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Issues: Whether an assessment order under the GST regime is liable to be set aside for non-mention of a DIN number, and whether fresh assessment can be permitted thereafter.
Analysis: The impugned assessment order did not contain a DIN number. The decision relied upon prior authority holding that an order issued under the GST framework without a DIN number is invalid, along with the CBIC circular on DIN requirements. In view of that settled position, the absence of DIN rendered the impugned proceedings unsustainable. Since the defect went to the validity of the order, setting aside the assessment while reserving liberty to proceed afresh after notice and allotment of DIN was warranted.
Conclusion: The assessment order was set aside in favour of the petitioner, with liberty to the assessing authority to undertake fresh assessment after giving notice and assigning a DIN number.
Challenge to assessment order - the proceedings did not contain a DIN number - HELD THAT:- The question of the effect of non-inclusion of DIN number on proceedings, under the G.S.T. Act, came to be considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pradeep Goyal Vs. Union of India & Ors [2022 (8) TMI 216 - SUPREME COURT]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after noticing the provisions of the Act and the circular issued by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (herein referred to as “C.B.I.C.”), had held that an order, which does not contain a DIN number would be non-est and invalid.
A Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Cluster Enterprises Vs. The Deputy Assistant Commissioner (ST)-2, Kadapa [2024 (7) TMI 1512 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT], on the basis of the circular, dated 23.12.2019, bearing No.128/47/2019-GST, issued by the C.B.I.C., had held that non-mention of a DIN number would mitigate against the validity of such proceedings.
In view of the aforesaid judgments and the circular issued by the C.B.I.C., the non-mention of a DIN number in the order, which was uploaded in the portal, requires the impugned order to be set aside.
Petition disposed off.
The core legal issues considered in this judgment include:
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Justification of Rejection Due to Lack of Certification
The relevant legal framework involves the requirement for shipping bills to be certified by the Superintendent of Customs to validate the refund of unutilized input credit. The appellate authority initially rejected the claims for three shipping bills because they were signed by the Inspector of Customs rather than the Superintendent.
The Court interpreted this requirement strictly, emphasizing the procedural necessity for proper certification. However, it acknowledged the new evidence presented by the petitioner, indicating that the shipping bills had since been certified by the Superintendent of Customs.
The Court found that the initial rejection, while procedurally correct, did not account for the subsequent certification and thus warranted reconsideration.
2. Presentation of Newly Certified Shipping Bills
The Court considered whether the petitioner should be allowed to present the newly certified shipping bills. The petitioner argued that these documents could not be presented earlier and that their inclusion could potentially alter the outcome of the refund claim.
The Court reasoned that in the interest of justice, the petitioner should be allowed to rely on the newly certified shipping bills. This decision was based on the principle that procedural technicalities should not impede substantive justice, especially when new evidence could significantly impact the case's outcome.
3. Absence of GST Appellate Tribunal
The petitioner contended that the absence of the GST Appellate Tribunal prevented an appeal against the appellate authority's decision. The Court acknowledged this procedural gap, which left the petitioner without a conventional appellate recourse.
In response, the Court provided a remedy by setting aside the appellate authority's decision concerning the disputed shipping bills and directing a rehearing, thereby temporarily circumventing the absence of the Tribunal.
4. Appropriateness of Recovery Proceedings
The Revenue had initiated recovery proceedings under Section 73 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The Court considered whether this was appropriate given the ongoing dispute over the refund claims.
The Court concluded that recovery proceedings should be stayed until the appeal concerning the newly certified shipping bills was resolved. This decision was based on the principle of maintaining the status quo to prevent potential injustice to the petitioner while the appeal was pending.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Court established several significant principles in this judgment:
The final determinations on each issue were as follows:
The Court directed the appellate authority to dispose of the appeal within three months, ensuring that the petitioner is granted an opportunity to be heard. This decision underscores the Court's commitment to procedural fairness and substantive justice.
Refund of unutilised input tax credit - Reconsideration on production of certified shipping bills - Rehearing and remand of first appellate order - Stay of recovery pending disposal of appeal
Refund of unutilised input tax credit - Reconsideration on production of certified shipping bills - Rehearing and remand of first appellate order - Stay of recovery pending disposal of appeal - Permissibility of permitting the petitioner to rely on shipping bills subsequently certified by the Superintendent of Customs and directing rehearing of the first appellate order in respect of those shipping bills. - HELD THAT: - The Court recorded that the petitioner originally obtained a refund order from Respondent No.4 which was partly set aside on appeal by the first appellate authority in respect of three of six shipping bills because those shipping bills were signed by an Inspector of Customs rather than by the Superintendent of Customs. The petitioner subsequently obtained certification of the three disputed shipping bills by the Superintendent of Customs but could not place those certified documents before the first appellate authority. In the interest of justice, the Court accepted that the petitioner should be allowed to rely on the now-certified shipping bills and accordingly set aside the appellate authority's order dated February 28, 2023 insofar as it related to the three specified shipping bills. The Court directed the appellate authority to rehear the appeal on those three shipping bills, taking into account the certified shipping bills filed in the writ petition at page 270, to afford the petitioner an opportunity to be heard and to decide the appeal afresh within three months. The Court further directed that no recovery shall be undertaken in respect of those three shipping bills until the appellate authority disposes of the rehearing in accordance with this order.
Order dated February 28, 2023 set aside insofar as it relates to the three specified shipping bills; appellate authority directed to rehear the appeal considering the certified shipping bills and to decide the matter within three months, with recovery stayed till disposal.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated: the appellate order is set aside in respect of three specified shipping bills, rehearing is directed on production of certified shipping bills with disposal within three months, and recovery in respect of those shipping bills is stayed pending the outcome of the rehearing.
Issues: Whether the appeal rejected as time-barred was required to be considered in the light of G.O.Ms.No.551 dated 16.11.2023 extending the limitation for appeals against orders passed before 31.03.2023 under Sections 73 and 74 of the GST Act.
Analysis: The appellate authority had rejected the appeal on limitation without considering the Government Order extending the period for filing appeals up to 31.01.2024 for covered assessment orders. The challenge before the Court was confined to the effect of that Government Order on the computation of limitation and the resulting rejection of the appeal.
Conclusion: The rejection of the appeal was set aside and the matter was remanded to the appellate authority to consider the question of delay in the light of G.O.Ms.No.551 dated 16.11.2023.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded, and the appellate rejection on limitation was annulled for fresh consideration of delay by the appellate authority.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a subsequent Government Order extends the appellate limitation for covered GST assessments, the appellate authority must decide limitation in accordance with that extension before rejecting the appeal as time-barred.
Rejection of appeal on the ground of limitation as the appeal should have been filed by 10.05.2023 whereas the appeal had been filed with a delay of 26 days which cannot be condoned - HELD THAT:- The Government of Andhra Pradesh, under G.O.Ms.No.551, dated 16.11.2023, had extended the period of limitation, for filing of an appeal, against any order passed before 31.03.2023, under Section 73 or 74 of the G.S.T Act, up to 31st January, 2024.
In view of G.O.Ms.No.551, dated 16.11.2023, this Writ Petition is allowed setting aside the order of rejection of appeal, dated 24.08.2023, and remanding the matter back to the appellate authority for consideration of the question of delay, in filing of the appeal, in terms of G.O.Ms.No.551, dated 16.11.2023, and to pass the orders thereon.
Issues: Whether the GST demand order passed under Section 73 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was sustainable when it did not record reasons or deal with the reply furnished to the show cause notice.
Analysis: The impugned order created tax, interest and penalty demands on the basis of brief assertions that the taxpayer had not properly replied or produced documents. It did not assign reasons, nor did it reflect consideration of the response submitted pursuant to the show cause notice. An order that omits such reasoning cannot be sustained.
Conclusion: The order was held unsustainable and was quashed, with liberty to the GST Officer to proceed afresh in accordance with law.
Duty to record reasons / requirement of a reasoned order - quashing of an unreasoned order - remand for fresh consideration - concluding proceedings under Section 73 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - show cause notice and opportunity to reply - reconciliation of GSTR-01 with GSTR-09 - under-declaration of output tax - claim of ineligible input tax credit
Duty to record reasons / requirement of a reasoned order - quashing of an unreasoned order - show cause notice and opportunity to reply - Whether the GST Officer's final order dated 20 August 2024 was sustainable despite lacking any reasoning or reference to the taxpayer's reply to the SCN. - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the impugned order and observed that, in respect of the demands for under-declaration of output tax and ineligible ITC, the authority failed to assign reasons or even allude to the responses submitted by the taxpayer to the SCN. The absence of any reasoning or consideration of the taxpayer's submissions renders the order unreasoned. An administrative adjudication concluding liability must demonstrate consideration of the issues raised and the replies to the SCN; in the present case the order does not disclose such consideration and therefore cannot be sustained. [Paras 3]
The impugned order dated 20 August 2024 was quashed for being unreasoned and for failing to record consideration of the taxpayer's replies.
Remand for fresh consideration - concluding proceedings under Section 73 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - reconciliation of GSTR-01 with GSTR-09 - under-declaration of output tax - claim of ineligible input tax credit - The appropriate course of action following quashing of the unreasoned order. - HELD THAT: - Having quashed the impugned order, the Court permitted the GST Officer to re-examine and conclude the SCN proceedings afresh and in accordance with law. The respondent accepted that the matter could be remanded rather than retained for further consideration by this Court. The remand is for fresh consideration on merits by the adjudicating authority, with due regard to the taxpayer's submissions and legal requirements governing conclusion of proceedings under Section 73. [Paras 4, 5]
The matter is remanded to the GST Officer to examine and conclude the SCN proceedings afresh and in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed; the impugned order dated 20 August 2024 is quashed for want of reasons, and the matter is remanded to the GST Officer for fresh consideration and conclusion of the SCN proceedings in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether the petitioner, whose GST registration had been cancelled, was entitled to an opportunity to furnish a reply to the show cause notice and to have the matter reconsidered in accordance with law.
Analysis: The petitioner had been unable to furnish a reply to the show cause notice within the stipulated time. In the circumstances, the Court found that the ends of justice required that an opportunity be given to submit a response, followed by a personal hearing and fresh consideration by the respondent.
Conclusion: The petitioner was granted time to file a reply to the show cause notice, the respondent was directed to accept the reply and afford a personal hearing, and the cancellation order was made subject to the fresh decision to be taken thereafter.
Cancellation of GST registration - show cause notice - opportunity to be heard - remand for fresh consideration - acceptance of reply and personal hearing
Cancellation of GST registration - remand for fresh consideration - The impugned order of cancellation of the petitioner's GST registration was set aside and the matter remanded for fresh decision. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the petitioner had been unable to furnish a reply to the Show Cause Notice dated 15 January, 2024 within the stipulated time and that, in the interests of justice, the petitioner should be given an opportunity to respond. Accordingly the final order of cancellation dated 30 May, 2024 was not sustained; the respondent is directed to take a fresh decision after affording the opportunity to the petitioner to file its reply and be heard. [Paras 4, 8]
The cancellation order set aside and the matter remanded for fresh consideration by the respondent after giving the petitioner an opportunity to reply and be heard.
Show cause notice - acceptance of reply and personal hearing - opportunity to be heard - Directions were given for procedural steps to be followed on remand including receipt of the petitioner's reply and grant of a personal hearing within prescribed timeframes. - HELD THAT: - The Court directed that the petitioner shall furnish a response to the SCN dated 15 January, 2024 within two weeks from the date of the order; the respondent shall accept that reply, accord a date for personal hearing, and thereafter dispose of the proceedings in accordance with law, preferably within two weeks from the date the reply is furnished. These directions are procedural and intended to ensure compliance with the requirement of giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard before any final decision is taken. [Paras 6, 7]
Petitioner to file reply within two weeks; respondent to accept the reply, grant personal hearing and decide the proceedings thereafter in accordance with law, preferably within two weeks of receiving the reply.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed of by setting aside the cancellation order and remanding the matter to the respondent to accept the petitioner's reply, grant a personal hearing and take a fresh decision in accordance with law within the specified timeframes.
The core legal issues considered in this judgment include:
1. The validity of assessments framed under Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, rather than under Section 153C or Section 148, following a search operation.
2. The admissibility of additional grounds raised by the assessee at a belated stage in the appellate proceedings.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Validity of Assessments under Section 143(3)
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The legal framework revolves around Sections 143(3), 153C, and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Section 153C pertains to the assessment of income of any other person, other than the person searched, in whose case incriminating documents are found during a search. Section 143(3) involves the regular assessment procedure, while Section 148 deals with reassessment.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal examined the applicability of Section 153C and determined that the assessments should have been framed under this section, given the context of the search operation and the seized materials. The Tribunal referenced the first proviso of Section 153C(1), which clarifies that the date of initiation of search or requisition should be construed as the date when the Assessing Officer receives the seized documents or assets.
Key Evidence and Findings: The evidence primarily involved the seizure of a mobile phone image indicating a property transaction, which was used to frame the assessments under Section 143(3). The Tribunal noted that the assessments were based on seized materials without invoking Section 153C or Section 148.
Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal applied the legal provisions and precedents to conclude that the assessments under Section 143(3) were not sustainable, as they should have been framed under Section 153C, considering the nature of the seized evidence.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Revenue argued for the validity of the Section 143(3) assessments, citing the timing of the search. However, the Tribunal found this argument unpersuasive, relying on established legal interpretations from higher courts.
Conclusions: The Tribunal quashed the assessments under Section 143(3), holding that the correct procedure under Section 153C was not followed, rendering the assessments invalid.
2. Admissibility of Additional Grounds
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The Tribunal referred to the landmark decision in National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. vs. CIT, which allows the admission of additional grounds in appellate proceedings if relevant facts are part of the record.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal admitted the additional grounds raised by the assessee, emphasizing the importance of determining the correct tax liability and the presence of all relevant facts on record.
Key Evidence and Findings: The Tribunal noted that the additional grounds pertained to the core issue of assessment validity, which was crucial for determining the correct tax liability.
Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal applied the precedent from the National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. case to admit the additional grounds, facilitating a comprehensive determination of tax liability.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Revenue objected to the admission of additional grounds at a late stage, but the Tribunal overruled this objection based on established legal principles.
Conclusions: The Tribunal allowed the additional grounds, enabling a full examination of the assessment's validity.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning: The Tribunal emphasized the interpretation of Section 153C, stating, "reference to the date of initiation of search under section 132 or making of requisition........., shall be construed as reference to the date of receiving the books of account or documents or assets seized or requisitioned by the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction....."
Core Principles Established: The judgment reinforced the principle that assessments following a search should be framed under the appropriate section (153C) when incriminating materials are found, rather than under the regular assessment procedure (143(3)).
Final Determinations on Each Issue: The Tribunal quashed the assessments under Section 143(3), ruling them invalid due to the improper application of the relevant sections. The additional grounds raised by the assessee were admitted, leading to a comprehensive resolution of the tax liability issue.
Validity of proceedings u/s 153C r.w.s. 143(3) - challenge to validity of the impugned assessments framed u/s 143(3) than that under section 153C or under section 148 - HELD THAT:- We find no reason to sustain the impugned section 153C assessment. We first of all deem it appropriate to quote section 153C(1) 1st proviso stipulating that “reference to the date of initiation of search under section 132 or making of requisition, shall be construed as reference to the date of receiving the books of account or documents or assets seized or requisitioned by the AO having jurisdiction ”
Hon’ble jurisdictional high court’s recent various landmark decisions, CIT-7 Vs. RRJ Securities Ltd. [2015 (11) TMI 19 - DELHI HIGH COURT], PCIT Vs. Ojjus Medicare (P) Ltd., [2024 (4) TMI 268 - DELHI HIGH COURT] and CIT Vs. Jasjit Singh [2023 (10) TMI 572 - SUPREME COURT] have already settled the issue that the reference in such an instance u/s 153C is the date when the Assessing Officer records his corresponding 153C satisfaction.
We, therefore, are of the considered view that the given fact that the learned lower authorities have framed section 243(3) assessments in these twin assessee’s cases based on the seized materials, without either taking recourse to section 153C or section 148 of the Act, as the case may be, the same are not sustainable in law. We accordingly quash the impugned twin assessments in very terms
The core legal issues considered in this judgment are:
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Imposition of Penalty under Section 271C
Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 271C of the Income Tax Act deals with penalties for failure to deduct tax at source. Section 10(5) provides exemptions for LFC reimbursements for travel within India. The precedent set by the Supreme Court in Pricewaterhouse Coopers P. Ltd was considered, where penalties were not imposed for bona fide errors.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal found that the assessee did not deduct tax at source on LFC reimbursements under a bona fide belief that such reimbursements were exempt under Section 10(5), even when the journey involved foreign travel, provided the ultimate destination was in India. This belief was supported by an interim order from the Madras High Court.
Key evidence and findings: The Tribunal noted that the assessee followed a consistent practice and relied on the interim order by the Madras High Court. The Supreme Court's decision ultimately clarified the requirement to deduct TDS on such reimbursements, but the Tribunal recognized the issue as debatable at the time of the original transactions.
Application of law to facts: The Tribunal applied the principle from Pricewaterhouse Coopers P. Ltd, determining that the assessee's error was bona fide and inadvertent, with no intention to conceal income. Therefore, the imposition of the penalty was not warranted.
Treatment of competing arguments: The Tribunal acknowledged the CIT(A)'s reliance on the Supreme Court's decision requiring TDS deduction but emphasized the bona fide nature of the assessee's belief and the interim order supporting their position.
Conclusions: The Tribunal concluded that the penalty under Section 271C should not be imposed due to the bona fide belief and lack of intent to evade tax.
2. Condonation of Delay in Filing Appeal
Relevant legal framework and precedents: The Tribunal considered the procedural fairness and the need to condone delays, especially in cases involving public sector undertakings where communication gaps might occur.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) should have condoned the delay, considering the recurring nature of the issue and the communication challenges in a faceless regime.
Key evidence and findings: The Tribunal noted that the assessee was not aware of the order until much later and had made persistent efforts to obtain it.
Application of law to facts: The Tribunal applied principles of fairness and procedural justice, recognizing the potential for communication gaps in a faceless regime.
Treatment of competing arguments: The Tribunal disagreed with the CIT(A)'s decision not to condone the delay, emphasizing the lack of any gain for the assessee by delaying the appeal.
Conclusions: The Tribunal concluded that the delay should have been condoned, and the appeal was allowed.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning: The Tribunal stated, "deduction of TDS on impugned reimbursements was not free from doubt and it was a debatable issue which has ultimately been settled by Hon'ble Apex Court."
Core principles established: The Tribunal reinforced the principle that penalties should not be imposed for bona fide errors where there is no intent to evade tax. It also highlighted the importance of considering procedural fairness in condoning delays.
Final determinations on each issue: The Tribunal deleted the penalty under Section 271C and allowed the appeal, emphasizing the bona fide belief and procedural fairness. The decision applied to both assessment years in question.
Levy of penalty u/s 271C - short deduction of tax on LFC reimbursements to its employees - CIT(A) rejected the ground as this issue has ultimately been held against the assessee by Hon’ble Supreme Court [2022 (11) TMI 426 - SUPREME COURT] holding that the assessee was required to deduct tax at source on such reimbursements, also did not condone the delay of 961 days in the appeal - Aggrieved, the assessee is in further appeal before us - HELD THAT:- The assessee, following consistent stand as taken earlier, did not deduct tax at source on impugned reimbursements under a bona-fide belief that irrespective of en-route journeys, when the ultimate destination was in India, such reimbursements would be exempt u/s 10(5). The same is also supported by the fact that the Hon’ble High Court of Madras granted interim order favoring the assessee. Finally, the issue has been put to rest by Hon’ble Apex Court holding that the assessee would be required to deduct TDS on such reimbursements.
On these facts, it could very well be said that deduction of TDS on impugned reimbursements was not free from doubt and it was a debatable issue which has ultimately been settled by Hon’ble Apex Court. However, the assessee could not be visited with impugned penalty for short deduction of TDS.
The cited case law in the case of Pricewaterhouse Coopers P. Ltd [2012 (9) TMI 775 - SUPREME COURT] duly supports the case of the assessee. It was held by Hon’ble court that imposition of penalty was not warranted since the assessee had committed an inadvertent and bona fide error and not intended to conceal its income.
We delete the impugned penalty. CIT(A), in our opinion, considering the recurring nature of issue, should have condoned the delay considering the fact that the assessee was a public sector undertaking and it would not stand to gain by filing the first appeal with such a delay.
The core legal issues considered in this judgment revolve around the imposition of penalties under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The specific questions addressed include:
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, provides for penalties on taxpayers for concealing income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The statute requires that the Assessing Officer clearly specify the grounds for penalty, whether for concealment or for furnishing inaccurate particulars, and provide adequate reasoning in the assessment order and subsequent notices.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal focused on the procedural aspects of invoking Section 271(1)(c). It noted that the Assessing Officer must distinctly identify and justify the grounds for penalty imposition, whether it pertains to concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars. The Tribunal highlighted that the Assessing Officer failed to provide a clear basis for the penalties related to the components of Rs. 5,51,003/- and Rs. 5,30,180/-, both in the assessment order and in the notice issued under Section 274 read with Section 271(1)(c).
Key evidence and findings: The Tribunal observed that the penalties were initially imposed for concealment of income and furnishing inaccurate particulars. However, the notice issued was solely for furnishing inaccurate particulars. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee had not maintained books of accounts, which was a significant factor in the quantum appeal. The Tribunal found that the additions made by the Assessing Officer were based on transactions already present in the bank accounts, negating the claim of concealment.
Application of law to facts: The Tribunal applied the principles of Section 271(1)(c) to the facts, emphasizing the need for clarity and specificity in penalty proceedings. It concluded that the lack of detailed reasoning and the absence of clear findings regarding the assessee's conduct rendered the penalty imposition unjustified.
Treatment of competing arguments: The Tribunal considered the arguments of both the assessee and the Revenue. The assessee contended that there was no concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars, as the transactions were disclosed, and the procedural requirements were not met. The Revenue relied on the assessment and penalty orders. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's arguments, focusing on procedural lapses and the nature of the disclosed transactions.
Conclusions: The Tribunal concluded that the penalties imposed under Section 271(1)(c) were not justified due to procedural deficiencies and the nature of the disclosed transactions. It emphasized the importance of clear and specific reasoning in penalty proceedings.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning: "By not giving any reason or any finding of the assessee's conduct, the invocation of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) fails and in the present case the Assessing Officer has not given the details in the penalty order as to how the assessee has made concealment of income."
Core principles established: The judgment reinforces the principle that penalties under Section 271(1)(c) require clear identification and justification of the grounds for penalty, whether for concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars. The procedural requirements must be strictly adhered to, and the assessee's conduct must be explicitly evaluated and detailed in the penalty order.
Final determinations on each issue: The Tribunal allowed all four appeals of the assessee, determining that the penalties imposed under Section 271(1)(c) were not justified due to procedural lapses and the nature of the transactions disclosed by the assessee. The Tribunal's decision underscores the necessity for precise and reasoned penalty proceedings.
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - addition u/s 68 and 69 - HELD THAT:- The penalty provisions act independently and while invoking the penalty u/s 271(1)(c), both the limbs can be invoked jointly or separately with the additions made by the AO, but while invoking Section 271(1)(c) of the Act, the AO has to categorically mention in the assessment order as well as in the notice issued u/s 274 r.w.s. 271(1)(c) of the Act that why there is a component of concealment of income or why there is a component of furnishing of inaccurate particulars on the part of the assessee.
By not giving any reason or any finding of the assessee’s conduct, the invocation of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) fails and in the present case the AO has not given the details in the penalty order as to how the assessee has made concealment of income related to addition u/s 68 and to the addition u/s 69 as these components were already there in the bank account transactions maintained by the assessee and therefore it cannot be treated as concealment of income. Penalty imposed by the AO u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act is not justified - Decided in favour of assessee.
Issues: Whether the reassessment initiated under section 147 on the footing that the assessee had not filed a return of income was valid, and whether the penalty under section 271(1)(c) could survive if the assessment was quashed.
Analysis: The reasons recorded for reopening proceeded on the assumption that no return had been filed, although the record showed that the return had in fact been filed. The reopening, which was beyond four years, therefore lacked the necessary nexus between the tangible material and the formation of belief regarding escapement of income. Since the reassessment was founded on a wrong premise, the jurisdiction to reopen was held to be invalid. Once the assessment failed, the penalty levied as a consequence of that assessment could not stand independently.
Conclusion: The reassessment was quashed and the penalty did not survive.
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - case has been reopened beyond 4 years - non-filing of a return by the assessee - HELD THAT:- In view of the assumption by Ld. AO that the assessee has not filed Income Tax Return, this fact has led to absence of necessary nexus between the tangible material and formation of belief which would vitiate the reassessment proceedings as held in the case of Sagar Enterprises[2001 (12) TMI 18 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] holding that the factor of non-filing of return of income has overbearingly weighed with the AO for arriving at satisfaction about the failure on the part of the assessee about escapement of income. Therefore, the assessment stood vitiated.
Similar is the analogy in the decision of Ritika Gupta [2022 (8) TMI 796 - ITAT LUCKNOW] which referred to the decision of Sunil Kumar Rastogi [2019 (12) TMI 1612 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT]
We would hold that the jurisdiction of AO to reopen the case stood vitiated since the same has proceeded on wrong presumption that the assessee had not filed her return of income. Consequently, the assessment order stands quashed. Assessee appeal allowed.
Issues: Whether late filing fee under section 234E could be levied through processing under section 200A for TDS returns pertaining to periods prior to 01-06-2015.
Analysis: The amendment to section 200A enabling computation of fee under section 234E was held to operate prospectively from 01-06-2015. In view of the contrary views of different High Courts and the absence of a jurisdictional High Court ruling, the interpretation favouring the assessee was adopted.
Conclusion: The impugned fee levied for the relevant quarters prior to 01-06-2015 was unsustainable and had to be deleted.
Levy of late filing fess u/s 234E qua TDS returns for various quarters - CIT(A) confirmed the same in the absence of any explanation from the assessee - HELD THAT:- We find that this issue stand covered in assessee’s favor by the decision of Fatehraj Singhvi vs UOI [2016 (9) TMI 964 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] holding that the amendment in section 200A came into effect only on 01-06-2015 and the same would have prospective effect. Therefore, there could not be any levy of fee for late filing fee u/s 234E of the Act while issuing intimation u/s 200A prior to 01-06-2015.
It was thus held that amendment u/s 200A was prospective in nature and therefore, no computation of fee for demand or intimation u/s 200A could be made for the TDS deducted for the respective Assessment Years prior to 01-06-2015.
Since no decision of jurisdictional high court is been shown to us, we follow the analogy of decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in CIT V/s Vegetable products Ltd. [1973 (1) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT] to hold that in case of two reasonable constructions of taxing statutes, the one that favors the assessee must be adopted. Accordingly, we direct Ld. AO to delete the impugned fees and revise thd demand as raised against the assessee. Assessee appeal allowed.
The core legal issues considered in this judgment are:
1. Whether the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)] erred in deleting the addition of Rs. 2,56,44,000 made by the Assessing Officer (AO) under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, concerning unexplained cash credits in the form of share application money.
2. Whether the CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition of Rs. 5,12,880 made by the AO as commission paid for taking accommodation entries.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Addition under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents
Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, addresses unexplained cash credits. The burden of proof lies on the assessee to establish the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions. The court referenced several precedents, including CIT vs. Lovely Exports, CIT vs. Victor Electodes Ltd., and CIT vs. Divine Leasing and Finance Ltd., which emphasize that once the assessee provides adequate evidence, the burden shifts to the revenue to disprove the evidence.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had accepted the explanations and documents provided by the assessee, which included confirmations, bank statements, income tax returns, and other relevant documents from the investor companies. The CIT(A) concluded that the assessee had discharged its burden of proof regarding the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions.
Key Evidence and Findings
The assessee submitted various documents, including confirmations from investor companies, bank statements, income tax returns, and resolutions authorizing subscriptions to equity shares. The CIT(A) found these documents sufficient to establish the genuineness of the transactions and the creditworthiness of the investors.
Application of Law to Facts
The Tribunal applied the principles established in precedents, highlighting that the revenue had not provided any adverse evidence to counter the documents submitted by the assessee. The Tribunal emphasized that the mere inability to produce directors of the investor companies does not invalidate the transactions when sufficient documentary evidence is provided.
Treatment of Competing Arguments
The revenue argued that the companies were shell entities and that the transactions were not genuine. However, the Tribunal found that the AO's conclusions were based on suspicion rather than concrete evidence. The Tribunal noted that the AO did not pursue further inquiries or present any material evidence to substantiate the claims of accommodation entries.
Conclusions
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, concluding that the assessee had adequately demonstrated the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions. The addition under Section 68 was not justified in the absence of contrary evidence from the revenue.
2. Addition for Commission Paid for Accommodation Entries
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents
The addition of Rs. 5,12,880 was made by the AO as commission paid for accommodation entries. The legal framework requires the revenue to provide evidence of such transactions being sham or bogus.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had rightly deleted the addition, as the AO failed to present evidence supporting the claim that the commission was paid for accommodation entries.
Key Evidence and Findings
The CIT(A) relied on the absence of any concrete evidence from the AO to support the claim of accommodation entries. The Tribunal noted that the AO's conclusions were speculative and not backed by any factual findings.
Application of Law to Facts
The Tribunal applied the principle that the revenue bears the burden of proving that a transaction is not genuine. In this case, the AO did not meet this burden, leading to the deletion of the addition by the CIT(A).
Treatment of Competing Arguments
The revenue's arguments were based on the assumption of accommodation entries without providing concrete evidence. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had correctly assessed the lack of evidence and deleted the addition.
Conclusions
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition of Rs. 5,12,880, finding no substantive evidence to support the AO's claim of commission for accommodation entries.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning
The Tribunal noted, "The observations of the AO about the status of company and that the identity, capacity to advance money and genuineness of the transactions were not proved by the appellant is not based on any material and without appreciating the material filed on record."
Core Principles Established
The judgment reinforces the principle that the burden of proof under Section 68 initially lies with the assessee, but once adequate evidence is provided, the burden shifts to the revenue to disprove the evidence. Mere suspicion or inability to produce directors does not suffice to justify additions under Section 68.
Final Determinations on Each Issue
The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal, upholding the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the additions of Rs. 2,56,44,000 under Section 68 and Rs. 5,12,880 as commission for accommodation entries. The Tribunal found no substantive evidence to support the AO's claims and emphasized the sufficiency of the documentary evidence provided by the assessee.
Addition u/s 68 - unexplained cash credits in the form of share application money - addition of commission paid for taking accommodation entries - CIT(A) deleted addition - HELD THAT:- In the case of PCIT vs. Narang Construction and Finance Pvt. Ltd. [2018 (8) TMI 1552 - DELHI HIGH COURT] relied upon the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court Lovely Exports [2008 (1) TMI 575 - SC ORDER] held at the relevant extracts have been reproduced in the order of the AO as well as the CIT(A) which disclosed that the share applicants were entering into proper commercial transactions and were not per se forged, bogus or sham investors.
In the case Lovely Exports [2008 (1) TMI 575 - SC ORDER] as mentioned hereinabove, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if the share application money is received by the assessee company from alleged bogus shareholders whose name is given to the Ld. AO then the Department is free to reopen individual assessment in accordance with law.
After hearing both and bare perusal of the impugned order, CIT(A) rightly observed that the assessee / appellant company furnished all necessary documents to prove the genuineness of the transaction and creditworthiness of the investor’s companies, we find material substance in the submissions advanced on behalf of the assessee / respondent. There is no any ground exists to interfere with the finding given by the Ld. CIT(A) and hence the appeal of the revenue liable to be dismissed, devoid of any substance. Appeal of revenue is hereby dismissed.
The core legal issues considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Validity of Assessment Proceedings on a Deceased Person
Addition of Rs. 88,84,000/- as Unexplained Cash Credit
Addition of Rs. 4,44,200/- as Commission
Denial of Cross-Examination
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Bogus LTCG - Addition of unexplained cash credit u/s 68 r/w sec 115BBE - HELD THAT:- AR correctly relied upon the judgment of Smt. Krishna Devi [2021 (1) TMI 1008 - DELHI HIGH COURT] in which held that if there was no dispute that shares of said companies were purchased by assessee online and payments were made through banking channel and shares were dematerialized and sales were routed from demat account and consideration was received through banking channels, then the Ld. AO could not make addition only on assumption and conjecture by treating impugned LTCG as bogus.
Addition in question made without confronting any direct material / statement collected against the assessee.
As during the assessment proceedings on being enquired, assessee / appellant duly submitted that shares were originally purchased in cash and were physically delivered on 28.04.2011, and then bonus share were also issued to the appellant and all of them were dematerialized in the demat account ledger, transaction account statement with the registered broker namely M/s Quest Securities Ltd. and copies of the bank statement etc. Perusal of abovementioned documents the legitimacy of the transaction is clearly proved and the Ld. AO only on the basis of some investigation report, made the aforesaid addition and it is relevant to mentioned here that the assessee has not been provided the copy of said investigation report.
Thus, we find material substance in the submissions advanced on behalf of the assessee / appellant and have thoughtful consideration that addition in question deserves to the deleted by allowing the appeal. Assessee appeal allowed.
Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings and the notice issued in the name of an amalgamating company that had ceased to exist after amalgamation were valid in law.
Analysis: The assessee had been amalgamated pursuant to a court-sanctioned scheme and had ceased to exist before the impugned notices were issued. The jurisdictional notice and consequent proceedings were nevertheless initiated in the name of the non-existent entity. In such circumstances, the defect was not a mere procedural irregularity but went to the root of jurisdiction. Participation in the proceedings did not cure the basic illegality, and the active status of the PAN could not validate a notice issued to a non-existent assessee.
Conclusion: The reassessment notice and the assessment framed in the name of the non-existent amalgamating company were invalid, and the assessee succeeded.
Reassessment proceedings against non-existent company which is already amalgamated with another company - HELD THAT:- Notice u/s 148 of the Act, has been issued in the name of the non-existent company and it is established principle of law that assessment framed in the name of non-existent company based on an issuance of notice is of no consequence.
As mentioned herein before, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of PCIT vs. Maruti Suzuki India Pvt. Ltd. [2019 (7) TMI 1449 - SUPREME COURT] held that the amendment made in the name of Suzuki Power Train India Ltd. is in resulting since the entity has been amalgated with the Maruti Suzuki India Ltd.
Revenue relied upon the case of Mahagun Realtors (P) Ltd. [2022 (4) TMI 347 - SUPREME COURT] does not apply in this case as amalgamation was complete and notice u/s 148 was issued and also that prior information regarding amalgamation was submitted before competent authority. Hence, assessment framed in the instant case in the name of non-existing camp, suffers from vice of jurisdictional effect and which cannot be cured. Decided in favour of assessee.
The core legal issues considered in this judgment include:
1. Whether the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the passing of the reassessment order under Sections 147/144B, without complying with the mandatory conditions under Sections 147 to 151A, is valid.
2. Whether the addition of Rs. 57,80,03,316/- on account of infrastructure funds by the Assessing Officer (AO) and confirmed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)] was justified.
3. Whether the reassessment order was barred by limitation.
4. Whether the CIT(A) erred in charging interest under Sections 234A, 234B, and 234C of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Assumption of Jurisdiction under Section 147
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The legal framework involves Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, which allows reassessment if the AO has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment. The third proviso to Section 147 restricts reopening on issues already subject to appeal. Precedents include the case of CIT vs. Kelvinator of India Ltd., which established that reopening based on a change of opinion is impermissible.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the original assessment was framed under Section 143(3) and that the issue of infrastructure funds was already under appeal. Hence, reopening on the same issue was not permissible under the third proviso to Section 147.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The Tribunal found that the objections to reopening were not disposed of by a speaking order, violating procedural requirements.
- Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal applied the legal principles from precedents and found that the reopening was based on a change of opinion and lacked fresh material.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Department did not effectively counter the assessee's arguments regarding jurisdictional errors.
- Conclusions: The Tribunal concluded that the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was invalid.
2. Addition of Rs. 57,80,03,316/- on Account of Infrastructure Funds
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The legal issue revolves around whether infrastructure funds, which are collected under government orders and used as directed by a high-powered committee, are taxable. Precedents include CIT vs. Lucknow Development Authority and others, which held that such funds are not taxable as they are not under the control of the assessee.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal referred to prior decisions where similar issues were decided in favor of the assessee, noting that the funds were collected and used as per government directives, without control by the assessee.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The Tribunal found that the infrastructure funds were not part of the assessee's income as they were collected and used under government orders.
- Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal applied the principles from the cited precedents and found that the addition of infrastructure funds to the assessee's income was unjustified.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Department's reliance on the AO's order was insufficient to counter the established legal position.
- Conclusions: The Tribunal concluded that the addition of infrastructure funds was incorrect and allowed the related grounds of appeal.
3. Reassessment Order Barred by Limitation
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The first proviso to Section 147 restricts reopening beyond four years unless there is a failure to disclose material facts by the assessee.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the reopening was beyond four years and lacked any allegation of the assessee's failure to disclose material facts.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The Tribunal found that the approval for reopening was obtained from the wrong authority, further invalidating the process.
- Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal applied the limitation provisions and found the reopening barred by limitation.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Department did not effectively address the limitation issue.
- Conclusions: The Tribunal concluded that the reassessment order was barred by limitation.
4. Charging of Interest under Sections 234A, 234B, and 234C
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Sections 234A, 234B, and 234C deal with interest for defaults in furnishing return, payment of advance tax, and deferment of advance tax, respectively.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal did not specifically address this issue in detail as the primary grounds were decided in favor of the assessee.
- Conclusions: The issue became academic following the decision on the primary grounds.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
- The Tribunal held that the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was invalid due to non-compliance with mandatory conditions and reopening on issues already under appeal.
- The Tribunal established that infrastructure funds collected and used under government directives are not taxable in the hands of the assessee.
- The Tribunal concluded that the reassessment order was barred by limitation as it was beyond four years without any failure to disclose material facts by the assessee.
- The appeal of the assessee was allowed, and the additions made by the AO were deleted.
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - non complying with mandatory conditions u/s 147 to 151A - addition on account of infrastructure funds -HELD THAT:- As decided in favour of the assessee in assessee’s own case for AY 2013-14 [2025 (3) TMI 1416 - ITAT DELHI] and for AY 2014-15 [2025 (3) TMI 1417 - ITAT DELHI] on comparison of both the charts it will be noted that besides the components of Infrastructure fund having been wrongly identified in the assessment order even the TOTALS of the columns were wrong. Only on this basis of this patent mistake the impugned assessment order needs to be set aside and the addition deleted.
Addition on account of Infrastructure Fund AO has made the addition by a very cryptic and non-speaking order without mentioning anything about the issue involved, facts of the matter or any legal and accounting provision under which the same has been added. Appellant has tried to bring to my knowledge the inference drawn from the assessment order, pointing the para that might be relevant for the basis of this addition. A perusal of the para shows that AO has in fact calculated sum in every column, incorrectly. In fact if it is presumed that the table made by AO is correct then appellant has in fact credited more in P&L Account and not less. Secondly even if it is to be held that the accretion to his fund namely Infrastructure fund received can be added to the income of the assessee then also the same shall be free of taxation because of the fact that appellant enjoys the exemption u/s 11 of the IT Act. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
The core issues considered in this appeal involve the following:
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Adjustments in Transfer Pricing Comparables
2. Notional Interest on Delayed Receivables
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The appeal was partly allowed, with directions for further proceedings as outlined above.
TP Adjustment - comparable selection - HELD THAT:- As relying on Agnity India Technologies Pvt. Ltd. [2013 (7) TMI 696 - DELHI HIGH COURT] & M/s. Avaya India Pvt. Ltd. [2019 (7) TMI 1279 - DELHI HIGH COURT] we direct to exclude the three companies Wipro Limited, Infosys Ltd. and Tata Elexi Limited.
Addition relating to interest on outstanding receivables - HELD THAT:- Assessee has not filed any Balance Sheet or any financial statement to support its contention. We observed that whether there is a debt free entity, it is normal and logical to not collect the outstanding from its AEs. As per the trade practice, the terms of payment depend upon mutual agreement between the parties and it is also depend upon the market practice in this line of business. Since assessee has not submitted any agreement to submit the terms of payment already agreed between them.
Therefore, we are inclined to permit this issue back to the file of AO/TPO to consider the industry practice in this line of business and in case there exists mutual agreement to show that the assessee has allowed to give terms of payment as per the agreement or determined the industry average in this line of business. If the terms of payment are average period holding of the debtors within the industry average or within the mutual terms of agreement, the same may be allowed. As far as interest rate is concerned, in our considered view, LIBOR plus 425 basis is on the higher side and may be determined upon the terms of payment agreed between parties, it can be proper if the rate of interest on the basis of LIBOR may be computed - Ground is allowed for statistical purposes.
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Transfer Pricing Related Issues
The TPO included several companies as comparables for benchmarking the international transaction of "Provision of Software Development Services". The assessee challenged the inclusion of Infosys Ltd., Persistent Systems Ltd., Tata Elexi Ltd. (Segmental), and Bodhtree Consulting Ltd. The Tribunal found these companies to be functionally dissimilar to the assessee, which provides contract software development services, and directed their exclusion based on precedents and the functional profile of the assessee.
Similarly, for "Provision of ITeS", the assessee contested the inclusion of Eclerx Services Ltd., Cosmic Global Ltd., Accentia Technologies Ltd., and Infosys BPO Ltd. The Tribunal found these companies to be functionally different, with some engaged in Knowledge Process Outsourcing (KPO) and others having high brand value and profitability, and thus directed their exclusion.
Deductions under Section 10A
The Tribunal addressed the denial of deductions under section 10A for the UB Plaza Unit, Titanium STPI Unit, and the unit acquired from Reuters India Pvt. Ltd. The Tribunal found that the deduction under section 10A is undertaking-specific and should not be denied merely due to a change in ownership. The Tribunal relied on previous decisions and CBDT Circular No. 1/2013, which clarified that a slump sale does not result in the splitting or reconstruction of an existing business.
Depreciation on Goodwill
The Tribunal considered the assessee's claim for depreciation on goodwill arising from the acquisition of business units. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's claim was based on the Supreme Court's decision in Smifs Securities Ltd., which held that goodwill is an asset under section 32 eligible for depreciation. The Tribunal directed the AO to re-examine the claim in light of the valuation reports and other details provided by the assessee.
Exclusion of Expenses from Turnover
The Tribunal upheld the DRP's direction to exclude communication and travel expenses from both export turnover and total turnover while computing deductions under section 10A. This decision was based on the Supreme Court ruling in HCL Technologies Ltd., which supports such exclusion.
Disallowance on Software Items
The Tribunal upheld the deletion of disallowance on software items under section 40(a)(ia), following the Karnataka High Court's decision in Tally Solutions Pvt. Ltd., which held that depreciation is not an outgoing expenditure and thus not subject to disallowance under section 40(a)(ia).
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Tribunal established several core principles:
The Tribunal's final determinations included the exclusion of certain companies from the set of comparables for transfer pricing, the allowance of section 10A deductions for specific units, the remand of the depreciation on goodwill issue for further examination, and the upholding of the DRP's directions on turnover exclusions and software disallowance.
TP Adjustment - Comparable selection - whether the assessee is a software product company or provides contract software development services? - HELD THAT:- Infosys Ltd. - As having considered the functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed by both entities, we are of the considered view that being a contract software development service provider, the assessee cannot be compared with the company as giant in its operations as Infosys Ltd. Accordingly, we direct the TPO/AO to exclude Infosys Ltd while benchmarking the international transaction pertaining to “Provision of Software Development Services”.
Persistent Systems Ltd be excluded while benchmarking the international transaction pertaining to “Provision of Software Development Services” in the absence of relevant segment information of Persistent System Ltd, which is comparable to the assessee's international transaction under consideration.
Tata Elexi Ltd. (Segmental) is not functionally comparable to the assessee. Hence, we direct the TPO/AO to exclude Tata Elexi Ltd.(segmental) while benchmarking the international transaction pertaining to “Provision of Software Development Services”
Bodhtree Consulting Ltd.company is earning revenue from various streams, therefore, in the absence of relevant segmental information, this company cannot be said to be functionally comparable to the assessee. Further, as regards the submission of the learned DR that the assessee is seeking exclusion of its own comparable, as noted in the foregoing paragraphs, there is no estoppel on the taxpayer from pointing out that a particular company has been wrongly taken as a comparable. Accordingly, we direct the TPO/AO to exclude Bodhtree Consulting Ltd. while benchmarking the international transaction pertaining to “Provision of Software Development Services”.
TP Adjustment in relation to the international transaction of “Provision of ITeS” - Eclerx Services Ltd be excluded as not functionally comparable.
Cosmic Global Ltd. be excluded while benchmarking the international transaction pertaining to “Provision of ITeS”.
Accentia Technologies Ltd. develops its own software and renders medical transcription services, while the assessee, as noted in the foregoing paragraph, compiles data from various publicly available sources, which is used as an input by the associated enterprises in its various products and databases, which are created, maintained and owned by the associated enterprises. Thus, we direct the TPO/AO to exclude Accentia Technologies Ltd. while benchmarking the international transaction pertaining to “Provision of ITeS”.
Infosys BPO Ltd be excluded as a comparable on the basis of its high brand value and consequent higher profitability.
Denial of deduction claimed u/s 10A in respect of the UB Plaza Unit - Since the year under consideration is the 3rd year of claim of deduction u/s 10A of the Act by the assessee in respect of the UB Plaza Unit, which has been allowed by the coordinate bench in the first year of claim, in absence of any change in facts and law AO is directed to allow the deduction claimed u/s 10A of the Act in respect of the UB Plaza Unit in the year under consideration. As a result, Ground No.9, raised in the assessee appeal, is allowed.
Denial of deduction claimed u/s 10A in respect of the Titanium STPI Unit - Since the year under consideration is the second year of the claim of deduction u/s 10A in respect of the Titanuim Unit, Bangalore, therefore respectfully following the decision of the coordinate bench cited supra, AO is directed to allow the deduction claimed by the assessee u/s 10A with respect to the Titanium Unit, Bangalore. Accordingly, Ground raised in assessee’s appeal, is allowed.
Denial of deduction claimed u/s 10A with respect to the unit acquired from Reuters India Pvt. Ltd.- HELD THAT:- The issue arising in the present appeal is recurring in nature and has been decided in favour of the assessee by the decision of the coordinate bench of the Tribunal. Accordingly, we direct the AO to allow the deduction claimed under section 10A of the Act with respect to the unit acquired from RIPL.
Denial of the claim of depreciation on goodwill - whether the assessee is entitled to claim depreciation on goodwill which arose on account of merger/amalgamation, being the excess amount of consideration over the value of net assets of the entity acquired, came up for consideration before various Courts/Tribunals? - HELD THAT:- As in the present case, it is evident that neither the AO nor the learned DRP considered the details filed by the assessee, as one of the reasons for rejecting the assessee’s claim was that the same was made by way of a letter instead of filing the revised return of income by placing reliance on the decision in Goetze India Limited [2006 (3) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT]
We further find that vide letter dated 25/06/2021, the Revenue requested for verification of factual details with respect to the claim of depreciation on goodwill.
Therefore, we are of the considered view that this issue be restored to the file of the jurisdictional AO for de novo adjudication, in light of the decisions cited supra, after examining the details filed by the assessee. Since this issue is restored to the AO for consideration afresh, it is needless to mention that the AO can seek any other information from the assessee for complete adjudication of this issue and the assessee can also furnish any other documents in support of its claim.
Exclusion of communication expenses and travel expenses from both export turnover as well as the total turnover while computing deduction u/s 10A - HELD THAT:- We find that this issue is now decided in favour of the taxpayer in CIT v/s HCL Technologies Ltd, [2018 (5) TMI 357 - SUPREME COURT] Accordingly, respectfully following the aforesaid decision, we do not find any infirmity in the directions of the learned DRP in excluding the communication expenditure and travel expenditure from the total turnover also to the extent it was excluded from the export turnover. As a result, the impugned final assessment order on this issue is upheld and Grounds No. 2 and 3, raised in Revenue’s appeal, are dismissed.
Disallowance on software items u/s 40(a)(ia) - HELD THAT:- We find that the learned DRP while issuing the directions to the AO to delete the disallowance of depreciation on computer software made under section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, followed the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in Tally Solutions Pvt. Ltd. [2020 (12) TMI 1160 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] Thus, in the absence of any contradictory decision on this issue being placed on record, we do not find any infirmity in the directions issued by the learned DRP. As a result, the impugned final assessment order on this issue is upheld.
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
1. Whether the Centralized Processing Centre (CPC) correctly denied the Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) credit of Rs. 12,38,459/- to the appellant, given that the TDS was reflected in the Form No. 26AS of the trust and not the appellant.
2. Whether the income from the assets held in a trust, where the appellant is the sole beneficiary, should be taxed in the hands of the appellant under section 161(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
3. Whether the appellant is entitled to TDS credit despite the trust not claiming the TDS credit in its return of income.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Denial of TDS Credit by CPC
Relevant legal framework and precedents: The Income-tax Act, 1961, particularly section 199 read with rule 37BA, governs the credit for TDS. The CPC's denial was based on the procedural requirement that TDS credit is granted only if it appears in the Form No. 26AS of the assessee.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the TDS was deducted in the name of the trust and appeared in its Form No. 26AS. The CPC, adhering to procedural compliance, denied the TDS credit to the appellant as it did not appear in the appellant's Form No. 26AS. However, the Tribunal recognized this as an inequitable situation since the TDS credit was neither granted to the trust nor the appellant, resulting in a demand against the appellant.
Key evidence and findings: The Tribunal found that the income from the trust was declared by the appellant, and the trust had not claimed the TDS credit in its return, which justified the appellant's claim for the TDS credit.
Application of law to facts: The Tribunal applied the principles of equitable treatment and fairness, directing the Assessing Officer to verify and allow the TDS credit as per the provisions of the Income-tax Act.
Treatment of competing arguments: The Tribunal balanced the procedural requirements with the equitable rights of the appellant, acknowledging the need for procedural compliance while addressing the inequitable outcome.
Conclusions: The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to verify the appellant's claim and allow the TDS credit, highlighting the need for a fair resolution.
2. Taxation of Trust Income in the Appellant's Hands
Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 161(1) of the Income-tax Act mandates that income from a trust should be taxed in the hands of the beneficiary if the trust is created for the beneficiary's sole benefit.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal agreed with the appellant's contention that the income from the trust should be taxed in the appellant's hands, as the appellant is the sole beneficiary.
Key evidence and findings: The trust deed and the appellant's status as the sole beneficiary were pivotal in determining the taxation of the income.
Application of law to facts: The Tribunal applied section 161(1) to conclude that the income should be taxed in the appellant's hands, supporting the appellant's claim for TDS credit.
Treatment of competing arguments: The Tribunal considered the procedural stance of the CPC but prioritized the substantive rights of the appellant based on the trust's structure.
Conclusions: The Tribunal upheld the appellant's right to have the income taxed in their hands and directed the necessary verification for TDS credit.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning: "The restriction of TDS by the CPC Bengaluru is held to be correct, because no TDS is reflected in Form 26AS of the Appellant, hence no credit was allowed by the CPC. However, the AO is directed to verify the claim of the Appellant and allow the TDS as per provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961."
Core principles established: The Tribunal emphasized the importance of equitable treatment in tax matters, especially when procedural requirements lead to an unjust outcome. It reinforced the principle that income from a trust should be taxed in the hands of the beneficiary when the trust is solely for their benefit.
Final determinations on each issue: The Tribunal allowed the appeal for statistical purposes, directing the Assessing Officer to verify the appellant's claim and grant the TDS credit as per the law, ensuring that the appellant's substantive rights are protected.
Denial of TDS credit claimed in the return of income only on the basis that the same did not appear in the 26AS of the Appellant - assessee, who is the sole beneficiary of a trust, on the ground that the tax was deducted in the name of the trust and, consequently, was reflected in Form No. 26AS of the trust rather than in the Form No. 26AS of the assessee.
HELD THAT:- It is the settled position that the Department grants credit for TDS only if the said amount appears in the Form No. 26AS of the relevant assessee. Since the TDS credit in the present case was not appearing in the Form No. 26AS of the assessee, the AO, relying strictly on procedural compliance, declined to grant such credit.
Ideally, the assessee ought to have ensured that the deductor deducted tax in the hands of the assessee rather than in the name of the trust. However, the crux of the matter is that the Department has neither granted credit for the TDS in the hands of the trust nor in the hands of the assessee. As a result, the tax deducted at source continues to remain with the Government, while, at the same time, a demand has been raised against the assessee.
This amounts to an inequitable situation, which cannot be countenanced in law. We note that the Ld. CIT(A) has already directed the Assessing Officer to verify the assessee’s claim and grant TDS credit in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
If such credit has not been granted till the date of passing of this order, we hereby direct the AO to take necessary steps to address the request of both the assessee and the trust for the transfer of TDS credit from the Form No. 26AS of the trust to the Form No. 26AS of the assessee and, thereafter, to allow the credit in accordance with law. The grounds of appeal of the assessee are accordingly allowed for statistical purposes.
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
(i) Whether the assessment orders passed under sections 143(3)/254 read with section 153B(1)(b) for A.Y. 2013-14 and 2017-18 were devoid of jurisdiction, making them void ab initio.
(ii) Whether the approval granted under section 153D was mechanical and without application of mind, rendering the assessment order invalid.
(iii) Whether the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) for Rs. 1,16,10,000/- and Rs. 3,71,74,468/- were justified and in accordance with the law.
(iv) Whether the method of accounting followed by the assessee, particularly the Project Completion Method, was appropriate and consistently applied.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Jurisdiction of Assessment Orders
- Legal Framework: The relevant sections under consideration are sections 143(3), 254, and 153B(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which govern the assessment procedures following a search action.
- Court's Interpretation: The Tribunal found that the assessment orders were passed in compliance with the directions issued by the coordinate bench in the first round of litigation. The orders were not found to be legally tenable as the earlier orders had merged with the coordinate bench's decision.
- Conclusion: The Tribunal dismissed the grounds challenging the jurisdiction of the assessment orders for A.Y. 2013-14 as they were not legally tenable.
Issue (ii): Validity of Approval under Section 153D
- Legal Framework: Section 153D mandates that approval must be obtained before passing an order under section 153B.
- Court's Interpretation: The Tribunal did not find sufficient evidence to conclude that the approval was mechanical or without application of mind.
- Conclusion: The Tribunal dismissed the grounds challenging the validity of the approval under section 153D.
Issue (iii): Additions Made by AO
- Legal Framework: The assessment of undisclosed income and the application of section 144 for best judgment assessment were considered.
- Court's Interpretation: The Tribunal noted that neither the Revenue nor the assessee could substantiate their claims regarding the figure of Rs. 1.35 Cr. The Tribunal relied on the principle of taxing real income and the judicial pronouncement in Brij Bhushan Lal Parduman Kumar vs. CIT.
- Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed a partial addition of Rs. 10 Lacs, considering it a reasonable estimate of income, and dismissed the full addition of Rs. 1.35 Cr.
Issue (iv): Method of Accounting
- Legal Framework: The Tribunal considered the applicability of Accounting Standards 7 and 9, and the consistency of the Project Completion Method followed by the assessee.
- Court's Interpretation: The Tribunal found that AS-7 was not applicable as the assessee was not a construction contractor. The Project Completion Method was consistently followed and accepted by the Revenue in the past.
- Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the method of accounting followed by the assessee and dismissed the Revenue's appeal challenging it.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
- The Tribunal emphasized the principle of taxing real income and the necessity of reasonable estimation in cases where the exact figures are not substantiated.
- The Tribunal concluded that the full amount of Rs. 1.35 Cr. could not be added as undisclosed income, and only a reasonable profit element should be considered.
- The Tribunal upheld the consistent application of the Project Completion Method by the assessee, noting its acceptance in past assessments and the lack of justification for changing the method.
- The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal, supporting the assessee's method of accounting and the principle of avoiding double taxation.
Treatment to amount found in diary and surrendered by the director - HELD THAT:- As no exercise has been made by the Assessing Officer as to hold that the surrender made by the assessee was not proper. No explanation was offered by the assessee before the AO, but the same was made before the Ld. CIT (A), which was also considered by the CIT (A) and in the first round of the litigation same was partly accepted also, who too was partly satisfied with the explanation and sustained addition by giving relief to the tune of Rs. 1.16 crores.
It was the claim of the assessee that the surrender made in the assessment year under consideration was a gross revenue figure and not the net undisclosed income and thus there is a scope for allowing expenditure incurred to earn the undisclosed gross revenue.
Therefore, in our considered opinion a lump sum addition of Rs. 10 Lacs can be applied to cover all the possibilities of revenue leakage as well as to satisfy the claim of the assessee about the expenditure incurred. Once it is settled that the amount surrendered is a gross undisclosed income, there can’t be a full amount addition and only the element of profit can be added into the same.
Thus, addition to the extent of Rs. 10 Lacs out of Rs. 1.35 Cr. is sustained in addition to the income already disclosed voluntarily by the assessee. In these terms Ground No. 3 raised by the assessee is partly allowed.
Method of accounting followed by the assessee - as categorically asked by the AO that by the assessee is not following percentage completion method. In response to this the assessee submitted that companies consistently following the completed contract method there was a discussion w.r.t. ICDS also as provided in section 145 of the Act - HELD THAT:- The facts of case are being governed by the accounting standard 9. It is further observed that the method of accounting adopted by the assessee is being followed consistently since in section and the same has been accepted by the revenue in past. In view of this on the one hand AS-7 is not applicable in the case of the assessee on the other hand as per AS-9 the assessee is consistently following the method and calculating its profits on project completion method this fact is not under challenged either by the revenue or by the assessee.
It is also being to our notice that the assessee had already offered to tax the income earned from the Project Completion Method in subsequent A.Y 2016- 17 and A.Y 2017-18.
In view of the above it is transpired that the transactions of the immovable property transfer are governed by the special provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TPA” for short) where under, every transfer of an immovable property requires compulsory registration under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1917 and the transfer is considered completed only when the entire consideration is received by the seller from the buyer and thereafter possession is handed over to him. Even the cases of part performance u/s. 53A of TPA, 1882 cannot be considered to be a complete transfer in the context of the present case. Further no title can be validly transferred to the buyer by merely entering into a Sale Agreement in as much as the Sale Agreement cannot confer any legal title of ownership to the proposed buyer. The buyer may make the payment and comply with the conditions of the Agreement or may not. There is no prohibition upon a buyer to complete the transaction.
Pertinently, the so called binding Agreement does not provide for forfeiture of money and therefore the amounts have been refunded in full because of the right of the buyer to get the booking cancelled and also keeping in mind the commercial ground realities. In view of these peculiar facts & circumstances therefore, it will not be logical and justifiable to recognize the revenue by a prudent businessmen until the transaction come to a conclusion by receiving of the entire payment.
AO has not brought any special reason as to why he is taking a departure from the past settled history between the assessee and the Department in as much as all along in the past, the assessee declared the results (Net Profit) by consistently following the Project Completion Method only and the policy as stated above and accordingly the ROI was filled.
In view of the above, the facts of the matter and the ratio as laid down in the case CIT v. Excel Industries Limited [2013 (10) TMI 324 - SUPREME COURT] are similar. The facts discussed (supra) are not under challenge by either of the parties to the disputes and legal position goes in favour of the assessee.
The core legal issues considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Corporate Guarantee and Letter of Comfort
Brand Promotion Expenses
Royalty Adjustment
Disallowance under Section 14A
Export Agency Commission
Loss on ECB Repayment
Additional Depreciation
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
TP adjustment - corporate guarantee and letter of comfort provided by the appellant to its AEs - HELD THAT:- AR had brought to our notice that this Tribunal in their own case for AY 2013-14, by relying on the decision in the case of CIT v. Everest Kento Cylinders Ltd [2015 (5) TMI 395 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] had ascertained the ALP guarantee commission at 0.5%. Respectfully following the same, we direct the AO to adopt the guarantee commission @ 0.50% as against 2% and accordingly re-compute the transfer pricing adjustment. This ground therefore stands partly allowed.
Brand promotion expenses incurred during the year was in the nature of international transaction and thereafter making TP adjustment - HELD THAT:- Hon'ble Delhi High Court has held in the case of Maruti Suzuki Ltd [2015 (12) TMI 634 - DELHI HIGH COURT] that the Revenue needs to establish the existence of international transaction before undertaking benchmarking of AMP expenses. Hence, applying this ratio decidendi laid down in these judgments, we agree with the assessee that the approach of the TPO cannot be upheld. We note that the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble Delhi High Court (supra) had not been considered by this Tribunal in assessee's own case for AY 2011-12
Even the assessee has not brought on record all the relevant facts concerning the Indonesian AE, AMP expenses incurred by the latter and if not, then whether can it be said that the assessee had indeed incurred expenses on its behalf etc. Also, the nature of AMP expenses incurred by the assessee, reasons for such excessive AMP costs vis-à-vis sales etc. have also not been explained before the TPO. Without these facts being brought on record, one cannot objectively ascertain and decide as to whether there exists any arrangement between the parties at all or not. For the aforesaid reasons and in fitness of the matters, we set aside the order passed by the AO on AMP expenses and restore the same to the file of AO/TPO for examining it afresh.
TP adjustment on account of royalty - HELD THAT:- In this case, assessee following the mercantile system of accounting, there is no question of deferment of receipt of income since the assessee was in a position to create the document as the transaction with AE which cannot be appreciated. It is only afterthought so as to postpone the liability of taxation. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that lower authorities were justified treating the accrued royalty as income of assessee.
Disallowance of u/s.14A read with Rule 8D - HELD THAT:- We note from the factual matrix discussed supra, that assessee had total own funds more than Rs 1121 crores and the total investment made only to the tune of Rs. 930 crores, therefore, the presumption in the cases of Reliance Utilities & Power Ltd supra is clearly applicable and the Ld. DR could not demonstrate that this presumption is factually incorrect, therefore, the disallowance made under section 14A read with Rule 8D(2)(ii) of the Rules, was not warranted and is directed to be deleted.
Coming to disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(iii), it is noted that in the case of ACIT v. Vireet Investment (P.) Ltd. [2017 (6) TMI 1124 - ITAT DELHI] has held that only the dividend yielding investments are to be considered in computation of disallowance under this Rule. Assessee also referred to the revised computation of disallowance in terms of Rule 8D(2)(iii) with reference to dividend yielding investments. Respectfully following the decision of Special Bench (supra), the AO is directed to verify the computation provided by the assessee and re-compute the disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D(2)(iii) accordingly. This ground is therefore partly allowed.
Disallowance of export agency commission paid to non-residents u/s.40(a)(i) - HELD THAT:- We note that this issue has already come up before this Tribunal in the assessee's own case for earlier assessment year 2011-12, wherein, this Tribunal was pleased to allow the contentions of the assessee by relying on the decision of this Tribunal in AY 2008-09. It is noted that the Tribunal has relied on the decision in the case of CIT v. Faizan Shoes Pvt. Ltd. [2014 (8) TMI 170 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] wherein held opening of letters of credit for the purpose of completing the export obligation was an incident of export and, therefore, the non-resident agent was under an obligation to render such services to the assessee, for which commission was paid. The non-resident agent did not provide technical services for the purposes of running of the business of the assessee in India. Therefore, the commission paid to the non resident agents would not fall within the definition of "fees for technical services" and the assessee was not liable to deduct tax at source on payment of commission.
Disallowance of loss on actual re- payment of External Commercial Borrowings ('ECB') loan during the year - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the assessee is noted to have obtained ECBs for acquiring indigenous fixed assets. It had accordingly entered into forward contracts to hedge the foreign exchange fluctuation at the time of repayment of loan. For this, it had paid an upfront premium to the seller of the contract. Further, the assessee had also incurred foreign exchange loss at the time of repayment of such ECBs. The assessee is noted to have amortized the premium cost over the life of contract, which along with the loss incurred on repayment of foreign currency loan was claimed as deduction from business profits.
The first claim in dispute before us relates to amortized portion of premium paid on foreign exchange forward contracts entered into by the assessee. These foreign exchange forward contracts were entered for the purposes of repayment of foreign exchange loan/external commercial borrowing taken by the assessee for acquiring indigenous fixed assets.
We find that this identical issue had come up for consideration in the case of CLP Wind Farm (India) Ltd [2022 (9) TMI 299 - ITAT AHMEDABAD] wherein it was held that the premium paid on foreign exchange forward contracts entered into by assessee for purpose of repayment of loan was to be amortized as revenue expenditure over life of contract. Thus we direct the AO to allow the deduction for the amortized sum of forward premium claimed by way of hedging cost.
Disallowance is the loss arising upon repayment of ECBs which were used for acquiring indigenous fixed assets in India - HELD THAT:- In the relevant FY 2011-12, the ICAI had modified Para 46A of AS-11 in December 2011, in terms of which the company now had an option to either debit such foreign exchange loss to the Profit & Loss Account or capitalize the same to the cost of assets. The assessee, in the present case, chose the latter option. Merely because the assessee chose the latter option would not be determinative of the character of the cost. It is by now trite in law that, the entries whether the assessee is entitled to a particular deduction or not depends upon the provision of law relating thereto. The existence or absence of entries in the books of account be decisive or conclusive in the matter.
As the reasoning given by the AO for making the impugned disallowance is found to be unjustified. Overall therefore, we hold that the impugned disallowance was untenable and is therefore directed to be deleted. This ground is allowed.
Denying the claim of balance additional depreciation on the assets which were put to use in the earlier FY 2011- 12 - HELD THAT:- In this case, the intention of the legislation is absolutely clear, that the assessee shall be allowed certain additional benefit, which was restricted by the proviso to only half of the same being granted in one assessment year, if certain condition was not fulfilled. But, that, in our considered view, would not restrain the assessee from claiming the balance of the benefit in the subsequent assessment year. The Tribunal, in our view, has rightly held, that additional depreciation allowed under Section 32(1)(iia) of the Act is a one time benefit to encourage industrialization, and the provisions related to it have to be construed reasonably, liberally and purposively, to make the provision meaningful while granting additional allowance. We are in full agreement with such observations made by the Tribunal. We direct the AO to delete the impugned disallowance and allow this ground of appeal.
The core legal issues considered in this judgment include:
1. Whether the delay in adjudication of the Show Cause Notice (SCN) from 2017 to 2021 renders the SCN liable to be quashed on the grounds of limitation under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962.
2. Whether the Appellants were denied an opportunity to respond to the merits of the SCN, and if such denial affects the validity of the Order-in-Original.
3. The appropriateness of the penalties and duties imposed on the Appellants under various sections of the Customs Act, 1962, as determined by the Order-in-Original and affirmed by the CESTAT.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Limitation in Adjudication of SCN
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 prescribes the time limit for adjudication of SCNs. The Appellants relied on precedents such as M/s Vos Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. v. The Principal Additional Director General & Anr. to argue that the delay in adjudication should lead to quashing of the SCN.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found that the delay from 2017 to 2021 was not so significant as to result in prejudice to the Appellants. The Court noted that the Appellants had the opportunity to file a reply on merits but chose not to do so, focusing solely on the limitation argument.
Conclusions: The Court was not inclined to quash the SCN on the basis of limitation, as the delay did not warrant such a drastic measure.
2. Opportunity to Respond on Merits
Key Evidence and Findings: The Appellants argued that they were not given a chance to respond to the SCN on merits. However, the Court observed that the Appellants did not file a detailed reply on merits despite having the opportunity.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court acknowledged the Appellants' argument but noted that the lack of a reply on merits was due to the Appellants' own actions. Nonetheless, the Court considered the provisional assessment and the substantial deposit made by the Appellants as factors warranting a remand for merits consideration.
Conclusions: The Court decided to remand the matter to CESTAT to allow the Appellants to file a reply on merits, thereby ensuring a fair opportunity for the Appellants to present their case.
3. Penalties and Duties Imposed
Application of Law to Facts: The Order-in-Original imposed penalties and duties based on findings of misdeclaration and IPR violations. The Appellants contested these findings primarily on procedural grounds rather than substantive merit.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Appellants' arguments focused on procedural lapses, while the Department maintained that the penalties were justified based on the evidence of misdeclaration and IPR violations.
Conclusions: The Court did not make a final determination on the appropriateness of the penalties and duties due to the remand for consideration on merits.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Core Principles Established: The judgment underscores the principle that procedural delays must be significant and prejudicial to warrant quashing of proceedings. It also emphasizes the importance of allowing parties a fair opportunity to present their case on merits.
Final Determinations on Each Issue:
1. The issue of limitation was resolved against the Appellants, as the delay was not deemed prejudicial.
2. The Court remanded the matter to CESTAT to allow the Appellants an opportunity to respond on merits, setting aside the impugned Order-in-Appeal.
3. The penalties and duties imposed were not conclusively addressed, pending the outcome of the remand proceedings.
The Court's decision to remand the matter reflects a balanced approach, ensuring procedural fairness while upholding the integrity of the adjudication process. The Appellants are now tasked with submitting a detailed reply on merits to CESTAT, which will further deliberate on the substantive issues raised in the SCN and the Order-in-Original.
Delay in adjudication of the SCN u/s 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 - denial of opportunity to respond to the merits of the SCN - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- The Respondent has now obtained instructions and submits that the matter may be remanded to CESTAT. In the opinion of this Court, considering the fact that a provisional assessment was done and the Appellant has in fact deposited a sum of Rs. 2.80 crores, the Court is inclined to give the Appellant an opportunity to file a reply on merits.
List before the CESTAT for further proceedings on 5th May, 2025.
Petition disposed off.
Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to regular bail in a prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 despite prolonged custody, alleged delay in trial, and the statutory restrictions under Section 45 of the Act.
Analysis: The application arose from allegations of a large-scale liquor scam in which the applicant was prima facie shown to have played a significant role in the alleged syndicate, received commission from suppliers, and participated in the acquisition and concealment of proceeds of crime. The Court noted that investigation against the applicant had substantially progressed, multiple prosecution complaints had been filed, and there was material in the form of statements, digital evidence, and flow of funds linking the applicant to the alleged laundering activity. Although prolonged incarceration and the right to speedy trial were pressed into service, the Court held that delay by itself could not override the statutory rigor of Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 where the Court was not satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the applicant was not guilty and would not commit an offence while on bail. The Court also treated the grounds of arrest as having been communicated in writing and reserved issues relating to evidentiary admissibility for trial.
Conclusion: The applicant did not satisfy the twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and the prayer for regular bail was refused.
Seeking grant of regular bail - Money Laundering - scheduled/predicate offence - proceeds of crime - collecting commissions and supplying unaccounted liquor to government liquor shops - twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA, 2002, are satisfied or not - delay in trial proceedings - HELD THAT:- It appears that the applicant had actively participated in the commission of predicate offence; had acquired proceeds of crime and had substantial share in proceeds of unaccounted liquor cannot be ignored. The investigation against 11 persons including the applicant is complete and three prosecution complaints against 11 accused persons spanning to nearly 20,000 pages with over 30 witnesses and 250 documents have been filed by the investigating agency and the investigation is going on. Despite the alleged huge scam, prosecution complaint has been filed against 11 persons. Even as per allegations made in the complaint filed by the ED, role of other individuals have also been surfaced. + There is no attachment of property against accused persons being distillers despite quantifying the same at over 200 crores and no proceedings under Section 8 of the PC Act has been initiated against them. Though it is true that the applicant has suffered long period of incarceration and the trial has not yet commenced and is not likely to conclude but the right to bail in cases of delay, coupled with incarceration for a long period, depending on the nature of the allegations, should be read into Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 45 of the PML Act. there is substantial material indicating a strong nexus between the applicant and the other accused persons in the commission of the crime.
Records show that the grounds of arrest was communicated to the applicant by the ED in writing. Thus, without giving any observation as to whether the statement recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA are admissible in evidence, but their thorough consideration should be reserved for the trial court. It emphasized that at the bail stage, these statements can be examined to ascertain whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty. There is a difference between the admissibility of a statement of an accused recorded under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) and its evidentiary value.
It can be foreseen that while the High Court in the specific facts and circumstances (where there was prima facie material against the petitioner) came to the conclusion that mere possession of proceeds of crime and upholding such proceeds as untainted would be sufficient to invoke the provisions of PMLA, however, the ratio of the said judgment may have the potential to have an unintended fallout in a different set of facts. Depending on the facts of the case, such an interpretation may include persons who might have no genuine knowledge and connection with the predicate offence and/ or the tainted money circulated by the actual accused persons and may have to go through the rigours of trial for no fault - Mens rea is a critical ingredient for any criminal offence and therefore requires its presence in any action or consequence which arises out of or in relation to an offence. It is important that to prosecute someone for mere possession of purported proceeds of crime, there should be an equal burden on the prosecution to prove at least a prima facie link to the proceeds of crime as defined under the Act.
Money laundering is understood to encompass a scenario in which an individual commits an offense outlined in the PMLA schedule, leading to the generation of property. This property subsequently qualifies as the proceeds of the crime. Furthermore, the individual engaged in activities such as concealment, possession, or utilization of said proceeds of crime, shall be deemed to have committed the offense of money laundering - the quantification of the Proceeds of Crime involves a multifaceted approach. It begins with the identification of initial assets stemming from criminal activity, subsequently encompassing any assets obtained through these initial proceeds.
Conclusion - It is thus held that in the investigation conducted during the predicate offence, the applicant being the orchestrator of the entire liquor scam in the State of CG, was involved in money laundering and proceeds of crime along with other co-accused therefore, the entitlement of the applicant to get bail under PMLA, 2002, is not acceptable and considering the entirety of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that the applicant is unable to satisfy twin conditions for grant of bail under Section 45 of the PMLA, 2002, as such, it is not a fit case for grant of bail to the applicant for the reasons.
The prayer for bail made by the applicant under Section 483 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) read with Section 45 of the PMLA, for the alleged offence punishable under Sections 3 & 4 of the PMLA, 2002 is hereby rejected.
The core legal issue considered in this judgment is whether the appellant is liable to pay service tax under the reverse charge mechanism for services rendered outside India by a service provider situated abroad. This involves the interpretation of Rule 3 of the Taxation of Services (Provided from Outside India and Received in India) Rules, 2006, and its interaction with Section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents
The legal framework centers around Section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994, which outlines the conditions under which services provided by a foreign entity to an Indian recipient are taxable. Additionally, Rule 3 of the Taxation of Services (Provided from Outside India and Received in India) Rules, 2006, specifies that certain services performed outside India are excluded from the service tax net.
Precedents include previous Tribunal decisions in the appellant's own case for earlier periods, notably Final Orders No. 43100/2018 and No. 40428/2023, which favored the appellant by setting aside similar demands for service tax.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning
The Tribunal interpreted Rule 3(ii) of the 2006 Rules to mean that services wholly performed outside India are not subject to service tax. The Tribunal emphasized that the rule's intent is to exclude such services from taxation to encourage exports and foreign exchange remittances.
The Tribunal also noted that the adjudicating authority's interpretation, which suggested that the rule applies only when services are partly performed in India, was incorrect. The Tribunal clarified that if services specified in Rule 3(ii) are performed entirely outside India, there is no liability to pay service tax.
Key Evidence and Findings
The Tribunal found that the services in question were indeed performed outside India. The appellant had consistently argued, and the Tribunal agreed, that the services fell under the categories specified in Rule 3(ii), which are exempt from service tax when performed wholly outside India.
Application of Law to Facts
The Tribunal applied Rule 3(ii) to the facts of the case, determining that the services provided by the foreign entity to the appellant were performed entirely outside Indian territory. As a result, these services were not subject to service tax under the reverse charge mechanism.
Treatment of Competing Arguments
The Department's argument was that the appellant was liable for service tax under Section 66A, as the services were received in India. However, the Tribunal pointed out that the services were performed outside India, and thus, Rule 3(ii) applied, excluding them from the service tax liability. The Tribunal distinguished the case from other precedents cited by the Department, noting that those involved services partly performed in India, which was not the case here.
Conclusions
The Tribunal concluded that the appellant was not liable to pay service tax for the services in question, as they were wholly performed outside India. The Order-in-Appeal No. 62/2015 was set aside, and the appeal was allowed with consequential benefits as per the law.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Tribunal's significant holding is that services specified under Rule 3(ii) of the Taxation of Services (Provided from Outside India and Received in India) Rules, 2006, when performed wholly outside India, are excluded from service tax liability. This holding reinforces the principle that the location of service performance is crucial in determining tax liability under the reverse charge mechanism.
Core Principles Established
The judgment establishes that the exclusion under Rule 3(ii) applies unequivocally to services wholly performed outside India, aligning with legislative intent to promote exports and foreign exchange inflow. The Tribunal's interpretation underscores the need for clear demarcation of service location in tax assessments.
Final Determinations on Each Issue
The Tribunal determined that the appellant was not liable for the service tax demand, as the services were performed outside India and fell under the exclusion provided by Rule 3(ii). The impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed with any consequential relief under the law.
Liability of appellants to pay service tax under the reverse charge mechanism on the services rendered outside India by service provider situated abroad - HELD THAT:- The issue is no more res integra as this Tribunal had on the same issue involving the same Appellant for earlier periods, in M/S. SUNDARAM INDUSTRIES LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF GST & CENTRAL EXCISE, MADURAI [2023 (6) TMI 591 - CESTAT CHENNAI] decided the issue in favor of the Appellant.
Conclusion - The appellant is not liable for the service tax demand, as the services are performed outside India and fall under the exclusion provided by Rule 3(ii).
Appeal allowed.
The primary issue considered in this appeal was whether the supply of food and beverages within a cinema complex constitutes a "service" or "declared service" under Sections 65B(44) and 66E of the Finance Act, 1994. This determination affects whether such transactions are subject to service tax.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents
The legal framework centers on the definitions of "service" and "declared services" as outlined in Sections 65B(44) and 66E of the Finance Act, 1994. The Tribunal referenced prior decisions, including a notable case involving the same appellant, which concluded that the sale of food and beverages in cinema halls does not constitute a service but rather a sale of goods. This precedent was pivotal in the Tribunal's analysis.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning
The Tribunal interpreted the supply of food and beverages as a mere transaction of sale, devoid of any service element. It emphasized that the sale of pre-packaged or reheated food items to cinema-goers, who consume these items at their seats, does not involve any additional service. The Tribunal distinguished this from scenarios where services, such as table service in restaurants, are predominant. The Tribunal also highlighted the limited choice of food items and the fact that these items are accessible only to ticket holders, reinforcing the view that this is a sale transaction rather than a service.
Key Evidence and Findings
The Tribunal's findings were based on the operational model of cinema complexes, where food items are sold over the counter and consumed by patrons at their seats. The Tribunal noted the absence of elements typically associated with service, such as table setting, waitstaff, and personalized service, which are common in restaurant settings. Additionally, the Tribunal considered the short duration of movie intervals, which necessitates the availability of quick, ready-to-eat options within the cinema complex.
Application of Law to Facts
The Tribunal applied the established legal principles to the facts of the case, concluding that the transaction in question is akin to a sale of goods rather than a provision of service. The Tribunal drew parallels with previous judicial interpretations and circulars issued by the revenue authorities, which clarified that such transactions are not subject to service tax.
Treatment of Competing Arguments
The Tribunal addressed the Revenue's argument that the appellant had previously admitted service tax liability for similar activities. It distinguished between different categories of service within the cinema complex, specifically noting that the "Gold Class" category involves additional services that justify the imposition of service tax. However, for the standard transactions under consideration, the Tribunal found no basis for service tax liability.
Conclusions
The Tribunal concluded that the supply of food and beverages in cinema halls, under the circumstances described, does not constitute a service and is not subject to service tax. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and allowed the appeal, aligning with the precedent set in the appellant's previous case.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Tribunal reiterated key legal reasoning from its previous decision, emphasizing that transactions involving the sale of packaged or reheated food items in cinema halls do not involve a service element. The Tribunal upheld the principle that the dominant purpose of the cinema complex is to screen movies, and the provision of food items is merely incidental, not constituting a service under the Finance Act.
Core Principles Established
The Tribunal established that the sale of food and beverages in cinema complexes, when limited to pre-packaged or reheated items without additional service elements, is not a "service" under the Finance Act. This principle is consistent with the interpretation of similar transactions in other contexts, such as takeaway food sales.
Final Determinations on Each Issue
The Tribunal determined that the transactions in question do not attract service tax liability, setting aside the previous order and allowing the appeal. This determination was based on the consistent application of legal principles and precedents, as well as a thorough analysis of the facts and circumstances surrounding the supply of food and beverages in cinema complexes.
Scope of service and declared service - whether the supply of food and beverages in the cinema complex falls within the definition of ‘service’ and ‘declared service’ in terms of Section 65B(44) and Section 66E of the Finance Act, 1994? - HELD THAT:- The issue is no longer res integra and has been decided in the case of the appellant themselves in the case of M/s. PVR Limited, Shri Nitin Sood, Shri Ajay Bijli and Shri Brijesh Arora Vs. CST, New Delhi [2023 (12) TMI 81 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] holding that the supply of food and beverages in the cinema hall does not involve any service element and is merely transaction of sale. The period involved in the said order was from 2013-2014 to 2015 and the present appeal involves the subsequent period from 2015-16 to June, 2017. The facts and the issue being same, the present appeal is squarely covered by the aforesaid decision of this Bench.
Conclusion - The sale of food and beverages in cinema complexes, when limited to pre-packaged or reheated items without additional service elements, is not a "service" under the Finance Act.
There is no reason to differ with the aforesaid order - Appeal allowed.
The core legal issues considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Exemption under Notification No. 12/2012-CE
Reversal of 6% under Rule 6 of the CCR, 2004
Time-Barred Demand and Suppression of Facts
Imposition of Interest and Penalty
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Entitlement to exemption under N/N. 12/2012-CE for goods supplied against International Competitive Bidding (ICB) and to Mega Power Projects - reversal of an amount equal to 6% of the value of exempted goods under Rule 6 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, there is no dispute that the goods have been supplied against International Competitive Bidding. Therefore, it is prudent to examine if these goods, when imported in India, are exempt from duties of customs and the additional duty leviable under sub-Section 1 of Section 3 of the Custom Tariff Act, 1975.
It is not in dispute that the goods have been supplied by the appellant to Mega Power Project(s) as certified by the Joint Sectary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Power. We find that the lower authority have ruled that the Electrical Power Cables are not covered under Chapter Heading 98.01 of the Customs Tariff Act, hence, these are not exempt from basic Customs Duty as well as Additional Customs Duty. This reasoning seems incorrect as the Central Excise Tariff Act does not have any corresponding Tariff entry as it exists in Customs Tariff Act, 1985. This issue has already been decided by the Tribunal in the case of Cords Cable Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of C. Ex., Jaipur-I [2016 (9) TMI 1126 - CESTAT NEW DELHI], wherein it was held that electrical wires, cables supplied to Mega Power Projects are fully exempt under the corresponding Central Excise Notification read with Customs Notification.
However, Condition No. 93 to the Notification No. 12/2012-CUS dated 17.03.2012, also prescribes certain requirements to be fulfilled, for availment of the exemption from Customs Duty as well as Additional Customs Duty. These conditions are factual in nature as to whether Power Purchasing State has constituted the Regulatory Commission with full powers to fix Tariffs and whether the Power Purchasing States have undertaken to carry out distribution reforms as laid down by the Ministry of Power. It also needs to be seen whether procurement Certificates have been issued by the designated Authorities as per Sr. No. (b) and (c) of the Condition No. 93. The documents submitted along with appeal, do not contain all the relevant details which are to be seen in the matter.
It is fit to remand the matter to the adjudicating authority to see fulfilment of Condition No. 93 of Notification No. 12/2012-CUS dated 17.03.2012. If these Conditions are satisfied, then the appellant will not be required to reverse an amount as demanded by the department. The Bench directs the Appellant to produce relevant documents/Certificates in respect of supplies involved in the case before the adjudicating authority within one month for determining whether the Condition No. 93 of the said Customs Notification is satisfied in the case. The adjudicating authority also directed to decide the issue within 3 months from the date of production of above documents, as the matter is quite old.
The appeals are disposed off by way of remand to the adjudicating authority.
The primary issue in this appeal was whether the appellant, M/s JSW Cement Ltd., is entitled to Cenvat Credit on Goods Transport Service (GTS) for outward transportation of cement from the depot to the buyer's premises on a FOR (Free on Road) basis. Additionally, the invocation of the extended period for demand and the imposition of penalties were also contested.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents
The legal framework revolves around the interpretation of the Cenvat Credit Rules (CCR) 2004, specifically Rule 2(l), which defines input services eligible for credit, and Rule 14(1)(ii) concerning the recovery of Cenvat Credit. The Central Excise Act, 1994 (CEA), particularly Section 11A(10), also plays a role in determining the eligibility for credit and the conditions for invoking the extended period for demand.
Key precedents considered include the judgments of the Supreme Court in Ultratech Cement, Roofit Industries Ltd., and Ispat Industries Ltd., which provide guidance on determining the 'place of removal' and the eligibility for Cenvat Credit on transportation services.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning
The Tribunal focused on whether the sales from the depot were on a FOR basis, which would determine the eligibility for Cenvat Credit. The appellant argued that sales were on a FOR basis, meaning the transaction was completed at the buyer's premises, thus entitling them to credit. The Tribunal noted that the appellant failed to provide sufficient documentary evidence to substantiate this claim for the disputed amount of Rs. 3,44,228/-.
Regarding the invocation of the extended period, the Tribunal observed that the show cause notice did not establish grounds of fraud, collusion, or wilful misstatement, which are necessary for invoking the extended period under Section 11A(4) of the CEA. The Tribunal also considered the interpretational issues surrounding the 'place of removal' during the relevant period, which were clarified in subsequent judgments and Circulars.
Key Evidence and Findings
The appellant provided documents claiming that sales from the depot were on a FOR basis. However, the Adjudicating Authority found these documents insufficient to prove that the sales were indeed on a FOR basis. The Tribunal agreed with this finding, noting the lack of corroborative evidence.
Application of Law to Facts
The Tribunal applied the principles established in relevant case law to the facts, determining that the appellant did not adequately demonstrate that the sales from the depot were on a FOR basis. Consequently, the demand for Cenvat Credit for the disputed amount was upheld.
In terms of the extended period, the Tribunal found that the lack of substantive evidence for fraud or wilful misstatement, combined with the interpretational issues of the time, did not justify invoking the extended period.
Treatment of Competing Arguments
The Tribunal considered the appellant's reliance on various judgments and Circulars, which clarified the determination of the 'place of removal.' However, it found that these did not support the appellant's case for the specific disputed amount due to insufficient evidence. The Tribunal also addressed the appellant's argument against the invocation of the extended period, finding merit in the argument due to the absence of fraud or misstatement.
Conclusions
The Tribunal concluded that while the demand for Cenvat Credit on the merits was sustainable due to the appellant's failure to prove the FOR basis of sales, the invocation of the extended period was not justified, leading to the setting aside of the demand and penalty based on limitation grounds.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Core Principles Established
The Tribunal reaffirmed the principle that eligibility for Cenvat Credit on outward transportation services depends on proving that sales are on a FOR basis, with the transaction completing at the buyer's premises. It also highlighted the necessity of substantive evidence to justify the invocation of the extended period for demand.
Final Determinations on Each Issue
The Tribunal upheld the demand for Cenvat Credit on the merits due to insufficient evidence from the appellant but set aside the demand and penalty on the grounds of limitation, as the extended period's invocation was unjustified.
Cenvat Credit on the Goods Transport Service (GTS) for outward transportation of cement from the depot to the buyer's premises on a FOR (Free on Road) basis - Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute in this present appeal that wherever the sale has been on FOR basis, as evidenced from record, the credits have allowed and it has not been disputed by the Department any further. However, in the case of Rs. 3,44,228/-, the appellant could not produce sufficient documents to satisfy the Adjudicating Authority that the ex-depot sales were also in the nature of FOR or that they were essentially FOR sale. The documents being cited as evidence before this Bench to prove that sales were on FOR basis pertains to the month of April as pointed by the Learned AR and that also is not very categorical as to whether the sale was on FOR basis or otherwise. There is no other corroborative evidence that it is on FOR basis.
The Adjudicating Authority has gone through various case laws as well as evidence adduced by the appellant at para 22 and observed that the documents furnished by the assessee related to the clearance of final products directly through the factory to the buyers premises and that they have not produced any documents / information evidencing (i) the sale from Depot/Premises of Consignment Agent to the customer’s premises was on FOR destination basis, (ii) transfer of property at buyer’s premises and (iii) inclusion of the freight charges in the assessable value and payment of Excise duty on the said freight charges. Therefore, essentially, the Adjudicating Authority has held that the Assessee had clearly failed to determine place of removal with reference to the points of sale and therefore the credit taken at outward freight on transportation of finished goods were clearly beyond the place of removal in relation to sale ex-depot.
Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The show cause notice has not adduced any substantive ground to invoke the ingredients required for invoking the extended period.
Conclusion - While on merit the demand is sustainable in the impugned order as the appellant have clearly failed to bring on record the evidence substantiating that sales were on FOR basis even in the case of ex-depot, however, as far as invocation of extended period is concerned, that it is not sustainable. Therefore, while on merit it is upheld, but on limitation, the demand is not sustained. Since, the entire demand is barred by limitation, the appeal to the extent of setting aside the demand and penalty by Adjudicating Authority is set aside on this count itself.
Appeal allowed.
The core legal question considered in this appeal was whether the appellant, M/s. Kunj Bihari Steels Private Limited, could be denied the utilization of CENVAT Credit for payment of duty during a defaulted period as per Rule 8(3A) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002. The Tribunal also examined the validity of the demand for central excise duty confirmed against the appellant and the imposition of interest and penalties.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Legal Framework and Precedents:
The case centered around Rule 8(3A) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002, which mandates that in the event of default in duty payment, the assessee must pay duty consignment-wise without utilizing CENVAT Credit until the default is rectified. The appellant argued that this rule was declared ultra vires by the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in Indsur Global Ltd. v. Union of India, and similarly by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sandley Industries v. Union of India. The Supreme Court had disposed of the related appeals as not pressed, indicating no pending challenge to these rulings.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:
The Tribunal noted that the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court and the Punjab and Haryana High Court had declared Rule 8(3A) ultra vires. The Tribunal emphasized that the Supreme Court's disposition of related appeals further supported the view that the rule could not be enforced to deny CENVAT Credit utilization.
Key Evidence and Findings:
The Tribunal reviewed the appellant's compliance with duty payments, noting that the appellant had paid a portion by cheque and the remainder through CENVAT Credit. The impugned order had treated the CENVAT Credit utilization as inadmissible based on Rule 8(3A). However, given the judicial declarations of the rule's invalidity, the Tribunal found no legal basis to support the denial of credit utilization.
Application of Law to Facts:
Applying the judicial precedents, the Tribunal concluded that the appellant's utilization of CENVAT Credit during the defaulted period was lawful. The Tribunal determined that the demand for duty, interest, and penalties based on the alleged contravention of Rule 8(3A) was unsustainable.
Treatment of Competing Arguments:
The Revenue's argument for upholding the demand was based on the impugned order's findings. However, the Tribunal found these arguments unpersuasive in light of the higher courts' rulings declaring Rule 8(3A) ultra vires. The Tribunal aligned its decision with the prevailing judicial interpretation, rejecting the Revenue's position.
Conclusions:
The Tribunal concluded that the appellant's utilization of CENVAT Credit was valid and that the demand for duty, interest, and penalties could not be sustained. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and allowed the appeal.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Tribunal held that Rule 8(3A) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002, being declared ultra vires, could not be invoked to deny CENVAT Credit utilization. The core principle established was that judicial declarations of a rule's invalidity preclude its enforcement, thereby protecting the appellant's rights to utilize CENVAT Credit.
Final Determinations on Each Issue:
The Tribunal set aside the demand for duty, interest, and penalties, affirming that the appellant's actions were compliant with the law as interpreted by relevant judicial authorities. The appeal was allowed, granting the appellant consequential relief as per law.
Denial of utilization of CENVAT Credit for payment of duty during the defaulted period in terms of Rule 8(3A) of Central Excise Rules, 2002 - levy of interest and penalty - HELD THAT:- Hon’ble High Court in [2024 (7) TMI 814 - CALCUTTA HIGH] has held that matter should be kept pending and is to be taken only after the Special Leave to Appeal No. 16523/2015 is decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court. However, during the course of hearing, it has been brought to the knowledge of the Bench that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has already disposed of the matter and the Department has already withdrawn the appeal.
The issue in the case of Indsur Global Ltd. has already been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In these circumstances, it is found that the issue is presently not pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Thus, in our view, there is no bar in taking up the issue for a decision based on the available documents.
Considering the fact that the provisions of Rule 8(3A) of Central Excise Rules, 2002 have been declared ultra vires by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Indsur Global Ltd. and also by the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Sandley Industries [2015 (10) TMI 2455 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT], the CENVAT Credit cannot be denied to the appellant for utilization in payment of duty during the defaulted period. Thus, there is no infirmity in utilization of CENVAT Credit for payment of duty during the defaulted period.
Conclusion - Since the denial of utilisation of CENVAT Credit by invoking Rule 8(3A) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 has been declared ultra vires by Courts, utilisation of CENVAT Credit during the impugned period by the appellant was not irregular. Accordingly, no amount can be demanded from the appellants either for using the CENVAT accruals of subsequent months or for using the CENVAT account for payment of duty during the said period for the alleged contravention of Rule 8(3A) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002.
The demand confirmed in the impugned order by denying the payment made by the appellant through CENVAT Credit is not sustainable and accordingly, the same is set aside - Since the demand raised against the appellant does not survive, the question of demanding interest or imposing penalty does not arise.
Appeal allowed.
Issues: (i) Whether the works contract for supply, installation, testing and commissioning of HVAC and electrical works, executed during construction of a hotel building, was an incidental or ancillary works contract covered by the notification treating certain contracts as construction contracts for the purpose of the composition scheme under section 42(3) of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002. (ii) Whether service tax collected under the contract could be included in the total contract turnover for levy under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002.
Issue (i): Whether the works contract for supply, installation, testing and commissioning of HVAC and electrical works, executed during construction of a hotel building, was an incidental or ancillary works contract covered by the notification treating certain contracts as construction contracts for the purpose of the composition scheme under section 42(3) of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002.
Analysis: The contract was found to be integrated with the ongoing civil construction of the building. The work was carried out inside the building, required concealed wiring and cabling, and had to be completed before finishing and plastering. On those facts, the work moved hand in hand with the civil work and the completion of the civil work depended upon completion of the HVAC work. The notification expressly brought within its ambit works contracts incidental or ancillary to construction contracts, where such work is awarded and executed before completion of the principal contract.
Conclusion: The contract was covered by the notification as an incidental or ancillary construction-related works contract, and the levy under the composition scheme at the applicable rate was upheld, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether service tax collected under the contract could be included in the total contract turnover for levy under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002.
Analysis: The Tribunal treated the issue as already settled by its earlier decision, and the High Court found no error in that approach. The service tax component was held not to form part of the taxable turnover for the purpose of the contract assessment.
Conclusion: Service tax was correctly excluded from the taxable turnover, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue failed to show any substantial question of law, and the assessment as modified by the Tribunal was left undisturbed.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a works contract is shown to be incidental or ancillary to a building construction contract and is executed before completion of the construction, it falls within the notified construction-contract category for composition taxation, and amounts not forming part of the sale price cannot be added to taxable turnover.
Levy of composition rate of tax on construction contract - covered by Part “B” of the Notification dated 30th February 2006 or not - whether the contract entered into by the Respondent herein with M/s. Sahara Hospitality Ltd was a works contract which fell within the Notification dated 30th November 2006? - HELD THAT:- The MSTT, after carefully going through and analyzing the context of the documents available before it, came to the conclusion that the works contract executed by the Respondent, was basically air conditioning work in a centralized Air Conditioned building mostly inside the building. All the wiring, cabling had to be concealed. It had to be done along with civil work, if a new building was being constructed, or if the work was being given along with other repairs and maintenance of the building. Finally, the said work had to be completed before finishing, plastering and civil work of the building. In a nutshell, the MSTT came to the conclusion that the work was basically going hand in hand with the civil work and the completion of the civil work was dependent on the completion of the air conditioning work. It is on this basis that the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the works carried out by the Respondent (the Appellant before the MSTT) had a direct nexus with the ongoing construction work of M/s. Sahara Hospitality Ltd, and therefore, the contract entered into by the Respondent with M/s. Sahara Hospitality Ltd was squarely covered under the Notification dated 30th November 2006.
The Tribunal, being the last fact finding authority, has come to the conclusion that the work carried out by the Respondent was going on hand in hand with the civil work of M/s. Sahara Hospitality Ltd and completion of civil work was dependent on the completion of the air conditioning work. Once this is the case, the order of the MSTT in so far as it relates to applying the Notification dated 30th November 2006 to the works contract executed by the Respondent with M/s. Sahara Hospitality Ltd does not give rise to any substantial question of law.
Even as far as the penalty is concerned and which was deleted by the impugned order, is correctly done so because if the principal challenge succeeds there is no question of any penalty being levied on the Respondent.
Conclusion - Works contracts ancillary to building construction, executed before completion, fall within the Notification's scope, qualifying for a reduced tax rate. Service tax is excluded from the total contract value under the MVAT Act.
Appeal dismissed.
Issues: (i) Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the acquittal of accused No. 4 on the question of vicarious liability under the Negotiable Instruments Act. (ii) Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the acquittal of accused No. 2 on the issue of existence of legally enforceable debt and liability under the cheque transaction.
Issue (i): Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the acquittal of accused No. 4 on the question of vicarious liability under the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Analysis: Liability of a director or officer of a company in a prosecution for dishonour of cheque can arise only if the complaint and evidence show that the person was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, or that the ingredients of consent, connivance or neglect are established. Mere correspondence or general awareness of some transaction is not enough. The material on record showed only that accused No. 4 had participated in earlier correspondence regarding previous cheques, without proof that he was connected with issuance of the present cheques or with the day-to-day conduct of the company's business.
Conclusion: Leave to appeal was rightly refused against accused No. 4, and the challenge to his acquittal was rejected.
Issue (ii): Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the acquittal of accused No. 2 on the issue of existence of legally enforceable debt and liability under the cheque transaction.
Analysis: The record contained the signed cheques, the agreement between the parties, the recovery certificates, the dishonour memos, the statutory notice, and oral evidence supporting the complainant's version. The question whether the debt was not proved, and whether omission to reflect the amount in income-tax returns or absence of some further documents destroyed the claim, required closer scrutiny of the evidence in appeal. At the stage of leave, the Court found that the appellate findings on non-proof of liability needed examination on merits.
Conclusion: Leave to appeal was granted against accused No. 2, and the challenge to his acquittal was entertained.
Final Conclusion: The application failed insofar as accused No. 4 was concerned, but succeeded insofar as accused No. 2 was concerned, resulting in a partial grant of leave and partial refusal of leave.
Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Sections 138, 141 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, vicarious liability of company officers must be supported by material showing their role in the conduct of business or their consent, connivance or neglect, whereas the sufficiency of proof of the underlying debt and cheque liability may warrant appellate scrutiny where the record contains substantive evidence supporting the complainant's claim.
Dishonour of Cheque - legally recoverable debt or not - grant of leave to appeal against the acquittal of accused.
Leave to Appeal Against Accused No. 4, Sumit.
Provisions for grant of leave - HELD THAT:- When there is judgment of acquittal, Court should be slow in interfering. Because presumption of innocence is reinforced. When the acquittal judgment is challenged on certain grounds, substance of those grounds is to be tested. However, standard of inquiry (expected for testing those grounds) to be carried out at the stage of grant of leave and that inquiry carried out while deciding the appeal, finally differs. Same standard of inquiry cannot be carried out at the stage of grant of leave.
Meaning of the phrase “in charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of business of the company” - HELD THAT:- There are certain other Acts which holds Company responsible or guilty. The list of few of the Acts given in para no. 19 of the said judgment. Such as the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, the Employees Provident Fund Act, Payment of Gratuity Act and so on. But for understanding the meaning of the phrase, we have to bank on the provisions of Companies Act. There is reference of the provisions of Sections 5, 291 and few of the definition clauses in the Companies Act. The list of such persons is also enumerated therein. The Managing Director is such kind of post which falls in that category.
Necessary averment in the complaint - HELD THAT:- Mere bald statement is not sufficient. One cannot presume every director is supposed to know about the transaction. However, category of Managing Director, Joint Managing Director or a director who has signed the cheque stands excluded. They will certainly liable and there need not be specific pleading “in charge of and responsible” in the complaint. In Gunmala Sales Private Ltd. [2014 (12) TMI 1116 - SUPREME COURT], this principle is further elaborated. Any particular director may produce incontrovertible or unimpeachable evidence to show his disconnection to the transaction. The High Court can quash such proceeding. That is why there is further necessity of pleading necessary averment with particular details - The complainant is supposed to know only generally as to who were in charge of the affairs of the company. Other administrative matters would be within the special knowledge of the company.
When it can be said there is consent, connivance or neglect - HELD THAT:- In present case, the evidence is already adduced. Every party has opened his cards. The principles are still applicable. But evidence has to be seen.
Evidence - HELD THAT:- Mere averments are not sufficient. It needs to be substantiated. There will be onus on the accused, only when the complainant will discharge initial burden. It is for the complainant to prove, accused no. 4 was involved in the transaction in either of the capacity. The Accused no. 4 is described as Vice President of Finance and Taxation. The correspondence which is referred above was in between the accused no. 4 and Morries. This correspondence relates to the previous cheques and not to the present 16 cheques. On the basis of that correspondence, it can certainly be said that accused no. 4 is aware about some transaction. But this is not enough, to hold him vicariously liable. Something more is required. The Complainant ought to have adduced certain evidence to show his complicity in the manner laid down under Sections 141 (1) and 141 (2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The learned Additional District Judge has correctly appreciated the evidence, and he rightly acquitted the accused no. 4. So, no case for grant of leave is made out. This is such type of acts, wherein the detailed scrutiny is not required. But at the threshold, we can decide the issue of vicarious liability.
Leave to Appeal Against Accused No. 2, Anubhav
It is true there are no documents showing incurring of expenses by Morries on account of professional expenses to advocates and other expenses (except debit note), but it is matter of record that rate of interest is subsequently enhanced by Debt Recovery Tribunal. It is very well true the evidence has to be appreciated on the basis of the documents produced and also on the basis of documents which could have been produced but not produced. The learned Appellate Judge has given more stress on the documents which are neither mentioned nor produced. The cross-examination of the witness also needs to be considered. It is admitted fact that accused has not given any evidence.
This Court is required to ascertain the correctness of the findings by the Appellate Court while acquitting the accused no. 2. It needs to be seen whether the findings on the point non proof of the liability is correct or not. The documents which are already on record are to be given weightage or documents which are not produced are to be given weightage. This has to be considered in totality of the evidence on the basis of the cross-examination. No doubt the Complainant by examining the Chartered Account has offered an explanation for not showing the amount in income tax returns. It is also true that Constitutional Courts have opined in certain judgments that reflecting the amount in income tax returns has got different connotation and it cannot be the factor to disbelieve the claim of the Complainant.
Conclusion - The evidence against Anubhav warranted further examination, while the evidence against Sumit did not justify granting leave to appeal.
Leave to prefer an appeal is refused against the accused no. 4-Sumit - Leave to prefer an appeal against accused no. 2-Anubhav is granted - appeal admitted.
Issues: Whether the non-bailable warrant issued against the accused petitioner for appearance before the trial court was liable to be converted into a bailable warrant.
Analysis: The petition was confined to the limited relief of conversion of the warrant into a bailable warrant. The order records that, in cases where cognizance is taken in the first instance against an accused, summoning by bailable warrants is the settled course, and the circumstances of the case, including the earlier orders cited, supported grant of that limited relief.
Conclusion: The non-bailable warrant was converted into a bailable warrant and the petitioner was directed to appear before the court below within 15 days.
Challenge to order from the Judicial Magistrate No. 2, North, Kota, which refused to convert a non-bailable warrant into a bailable warrant - HELD THAT:- Taking into consideration the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and the limited prayer made on behalf of the accused petitioner so also the observations made by the Coordinate Bench of this Court and the Apex Court in the orders referred, the present criminal misc. petition is disposed of.
The non-bailable warrant dated 07.12.2004 issued against the accused petitioner is converted into bailable warrant and the petitioner is directed to appear before the Court below within a period of 15 days from the date of passing of this order.
Application disposed off.
TaxTMI