best be granted benefit of 103 days and the limitation period had already expired before the writ petition was filed. The Tribunal was therefore not satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the statutory 90 day period and found the appellant's conduct and explanation not sufficiently bona fide to warrant condonation. [Paras 9, 11, 15, 16]

Delay condonation application rejected; appeal dismissed as barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: The application for condonation of delay is refused because the appellant failed to demonstrate sufficient cause; the appeal, filed beyond the 90 day period prescribed by Section 9C(2) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, is therefore dismissed.

Exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution - Superintendence jurisdiction and limits on judicial review - Availability of alternative statutory remedy as restraint on writ/Article 227 - Jurisdiction of NCLT in corporate disputes and exclusivity under the IBC/code - Consent/consensus order and its enforcement before the forum which made it

Exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution - Availability of alternative statutory remedy as restraint on writ/Article 227 - NCLT jurisdiction - Whether the High Court should exercise its superintendence jurisdiction under Article 227 to entertain the Civil Revision Petition challenging alleged breaches of NCLT orders and related conduct while the relevant proceedings (I.A.No.421/2019 in C.P.No.20/2018) are pending before the NCLT and statutory remedies under the IBC are available. - HELD THAT: - The Court applied the established limit on the exercise of Article 227, stressing that the High Court's wide powers of superintendence must be exercised with care and circumspection and are subject to recognised constraints. Precedents were applied to the effect that where a statutory alternative remedy exists, the High Court should ordinarily refrain from intervening unless there is a lack of jurisdiction or a grave dereliction/abuse warranting interference. The Court noted that the NCLT is the adjudicatory forum for the corporate disputes in question and that the interlocutory applications impugning the alleged transfers and board actions remain pending before the NCLT. Given that the petitioner has the forum of the NCLT (and appellate recourse under the statutory scheme), and absent any finding that the NCLT acted without jurisdiction or in such flagrant abuse as to justify exceptional interference, the High Court must decline to adjudicate the merits. The Court observed that allegations of fraud or non-compliance with the NCLT's directions should be urged before the NCLT which retains jurisdiction to deal with the matter and that the pendency of I.A.No.421/2019 militates against entertaining the civil revision under Article 227. [Paras 8, 9, 10, 11]

The High Court will not exercise its Article 227 jurisdiction to entertain the petition while the relevant proceedings are pending before the NCLT and statutory remedies are available; the petition is dismissed at the admission stage.

Final Conclusion: The Civil Revision Petition was dismissed at the admission stage for want of maintainability because the disputed matters and the challenge to compliance with NCLT directions were pending before the NCLT (I.A.No.421/2019 in C.P.No.20/2018) and an alternative statutory remedy exists; no costs.

Interim bail/parole during COVID-19 - overcrowding of prisons and pandemic response - High Powered Committee guidelines for release of undertrial prisoners - exclusion of offences under PMLA and economic offences from interim release - medical condition and custodial treatment as ground for interim release - supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 and inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC - allegations under PMLA and Section 409 IPC

High Powered Committee guidelines for release of undertrial prisoners - exclusion of offences under PMLA and economic offences from interim release - interim bail/parole during COVID-19 - medical condition and custodial treatment as ground for interim release - Whether the petitioner, accused of alleged economic offences including offences under the PMLA and Section 409 IPC, is entitled to interim bail/parole in view of the High Powered Committee minutes dated 28.03.2020 (and reiterated 18.04.2020) framed in the context of COVID-19. - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the Committee minutes which prescribed categories of undertrial prisoners eligible for interim bail/parole during the pandemic and expressly excluded persons facing trial under the PMLA and other specified serious/economic offences. The petitioner is alleged to be involved in transactions attracting offences under the PMLA and Section 409 IPC, offences which fall outside the categories identified by the High Powered Committee. The medical status report from the jail medical authorities showed the petitioner's general condition to be stable, that prescribed medications were being provided, and that he was maintained in effective isolation such that social distancing was observed. The Court also noted the procedural outcome in a separate challenge to the Committee's criterion before the Supreme Court where the petitioner in that matter withdrew with liberty to make a representation to the High Powered Committee; the Court observed that a similar course remains open to the present petitioner. In light of the exclusion of PMLA/economic offences from the Committee's criteria, the nature and gravity of the allegations (including offences punishable with long terms of imprisonment), and the jail medical report, the Court found no ground to grant interim bail/parole in the present petition. [Paras 17, 18]

The petition for interim bail/parole is declined while preserving the petitioner's liberty to approach the High Powered Committee by representation.

Final Conclusion: The application under Article 226/Section 482 CrPC for interim bail/parole is refused because the petitioner is accused of offences falling within the categories excluded by the High Powered Committee's COVID-19 release criteria and the jail medical report indicates his condition is stable; the petitioner remains free to make a representation to the High Powered Committee as permitted by the Supreme Court in a related matter.

Classification of service as Works Contract Service vs Commercial Construction Service - Applicability of composition scheme for Works Contract - Taxability of Works Contract Service prior to 1.6.2007 - Collection of statutory charges and Business Auxiliary Service - Renting of Immovable Property Service and discharge of tax - Refund of erroneously paid service tax

Classification of service as Works Contract Service vs Commercial Construction Service - Applicability of composition scheme for Works Contract - Taxability of Works Contract Service prior to 1.6.2007 - Whether the appellant's composite contracts for interior furnishing and related works for the period 2005-06 to 2009-2010 are taxable as Commercial Construction Service or as Works Contract Service and whether the appellant was correctly on composition scheme. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the nature of the contracts (interior furnishing with reimbursable items) and noted the appellant obtained registration as a Works Contract service provider with effect from 1.6.2009. Applying the legal position in Larsen & Toubro and subsequent authority relied upon by the appellant, the Tribunal held that the services rendered were in the nature of Works Contract service and that such services could not be taxed as Works Contract prior to 1.6.2007. Having accepted that the nature of service remained unchanged over the relevant period and that the appellant had validly opted for the composition scheme after registration, the department could not classify the same transactions under different heads for different periods. The demand premised on classification as Commercial Construction Service was therefore unsustainable. [Paras 2]

Demand based on classification as Commercial Construction Service is not sustained; appellant correctly treated services as Works Contract service and validly availed composition scheme.

Collection of statutory charges and Business Auxiliary Service - Whether amounts collected by the appellant from clients for payment of statutory charges (electricity, municipal etc.) constitute taxable Business Auxiliary Service. - HELD THAT: - Relying on the apex court decision cited by the Tribunal, the collections for statutory payments made on behalf of clients did not amount to rendering any service in relation to promotion of the clients' business or marketing of goods. The Tribunal therefore concluded that such collections could not be the basis for classification as Business Auxiliary Service. [Paras 3]

Demand treated as Business Auxiliary Service is not sustained.

Renting of Immovable Property Service and discharge of tax - Whether the demand for Renting of Immovable Property Service is sustainable when the appellant contends that service tax was discharged and produced proof. - HELD THAT: - The appellant produced proof of payment of service tax under the head of Renting of Immovable Property; the Tribunal noted the Delhi High Court authority relied upon by the appellant on timing of taxability remains under challenge before the Supreme Court but found no reason to sustain the demand where tax had been paid. In these circumstances the adjudicated demand under this head was not maintained. [Paras 4]

Demand relating to Renting of Immovable Property Service is not sustained in view of tax having been discharged by the appellant.

Refund of erroneously paid service tax - Whether the appellant is entitled to refund of a small amount excluded while paying duty under 'Architect' service (sale of tender forms) if payment cannot be treated as tax under Works Contract service. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal observed that, on the broader conclusions reached that the appellant had correctly paid service tax under Works Contract service, there was no basis for a refund. The limited contention about exclusion for sale of tender forms was considered but, in the context of the accepted classification and payments, did not warrant refund. [Paras 5]

No refund is payable; the small disputed amount does not give rise to a refund where service tax was correctly discharged as Works Contract service.

Final Conclusion: All demands raised in the Order-in-Original are held to be unsustainable on the merits for the period 2005-06 to 2009-2010; the appeal is allowed.

Input services - Cenvat credit - Renting of immovable property service - nexus between input service and output service - reliance on documents / not relied upon documents - limitation / extended period of limitation - wilful suppression

Input services - direct nexus between input and output service - Cenvat credit - reliance on documents / not relied upon documents - Commercial construction services received by the appellant qualify as input services and Cenvat credit availed thereon is permissible. - HELD THAT: - The appellant, a provider of renting of immovable property service, received commercial construction services for premises that were let out to render the output service. The Tribunal held that construction services have a direct nexus to the output service and fall within the inclusive part of the definition of input services. The invoice (No. 001 dated 02.09.2007) was supported by the appellant's ledger and bank statements showing payment; the departmental letter of the service provider denying provision of services was not a relied upon document and was not corroborated by enquiry. On the material before the Tribunal the invoice attracts the presumption of correctness and the appellant committed no error in availing Cenvat credit for the construction services. [Paras 12]

Cenvat credit in respect of commercial construction services upheld.

Input services - nexus between input service and output service - Cenvat credit - Club membership fee does not qualify as an input service for rendering the renting of immovable property service and Cenvat credit availed thereon was rightly denied on merits. - HELD THAT: - The appellant failed to demonstrate that club membership was used to enable rendering of the output service. Apart from a general assertion that the club facilitated contacts, no documentary evidence (such as use for business meetings, training, marketing or promotion) was placed on record. The Tribunal found the ITC Ltd precedent relied upon by the appellant distinguishable on facts, and concluded that no nexus was established between the club membership and the renting activity. [Paras 12, 13]

Cenvat credit in respect of club membership fee disallowed on merits.

Input services - Cenvat credit - nexus between input service and output service - Maintenance and repair services for the premises used to render the output service qualify as input services and Cenvat credit availed thereon is permissible. - HELD THAT: - Although the precise bill was not produced, there was acknowledgement that maintenance and repair services were received for premises let out by the appellant and the bill date corresponds to the date when such services became taxable. The adjudicating authority had denied credit for want of nexus, but the Tribunal found that maintenance and repair services are covered by the inclusive definition of input services when used in relation to premises for rendering the renting service and therefore the appellant rightly availed credit. [Paras 12, 13]

Cenvat credit in respect of maintenance and repair services upheld.

Limitation / extended period of limitation - wilful suppression - reliance on documents / not relied upon documents - The show cause notice issued in 2012 is time-barred; extended period based on alleged fake invoice or wilful suppression is not attracted. - HELD THAT: - Audit and compliance events occurred in 2009 and the appellant filed replies promptly. The show cause notice issued in 2012 was beyond the permissible period and the show cause notice did not record any event justifying a delay of more than three years. The allegation of wilful suppression was based primarily on the service provider's letter which was not a relied upon document, was uncorroborated, and did not specifically allege the invoice to be fake. Consequently there was no basis to invoke the extended period of limitation. [Paras 14, 16, 17]

Show cause notice held barred by limitation; extended period not attracted and allegations of wilful suppression rejected.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed: Cenvat credit for commercial construction and for maintenance and repair services is upheld; credit for club membership was denied on merits but the related demand is set aside as the show cause notice is time barred; extended period for recovery not attracted.

Option under Rule 6(3) and compliance with Rule 6(3A) - proportionate reversal of Cenvat credit on input services - credit for input services specified in Rule 6(5) - availment of Cenvat credit on ISD invoices issued prior to ISD registration - transfer of Cenvat credit under centralized registration between branches - technical infirmity in invoice (absence of serial number/registration) not automatically disentitling Cenvat credit - penalty and interest consequential on demand

Option under Rule 6(3) and compliance with Rule 6(3A) - proportionate reversal of Cenvat credit on input services - Validity of demand under Rule 6 for amount claimed as 10%/5% of exempted clearances when the assessee reversed Cenvat credit attributable to exempted goods under Rule 6(3A) and paid interest - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that Rule 6(3) provided alternative options and it is for the assessee to elect the option to be followed. Where the assessee has reversed the Cenvat credit attributable to common input services used for exempted goods in terms of sub rule (3A) and paid interest, the Department cannot insist on recovery by applying the 10%/5% formula under Rule 6(3)(i). The adjudicating authority's demand framed by applying the 10%/5% option despite the assessee's reversal and payment under Rule 6(3A) was unsustainable. The Tribunal observed that the amount recoverable under Rule 6 cannot exceed the Cenvat credit attributable to inputs/input services used for exempted goods. The appellant asserted, and record showed, reversal in excess of the proportionate credit and payment of interest; accordingly the major demand was set aside. The Tribunal directed the adjudicating authority to recalculate the proportionate credit for the show cause period and, if any excess reversal and interest stand to the appellant's credit, to refund the same. [Paras 6, 10, 11]

Demand under Rule 6 for the sum invoked was set aside; adjudicating authority to recompute proportionate credit for the period of the show cause notice and refund any excess reversal and interest.

Technical infirmity in invoice (absence of serial number/registration) not automatically disentitling Cenvat credit - Denial of Cenvat credit on invoices for management consultancy and security services that did not carry invoice serial number or service tax registration number - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal treated the omission as a technical defect attributable to the service provider and noted there was no dispute that service tax had been paid or that services were received and used. Applying precedents, the Tribunal held that mere absence of serial number or registration particulars on invoices is not a ground to deny credit where the essential criteria - payment of service tax and receipt/use of service - are satisfied. The demand on this count was therefore set aside. [Paras 5, 11]

Demand for denial of Cenvat credit on the invoices in question set aside.

Transfer of Cenvat credit under centralized registration between branches - Legitimacy of denying credit because transfers from branches to the Nadiad unit under centralized registration were not accompanied by specific documents - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal observed there is no statutory requirement prescribing specific documents for transfers to a centralized registration and there was no dispute that the transferred credit originally existed with the branches or that excess/incorrect credit was transferred. Recorded entries in statutory books sufficed to establish transfers. On identical reasoning in earlier decisions, the Tribunal held that absence of particular documents is a technical lapse that does not warrant denial of credit where there is no revenue loss or excess claim, and set aside the demand. [Paras 5, 12]

Demand based on alleged improper transfers under centralized registration set aside.

Entitlement to Cenvat credit on input services - Denial of Cenvat credit for various input services (mediclaim, canteen, vehicle insurance, vehicle hire, CHA charges, guest house, residential premises, membership) - HELD THAT: - Relying on Tribunal and High Court precedents, the Tribunal held that these services have been repeatedly recognized as having nexus with manufacturing activity and are eligible for Cenvat credit. The demand disallowing credit in respect of these input services was therefore found unsustainable and was set aside. [Paras 6, 13]

Demand disallowing Cenvat credit for the listed input services set aside.

Availment of Cenvat credit on ISD invoices issued prior to ISD registration - Denial of credit on ISD invoices issued by the appellant's branches for services received prior to ISD registration - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal relied on authoritative decisions holding that lack of ISD registration at the time of issue of invoices does not, by itself, disentitle an assessee to Cenvat credit. The Tribunal noted that correctness of the claim is nonetheless subject to documentary proof of payment of service tax and remitted insofar as necessary under precedent; however on the facts before it the demand was set aside as impermissible solely on the registration ground. [Paras 7, 14]

Demand based on ISD invoices issued prior to registration set aside.

Penalty and interest consequential on demand - Consequences for penalty and interest where the underlying demands are set aside - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that, since the principal demands were set aside, the concomitant imposition of penalties and interest could not survive. Therefore penalties and interest confirmed by the adjudicating authority were also set aside as consequential relief. [Paras 15]

Penalties and interest confirmed along with the set aside demands were also set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed: the major Rule 6 demand and the assorted demands relating to invoice formalities, branch transfers, specified input services and ISD invoices were set aside; penalties and interest were consequentially set aside; the adjudicating authority is directed to recompute the proportionate credit for the show cause period and refund any excess reversal and interest, if found payable.

Refund under Section 11B - interest under Section 11BB - pre-deposit/refund of amounts deposited during investigation - requirement of proof of payment for refund claims - interim return of deposits for inordinate delay in adjudication

Refund under Section 11B - requirement of proof of payment for refund claims - Refund amount of Rs. 29,91,483/- allowed by Commissioner (Appeals) is not sustainable where the respondent had withdrawn the claim and produced no documentary evidence of payment. - HELD THAT: - The adjudicating authority had initially denied Rs. 29,91,483/- from the sanctioned refund because no documentary evidence of payment was produced and the respondent subsequently withdrew that portion of the claim. The Commissioner (Appeals) nevertheless allowed the withdrawn amount, relying on extraneous reasoning (speculation about payment during factory closure) not supported by the record. The Tribunal found that once the respondent withdrew the claim there was no occasion for the adjudicating authority to examine admissibility, and the Commissioner (Appeals) decision to allow the amount was de hors the record and thus unsustainable. Consequently the Commissioner (Appeals) finding allowing the said refund amount was set aside. [Paras 13]

Allowing the refund of Rs. 29,91,483/- is set aside.

Interest under Section 11BB - pre-deposit/refund of amounts deposited during investigation - interim return of deposits for inordinate delay in adjudication - finality of adjudication - Interest directed by the Commissioner (Appeals) from the date of deposit is not payable; that direction is set aside. - HELD THAT: - The amounts deposited by the respondent during investigation flowed from a show-cause notice dated 01.07.2016 which remains pending adjudication. While the Tribunal earlier directed return of the deposit as an interim measure to mitigate hardship caused by inordinate delay in adjudication, such interim return does not render the deposit finally refundable if the classification/adjudication is ultimately decided against the respondent. Because the deposits had not attained finality pending adjudication of the show-cause notice, the Commissioner (Appeals) was not justified in directing interest from the date of deposit. The Tribunal accordingly held the Commissioner (Appeals) order on interest to be without merit and set it aside. [Paras 14]

Direction to pay interest from the date of deposit is set aside.

Final Conclusion: Revenue's appeal is allowed; the impugned Commissioner (Appeals) order is set aside insofar as it allowed the withdrawn refund amount and directed interest from the date of deposit; the stay application is disposed of.

Lapsing of CENVAT credit - conditional exemption notification under Section 5A - transitional provision in Rule 11(3) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 concerning reversal and lapse - opted-for exemption and reversal under Rule 11(3)(i)

Lapsing of CENVAT credit - conditional exemption notification under Section 5A - transitional provision in Rule 11(3) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 concerning reversal and lapse - Whether the balance of CENVAT credit remaining after reversal under Rule 11(3) lapses when the assessee opts for Notification No.30/2004-CE which contains a condition of non availment of credit. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that Notification No.30/2004 CE contains an express proviso excluding goods for which CENVAT credit has been taken and is therefore not an absolute exemption under Section 5A. Rule 11(3) contains two distinct and alternative clauses separated by a semicolon and the disjunctive 'or'. Sub rule (3)(i) applies where a manufacturer opts for exemption under a notification (an option to be exercised) and requires payment equivalent to credit attributable to inputs, inputs in process or contained in final products lying in stock. Sub rule (3)(ii) applies only where the final product has been exempted absolutely under Section 5A, in which event any balance after the specified deduction shall lapse. On a plain reading the two sub rules are mutually exclusive; therefore where exemption is conditional (as in Notification No.30/2004 CE) only the reversing/payment obligation under sub rule (3)(i) is attracted and the residual credit does not lapse. The Tribunal followed earlier Coordinate Bench decisions applying the same construction and distinguished the contrary decision relied upon by Revenue as not directly deciding this issue. [Paras 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]

Balance CENVAT credit remaining after the permitted reversal does not lapse under Rule 11(3) where the exemption notification is conditional; only reversal under sub rule (3)(i) applies.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal, upheld the view that Notification No.30/2004 CE is a conditional exemption and that Rule 11(3)(ii) (lapse of balance) applies only to absolute exemptions; accordingly the demand was not sustainible and the impugned order stands.

Duty of CPIO to provide clear, cogent and precise response - onus on CPIO/Public Authority under Section 19(5) to justify denial of information - requirement to specify grounds for denial under Section 8(1) - obligation to assist information seekers and courteous behaviour of PIOs - penal accountability of CPIO for failure or dereliction - directions to re examine and furnish information on fresh consideration - sensitisation and training of officials for effective discharge of RTI duties

Duty of CPIO to provide clear, cogent and precise response - obligation to assist information seekers and courteous behaviour of PIOs - The response furnished by the CPIO/FAA was unsatisfactory and failed to explain the factual position clearly and cogently to the appellant. - HELD THAT: - The Commission found that the CPIO/FAA did not discharge the statutory duty to supply a clear, cogent and precise reply. The RTI Act and judicial authorities require the CPIO to apply mind, analyse the material and either disclose the information or give clear grounds for nondisclosure. The Commission observed that maximum assistance must be afforded to information seekers and referred to administrative guidance on courteous behaviour and help to applicants. The Respondent conceded that the factual position had not been explained to the appellant but undertook to provide a self contained, clear response.

CPIO/FAA faulted for unsatisfactory reply; respondent directed to provide a clear, cogent and precise point wise response explaining the updated factual status to the appellant.

Onus on CPIO/Public Authority under Section 19(5) to justify denial of information - requirement to specify grounds for denial under Section 8(1) - penal accountability of CPIO for failure or dereliction - The denial or withholding of information was not justified and the CPIO/Respondent failed to establish any exemption under Section 8(1). - HELD THAT: - The Commission noted that under Section 19(5) the onus lies on the CPIO to prove denial was justified. Neither the CPIO nor the respondent could show that disclosure would attract any exemption under Section 8(1). The Commission relied on extant judicial dicta emphasising that a public authority must show specific justification for refusal and that mere pendency of related proceedings is not by itself a ground for denial. The matter was therefore not shown to be covered by any claimed exemption.

Denial of information not justified; information concerned must be furnished unless a valid exemption is specifically established.

Directions to re examine and furnish information on fresh consideration - sensitisation and training of officials for effective discharge of RTI duties - The Commission remanded the matter for fresh consideration and directed the Public Authority to re examine and communicate the updated factual position within a specified time; and to undertake sensitisation of concerned officials. - HELD THAT: - Having found the existing response inadequate and no valid exemption established, the Commission instructed the respondent to re examine the files and provide a self contained, point wise explanation of the updated factual status to the appellant. The Commission also directed the Public Authority to convene periodic conferences/seminars to familiarise and sensitize officials about RTI obligations so as to ensure effective compliance in future.

Matter remanded for fresh consideration; respondent directed to supply the clarified response within 15 days and to undertake periodic sensitisation/training of officials.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is disposed: the Commission found the CPIO/FAA's reply unsatisfactory and that no exemption justified withholding; the Public Authority is directed to re examine the matter and furnish a clear, point wise explanation of the updated factual status to the appellant within 15 days and to conduct periodic sensitisation of officials regarding RTI obligations.

Deemed sale - transfer of right to use - extended definition of sale under Article 366(29-A)(d) - Section 2(33)(iv) of TNVAT Act, 2006 - dominant nature test - shared / non-exclusive use - levy under Section 4 of the TNVAT Act, 2006

Deemed sale - transfer of right to use - extended definition of sale under Article 366(29-A)(d) - Section 2(33)(iv) of TNVAT Act, 2006 - dominant nature test - shared / non-exclusive use - levy under Section 4 of the TNVAT Act, 2006 - Whether the petitioner's provision of passive telecom infrastructure amounts to a "deemed sale" by way of transfer of right to use goods so as to attract tax under Section 4 of the TNVAT Act, 2006 for the Assessment Years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010. - HELD THAT: - The court examined the business model - lease of land, temporary shelter, mast/tower, power generation and air-conditioning provided by the petitioner to house Base Transceiver Stations of two or more Mobile Telecommunication Operators on a shared basis. Applying the tests in BSNL and related authorities, the court emphasised that an extended definition of "sale" by transfer of right to use requires, inter alia, availability of goods for delivery and an exclusive transfer of the right to use to the exclusion of the owner and others. The factual matrix disclosed shared, non exclusive use of shelter and mast; the facilities were not transferred exclusively to any single operator nor was effective control and exclusion demonstrable. The court applied the dominant nature test where Article 366(29 A) is not otherwise attracted, and held that the petitioner's arrangement was provision of passive infrastructure services (renting of space coupled with services) and not a transfer of right to use goods within the extended definition. The court noted and followed decisions favouring the petitioner (including Indus Towers line of authorities) and distinguished other cases relied upon by the revenue where exclusive control/effective transfer was found. On these grounds the levy under Section 4 could not be sustained for the Assessment Years in question. [Paras 39, 56, 57, 58, 59]

No "deemed sale" by transfer of right to use was made out; the assessments for the Assessment Years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 under Section 4 of the TNVAT Act, 2006 are unsustainable and the impugned orders are quashed.

Final Conclusion: Writ petitions allowed. The impugned assessment orders dated 29.07.2016 for Assessment Year 2008-2009 and Assessment Year 2009-2010 quashed on the ground that the petitioner's supply of passive telecom infrastructure involved shared, non exclusive use and did not amount to a transfer of right to use goods attracting VAT under Section 4 of the TNVAT Act, 2006; no tax is payable.

Levy of Value Added Tax on supply of crude petroleum - Taxability of supplies originating in the Exclusive Economic Zone - Place of sale or delivery for state value-added tax - Liability under purchase tax - Effect of commercial agreement on statutory tax liability - Determination of disputed questions of fact by the assessing officer

Levy of Value Added Tax on supply of crude petroleum - Place of sale or delivery for state value-added tax - Taxability of supplies originating in the Exclusive Economic Zone - Whether the supplies of crude petroleum were taxable within the State of Tamil Nadu and whether the sale took place within the State or outside (including in the Exclusive Economic Zone). - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that petroleum products are covered as declared goods and would be taxable under the Tamil Nadu VAT Act if the sale occurred within the State. Whether delivery from the development area to the delivery point fell within the territorial jurisdiction of Tamil Nadu or outside involves disputed questions of fact arising from the contractual delivery terms (ship-to-ship transfer, delivery point, FSO/offtake vessel) and the factual matrix of where custody, title and risk passed. These factual determinations cannot be resolved in a writ petition and must be examined by the assessing officer. Consequently the question of exigibility of VAT in respect of the supplies was left open for adjudication by the assessing officer on the basis of record and agreement terms. [Paras 30, 31, 35, 36]

Left to the assessing officer to determine whether the sales occurred within the State of Tamil Nadu and therefore are exigible to VAT; writ petitions are not the forum for resolving these factual disputes.

Liability under purchase tax - Determination of disputed questions of fact by the assessing officer - Whether Chennai Petroleum Corporation Ltd. was liable to pay purchase tax in terms of Section 12 of the Tamil Nadu VAT Act, 2006. - HELD THAT: - The Court noted the statutory test in Section 12 and held that applicability of purchase tax to the buyer requires factual determination on whether the specified circumstances in Section 12 are attracted. The question depends on the facts and the construction of the parties' arrangements and cannot be decided in the writ jurisdiction. The matter must be examined and decided by the assessing officer. [Paras 37, 38]

Referred to the assessing officer for determination; issue not decided on merits by the Court.

Effect of commercial agreement on statutory tax liability - Determination of disputed questions of fact by the assessing officer - Whether the Crude Oil Sale Agreement or related arrangements operate to shift or extinguish statutory liability to pay VAT (including whether sellers or buyer bear tax and whether reimbursement/book adjustments affect exigibility). - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the contractual clauses which allocate responsibilities for taxes and noted that an agreement cannot alter statutory incidence of tax; sellers remained primarily liable though the buyer had contractually undertaken to pay or reimburse taxes. Whether the agreement confers rights or obligations that attract purchase tax or affect liability is a factual and legal question requiring detailed consideration by the assessing officer. The Court declined to decide these contentions in writ proceedings. [Paras 32, 33, 34, 35, 39]

Question of contractual impact on statutory tax liability remitted to the assessing officer for adjudication.

Determination of disputed questions of fact by the assessing officer - Remedial direction and procedural disposal of the writ petitions. - HELD THAT: - Because the core disputes were factual and required adjudication under the VAT Act, the High Court dismissed the writ petitions without deciding the merits. The petitioners were directed to file replies with the assessing officer within 30 days of receipt of the order, and the assessing officer was directed to decide all issues on the available records within three months, hearing the petitioners. [Paras 36, 40, 41]

Writ petitions dismissed; issues remitted to the assessing officer for decision within three months after the petitioners file their replies within 30 days; no costs.

Final Conclusion: Writ petitions challenging notices for recovery of VAT/purchase tax on supply of crude petroleum are dismissed because they raise disputed questions of fact and factual construction of agreements; all substantive questions (place of sale, exigibility, applicability of Section 12, and contractual effect on statutory liability) are left open and remitted to the assessing officer to decide on merits after the petitioners file replies within 30 days, with the assessing officer to pass orders within three months; no costs.