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Issues: Whether the orders cancelling GST registration and the appellate order affirming cancellation were liable to be set aside, and whether restoration of registration could be made conditional upon filing returns and payment of tax, interest, fine, penalty and late fees.
Analysis: The cancellation had been made on the ground of continuous non-filing of returns. The order applied the earlier Division Bench and coordinate bench approach that such defaults may be cured by granting one further opportunity, since restoration of registration can facilitate filing of returns and recovery of dues. The Court also directed opening of the portal to enable compliance.
Conclusion: The cancellation notice, cancellation order and appellate order were set aside and quashed subject to the petitioner filing the GST returns for the entire period of default and paying the requisite dues within the stipulated time, failing which the benefit of the order would not enure and the cancellation would revive.
Cancellation of GST registration of the petitioner - petitioner did not file its return in accordance with law for consecutive six months - HELD THAT:- The issue has already received the attention of the Hon’ble Division Bench in the matter of Subhankar Golder Vs. Assistant Commissioner of State Tax [2024 (5) TMI 1262 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT]. The Hon’ble Division Bench had observed that 'we are of the view that the appellant can be provided with one more opportunity to remedy the bridge as the appellant being an individual since a small retailer of imitation jewellery, we deem it appropriate that the appellant should be permitted to remedy the bridge.'
The show cause notice dated January 14, 2023 at page 32 to the writ petition, the order of cancellation of GST registration dated January 11, 2023 at page 39 to the writ petition and the order of the appellate authority dated December 24, 2024 at page 59 to the writ petition stand set aside and quashed subject to petitioner files his GST returns for the entire period of default and pays requisite amount of tax, interest, fine and penalty and/or late fees within four weeks from date.
Subject to fulfilment of the above conditions by the petitioner the GST registration of the petitioner shall be restored by the jurisdictional officer. However, if the petitioner fails to comply with the direction and fulfil the conditions as above, the benefit of this order will not enure to the petitioner and the writ petition would stand automatically dismissed, without any further reference to this court. Consequently, the cancellation of the GST registration would be restored and effected with an immediate effect.
Petition disposed off.
Issues: Whether the deficiency memo rejecting the refund application could be quashed and the matter remanded for fresh consideration, and whether the refund claim was governed by the limitation and rectification cut-off under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Analysis: The refund application was found to have been rejected without a reasoned order being uploaded on the portal, which prevented the petitioner from effectively pursuing appellate remedies. The statutory scheme under Section 39(9) and Section 54(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 recognises cut-off dates for rectification and refund claims, but the entitlement to refund itself was left to the authority to determine in accordance with law. The authority was required to hear the petitioner and pass a speaking order on the refund application.
Conclusion: The deficiency memo dated 21.02.2024 was quashed and the refund application dated 05.02.2024 was directed to be reconsidered afresh by the authority after hearing the petitioner and by passing a reasoned order.
Cut-off time-limits for rectification and refund under Section 39(9) and Section 54(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - requirement of a reasoned order and upload on the designated portal to enable exercise of right of appeal - power of writ court to quash administrative deficiency memo and remit for fresh adjudication - reconsideration of refund claim after opportunity of hearing
Requirement of a reasoned order and upload on the designated portal to enable exercise of right of appeal - power of writ court to quash administrative deficiency memo and remit for fresh adjudication - Deficiency memo dated 21.02.2024 quashed and refund application dated 05.02.2024 remitted for fresh consideration with directions to hear the petitioner, pass a reasoned order and upload it on the portal. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the respondent authority issued a deficiency memo without uploading a reasoned order on the relevant portal, thereby depriving the petitioner of the ability to prefer an appeal. While the statutory provisions prescribe cut-off dates for rectification and for filing refund claims, the court has not adjudicated the merits of the refund claim itself. In exercise of writ jurisdiction the Court quashed the impugned deficiency memo and directed the authority to consider the refund application afresh in accordance with law after providing opportunity of hearing, to pass a reasoned order and to upload that order on the portal so that the petitioner can pursue appellate remedies. The Court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the refund claim and directed the authority not to be influenced by observations made by the Court. [Paras 8, 10, 11, 13]
Impugned deficiency memo quashed; respondent directed to rehear the refund application dated 05.02.2024, pass a reasoned order and upload it on the portal.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed to the extent that the deficiency memo dated 21.02.2024 is quashed and the respondent is directed to reconsider the refund application dated 05.02.2024 after hearing the petitioner, to pass a reasoned order and to upload the same on the portal; merits of the refund claim left open.
The core legal issues considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Compliance with Section 271AAA(2)
Discretion in Imposing Penalty under Section 271AAA(1)
Interpretation of "Undisclosed Income" and "Specified Previous Year"
Penalty Imposition on Undisclosed Income
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Penalty u/s 271AAA - Appellant did not make payment of tax - As argued Revenue Authorities without satisfying themselves as to the satisfaction of ‘undisclosed income’ as stipulated in Section 271AAA(1) levied the penalty
HELD THAT:- Section 271AAA(1) stipulates that the Assessing Officer may, notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of the Act 1961, direct the Assessee, in a case where search has been carried out to pay by way of a penalty, in addition to the tax, a sum computed at the rate of 10% (Ten per cent) of the undisclosed income of the specified previous year. However, the imposition of penalty is not mandatory. Consequently, penalty under this Section may be levied if there is undisclosed income in the specified previous year.
This Court is of the view that though under Section 271AAA(1) of the Act 1961, the Assessing Officer has the discretion to levy penalty, yet this discretionary power is not unfettered, unbridled and uncanalised. Discretion means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour, it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful. [See: Som Raj and Others vs. State of Haryana and Others, [1990 (2) TMI 306 - SUPREME COURT].
Section 271AAA(2) stipulates that Section 271AAA(1) shall not be applicable if the assessee–(i) in a statement under sub-section (4) of Section 132 in the course of the search, admits the undisclosed income and specifies the manner in which such income has been derived; (ii) substantiates the manner in which the undisclosed income was derived; and (iii) pays the tax, together with interest, if any, in respect of the undisclosed income. (See: Chaturvedi & Pithisaria’s Income Tax Law Seventh Edition).
Consequently, if the aforesaid conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied and the tax together with interest on the undisclosed income is paid upto the date of payment, even with delay, in the absence of specific period of compliance, then penalty at the rate of 10% (Ten per cent) under Section 271AAA is normally not leviable.
The expression ‘Undisclosed Income’ has been defined in Explanation (a) appended to Section 271AAA.The onus is on the Assessing Officer to satisfy the condition precedent stipulated in the said Explanation, before the charge for levy of penalty is fastened on the assessee.
Consequently, it is obligatory on the part of the Assessing Officer to demonstrate and prove that undisclosed income of the specified previous year was found during the course of search or as a result of the search.
Expression ‘specified previous year’ has been defined in Explanation (b) appended to Section 271AAA of the Act 1961. Since in the present case, the search was conducted on 25th November, 2010 and as the year for filing returns under Section 139(1) of the Act 1961 which ended prior to that date had expired on 31st July, 2010, Explanation b(i) is not applicable so as to make AY 2010-11 the specified previous year. Consequently, by virtue of Explanation b(ii), AY 2011-12 (the year in which the search was conducted) is the specified previous year in the present case for the purpose of Section 271AAA(1) of the Act 1961.
Penalty levied - In the present case, the Appellant admitted Rs.2,27,65,580/- as income for AY 2011-12 during the search before DDIT (Inv.) as well as substantiated the manner in which the said undisclosed income was derived and paid tax together with interest thereon, albeit belatedly.
Consequently, all the conditions precedent mentioned in Section 271AAA(2) stand satisfied and, therefore, penalty under Section 271AAA(1) is not attracted on the said amount.
Penalty @ 10% levied - It is an admitted position that the Appellant had not offered in the declaration before the DDIT(Inv.) any income on land transactions belonging to Mr. Sharab Reddy and Mr. NHR Prasad Reddy.
The argument that the said transactions had not been found in the search at the Appellant’s premises but had been found due to ‘copies of sale deeds collected from the society’ cuts no ice with this Court as the sale deeds had been collected as a result of the search and in continuation of the search. This Court is of the view that as the causation for collecting the sale deeds from the Society was the search at the Appellant’s premises, it cannot be said that the said documents were not found in the course of the search.
Further, this Court is of the opinion that the expression ‘found in the course of search’ is of a wide amplitude. It does not mean documents found in the assessee’s premises alone during the search. At times, search of an assessee leads to a search of another individual and/or further investigation/interrogation of third parties. All these steps and recoveries therein would fall within the expression ‘found in the course of search’.
Since income of Rs.2,49,90,000/- constitutes undisclosed income found during the search, penalty under Section 271AAA(1) of the Act 1961 is leviable on the said amount.
Also, as the said amount was not admitted in the declaration before the DDIT(Inv.) during the course of search but was disclosed by the Appellant only during the assessment proceedings, and that too, after the Assessing Officer had asked for copies of the sale deeds from the Society, this Court is of the view that the exception carved out in Section 271AAA(2) is not attracted to the said portion of the income.
Issues: Whether a notice for reassessment issued after four years from the end of the relevant assessment year was valid in the absence of any recorded allegation that the assessee failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment, and whether the reopening was impermissible when the relevant issue had already been queried, replied to, and dealt with in the original assessment.
Analysis: The notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was issued beyond four years, so the first proviso to Section 147 applied. In such a case, reassessment can be initiated only if the reasons recorded specifically disclose a failure by the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of material facts. The recorded reasons did not contain any such allegation. Instead, they showed that the reopening was founded on material already furnished with the return and during the assessment proceedings. The assessment record also showed that a query on the relevant deduction issue had been raised, answered by the assessee, and considered in the assessment order. On these facts, reopening on the same material would amount to an impermissible review of the earlier assessment and would also be consistent with a mere change of opinion.
Conclusion: The reassessment notice was invalid and was quashed.
Ratio Decidendi: Where reassessment is sought after four years, the recorded reasons must themselves disclose a failure to fully and truly disclose material facts; if the issue was already examined in assessment on the basis of material supplied by the assessee, reopening on the same basis is barred as an impermissible review or change of opinion.
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - Notice after expiry of period of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment order - HELD THAT:- As per the first proviso of Section 147 re-assessment proceedings cannot be initiated after period of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment year unless there is a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment.
In the case of Hindustan Unilever Limited [2004 (2) TMI 41 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] has held that there has to be not only the allegation that there is a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts but the reasons should also state what are the material facts which were not disclosed.
On a perusal of the reasons recorded in the present case, we do not find any allegation of any failure to disclosure fully and truly of material facts necessary in the assessment. But on the contrary on a perusal of the reasons recorded, it shows that the information on the basis of which re-opening is sought was based on the documents filed by the petitioner alongwith the return of income and in the assessment proceeding. Therefore, on this short ground itself the impugned proceedings are required to be quashed and set aside.
If a query is raised and the assessee files its reply and the issue form subject matter of the assessment order, there can be no question of any failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts but on the contrary allowing the respondents to pursue the present proceeding would amount to empowering power of review on respondents which the Act does not provide and which is not permissible under the Act. Therefore, even on this ground, the impugned proceedings are required to be quashed and set aside.
The core legal questions considered in the judgment include:
1. Whether the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition of Rs. 13,00,11,072/- made by the Assessing Officer due to the difference in receipts as per 26AS and ITR for the assessment year 2021-2022.
2. Whether the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition of Rs. 8,65,59,856/- made by the Assessing Officer based on the estimated business income for the assessment year 2022-2023.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Difference in Receipts as per 26AS and ITR (Assessment Year 2021-2022)
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The assessment was made under Section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The issue revolved around the difference in receipts reported in the Income Tax Return (ITR) and Form 26AS.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the assessee had taken inconsistent positions regarding the nature of the advances received. The CIT(A) had deleted the addition based on the audited balance sheet without verifying the bills/vouchers and TDS for the differential amounts.
Key Evidence and Findings: The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) did not confront the Assessing Officer with the reconciliation details provided by the assessee, leading to a lack of thorough examination.
Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal decided that the matter should be remitted back to the Assessing Officer for a de novo examination to ensure all discrepancies and explanations are adequately addressed.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Revenue argued that the CIT(A) failed to verify the evidence properly, while the assessee maintained that the CIT(A) had acted in accordance with the law. The Tribunal sided with the Revenue, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive review.
Conclusions: The Tribunal remanded the issue back to the Assessing Officer for re-evaluation, allowing the Revenue's appeal for statistical purposes.
Issue 2: Estimated Business Income (Assessment Year 2022-2023)
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The assessment was conducted under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The dispute centered on the estimation of gross profit by the Assessing Officer.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) accepted the assessee's explanations without providing substantial reasoning or evidence, leading to a non-speaking order.
Key Evidence and Findings: The Tribunal noted discrepancies in the gross profit ratio and the lack of documentary evidence to support the assessee's claims regarding the impact of the Covid pandemic.
Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal determined that the matter required further examination by the Assessing Officer, particularly regarding the documentary evidence supporting the assessee's claims.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Revenue contended that the CIT(A) failed to appreciate the discrepancies in the books of accounts, while the assessee argued that the CIT(A) correctly considered the audited accounts. The Tribunal found merit in the Revenue's position.
Conclusions: The Tribunal remanded the issue back to the Assessing Officer for further scrutiny, allowing the Revenue's appeal for statistical purposes.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Core Principles Established: The Tribunal emphasized the importance of thorough verification and examination of evidence by the lower authorities, particularly when discrepancies are noted.
Final Determinations on Each Issue: Both issues were remanded back to the Assessing Officer for re-evaluation, with instructions to provide the assessee an opportunity to present evidence and explanations.
Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning: The Tribunal stated, "We, therefore, remit the matter in issue back to the file of learned jurisdictional Assessing Officer with a direction to re-decide the issue de novo, after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee."
In conclusion, the Tribunal allowed the Revenue's appeals for statistical purposes, directing a re-evaluation of both issues by the Assessing Officer to ensure a comprehensive and fair assessment process.
Addition made due to the difference in receipts as per 26AS and ITR - HELD THAT:- The assessee has failed to properly explain the impugned amount as mobilization advance or other advance, or for the work to be carried-out or for other materials. Before CIT(A), the assessee has furnished the details for the purpose of reconciliation of the above contradictions which were not confronted to the Assessing Officer by the learned CIT(A).
We, therefore, remit the matter in issue back to the file of learned jurisdictional Assessing Officer with a direction to re-decide the issue de novo, after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
Rejection of trading results - As argued books of accounts of the assessee company were duly audited u/sec.44A - AO disbelieved the contentions of the assessee-company and noted that the assessee was failed to substantiate it’s claim of mismatch in inventories with supporting documentary evidence - HELD THAT:- CIT(A) has passed a cryptic, non-speaking order and has accepted the contention of the assessee without giving any cogent reasons. We, therefore, remand the matter in issue back to the file of jurisdictional AO with a direction that the assessee-company shall furnish documentary evidence to prove it’s case of difference in GP ratio.
We remit the matter in issue back to the file of learned jurisdictional Assessing Officer to examine the gross profit of the assessee company.
It is the risk and responsibility of the assessee to plead and prove it’s case in consequential proceedings. If the assessee did not respond to the notice(s) issued by the learned jurisdictional Assessing Officer or taking adjournments under any pretext or failed to furnish requisite documents as called for, AO is at liberty to decide the matter in issue as per fact and law.
Grounds raised by the Revenue are allowed for statistical purposes.
The core legal issues considered in this case are as follows:
1. Whether the notices issued under sections 147 and 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were beyond jurisdiction and invalid, thus rendering the assessment order void.
2. Whether the reasons for holding that income escaped assessment and the sanction of the appropriate authority were not disclosed to the assessee, thereby invalidating the assessment process.
3. Whether the assessee's income is exempt under section 10(26AAA) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as a resident of the state of Sikkim.
4. Whether the addition under section 69 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, based on estimated income, was justified.
5. Whether the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was justified in accepting additional evidence without a remand report from the Assessing Officer, in contravention of Rule 46A(3) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Validity of Notices under Sections 147 and 148
The legal framework under sections 147 and 148 allows the reopening of assessments if the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment. The assessee contended that the notices were beyond jurisdiction and invalid. The Tribunal noted that the assessee was not provided with sufficient opportunity to contest the reopening, which is a procedural requirement. However, the Tribunal did not conclusively determine the validity of the notices, instead focusing on the procedural irregularities.
2. Disclosure of Reasons for Income Escaping Assessment
The assessee argued that the reasons for the belief that income had escaped assessment were not disclosed, which is a prerequisite for a valid assessment. The Tribunal acknowledged this procedural lapse but did not provide a detailed analysis, as the case was remanded for a fresh assessment.
3. Exemption under Section 10(26AAA)
The Tribunal considered whether the income was exempt under section 10(26AAA), which exempts income accruing to a Sikkimese individual from sources within Sikkim. The assessee provided evidence of being a Sikkimese resident and claimed exemption. However, the Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to file a return of income to substantiate the exemption claim. The Tribunal emphasized the need for filing a return to claim exemptions and found procedural shortcomings in the assessee's approach.
4. Addition under Section 69
The Assessing Officer added Rs. 1,08,28,180 under section 69 as unexplained investment. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) directed an 8% estimation on total receipts without proper justification or evidence. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) accepted additional evidence without a remand report, violating procedural rules.
5. Acceptance of Additional Evidence
The Tribunal criticized the CIT(A) for accepting additional evidence without a remand report from the Assessing Officer, violating Rule 46A(3). The Tribunal emphasized the importance of procedural compliance in accepting additional evidence.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Tribunal held that both the assessee and the Revenue's appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, remanding the case to the Assessing Officer for a fresh assessment. The Tribunal emphasized procedural compliance, particularly in disclosing reasons for reopening assessments and handling additional evidence. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to provide the assessee with a reasonable opportunity to present evidence supporting the exemption claim under section 10(26AAA).
The Tribunal's decision underscores the importance of procedural compliance in tax assessments, particularly regarding the disclosure of reasons for reopening assessments and the handling of additional evidence. The Tribunal's remand for a fresh assessment highlights the need for thorough procedural adherence to ensure fair and just tax proceedings.
Unexplained investment u/s 69 - cash withdrawals made during the financial year 2017-18 - Denial of assessee's claim of exemption u/s 10(26AAA) - HELD THAT:- For claiming exemption u/s 10(26AAA) not only the assessee should be a Sikkimese as per the provision specified but the source of income should also be from within the State of Sikkim.
CIT(A), accepted the contention of the AO in denying the claim of benefit u/s 10(26AAA) however, without allowing an opportunity of being heard to the AO, treated the entire deposit as income from contract by admitting additional evidence in violation of Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962.
Some of the documents filed before us were not filed before the Ld. AO and additional evidence has been admitted by the Ld. CIT(A), after examining the facts of the case, we deem it appropriate to set aside the orders of the Ld. CIT(A) as well as of the Ld. AO and remit the matter back to the file of the Ld. AO for passing the assessment order de novo as the evidence filed before us along with the grounds of appeal for claiming exemption under section 10(26AAA) of the Act were not filed before the Ld. AO and some of them were admitted by the Ld. CIT(A). Assessee shall be at liberty to make all submissions in support of the claim that the income was exempt u/s 10(26AAA) of the Act as per the provisions thereof.
Appeals filed by the assessee as well as the Revenue are allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal considered several core legal issues in this appeal:
1. Whether the assessment order under section 153A was valid given the absence of incriminating material found during the search.
2. The validity of the reliance on the statement of Mr. Kapil Tyagi recorded under section 132(4) without corroborative evidence.
3. Whether the approval granted under section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind.
4. The genuineness of the purchases from M/s. Raja Construction and whether the burden of proof was adequately discharged by the assessee.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Validity of Assessment under Section 153A
The relevant legal framework involves section 153A of the Income-tax Act, which allows for assessment or reassessment post-search. The Tribunal noted that the assessment year in question was unabated, meaning it had already been completed before the search. The Court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Pr. CIT v. Abhishar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd., which established that additions under section 153A can only be made based on incriminating material found during the search. The Tribunal found that no such material was discovered for the assessment year 2013-14, leading to the conclusion that the assessment under section 153A was invalid.
2. Reliance on the Statement under Section 132(4)
The Tribunal examined the reliance on the statement of Mr. Kapil Tyagi, recorded under section 132(4), which allegedly admitted to the bogus nature of M/s. Raja Construction. The Tribunal emphasized that such statements require corroboration by material evidence, as established in CIT vs. Kabul Chawla and CIT vs. Harjeev Aggarwal. The statement pertained to AY 2014-15, not the year in question, and lacked corroborative evidence, rendering it insufficient for the addition.
3. Approval under Section 153D
The Tribunal scrutinized the approval process under section 153D, which requires the Additional Commissioner to approve assessments under section 153A. The Tribunal found that the approval was granted for multiple cases in a short span, suggesting a lack of detailed consideration. This mechanical approach, as argued by the assessee and supported by precedents like Pr. CIT v. Anuj Bansal, rendered the approval invalid.
4. Genuineness of Purchases from M/s. Raja Construction
The Tribunal evaluated the evidence provided by the assessee to substantiate the genuineness of purchases, including invoices, bank statements, and ledger accounts. The Tribunal noted that the burden of proof shifted to the Revenue once the assessee provided prima facie evidence of genuineness. The Revenue failed to disprove the evidence or conduct further inquiries, thus failing to meet its burden of proof.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Tribunal held that no additions could be made under section 153A for an unabated year without incriminating material. It stated, "Therefore, it is settled position of law that no addition can be made u/s 153A without there being any incriminating material relating to unabated assessment year." This principle was pivotal in the Tribunal's decision to delete the additions made by the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal also highlighted the necessity for corroborative evidence when relying on statements recorded under section 132(4), reinforcing established precedents.
Regarding the approval process under section 153D, the Tribunal underscored the need for individualized, non-mechanical consideration, which was lacking in this case.
Finally, the Tribunal acknowledged the sufficiency of the assessee's evidence in proving the genuineness of the purchases, emphasizing the Revenue's failure to discharge its burden of proof.
In conclusion, the Tribunal allowed the appeal in part, primarily on the grounds of invalid assessment under section 153A and improper reliance on uncorroborated statements.
Assessment u/s 153A - Addition of bogus Purchase transactions - assessee has raised ground on no incriminating material - HELD THAT:- As query raised by the Assessing Officer relates to AY 2014-15. Therefore, the finding in search was not relevant to the present assessment year.
The addition made by the Assessing Officer in original assessment u/s 143(3) was relating to the same transaction. Further we observed that the year under consideration is unabated and there is no material on record which shows that income escaped in the current assessment year.
The findings during search relating to AY 2014-15, therefore, there is no incriminating material relevant for the current assessment year. Therefore, it is settled position of law that no addition can be made u/s 153A without there being any incriminating material relating to unabated assessment year. Therefore, we are inclined to delete the additions made in the assessment order.
The primary issues considered in this judgment are:
1. Whether the deletion of the addition of INR 63,00,000/- under Section 69A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)] was justified.
2. Whether the deletion of the addition of INR 12,90,00,000/- under Section 69A as unexplained investment was appropriate.
3. Whether the CIT(A) erred in confirming the addition of INR 17,65,000/- made by the Assessing Officer (AO) on account of alleged unexplained cash deposits in the bank account.
4. Whether the denial of the short-term capital loss of INR 21,00,000/- on the sale of property was valid.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Deletion of Addition of INR 63,00,000/- under Section 69A
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 69A of the Income Tax Act deals with unexplained money, requiring the taxpayer to provide a satisfactory explanation for the source of any money found.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had considered the facts that the property was sold for INR 63,00,000/-, which was acquired for INR 84,00,000/-, resulting in a loss of INR 21,00,000/-. The AO had not provided a contrary view during remand proceedings.
Key Evidence and Findings: The assessee provided evidence of the acquisition and sale of the property, demonstrating the genuineness of the transaction.
Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) rightly deleted the addition as the transaction was genuine and supported by evidence.
Conclusions: The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's ground, affirming the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition.
2. Deletion of Addition of INR 12,90,00,000/- under Section 69A
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 69A requires taxpayers to explain the source of investments to avoid being treated as unexplained.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal considered the Remand Report, which confirmed that the assessee and his brother acquired 20% of the property, and the brother's share was paid from his own sources.
Key Evidence and Findings: The Tribunal noted that the assessee substantiated the source of investment through banking channels and necessary documentation.
Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal found the CIT(A) correctly deleted the addition, as the assessee's investment was from explained sources.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Tribunal addressed the Revenue's contention regarding unexplained sources and stamp duty payment, sending the latter issue back to the AO for verification.
Conclusions: The Tribunal partly allowed the Revenue's ground for statistical purposes, remanding the stamp duty issue.
3. Addition of INR 17,65,000/- for Unexplained Cash Deposits
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The scope of limited scrutiny must align with the reasons for selection, and additions outside this scope require proper procedure.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal found the AO exceeded jurisdiction by examining cash deposits not covered under limited scrutiny.
Key Evidence and Findings: The assessee provided a cash flow statement showing sufficient cash balance for deposits.
Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal concluded that the AO's addition was beyond jurisdiction and unsupported by evidence.
Conclusions: The Tribunal deleted the addition of INR 17,65,000/-.
4. Denial of Short-Term Capital Loss of INR 21,00,000/-
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 80 of the Income Tax Act requires claims to be made in the return of income for them to be considered.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the loss was not claimed in the return, and thus, could not be allowed to be carried forward.
Conclusions: The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to deny the claim.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Core Principles Established:
1. Additions under Section 69A require substantiation of unexplained money or investments, with a proper explanation and evidence.
2. The scope of limited scrutiny must be adhered to, and any expansion requires following due procedures.
Final Determinations:
1. The deletion of the addition of INR 63,00,000/- was affirmed.
2. The deletion of the addition of INR 12,90,00,000/- was partly affirmed, with remand for verification of stamp duty payment.
3. The addition of INR 17,65,000/- was deleted.
4. The denial of the short-term capital loss of INR 21,00,000/- was upheld.
Unexplained money u/s 69A - assessee sold his property - CIT(A) deleted addition - assessee has filed detailed reply alongwith the additional evidences alongwith prayer under Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 - HELD THAT:- The evidences filed in respect of the acquisition of the property were also examined by the AO in the remand proceedings and no contrary view was given by the AO and therefore, in our considered opinion, the Ld.CIT(A) has rightly deleted the addition made by AO. Accordingly Ground No.1 of Revenue is dismissed. With regard to the claim of loss, we find that this transaction was not disclosed by the assessee in the return of income nor any details were filed before the AO. It is the fresh claim of short term capital loss which was made before the Ld.CIT(A) for the first time. As this loss was not claimed in the return of income filed, in terms of provision of section 80 of the Act, such loss cannot be allowed to be carried forward to the assessee.
Addition u/s 69A as unexplained investment - HELD THAT:-Assessee alongwith his brother has purchased 20% shares in the property and out of that 20% share, brother through an affidavit has affirmed that purchase consideration to the extent of his share of 10% was paid by him out of his own sources.
With regard to the source of the investment the assessee has been able to substantiate its claim of making such investment out of explained funds by filing the necessary evidences before the AO during remand proceedings.
CIT(A) after considering these evidences, has deleted the addition made. As all the payments were made by the assessee were through banking channels and immediate source of the same were duly substantiated therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the order of CIT(A) to this extent.
With regard to the issue of payment of Stamp Duty out of loan taken from one Shri Vijay Kumar, brother of the assessee, we find that the Ld. CIT(A) has accepted the contention of the assessee on the basis of confirmation and bank statement of Shri Vijay Kumar without confronting and obtaining a report from the AO on the same. Under these circumstances, the issue of source of investment of INR 32.5 Lakhs in stamp duty is sent back to the file of the AO for making necessary verification.
Unexplained cash deposits - AO based on AIR information observed that the assessee has made cash deposits in various accounts - CIT(A) has not accepted the claim of the assessee by observing that under limited scrutiny, the AO can examine the investment in property and since the cash deposit was utilized for making investment in properties, the AO was well within the jurisdiction to examine the issue - HELD THAT:- Form the reasons for selection of assessee’s case for limited scrutiny, we find that none of the reasons indicate the verification of cash deposited in the bank accounts.
AO has enlarged the scope of verification from the investment in property to examine cash deposits in banks which was not permitted in the eyes of law as the reason for limited scrutiny was not for examination of cash deposit in bank accounts. From the perusal of the cash flow statement, we find that the assessee has sufficient cash balance when cash was deposited in the bank accounts therefore, even on merits also, no addition is required to be made in the hands of the assessee. We hereby delete the addition made on account of cash deposited in bank accounts.
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
1. Whether the CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition of Rs. 6,27,25,000/- made under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, due to the alleged failure of the assessee to prove the creditworthiness of the creditor.
2. Whether the CIT(A) erred in holding that the balance sheet was furnished along with the return by the creditor, contrary to the Assessing Officer's (A.O.) observations, and whether the CIT(A) should have remanded the issue back to the A.O. under Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962.
3. Whether the CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition of Rs. 83,70,259/- made under Section 69C of the Income Tax Act, due to the alleged failure of the assessee to furnish substantive documents evidencing actual purchases and transportation of goods.
4. Whether the CIT(A) erred in deleting the disallowance of Rs. 2,78,48,066/- made under Section 37 of the Income Tax Act, ignoring the claim that the expenses were aimed at reducing the purchase cost of third parties and were not actual business expenses.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Addition under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 68 of the Income Tax Act deals with unexplained cash credits, where the assessee is required to prove the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the creditor.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the A.O. questioned the creditworthiness of the creditor, Sh. Narain Dass, due to his low declared income and lack of audited accounts. However, the CIT(A) found that the loans were legitimate, as they were reflected in the creditor's income tax return and supported by documentary evidence.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The CIT(A) considered the ledger, repayment details, and the fact that the creditor was a legitimate taxpayer. The creditor's loans to other group entities and subsequent repayments were also documented.
- Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the A.O. failed to consider repayments and fresh loans, and the creditor's transactions were adequately explained.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's argument, emphasizing the sufficiency of evidence presented by the assessee.
- Conclusions: The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the addition, finding no merit in the Revenue's ground.
Issue 2: Balance Sheet and Rule 46A
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Rule 46A governs the admission of additional evidence at the appellate stage.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) did not violate Rule 46A, as the additional evidence was submitted in response to specific queries and was already available with the A.O.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The CIT(A) had access to the ITR and supporting documents, negating the need for a remand.
- Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal concluded that the CIT(A) acted within the rules by not remanding the issue, given the circumstances.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's contention, supporting the CIT(A)'s approach.
- Conclusions: The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, dismissing the Revenue's ground.
Issue 3: Disallowance under Section 69C
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 69C pertains to unexplained expenditure, requiring substantiation of expenses.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the purchase of sand and Bajri was substantiated by GST payments and bank transactions.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The assessee's construction of a factory and the documented purchase of materials were considered legitimate expenses.
- Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition appropriate, given the evidence.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's argument, citing the adequacy of the assessee's documentation.
- Conclusions: The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, dismissing the Revenue's ground.
Issue 4: Disallowance under Section 37
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 37 allows deductions for business expenses, provided they are not personal or capital in nature.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal observed that the discounts offered by the assessee were legitimate business expenses.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The discounts were less than 1% of total expenses and were accounted for, without the A.O. rejecting the books of account.
- Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s reversal of the disallowance justified, given the business rationale for the discounts.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's argument, supporting the CIT(A)'s findings.
- Conclusions: The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, dismissing the Revenue's ground.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
- The Tribunal preserved the CIT(A)'s findings and conclusions on all grounds, emphasizing the adequacy of evidence and adherence to legal procedures.
- Core principles established include the importance of documentary evidence in substantiating claims and the proper application of procedural rules.
- The Tribunal's final determination was to dismiss the Revenue's appeal, upholding the CIT(A)'s order in its entirety.
Addition u/s 68 - creditworthiness of the creditor/party - Party from whom the Assessee has received the loan had declared an accumulative total income of only Rs. 2.26 crore during the last four Assessment Years and the accounts are not audited and assets and liabilities were not declared in the ITR and there is no official records are available on the capital balance of him as assets and liabilities were not declared to the Department - also AO observed that there is no existence of other transaction like sale of assets during past four years to explain the source of funds to advance huge unsecured loan
HELD THAT:- CIT(A) finding that the Assessee has repaid the loan and also paid interest and TDS was duly deducted of such interest payment and further finding that the AO has considered the cumulative total loans received by the Assessee from the ledger, however ignored the repayment and fresh receipt of loans from lender. Thus, we are of the opinion that the CIT(A) has rightly deleted the addition. Finding no merit, we dismiss the Ground No.1 of the Revenue.
Admission of additional advances - Revenue contended that the Assessee erred in holding that the balance sheet was furnished along with the return by the creditor whereas the A.O. observed otherwise and the CIT(A) has not remanded back the issue to the A.O. under Rule 46A of the I. T. Rules, 1962 - During the appeal proceedings, against specific query of the CIT(A), the Assessee submitted complete details of every customer with its address, PAN, total sell amount and various discounts or rebates allowed by the Assessee. Those documents were submitted as per a specific query raised by the CIT(A). Therefore, the Rule 46A of the Rules will not come in the way of the Assessee. Considering the fact that the copy of the ITR etc. were available with the AO there was no requirement for the Ld. CIT(A) for calling for the Remand from the A.O. as there is no application for additional evidence was filed by the Assessee under Rule 46A of the Rules.
Disallowance of expenses u/s 69C - DR submitted that the Assessee has failed to furnish the substantive documents evidencing the actual purchases and transportation of goods and failed to establish the genuineness of the transaction - HELD THAT:- Assessee Company has constructed new factory building of 15.06 crore and purchased the sand and Bajri from Hardev Singh and the said transaction was subjected to applicable GST at 5% and also considering the fact that those payments have been made from term loan raised by the Assessee from the Bank, we find no reason to interfere with the findings and conclusion of the CIT(A) and we find no error or infirmity in the order of the Ld. CIT(A) in deleting the addition. Accordingly, Ground No. 3 of the Revenue is dismissed.
Addition u/s 37 - expenses claimed by the Assessee were aimed to reduce the purchase cost of third parties which were not accrual business expenses - HELD THAT:- AO was of the opinion that in the transaction related to discount the nexus existents between the Assessee’s expenses and it is distributor’s income and not that all the Assessee, therefore, the same cannot be said to be made out of Assessee’s business. AO opined that the Assessee had aimed at reducing the purchase price of the third parties who are independent entities cannot be said to be under the premises of business expediency.
During the appellate proceedings, the said disallowance has been reversed by the Ld. CIT(A). It is found that the total rebate and discount allowed by the Assessee was less than 1% and all the rebates and discounts are well account for and while disallowing the expenses the Ld. A.O. has not rejected the books of account.
Appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
Issues: (i) Whether the addition made on the basis of a pen drive and other material seized from a third party, alleging receipt of sale consideration in cash by the assessee in relation to the sale of shares, was sustainable in the absence of independent corroboration. (ii) Whether the assessment framed by the Additional Commissioner was valid in the absence of an order under section 120(4)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and a valid transfer order under section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Issue (i): Whether the addition made on the basis of a pen drive and other material seized from a third party, alleging receipt of sale consideration in cash by the assessee in relation to the sale of shares, was sustainable in the absence of independent corroboration.
Analysis: The addition rested on material seized from the Dalmia group, including entries said to refer to J. Reddy and JR account, together with statements describing a parallel cash book and certain e-mail/SMS references. However, the material was not found from the assessee, the alleged link to the assessee was not established by any direct or corroborative evidence, and the assessee's connection with the impugned entries remained unproved. The presumption under section 132(4A) could not be extended against a third party on such material, and third-party search material, standing alone, could not justify assessment in the assessee's hands. The theory of quid pro quo also remained unsupported by evidence.
Conclusion: The addition was not sustainable and deletion of the amount was justified, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the assessment framed by the Additional Commissioner was valid in the absence of an order under section 120(4)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and a valid transfer order under section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: The definition of Assessing Officer under section 2(7A) permits an Additional Commissioner to act only when specifically empowered under section 120(4)(b). The record did not contain any such empowering order in writing for this case, and there was also no transfer of jurisdiction under section 127 from the original Assessing Officer to the Additional Commissioner. The objection was one of inherent authority, not merely territorial jurisdiction, and was not barred by section 124(3). On this footing, the assessment order was passed without lawful jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The assessment order was void ab initio and was quashed, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal failed on merits and the assessee's jurisdictional challenge succeeded, resulting in annulment of the assessment and deletion of the impugned additions.
Ratio Decidendi: Third-party search material cannot sustain an addition against an assessee without independent corroboration, and an Additional Commissioner can validly frame an assessment only when empowered under section 120(4)(b) and, where required, after a lawful transfer of jurisdiction under section 127.
Addition u/s 56(1)(vii) - amount received on sale of shares held as agent/benamidar of the assessee - consideration received by third party for sale of shares of a company - Relevancy of search material found in any search
HELD THAT:- As in Common Cause (A registered Society Vs. UOI [2017 (1) TMI 1164 - SUPREME COURT] where, it has been held that search material found in any search do not have any evidentiary value and the transactions recorded in such papers etc. would have to be corroborated by independent evidence to proceed against the person, whose names appear as beneficiaries in such documents.
In the present case, the entire addition hinges on evidence gathered from third party document, without any corroborative evidence to suggest that in the so-called documents that have been found and account by name Shri J Reddy or JR as the assessee and the assessee is beneficiary of whatever amount recorded therein.
Although the AO claimed that the pen drive was found in the possession of an employee, subsequently those employees have denied allegation of the Assessing Officer and stated that no such pen drive was found during the course of search. Even Mr. Puneet Dalmia, Managing Director of Dalmia group also denied having knowledge of any pen drive found in the possession of employee and contents recorded therein. Therefore, the presumption with regard to contents of documents has been drawn against the assessee, without there being any corroborative evidence to link such documents to the assessee.
If at all any presumption can be drawn on such documents, then the same can be drawn against Dalmia group and the onus shall be on the Dalmia group to produce cogent material to rebut presumption u/s 132(4A). The Dalmia group never alleged that the transactions belong to the assessee. The additions made by the AO on the basis of third-party evidence, without providing this evidence to the assessee and allowing cross examination is contrary to law and settled position.
AO is erred in making additions towards consideration received by Dalmia Bharat Enterprises Ltd. towards sale of shares of Bharati Cement Corporation Ltd to M/s Parcifim SAS, amounting to Rs. 139.67 crores as income of the assessee u/s 56(1)(vii). CIT(A), after considering the relevant facts has rightly deleted the additions made by the AO towards cost of acquisition of on ‘protective basis’ and substantive addition in the hands of the assessee.
Addl. CIT Jurisdiction to pass order - Whether the Ld. Addl. CIT who passed the assessment order is vested with jurisdiction and authority to pass such order in absence of proper order u/s 120(4)(b)? - HELD THAT:- This issue is squarely covered in favour of the assessee by the decision of Coordinate Bench of the ITAT, Mumbai in the case of TATA Communications Ltd. [2019 (8) TMI 1446 - ITAT MUMBAI] where the Tribunal after considering arguments of both sides, including the case laws cited by the Ld. AR for the assessee as well as the Ld. DR, came to the conclusions that unless the Add. CIT who passed the assessment order possesses valid jurisdiction and authority by virtue of order u/s 120(4)b of the Act, he cannot act as an A.O and pass assessment order consequently, the assessment order passed by the A.O is null and void-ab-initio and liable to be quashed.
The assumption of jurisdiction by the Addl.CIT, Range-2, Hyderabad and consequent assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer without an valid order u/s 120(4)(b) of the Act is illegal, void ab-initio and liable to be quashed. Thus, we quash the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer u/s 143(3). Appeal of assessee is allowed.
Estimation of net profit on the alleged purchases made in cash by the assessee - HELD THAT:- All the details of books of account and ledger account have been provided to the AO, however, he has not rejected the book results prior to estimation.
Assessee has contended that estimation of profit without rejecting the book results in itself vitiates the assessment proceedings and the impugned addition deserves to be deleted.
Although ld. AO has not specifically mentioned about the rejection of book results and has not mentioned section 145(3) of the Act, however, in the assessment order AO has made certain observations which questions the correctness of books and Net Profit estimated by the assessee. So far as this plea of the assessee that books of account not being rejected will result into deletion of the impugned addition, I do not find any merit.
After considering the details filed by the assessee, financial statements for the years under appeal and considering the net profits offered by the assessee in subsequent years showing the turnover of Livestock/Poultry products equal to the amounts of goods brought from VHPL on behalf of his clients and the assessee adds back the profit which is normally the commission per kg basis and declares the sales, the activity of business of Livestock and earning commission per kg basis for transporting Livestock from VHPL to the retailers of Dhule District remain proved but the AO has estimated the profit as applicable to retailer traders which is not applicable to assessee since he is engaged in the business of transportation of Livestock and is not a retailer.
Income earned on the alleged transaction of purchases referred in the assessment order - Net profit offered in the past and in subsequent period and also considering the fact that assessee is mainly involved in transporting of livestock and poultry products and the income is in the nature of Commission which is earned on per kg basis, deem it proper to apply the net profit rate of 1.50% on the turnover of Rs. 2,85,94,760/- referred in the assessment order and calculate the profit at Rs. 4,28,921/-. However, since the assessee has already offered the profit of Rs. 3,50,828/- in the income-tax return, the excess amount of profit at Rs. 78,093/- is sustained in the hands of assessee. Finding of ld.CIT(A) is set aside and grounds of appeal raised on merits by the assessee is partly allowed.
Addition of one time life membership fees as non-corpus fund and not eligible for exemption u/s 11(1)(d) - HELD THAT:- The life and institutional membership fees received are not voluntary contributions.
Hence whether or not they have been given with a specific direction to form a part of the corpus fund or not is not material as is the issue whether such receipts are revenue or capital in nature.
There is no infirmity in the order of the AO to add these such fees to the income of the assessee.
As has been held in the case of CIT vs Divine Light Mission [2004 (4) TMI 25 - DELHI HIGH COURT] such receipts are income from property held under trust which the AO has considered and has allowed set apart of income upto 15%. The only ground of appeal raised is dismissed.
Issues: Whether the reassessment notice issued under section 148 was valid when the original assessment had been completed under section 143(3) on the same material and the reopening was based on audit objections without fresh tangible material.
Analysis: The original assessment had been completed after scrutiny of the material already on record. The reasons recorded for reopening referred to the same profit and loss account entries and proceeded on the premise that certain expenditure should have been added back. No new information or independent material was brought on record to justify a fresh formation of belief. On the facts, the reopening was an attempt to revisit the earlier conclusion on the same material, which is impermissible as a mere change of opinion.
Conclusion: The reassessment was invalid and the notice issued under section 148 was quashed, in favour of the assessee.
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - disallowance of the Bad-debts claimed - change of opinion - HELD THAT:- From the perusal of the reasons recorded as well as perusal of the observation of the AO in disposing the objections raised by the assessee, we find that there is no quarrel that assessee has not truly and fully disclosed all the material facts necessary for the purpose of assessment. In the original assessment proceedings, the AO after considering all the material has framed an opinion that the income declared by the assessee is true and correct. There was nothing more to disclose and a person cannot be said to have omitted or failed to disclose something when, of such thing, he had no knowledge. Not only material facts were disclosed by the assessee but also they were fully scrutinized by the AO in the original assessment proceedings and figure of income as well as the deductions were worked out by the AO.
The claim of bad debts is duly disclosed in the Profit & Loss account which was available with the AO while framing the assessment. Now on the same material AO has tried to cover up the error and omission by way of reopening the assessment without any fresh material which is nothing but mere change of opinion. No new information and/ or tangible material was found and the formation of any opinion based on same facts which were then available with the AO at the time of original assessment is not permissible
By respectfully following the judgement of Kelvinator of India Ltd. [2010 (1) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT] we are of the considered opinion that the reopening in the instant case is not based on fresh material and is in the nature of mere change of opinion. Accordingly, the notice issued u/s 148 is hereby quashed. The ground of appeal No 1 of the assessee is allowed.
Addition u/s 41(1) - assessee contended that the liability was duly disclosed in its books of account and there was no cessation of liabilities - HELD THAT:- The assessee in its explanation vide letter dated 11.12.2017 is clearly submitted that outstanding balance of M/s Baba Panchanan Construction & Suppliers was lying since FY 2011-12. It has also been stated by the assessee that amount has not been paid due to supply of bad materials.
We have gone through the cited decision of Dattatray Poultry Breeding Pvt. Ltd. [2019 (4) TMI 1171 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] wherein it has been held that while the assessee has continued to declare the trading liability in its books of accounts no benefit can be said to have been obtained in respect of such trading liability by way of remission or cessation thereof and thus the requirement of Section 41(1) is not satisfied.
We further find that for AY 2012-13 in the assessee’s own case ITAT, Kolkata Bench has decided the specific issue of old liabilities and creditors were examined and AO did not raise any doubt or suspicion about the list of creditors except for certain payables. Hence, once such assessment is complete the revenue authorities cannot in a subsequent year take a diametrically opposite view and consider the same to be ingenuine. Addition u/s 41(1) is hereby to be bad and illegal. Accordingly, amount as made u/s 41(1) is directed to be deleted.
Addition u/s 69 - Assessee had purchased a demand draft for registration of land at Hatia - It is pertinent to mention that demand draft for registration has been spent by the assessee for FY 2014-15, it was accounted for under fixed asset held for that year. Hence we are in this view that section 69 does not apply because all investment has duly recorded in the books of account. Accordingly, addition under this head made and directed to be deleted.
Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
The core legal issues considered in this judgment were:
1. Whether the assessment proceedings under Section 153A for A.Y. 2017-18 and under Section 143(3) for A.Y. 2019-20 were valid and lawful.
2. Whether the additions made under Section 69C of the Income Tax Act for unexplained purchases and taxed under Section 115BBE were justified.
3. Whether the addition for unaccounted sales in A.Y. 2019-20 was valid.
4. The applicability of Section 115BBE for taxing the assessee at a higher rate.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Validity of Assessment Proceedings:
The assessee challenged the validity of the assessment proceedings under Sections 153A and 143(3), claiming they were arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice. However, this issue was not pressed by the assessee during the appeal, leading to its dismissal.
2. Additions under Section 69C for Unexplained Purchases:
Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 69C allows for additions to income when an assessee fails to explain the source of expenditure. The additions were made based on images found on a mobile phone during a search operation, which allegedly showed unaccounted cash transactions.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal considered the evidence from the mobile phone as valid, rejecting the assessee's claim that the mobile belonged to an employee. The Tribunal noted the assessee's failure to substantiate claims with documentary evidence and the admission during search proceedings that the transactions were not recorded in the books.
Key Evidence and Findings: The Tribunal found that the assessee could not verify the entries from the seized material with regular books of account. The Tribunal accepted the department's contention that the mobile data pertained to the assessee.
Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal concluded that the entire amount of alleged unexplained purchases could not be added as income. Instead, only the profit embedded in these transactions should be taxed, considering the business nature of the purchases.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Tribunal rejected the assessee's argument that the images were not reliable evidence and that the entire purchase amount should not be treated as income. The Tribunal applied a profit rate based on past business performance.
Conclusions: The Tribunal sustained a reduced addition by estimating the profit at 8% on the unexplained purchases for both assessment years, rather than the entire purchase amounts.
3. Addition for Unaccounted Sales in A.Y. 2019-20:
Legal Framework and Precedents: The addition was based on documents seized from a related party, indicating unaccounted sales.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal found procedural lapses by the assessing officer, including failure to provide the assessee with the seized documents and the statement of a related party used against the assessee.
Key Evidence and Findings: The Tribunal noted the lack of direct evidence linking the assessee to the unaccounted sales and the absence of opportunity for cross-examination.
Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal determined that the addition was unjustified due to the lack of corroborative evidence and procedural fairness.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Tribunal sided with the assessee, emphasizing the importance of procedural justice and the inability to double tax the same income.
Conclusions: The Tribunal directed the deletion of the Rs. 50,270/- addition for unaccounted sales.
4. Applicability of Section 115BBE:
Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 115BBE provides for a higher tax rate on certain unexplained income.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the assessing officer did not issue a show cause notice for applying the higher tax rate, which was a violation of natural justice.
Conclusions: The Tribunal did not explicitly address the applicability of Section 115BBE in the final determination, focusing instead on the substantive issues of unexplained purchases and sales.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Tribunal established the principle that only the profit embedded in unexplained purchases should be taxed, rather than the entire purchase amount. This decision aligns with the precedent that past business performance should guide profit estimation.
Core Principles Established: Procedural fairness is crucial, and any evidence used against an assessee must be corroborated and disclosed. The Tribunal emphasized that double taxation of the same income is not permissible.
Final Determinations: The Tribunal partly allowed the appeals, reducing the additions for unexplained purchases by applying a profit rate and deleting the addition for unaccounted sales due to procedural lapses.
Addition u/s 69C - unexplained purchases - taxed the same u/s 115BBE - HELD THAT:- The assessee is in the business of non-edible oil and other soap material, therefore, the profit embedded in unexplained purchases should be estimated taking into consideration the GP which has been shown in the identical industry.
The past history of the assessee is best guiding factor of trade results.
As decided in the case of CIT Vs Bhawan Va Path Nirman (Bohra) [2002 (4) TMI 26 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT] has held that the past history of the assessee is best guiding factor.
The fact remains that the Ld. CIT (A) estimated the profit on short stock by applying profit rate of 6.97% and the weighted average rate of GP is 7.96% for A.Y. 2014-15, 2015-16, 2016-17 and 2017-18. Therefore, keeping in mind the doctrine of equity, justice and good conscious business income should be estimated @ 8% on the unexplained purchases.
Addition of unaccounted sales - AO made the addition treating the same as cash sales out of the books in the hands of the assessee on the basis of documents found from Shubh Laxmi Group seized - HELD THAT:- AO used the statement of Birendra Taparia against the assessee without providing the copy of the statement to the assessee and without providing opportunity of cross examination which is against the principle of natural justice.
AO has not reproduced the relevant part of the statement in the assessment order although he mentioned in assessment order that he is reproducing the relevant part of statement. AO has made separate addition on account of unaccounted purchases and short stock treating the same as unaccounted sales therefore, the separate addition on account of sales out of the books cannot be made. Therefore AO has not justified in making the addition on account of unaccounted sales.
Issues: (i) whether the earlier order of the Tribunal suffered from a mistake apparent on record and was liable to be recalled in view of the CBDT circular clarifying the nature of Form No. 10AC issued for registration under section 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) whether the assessee's appeal against rejection of the application for final registration was maintainable after the grant of regular registration.
Issue (i): Whether the earlier order of the Tribunal suffered from a mistake apparent on record and was liable to be recalled in view of the CBDT circular clarifying the nature of Form No. 10AC issued for registration under section 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: The registration granted in Form No. 10AC had been described as provisional because of the wording used in the form, but the subsequent CBDT Circular No. 11 of 2022 clarified that such forms issued due to technical glitches are to be treated as orders of registration. In that light, the premise on which the earlier remand was made was shown to be mistaken.
Conclusion: The earlier order contained a mistake apparent on record and was recalled.
Issue (ii): Whether the assessee's appeal against rejection of the application for final registration was maintainable after the grant of regular registration.
Analysis: Once the registration granted on 06.04.2022 was treated as regular registration valid up to AY 2026-27, there remained no live dispute requiring a further application for final registration. The appeal therefore ceased to have practical utility.
Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable and was dismissed as infructuous.
Final Conclusion: The Department succeeded in the miscellaneous application, the earlier Tribunal order was set aside by recall, and the assessee's appeal failed for want of maintainability.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the statutory form granting registration is later clarified by the competent authority to operate as a regular registration, an earlier contrary assumption constitutes a mistake apparent on record and any appeal seeking redundant final registration becomes infructuous.
Mistake apparent on record has occurred in the order of the Tribunal - trust had already been granted final registration, while the assessee believed it had provisional registration and applied for final registration - whether the trust's registration u/s 12A was provisional or final?
Assessee Trust was an existing charitable Trust u/s 12A before 01.04.2021 and the assessee had applied for fresh registration u/s 12A(1)(ac)(i) and fresh registration was granted on 06.04.2022 which was valid up to AY 2026-27. Assessee again applied for registration u/s 12A(1)(ac)(iii) which was rejected by the CIT (Exemptions), Kolkata observing that the registration of the assessee was valid till AY 2026-27 and there was no need to apply again. Assessee filed appeal before this Tribunal and the Tribunal set aside the order of ld. CIT (Exemption) and held that there was no bar in moving the application for final registration and restored the matter to ld. CIT (Exemption) to consider the application of the assessee for final registration
HELD THAT:- Where due to technical glitches, Form No. 10AC has been issued during FY 2021- 2022 with the heading “Order for provisional registration” or “ Order for provisional approval” instead of “Order for registration” or “ Order for approval”, then all such Form No. 10AC shall be considered as an “Order for registration or approval” and, in such cases where Form No. 10AC has been issued. Therefore, all registrations issued by CPC, Bengaluru under sub-clause (i) of section 12AC(1) would be construed as if granted for regular purposes.
Department has come with Miscellaneous Application stating therein that the observation of this Tribunal is based on incorrect assumption of facts and that the Tribunal has assumed that the assessee has been granted provisional registration whereas, the registration granted to the assessee earlier vide order dated 03.07.2020 was a regular/final registration.
As noted above, the aforesaid observation of the Tribunal was on account of the aforesaid confusion created on account of incorrect mention in the relevant columns of Form 10AC stating the said order to be a provisional order.
The said confusion stood clarified by the CBDT under circular No. 11 of l2022 (supra), vide which it has been clarified that the provisional registration will be construed as regular registration u/s 12A(1)(ac)(i) read with Section 12AB(1)(a) of the Act.
Therefore, there was no requirement of setting aside this matter to the file of the ld. CIT (Exemption). Therefore, under these circumstances, an inadvertent error apparent on record has occurred in the order of the Tribunal because of not bringing the aforesaid developments before this Tribunal. Therefore, the impugned order of the Tribunal[2024 (1) TMI 1437 - ITAT KOLKATA] is hereby recalled.
Dismissal for delay - condonation of delay - entertaining delayed appeal - interference with appellate tribunal order - decision on merits - question of law kept open
Dismissal for delay - condonation of delay - entertaining delayed appeal - The appeal should not be entertained in view of inordinate delay in filing and lack of satisfactory explanation. - HELD THAT: - The Court recorded a gross delay of 499 days in filing the appeal and found that the delay had not been satisfactorily explained. On that basis the Court exercised its discretion against condoning the delay and declined to admit the appeal for adjudication. [Paras 1]
Appeal dismissed on the ground of delay.
Interference with appellate tribunal order - decision on merits - No interference is warranted with the impugned order of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, Kolkata dated 14-06-2023; the appeal is dismissed also on merits. - HELD THAT: - Independent of the delay, the Court found no reason to disturb the Tribunal's order dated 14-06-2023 (CUSTA No. 76260/2016) and therefore declined to interfere. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on merits as well as on the procedural ground of delay. [Paras 2, 3]
No interference with the Tribunal's order; appeal dismissed on merits.
Question of law kept open - Question of law, if any, arising from the matter is not decided by the Court and is left open for consideration. - HELD THAT: - Although the appeal was dismissed both for delay and on merits, the Court expressly refrained from deciding any question of law and kept such question open for future determination. This leaves substantive legal issues, if framed, undecided by this order. [Paras 4]
Question of law left open.
Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed for inordinate and unexplained delay of 499 days and, additionally, on merits by refusing to interfere with the Tribunal's order dated 14-06-2023; any question of law is left open and pending applications are disposed of.
The core issues considered in this judgment are:
(1) Whether the Commissioner was justified in rejecting the declared assessable value of the imported Black Pepper, categorizing it as 'prohibited', and consequently re-determining the transaction value.
(2) Whether the penalties imposed under Sections 112 and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962, on the appellants were valid.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Rejection of Declared Value and Classification as 'Prohibited'
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The legal framework involves the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007, particularly Rule 3(1) and Rule 9, alongside Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962. The DGFT Notification No. 21/2015-20 sets a Minimum Import Price (MIP) for Black Pepper, deeming imports below 500 per Kg as 'Prohibited'.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal scrutinized the Commissioner's application of Rule 9, which is a residual method used when the value cannot be determined under preceding rules. The Tribunal found that the Commissioner's rejection of the declared value was based on an incorrect application of the rules, as the prohibition under the DGFT Notification was conditional and not absolute.
Key Evidence and Findings: The investigation revealed that the importer declared a higher value for Black Pepper than the actual transaction price. However, this overvaluation was argued to circumvent the MIP condition, not to defraud the exchequer. The Tribunal noted that the import was from a related entity, but this relationship alone was insufficient to reject the transaction value.
Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal emphasized that the DGFT Notification's prohibition was conditional, allowing imports if the CIF value exceeded 500 per Kg. Since the imports were declared above this threshold and duties were paid, the goods should not be classified as 'prohibited'.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellants argued that the declared value was consistent with Section 14 of the Customs Act and the Customs Valuation Rules. They contended that the overvaluation led to higher duty payments, benefiting the exchequer, thus negating any loss or fraud. The Tribunal found these arguments persuasive.
Conclusions: The Tribunal concluded that the Commissioner's rejection of the declared value and classification of the goods as 'prohibited' was unjustified. The declared value should not have been interfered with, and the goods should not be deemed 'prohibited' under the conditional DGFT Notification.
Issue 2: Imposition of Penalties
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The penalties were imposed under Sections 112 and 114AA of the Customs Act, which pertain to improper importation and misdeclaration, respectively.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal assessed whether the penalties were warranted given the circumstances. It noted that penalties under Section 112 require a clear violation of customs provisions, which was not established in this case.
Key Evidence and Findings: The Tribunal found no evidence of loss to the exchequer or fraudulent intent, as the appellants had paid the appropriate duties and taxes. The imposition of penalties appeared to lack a legal basis, as no specific contravention was identified.
Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal applied the legal standards for imposing penalties and found that the conditions for invoking Sections 112 and 114AA were not met. The appellants' actions did not constitute a misdeclaration or improper importation under the Customs Act.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellants argued that the penalties were based on an incorrect interpretation of the law, as there was no misdeclaration or violation of the MIP policy. The Tribunal agreed, noting the absence of any loss to the exchequer or fraudulent conduct.
Conclusions: The Tribunal concluded that the penalties imposed under Sections 112 and 114AA were unwarranted. The absence of any contravention of customs provisions rendered the penalties legally unsustainable.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Tribunal set aside the Commissioner's order in its entirety, including the re-determination of transaction value and the imposition of penalties. The Tribunal emphasized the conditional nature of the DGFT Notification, stating: "The prohibition is only a conditional one and not an absolute one." This underscores the principle that conditional prohibitions must be interpreted in light of their specific conditions.
The Tribunal also highlighted the importance of adhering to legal standards for imposing penalties, stating: "No notice per se can be issued even for imposition of penalty" without a clear contravention of customs provisions.
In conclusion, the Tribunal allowed the appeals, setting aside the penalties and re-determined values, and granted consequential benefits as per law. The judgment reinforces the necessity of precise legal grounds for rejecting declared values and imposing penalties under customs law.
Valuation of imported goods - Black Pepper - rejection of declared value - re-determination of transaction value - prohibited goods or not - Confiscation - penalty u/s 112 & 114AA of CA, 1962 - whether the importer had contravened the MIP price fixed by the DGFT N/N. 21/2015–20 dated 25.07.2018 or not? - HELD THAT:- There is no dispute that in terms of Explanation (1) (i) to Rule 12 ibid, when the proper officer has reason to doubt the declared value and where the declared value is rejected, the value shall be determined by proceeding sequentially in accordance with rules 4 to 9’.
Is the goods imported, a prohibited goods in India? - HELD THAT:- The answer is no, since, firstly the DGFT Notification No. 21/2015-2020 though prohibits the import as a policy, however the policy condition is not absolute. The same is subject to the condition that import is free if CIF is above Rs. 500/- per Kg.’ So, the subject goods is made ‘prohibited’, once again in a grave defiance of the condition of a guiding Rule/Circular issued in this regard, by ignoring that the prohibition is only a conditional one and not an absolute one.
References were made to clause (d)/para 2 of Article III, Article 5 of the SAFTA, apart from Article III of GATT, to highlight that Free Trade Agreements are part of International Law, accordingly the Govt. of India had granted concessional rate of Basic Customs Duty (BCD) for the impugned goods, but unfortunately, the Commissioner is only enforcing non-tariff restriction in the guise of MIP by treating the goods in question as ‘prohibited’.
Conclusion - The declared assessable value of the impugned goods did not warrant any interference, much less any re-determination as done by the proper officer in the impugned order and hence, the impugned order cannot sustain. Consequently, there cannot be any room also to impose any penalties under Sections 112 & 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 on the Appellants.
Appeal allowed.
Wrongful classification of imported goods - pudding and jelly - failure to affix stickers declaring RSP on the individual packets of imported goods - levy of penalty u/s 112 (a) of Customs Act, 1962 for allegations of contraventions and misdemeanors - HELD THAT:- The case against the main party on the issue of Notification was decided M/S MAGNUM CHOCOLATIER VERSUS C.C. AHMEDABAD [2019 (9) TMI 1221 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD]. However, the contents of the decision in the matter of M/s. Magnum Chocolatier do not indicate whether the issue of labelling of consignment was before the Division Bench of this Tribunal or was given relief of to the party at any stage earlier, before the contest in the Tribunal. Since, the decision delivered does not show any context on the point of RSP, it will be reasonable for this Court to conclude that the same was not agitated to the prejudice of the party by the department.
As far as, the issue of classification is concerned even from the judgment, it is clear that it has gone in favour of the importer, therefore, the main party stands exonerated of the charges. The question of any allegation sustaining against the CHA, therefore, does not arise. The decision cited by the learned advocate are clearly in support of the proposition that there was no prior knowledge of the contents of the container or how they were going to be presented before the Customs authority for examination. The actions taken by the CHA on the basis of documents presented to him by his client, who as on date also stands absolved do not leave any scope for imposition of penalty.
Conclusion - The actions taken by the Custom Broker were based on the information provided by the importer, absolving them of any penalty. The appellant was not liable for misclassification of goods and penalty under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962.
The impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
The primary issues considered in this judgment include:
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Refund Claim under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962
The appellant sought a refund of excess CVD paid, invoking Section 27 of the Customs Act, which mandates that refund claims be filed within one year of duty payment unless the duty was paid under protest. The appellant argued that the duty was paid under protest due to the unavailability of a relevant exemption notification on the ICEGATE Portal at the time of payment.
Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 27 outlines the conditions for refund claims, emphasizing the one-year limitation unless the duty was paid under protest. The appellant cited the Karnataka High Court's decision in DHL Express India Pvt. Ltd. to support their position.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal found no documentary evidence supporting the appellant's claim of having paid the duty under protest. The Tribunal noted that the appellant's refund claim was filed significantly beyond the one-year limitation period, and the circumstances at the time of duty payment did not justify a protest.
Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the rejection of the refund claim on the basis of being time-barred, as there was no evidence of duty payment under protest.
2. Reassessment of Bills of Entry
The appellant requested reassessment of the self-assessed Bills of Entry, arguing that reassessment was not mandatory for claiming a refund under Section 27. The appellant's request for reassessment was rejected without a speaking order, and this rejection was not challenged.
Legal Framework and Precedents: The Tribunal referenced the Supreme Court's decision in ITC Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, which clarified that refund claims under Section 27 require prior modification or reassessment of the self-assessed Bills of Entry.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal observed that the appellant's request for reassessment was rejected, and without a challenge to this rejection, the self-assessment remained final. The Tribunal emphasized that refund proceedings are not a substitute for assessment or reassessment proceedings.
Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the rejection of the refund claim due to the lack of reassessment of the Bills of Entry.
3. Unjust Enrichment
The Commissioner (Appeals) raised the issue of unjust enrichment, asserting that the appellant had passed on the duty incidence to the buyers, thus barring the refund claim.
Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 28D of the Customs Act presumes that the incidence of duty has been passed on to the buyer unless proven otherwise. The appellant provided a Chartered Accountant's certificate to counter this presumption.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal found the Chartered Accountant's certificate insufficient to prove that the duty incidence was not passed on to the buyers. The Tribunal referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd., emphasizing the need for claimants to establish that they bore the duty burden.
Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the rejection of the refund claim due to the appellant's failure to rebut the presumption of unjust enrichment.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Core Principles Established:
Final Determinations on Each Issue:
Refund claim for excess Countervailing Duty (CVD) paid - applicability of the principle of unjust enrichment - appellant passed on the incidence of the duty to the buyers or not - rejection also for want of reassessment - principles of unjust enrichment.
Refund claim for excess Countervailing Duty (CVD) paid - HELD THAT:- The refund claim in the present case is with respect to the excess CVD as was paid at the time of import of the mobile phones in the Year 2014. The claim has been filed in the Year 2019 pursuant to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. SRF Ltd. [2015 (4) TMI 561 - SUPREME COURT] - in any refund application on any ground whatsoever the same is required to be filed within one year from the date when the duty/excess duty, the refund whereof is claimed, was paid. The second proviso clarifies that one year limitation shall not apply if the duty/excess duty was paid under protest. The appellant otherwise has taken the plea the duty at the rate of 6% was paid under protest which otherwise was to be deposited at the rate of 1%. But there are no document on record to corroborate and justify the said testimony.
There are no fault when it has been held that the refund claim was filed much after the completion of one year from the date of payment of duty ass well as from the date of order of Hon’ble Supreme Court in SRF Ltd. The order to that extent is therefore hereby upheld.
Rejection for want of reassessment - HELD THAT:- It is observed that vide the same letter vide which the impugned claim was filed i.e. the letter dated 25.11.2019, the appellant had requested for amendment of 77 number of Bills of Entry which were of the impugned Bills of Entry. Apparently and admittedly, the said request has been rejected. Admittedly there is no challenge to the said rejection by the appellant. The outcome remains is that the Bills of Entry, though were self-assessed but have not got modified/amended/reassessed prior filing of the impugned refund claim - the grounds of grievance raised by the appellant against the impugned order are not sustainable. The order under challenge is therefore found no infirmity to this extent also.
Rejection on the ground of unjust enrichment - presumption about incidence of duty passed on to the buyer or not - HELD THAT:- HELD THAT:- The claims of refund except where provision is held unconstitutional, is to be preferred and adjudicated upon either under Section 11B of Central Excise Act, 1944 or under Section 27 of Customs Act, 1962. It shall be incumbent for the claimant to establish that the burden of duty has not been passed on to third party. The refund claim shall not be maintainable nor even by way of a civil suit the only possible remedy of that under Article 226 before Hon’ble High Court or under Article 32 before the Hon’ble Apex Court - the law of land and in absence of any evidence, other than the afore observed incomplete C.A. Certificate, to discharge the burden, there are no reason to differ with the findings arrived at by Commissioner (Appeals).
Conclusion - i) Refund claims under Section 27 of the Customs Act require adherence to the one-year limitation period unless duty was paid under protest, which must be substantiated with evidence. ii) Reassessment or amendment of self-assessed Bills of Entry is a prerequisite for processing refund claims under Section 27. iii) The principle of unjust enrichment applies to refund claims, and claimants must provide substantial evidence to prove that the duty incidence was not passed on to buyers.
Appeal dismissed.
The core legal issues considered in this judgment are:
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Legitimacy of Seizure and Confiscation of Gold Jewelry
The relevant legal framework involves the Customs Act, 1962, particularly Sections 111 and 123. Section 111 deals with the confiscation of improperly imported goods, while Section 123 places the burden of proof on the person from whom goods are seized to prove that they are not smuggled.
The Court examined the evidence provided by the appellants, including invoices and bank transaction details, to demonstrate that the gold was purchased legitimately from M/s Jain Jewellers and M/s Shree Jewellers in Chennai. The appellants argued that the gold did not bear foreign markings and was domestically acquired, thus not subject to seizure under the suspicion of smuggling.
The Court found that the appellants satisfactorily proved the ownership and legitimate purchase of the seized gold jewelry. There were no contradictions in their statements, and the transactions were consistent with normal business practices.
2. Burden of Proof under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962
Section 123 of the Customs Act requires that when goods are seized under the belief that they are smuggled, the burden of proof lies on the person from whom the goods were seized. The Court noted that the appellants provided invoices and bank transaction details as evidence of legitimate purchase, shifting the burden back to the Customs Department to prove smuggling.
The Court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India Vs Kasambhai Umerbhai Kureshi, which held that without reasonable belief of smuggling, Section 123 does not apply. The Court found that the Customs Department failed to establish a reasonable belief that the gold was smuggled.
3. Admissibility of Statements and Claims of Coercion
The appellants claimed that their initial statements were obtained under coercion and subsequently retracted them. The Court considered the retraction and the subsequent statements made by the appellants and other witnesses, such as the proprietor of M/s Jain Jewellers, which corroborated the appellants' claims of legitimate purchase.
The Court emphasized that the statements were consistent and supported by documentary evidence, thus dismissing the claims of coercion as not materially affecting the legitimacy of the appellants' claims.
4. Evaluation of Competing Arguments
The Customs Department argued that the appellants failed to prove that the gold was not smuggled, relying on the initial statements and the provisions of Section 123. However, the Court found that the appellants provided sufficient evidence to refute the presumption of smuggling, as required by the legal framework.
The Court also considered the decision in Commissioner of Customs, Cochin Vs Om Prakash Khatri, which dealt with the burden of proof and reasonable belief. However, the Court distinguished this case, noting that the appellants provided a satisfactory explanation and evidence for the legitimacy of the gold, rendering the cited case inapplicable.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Court held that the Customs Department failed to establish a reasonable belief that the seized gold was smuggled. The appellants successfully proved the legitimacy of their ownership and purchase of the gold jewelry.
Core Principles Established:
Final Determinations:
Smuggling of gold jewelry - burden of proof regarding the origin of the gold lies with the appellants or the Customs Department under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 - HELD THAT:- The appellants satisfactorily proved that seized gold belongs to them. There are no any material retractions or contradictions in their statement. Their statements are natural. No any special delays in statement of Appellant No. 1 on 05.04.2022 and 23.05.2022. Findings of Adjudicating Authority as well as Commissioner (Appeals) are based on assumptions and presumptions. M/s Jain Jewellers accepted to receive payment through RTGS. In business, payment as such in the statement are natural transaction.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs Kasambhai Umerbhai Kureshi [1979 (2) TMI 216 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] held that where there was nothing on record to show that the goods were seized by the Police on reasonable belief that they were smuggled goods, Section 123 would not apply.
Revenue relied on Commissioner of Customs, Cochin Vs Om Prakash Khatri [2019 (3) TMI 457 - KERALA HIGH COURT] in which it is held that “Burden of proof, reasonable belief, unmarked gold recovered from the possession of two persons and their statements as to the source of the gold sufficient to have a reasonable belief that gold is smuggled. No satisfactory explanation given to prove the legitimacy of the gold carried by intercepted persons. Burden of proof under Section 123 of Customs Act, 1962 being only of a reasonable belief, effectively discharged by Department. Mere fact that interception and seizure not affected in an international border or near an airport or seaport irrelevant. Onus to prove that the gold was not smuggled, so as to upset the reasonable belief entertained by Department shifted and squarely rested on owner. Registered produced and the transactions alleged as well as the quantity seized and that seen from the alleged Travel Authorisation Vouchers not tallying”. The seized gold or ornament, there is no sufficient reason to believe the gold is smuggled. Appellants have given satisfactory explanation about the seized gold. Therefore, this case law is not applicable in this case.
Conclusion - Revenue prima facie failed to establish reasonable belief that they are smuggled gold. Whereas appellants successfully proved the legitimacy of the gold carried by them.
Appeals have merit and are liable to be allowed.
Seeking approval of Resolution Plan - Authority to submit a Resolution Plan for consideration after the approval of another Resolution Plan by the Committee of Creditors - HELD THAT:- Resolution Plan submitted by SRA has been approved by the CoC and Application for approval of Resolution Plan is filed by the RP, which is pending consideration. There are various Applications, which were filed objecting to the Resolution Plan, which are also pending consideration before the Adjudicating Authority. The Adjudicating Authority by the order impugned itself, adjourned the Applications to next date, i.e., 09.12.2024. When a Resolution Plan has been approved by the CoC, the CoC is clearly bound by such approval of Resolution Plan.
The law in this reference is well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ebix Singapore Pvt. Ltd. vs. Committee of Creditors of Educomp Solutions Ltd. & Anr. [2021 (9) TMI 672 - SUPREME COURT], wherein it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that Resolution Plan even prior to the approval of the Adjudicating Authority is binding inter se the CoC and the SRA.
The CoC is clearly not entitled to consider any other request for consideration of any Resolution Plan, after it has approved the Resolution Plan, which is pending consideration for approval before the Adjudicating Authority. The learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the SRA itself is no longer in existence and one of the JV Partner has withdrawn and it has requested to opt another JV Partner, which itself makes the Plan unimplementable.
Conclusion - The rejection of the Appellant's Application was upheld as it was not within their jurisdiction to submit a new Resolution Plan.
Appeal dismissed.
The core legal questions considered by the Supreme Court in this judgment are:
1. Whether the High Court erred in granting bail to the respondent without adhering to the mandatory conditions prescribed under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA).
2. Whether the statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA are admissible, and if Article 20(3) of the Constitution provides protection against self-incrimination in this context.
3. Whether the offence of money laundering is independent of the predicate offence, and the implications of such independence on the prosecution of the accused.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Grant of Bail under Section 45 of the PMLA
Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 45 of the PMLA imposes stringent conditions for granting bail to individuals accused of money laundering. The section mandates that the court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing the accused is not guilty and is unlikely to commit an offence while on bail. This provision overrides the general bail provisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court emphasized that Section 45 is a special provision with an overriding effect, requiring strict compliance with its conditions before granting bail. The High Court failed to record any satisfaction regarding the innocence of the accused or the likelihood of reoffending, making its order unsustainable.
Key evidence and findings: The High Court granted bail without addressing the mandatory conditions of Section 45, focusing instead on extraneous considerations.
Application of law to facts: The Supreme Court found that the High Court's order did not comply with Section 45, as it did not consider whether the accused was likely to commit further offences or whether there were reasonable grounds to believe in his non-guilt.
Treatment of competing arguments: The respondent argued that the statements under Section 50 were inadmissible and that he had cooperated with the investigation. The Court dismissed these arguments, emphasizing the mandatory nature of Section 45.
Conclusions: The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court's order granting bail was flawed due to non-compliance with Section 45, warranting its reversal.
2. Admissibility of Statements under Section 50 of the PMLA
Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 50 of the PMLA empowers authorities to summon individuals and record their statements, which are admissible as evidence. Article 20(3) of the Constitution protects against self-incrimination.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court referenced the Vijay Madanlal Choudhary case, clarifying that statements under Section 50 are not protected by Article 20(3) since the protection applies to testimonial compulsion in court, not to statements made during investigations.
Key evidence and findings: The respondent's argument that the statements were inadmissible was rejected based on established precedents.
Application of law to facts: The Court applied the reasoning from Vijay Madanlal, affirming the admissibility of Section 50 statements and dismissing the respondent's claim of inadmissibility.
Treatment of competing arguments: The respondent's reliance on Article 20(3) was dismissed as the Court emphasized the distinction between investigative and testimonial compulsion.
Conclusions: The Court upheld the admissibility of statements recorded under Section 50, rejecting the respondent's arguments to the contrary.
3. Independence of Money Laundering Offence from Predicate Offence
Relevant legal framework and precedents: The PMLA defines money laundering as an independent offence, distinct from the predicate offence from which proceeds of crime are derived.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court reiterated that money laundering is a standalone offence, focusing on the process or activity involving proceeds of crime, irrespective of the status of the predicate offence.
Key evidence and findings: The respondent's argument that he was not shown as an accused in the predicate offence was deemed irrelevant, as money laundering is prosecuted independently.
Application of law to facts: The Court applied the established principle that involvement in the process or activity related to proceeds of crime constitutes money laundering, independent of the predicate offence.
Treatment of competing arguments: The respondent's argument was dismissed, with the Court emphasizing the independence of money laundering from the predicate offence.
Conclusions: The Court affirmed the independent nature of money laundering as an offence, rejecting arguments linking it to the predicate offence status.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Supreme Court's significant holdings include:
- Section 45 of the PMLA imposes mandatory conditions for granting bail, requiring courts to be satisfied of the accused's non-guilt and low likelihood of reoffending. The High Court's failure to adhere to these conditions rendered its bail order unsustainable.
- Statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA are admissible, and Article 20(3) does not apply to investigative processes under this section.
- Money laundering is an independent offence, distinct from the predicate offence, focusing on the process or activity involving proceeds of crime.
Final determinations:
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's bail order and remanded the case for fresh consideration, emphasizing the need for compliance with Section 45 of the PMLA. The respondent was directed to surrender, and the matter was to be reconsidered by a different High Court bench.
Legality of granting bail - Money Laundering - proceeds of crime - illegal mining and selling of sand without using the departmental pre-paid transportation E-challan - compliance with Section 45 of the PMLA or not - admissibility of statements recorded - HELD THAT:- It is well settled position of law that Section 45 of the PMLA starting with a non-obstante clause has an overriding effect on the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in case of conflict between them. Section 45 imposes two conditions for the grant of bail to any person, accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of more than 3 years under Part A of the Schedule. The two conditions are that (i) the prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail; and (ii) the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused person is not guilty of such offence and that he is not liable to commit any offence while on bail. As well settled, these two conditions are mandatory in nature and they need to be complied with before the accused person is released on bail.
It is further required to be noted that Section 65 of PMLA requires that the provisions of Cr.P.C. shall apply insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the PMLA and Section 71 provides that the provisions of PMLA shall have overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. Hence the conditions enumerated in Section 45 will have to be complied with even in respect of application for bail made under Section 439 of Cr.P.C.
So far as facts of the present case are concerned, the High Court in a very casual and cavalier manner, without considering the rigours of Section 45 granted bail to the respondent on absolutely extraneous and irrelevant considerations. There is no finding whatsoever recorded in the impugned order that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the respondent was not guilty of the alleged offence under the Act and that he was not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Noncompliance of the mandatory requirement of Section 45 has, on the face of it, made the impugned order unsustainable and untenable in the eye of law.
There are no substance in the submission made by learned Senior Advocate Ranjit Kumar for the respondent that the respondent has not been shown as an accused in the predicate offence. It is no more res integra that the offence of money laundering is an independent offence regarding the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, which had been derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to or in relation to a schedule offence. Hence, involvement in any one of such process or activity connected with the Proceeds of Crime would constitute offence of money laundering. This offence otherwise has nothing to do with the criminal activity relating to a schedule offence, except the Proceeds of Crime derived or obtained as a result of that crime.
As well settled, the offence of money laundering is not an ordinary offence. The PMLA has been enacted to deal with the subject of money laundering activities having transnational impact on financial systems including sovereignty and integrity of the countries. The offence of money laundering has been regarded as an aggravated form of crime world over and the offenders involved in the activity connected with the Proceeds of Crime are treated as a separate class from ordinary criminals. Any casual or cursory approach by the Courts while considering the bail application of the offender involved in the offence of money laundering and granting him bail by passing cryptic orders without considering the seriousness of the crime and without considering the rigours of Section 45, cannot be vindicated.
The impugned order passed by the High Court being in teeth of Section 45 of PMLA and also in the teeth of the settled legal position, it is opined that the impugned order deserves to be set aside, and the matter is required to be remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside, and the matter is remanded to the High Court for consideration afresh with the request to the Chief Justice to place the matter before the Bench other than the Bench which had passed the impugned order.
Conclusion - i) Section 45 of the PMLA imposes mandatory conditions for granting bail, requiring courts to be satisfied of the accused's non-guilt and low likelihood of reoffending. The High Court's failure to adhere to these conditions rendered its bail order unsustainable. ii) Statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA are admissible, and Article 20(3) does not apply to investigative processes under this section.
Appeal allowed by way of remand.
Issues: Whether bail should be granted in a prosecution under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 despite the rigours of Section 45, where the applicant was not named in the predicate FIR or ECIR, the material against him was prima facie limited, and the trial was not likely to conclude in the near future.
Analysis: The application turned on the interplay between the statutory restrictions on bail under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 and the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty and speedy trial. The material showed that the applicant had been in custody for a substantial period, had cooperated with the investigation, and that the prosecution case against him was substantially founded on statements of co-accused and on allegations that were yet to be tested at trial. The Court also noted that charges had not yet been framed and that the case was not likely to proceed to an early conclusion. In these circumstances, continued detention was considered inconsistent with the protection of liberty under Article 21, and the statutory threshold under Section 45 was not treated as a bar where the trial itself was unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time.
Conclusion: Bail was granted to the applicant.
Ratio Decidendi: The rigours of Section 45 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 may yield where the accused has undergone substantial pre-trial incarceration, has cooperated with investigation, and the trial is not likely to conclude within a reasonable time, because the constitutional right to personal liberty and speedy trial cannot be defeated by continued detention without meaningful progress in trial.
Money Laundering - seeking grant of bail - signing and approving fabricated invoices - Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - applicability of twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA - HELD THAT:- The statutory legal position as applicable is required to be considered and stated. Chapter III of the Constitution of India enumerates the fundamental rights which have been time and again construed to be inherent and any law which abrogates and abridges such fundamental rights would be violative of the basic structure doctrine including right of protection imposed against arrest and detention in certain cases contemplated under Article 22 of the Constitution of India.
In the present case it is seen that on 19.07.2023 Applicant was summoned by ED in connection with the investigation however ED exercised its power under Section 19 (1) of the PMLA arrested Applicant on the same day. It is seen that no grounds of arrest as mandated under Section 50 of Cr.P.C were provided save and expect an arrest memo. It is prima facie seen that Applicant before me has fully co-operated with the investigation and made all disclosures which is evident from the prosecution complaint appended at page No. 54 of the Application. Prosecution Compliant is filed on 15.09.2023.
The sole allegation against the Applicant is that he signed and approved fabricated invoices based on falsified attendance sheets of staff records thereby facilitating alleged fraudulent activities and generation of proceeds of crime. The Applicant held his position for only five months and verified 15 bills / invoices, one of the bill / invoice is appended at page Nos. 494 and 495 of the Application. There is no impediment or provision in EOI guidelines that mandated Dean of Jumbo Covid Centres to physically verify deployment of staff, their attendance or doctor to patient ratio which has been brought to my notice prima facie since that is one of the allegation in the prosecution complainant. Instead, designated staff members performed this duty and reported to the Dean - If at all it is prosecution case that Applicant aided fraudulent activities of M/s. Lifeline Hospital Management Services, prima facie there is no material on record to substantiate this allegation. The chargesheet encloses statements of co-accused which is the sole basis of allegation so as to come to conclusion that illegal proceeds of crime under the contract were routed to the Applicant via his driver once again will be a matter of trial. However, no recovery has been made till date.
When the investigation is completed, can twin conditions under Section 45 of PMLA be applied mechanically despite in absence of prima facie evidence, warranting further incarceration of the Applicant or otherwise? - HELD THAT:- It is seen that Applicant is not made an accused in predicate offence or in the ECIR. Chargesheet has been filed in predicate offence, however charges are yet to be framed. Trial is not likely to commence hence trial in PMLA offence cannot commence. Applicant is incarcerated for 1 year 6 months 25 days after duly co-operating with the investigation.
The existence of proceeds of crime at the time of trial of the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA can be proved only if the Scheduled Offence is established in prosecution of the Scheduled Offence. This clearly envisages that even if trial of the case under the PMLA proceeds it cannot be officially tested unless the trial of the Scheduled Offence concludes. In the present case before me in the Scheduled Offence, Chargesheet has been filed but trial is not likely to start in the near foreseeable future. Therefore prima facie, I see no possibility of both trials concluding in the foreseeable future. Applicant before me is in judicial custody pending trial for more than one year.
The Supreme Court in the case of Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. Vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh [1977 (12) TMI 143 - SUPREME COURT] has reiterated the same principle. Keeping the aforesaid principle in mind and the facts of the present case, it is prima facie seen that the present case would largely depend upon documentary evidence which is already seized by the prosecution and is made part of the Chargesheet. As such there is no possibility of tampering with the evidence.
The present case in hand is restricted to grant of bail on account of incarceration of the under trial accused / Applicant having fully co-operated in the investigation and made all disclosures, it is refrained to comment on any of the merits of the matter. Any comment made above on the merits is cursory and only to the extent of considering the Applicant's case for grant of bail and is not an opinion expressed by the Court so as to influence the trial which may be noted.
Conclusion - Given the incarceration of Applicant and the absence of any foreseeable conclusion of the trial, continued detention would violate the Applicant’s fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees a speedy trial and personal liberty. The primary allegation relates to the Applicant’s temporary position which no longer persists, mitigating concerns of tampering with the evidence. Any such apprehension can be addressed through appropriate conditions. Continued incarceration of the Applicant would be unwarranted and would amount to punitive detention prior to the establishment of guilt.
Applicant is granted bail subject to the fulfilment of conditions imposed - bail application allowed.
The core legal issues considered in this judgment include:
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Pre-show Cause Notice Consultation Requirement
- Legal Framework and Precedents: The Master Circular dated 10th March 2017 mandates pre-show cause notice consultation for demands above Rs. 50,00,000, except for preventive or offence-related SCNs. This requirement was reinforced by Circular No. 1079/03/2021-CX.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court emphasized that the pre-show cause notice consultation is a mandatory procedural requirement aimed at reducing unnecessary litigation by narrowing down disputes before issuing SCNs.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The Court noted that in most petitions, the SCNs were issued based on discrepancies between income reported in Form 26AS and Form ST-3 returns, without conducting the required pre-consultation.
- Application of Law to Facts: The Court found that the respondents failed to adhere to mandatory pre-consultation procedures, rendering the SCNs procedurally flawed.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The respondents argued that the SCNs were based on intelligence and thus exempt from pre-consultation. However, the Court rejected this, citing the clarification that exemptions are case-specific, not formation-specific.
- Conclusions: The absence of mandatory pre-consultation was deemed fatal to the validity of the SCNs.
2. Exceptions to Pre-consultation Requirement
- Legal Framework and Precedents: Circular No. 1079/03/2021-CX outlines exceptions to the pre-consultation requirement, such as cases involving fraud, collusion, or suppression of facts.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court assessed whether the SCNs fell within these exceptions and concluded that they did not, as they were primarily based on discrepancies in reported income rather than fraud or suppression.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The SCNs were found to lack specific allegations of fraud or collusion that would justify bypassing pre-consultation.
- Application of Law to Facts: The Court applied the exceptions criteria and determined that the SCNs did not meet the threshold for exemption from pre-consultation.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The respondents' claim that the SCNs were preventive was dismissed, as the Court highlighted the absence of preventive aspects in the SCNs.
- Conclusions: The SCNs were not exempt from pre-consultation under the outlined exceptions.
3. Revival of Original Show Cause Notices
- Legal Framework and Precedents: The pending proceedings before the Supreme Court regarding the revival of SCNs were noted, with reference to the decision in L AND T Hydrocarbon Engineering Ltd.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court acknowledged the possibility of reviving SCNs post pre-consultation, subject to the outcome of the Supreme Court proceedings.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The Court considered the procedural defects in the current SCNs and the ongoing Supreme Court case regarding SCN revival.
- Application of Law to Facts: The Court allowed for the potential revival of SCNs, contingent on the Supreme Court's decision.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The petitioners' concerns about the revival of SCNs were addressed by the Court's conditional allowance for such revival.
- Conclusions: The Court granted liberty to the respondents to revive SCNs post pre-consultation, subject to the Supreme Court's ruling.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
- Crucial Legal Reasoning: "ABSENCE OF MANDATORY PRE-SHOW CAUSE NOTICE CONSULTATION IS FATAL TO THE PRESENT SHOW CAUSE NOTICE."
- Core Principles Established: The mandatory nature of pre-show cause notice consultation for demands exceeding Rs. 50,00,000, unless specific exceptions apply, was reinforced.
- Final Determinations on Each Issue: The SCNs were quashed due to the absence of pre-consultation, with liberty granted for revival contingent on the Supreme Court's decision. The Court underscored the procedural importance of pre-consultation in tax demand cases, emphasizing adherence to established guidelines to prevent unnecessary litigation.
Issuance of the show cause notices (SCNs) by the respondents without pre-SCN consultation - violation of Master Circular dated 10th March 2017 or not - SCNs issued fall within the exceptions outlined in the Circular No. 1079/03/2021-CX dated 11th November 2021 or not - HELD THAT:- The SCN itself is absolutely vague and without reference to any of the contentions which are raised by the petitioners in pre-consultation which is already decided by the respondents-authorities vide order dated 19.10.2023 passed disposing such contentions during the pendency of these petitions.
In the facts of the case, the Adjudicating Authority has also passed an Order-in-Original dealing with such contentions of the petitioners confirming the demand. However, the show cause notice dated 29th September, 2020 did not contain any of the grounds on which Order-in-Original is passed or the grounds on which the objections are disposed of in pre-consultation during the pendency of these petitions. In such circumstances, the respondents-authorities is required to issue a fresh show cause notice in accordance with law.
In view of the decision of this Court in case of L AND T Hydrocarbon Engineering Ltd. [2022 (4) TMI 70 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT], it is opined that none of the show cause notice except Special Civil Application No. 5685 of 2022 can be sustained in absence of pre-consultation notice. Even in Special Civil Application No. 5685 of 2022, the show cause notice contained the ingredients of the issue of liability of the petitioner but it only refers to the difference in value of income as per Form 26AS and as per Form ST-3 returns filed by the petitioner. In such circumstances, the show cause notices issued in the respective petitions are hereby quashed and set aside and therefore as a consequence the Order-in-Original if any shall also be quashed and set aside, with a liberty to the respondent-Department to initiate the proceedings or to revive the original show cause notice subject to outcome of the pending proceedings before the Hon’ble Apex Court in accordance with law.
Conclusion - Absence of mandatory pre-SCN consultation is fatal the the present SCN.
Petition disposed off.
Issues: Whether the appeal survived after the appellant company was ordered into liquidation and no application was made for continuance of the proceedings by the liquidator.
Analysis: The appellant company had been placed under liquidation, and the Tribunal noted that the departmental claim had not been registered in the liquidation proceedings in respect of the disputed demand. In the absence of any application by the liquidator for continuance of the appeal under Rule 22 of the CESTAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982, the proceedings could not be continued. The Tribunal also referred to the settled position that claims not forming part of the resolution plan stand extinguished, and to the liquidation framework under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
Conclusion: The appeal abated and could not be proceeded with.
Final Conclusion: The matter was disposed of without adjudication on the tax demand, as the proceedings ceased to survive in view of liquidation and the absence of a continuance application.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a company is in liquidation and no application is made for continuance of the appeal by the liquidator under the applicable procedural rule, the appeal abates and cannot be heard on merits.
Abatement of appeal - Non-payment of Service Tax under Goods Transport Agency Services on freight amounts paid to M/s. Gaerish Logistics (P) Ltd. for handling export goods - eligibility for exemption under N/N. 18/2009-ST. - HELD THAT:- As the NCLT, Chennai has ordered for Liquidation of the appellant vide its order dated 19.03.2018 and as the Liquidator has confirmed non receipt of claim from the Deputy Commissioner of GST and Central Excise, Trichy and also as no application as per Rule 22 has been made by the Official Liquidator appointed by the NCLT for continuance of the appeal, the appeal should abate in terms of the above referred Rule.
As such the appeal gets abated in terms of Rule 22 of the CESTAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982.
The core legal questions considered in this judgment revolve around the denial of CENVAT Credit claimed by the Appellant, M/s. The Dhamra Port Company Limited, on various goods and services categorized as either capital goods or input services under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The issues include:
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Capital Goods Classification
The relevant legal framework involves Rule 2(a) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, which defines "capital goods." The Court interpreted that the items in question, such as "Electrical Transmission Tower Materials," are components or accessories of capital goods used in power transmission lines. The Court relied on precedents, including the Supreme Court's decision in M/s. Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune, which recognized similar items as capital goods. The Court concluded that these items qualify as capital goods, allowing the CENVAT Credit claimed.
2. Input Services Classification
The legal framework for input services is provided by Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, which includes services used in relation to business activities. The Court examined services like "Health Insurance of staff and family," finding them integral to business operations under the Major Port Trust Act, 1963, and the Indian Ports Act, 1908. The Court referenced the Tribunal's decision in M/s. Indian Bank v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Kolkata, supporting the inclusion of such services as input services. Similarly, services related to construction, housekeeping, and advisory functions were deemed essential to the business, qualifying for CENVAT Credit.
3. Excess Credit and Improper Documentation
For excess credit availed, the Appellant agreed to reverse part of the credit, which the Court upheld. Regarding credit availed on improper documents, the Court found procedural lapses, such as missing registration numbers, to be curable and not grounds for denying credit. The Court referenced the definition of input services, emphasizing the broad scope covering business-related services.
4. Extended Period of Limitation and Penalties
The Court examined whether the extended period of limitation was applicable, noting the absence of evidence for suppression with intent to evade tax. Consequently, the invocation of the extended period was deemed unsustainable. The Court also found no basis for imposing penalties, considering the circumstances and lack of deliberate non-compliance.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Court established several core principles:
Final Determinations:
Denial of CENVAT Credit - capital goods/input services - Electrical Transmission Tower Materials - 132 KVD/CTLNT Towers - Mild Steel Section for Templates - Health Insurance of staff and family - Consultancy for construction of railway line - Supervision charges for construction of Electrical Transmission Towers - denial of CENVAT Credit on the grounds of Excess credit availed and Credit availed on improper documents - applicability of the extended period of limitation - imposition of penalties.
Whether the goods such as Electrical Transmission Tower Materials, 132 KVD/CTLNT Towers, and Mild Steel Section for Templates qualify as capital goods under Rule 2(a) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004? - HELD THAT:- These items have been used by the Appellant in relation to transmission of electricity through Power Transmission Lines and thus the same are to be treated as components or accessories of capital goods falling in terms of Rule 2(a)(A) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. These Power Transmission lines cannot be erected without transmission towers; the transmission towers, hence, are the necessary component of Power Transmission Line and thus the same are to be treated as the components or accessories of the capital goods falling under clause (i) of the Rule 2(a)(A) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004; as per clause (iii), the components, spares and accessories of the goods specified at clause (i) and (ii) of Rule 2(a)(A) of the Rules are eligible as capital goods - the transmission towers are eligible capital goods in terms of clause (iii) of Rule 2(a) (A) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and the CENVAT Credit of duty of Rs.90,44,256/- has correctly been correctly availed by the Appellant in respect of such goods.
This issue is no more res integra as an identical issue has already been examined in the case of M/s. Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune [2024 (11) TMI 1042 - SUPREME COURT] wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has allowed the credit in respect of similar items/goods holding the same as components/accessories of capital goods falling under sub-clause (i) of Rule 2(a)(A) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
Thus, the Appellant is eligible for the credit in respect of “Electrical Transmission Tower Materials”, “132 KVD/CTLNT Towers” and “Mild Steel Section for Templates”. Accordingly, the denial of CENVAT Credit to the appellant on this count is set aside.
Whether services like Health Insurance of staff and family, Consultancy for construction of railway line, Supervision charges for construction of Electrical Transmission Towers, and others qualify as Input services under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004? - HELD THAT:- The provision of medical facilities within the Port Area is a pre-requisite for obtaining approval for the port under the Major Port Trust Act, 1963 and the Indian Ports Act, 1908. It has been stated by the Appellant that they have an insurance policy to cover the hospitalization expenses of the employees and their family members as per the company's policy of the 'Corporate Social Responsibility’. Therefore, the same are input services for availing credit of Service Tax - the denial of credit in respect of “Health Insurance of staff and family” vide the impugned order is not sustainable.
Whether the denial of CENVAT Credit on the grounds of Excess credit availed and Credit availed on improper documents is justified? - HELD THAT:- The submission of the Appellant that discrepancies pointed out by Revenue in the Show Cause Notice such as Telephone bills in name of employee, non-mentioning of Service Tax Registration number in invoices, invoices in name of previous entity viz. Tata Steels, Jurisdictional details not mentioned, etc., are procedural infractions due to which substantive benefit of credit cannot be denied to the Appellant, are agreed upon. Accordingly, the CENVAT Credit availed by the Appellant in this regard remains allowed, as they are covered within the definition of 'input services'.
However, the Appellant is liable to reverse the credit of Rs.25,544/- out of the credit of Rs.9,65,903/-, along with interest, which the Appellant had agreed to reverse before the ld. adjudicating authority. Consequently, the Appellant is eligible for the credit of Rs.9,40,359/- [Rs.9,65,903/- - Rs.25,544/-] denied by the ld. adjudicating authority and they are liable to reverse the credit of Rs.25,544/-, along with interest, if not reversed already.
Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The issues involved in the present appeal were subject matters of litigation before various legal fora. Further, the Department has not brought in any evidence to establish the allegation of suppression with intention to evade tax on the part of the Appellant. In these circumstances, the invocation of extended period of limitation is not sustainable. Therefore, the Appellant succeeds on merits as well as on limitation.
Levy of penalties - HELD THAT:- The penalties are not imposable on the Appellant. Accordingly, the penalties imposed are set aside.
Conclusion - i) The denial of CENVAT Credit for items listed as capital goods and input services was set aside. ii) The Appellant was required to reverse specific amounts of credit they agreed to, but the remaining credit was deemed eligible. iii) The demand raised by invoking the extended period of limitation was set aside, and no penalties were imposed.
Appeal disposed off.
The core legal issues considered in this judgment are:
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Service Tax Liability and Abatement Claims:
The appellant was registered under the 'rent-a-cab scheme operator's service' and had been paying Service Tax. However, the Revenue demanded additional Service Tax based on the appellant's financial records, which included income from car hiring charges, fuel income, overtime charges, and parking fees. The appellant argued that these were not taxable and claimed abatement under Notification No. 01/2006-S.T. The Court found that the appellant failed to provide evidence to support their claim for abatement, as they had invoiced Service Tax on the gross amount without availing any abatement.
For the 'tour operator's service', the appellant accepted a short-paid Service Tax liability after considering a 75% abatement under Notification No. 38/2007-S.T. The Court upheld this calculation as the appellant did not contest it on merits.
Regarding 'business auxiliary service', the appellant accepted the demand calculated by considering the gross amount as cum tax value. The Court upheld this as the appellant did not contest it on merits.
Limitation Period:
The appellant contested the demands primarily on the grounds of limitation, arguing that the data from their financial statements alone should not automatically determine tax liability. They contended that the extended period of limitation was invoked without evidence of suppression of facts or intent to evade tax. The Court agreed, noting that the appellant had been regularly filing returns and paying taxes, and thus, the extended period of limitation was not applicable. Consequently, the Court restricted the demands to the normal period of limitation.
Penalties:
The Court set aside the penalty under Section 78, as there was no evidence of intentional suppression or evasion. However, penalties under Sections 77(1)(a) and 77(2) were upheld due to the appellant's failure to register for services under the categories of 'tour operator's service' and 'business auxiliary service'.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Court held that:
The appeal was disposed of with these determinations, emphasizing the need for precise evidence and adherence to statutory limitations in tax demands.
Liability to pay service tax - rent-a-cab scheme operator's service - tour operator's service - business auxiliary service - abatement under N/N. 01/2006-S.T. for rent-a-cab services and N/N. 38/2007-S.T. for tour operator services - extended period of limitation - penalties u/s 78 and Sections 77(1)(a) and 77(2) of the Finance Act, 1994.
Abatement under N/N. 01/2006-S.T. for rent-a-cab services and N/N. 38/2007-S.T. for tour operator services - HELD THAT:- The appellant submits that rightly paid service tax on the liability payable by them and differential Service Tax liability confirmed in the impugned order is on account of not allowing the abatement provided under N/N. 01/2006-S.T. dated 01.03.2006. The appellant claims that they are eligible for the abatement which has not been extended to them by the ld. adjudicating authority. However, it is found that the ld. adjudicating authority has observed that the appellant has raised the bill for Service Tax on the gross amount without availing any abatement. It is found that the appellant has not disputed this finding of the Ld. adjudicating authority. It is also found that the appellant has also not produced any evidence to substantiate their claim of eligibility for the abatement.
Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The appellant has been registered with the Service Tax Department and had been paying Service Tax regularly and also filing returns. Thus, the demand of Service Tax short paid, if any, should have been raised within the normal period of limitation as there is no suppression of facts with intention to evade payment established in this case. It is held that the extended period of limitation cannot be invoked to demand Service Tax in this case. Accordingly, the demand of Service Tax by invoking the extended period of limitation is not sustainable.
Penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 - HELD THAT:- Penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 is not imposable on the appellant. Consequently, the penalty imposed under Section 78 of the Act is set aside.
Penalties imposed under Section 77(1)(a) and Section 77(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 - HELD THAT:- The appellant has not made any submission for non-imposition of penalties under these sections. We find that the appellant has not registered for rendering service under the category of ‘tour operator’s service’ and ‘business auxiliary service’ . Thus, the penalties under Sections 77(1)(a) and Section 77(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 has been rightly imposed. Accordingly, the penalties imposed under these sections upheld.
Conclusion - i) The demands for Service Tax under the categories of 'rent-a-cab scheme operator's service', 'tour operator's service', and 'business auxiliary service' are not sustainable for the extended period of limitation due to lack of evidence of suppression or intent to evade tax. ii) The appellant is liable to pay Service Tax for the normal period of limitation along with interest. iii) The penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 is not imposable, while penalties under Sections 77(1)(a) and 77(2) are upheld.
Appeal disposed off.
Issues Presented and Considered:
The Tribunal considered the following core legal questions:
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Eligibility for Cenvat Credit on Dumpers/Tippers:
The relevant legal framework includes Rule 2(a) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, which defines capital goods, and Notification No. 25/2010, which specifies that dumpers/tippers must be registered in the name of the service provider to avail Cenvat Credit. The appellant argued that ownership is not a criterion for denial of credit, citing several precedents supporting the eligibility of Cenvat Credit on leased capital goods.
The Tribunal noted that prior to Notification No. 25/2010, the issue of eligibility was settled in favor of the appellant by various decisions, including the case of Hindustan Copper Ltd. However, the introduction of Notification No. 25/2010 changed the statutory position, requiring strict compliance with the registration requirement. The Tribunal emphasized the Supreme Court's ruling in Dilip Kumar & Company, which mandates strict interpretation of exemption provisions in favor of the Revenue.
Consequently, the Tribunal concluded that since the dumpers/tippers were not registered in the appellant's name, Cenvat Credit was not admissible.
2. Applicability of the Extended Period for Demand:
The appellant contended that the extended period under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994, is applicable only in cases of fraud, collusion, or willful misstatement. The appellant maintained regular accounts and filed returns, arguing that the department's delay in scrutiny does not justify invoking the extended period.
The Tribunal agreed with the appellant, noting the absence of evidence indicating an intention to evade tax. The Tribunal referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Pratibha Processors, emphasizing that interest is compensatory and not punitive. Therefore, the demand for the extended period was set aside.
3. Imposition of Penalties:
The Tribunal considered whether penalties under Rule 15(3) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, were warranted. The appellant argued that the lack of clarity in the statutory provisions and the absence of intent to evade duty should preclude penalties.
The Tribunal concurred, finding no evidence of deliberate suppression or intent to evade duty. The penalties were deemed unjustified and were consequently set aside.
Significant Holdings:
The Tribunal upheld the demand for Cenvat Credit and interest for the normal period but set aside the penalty and the demand for the extended period. The Tribunal emphasized the necessity of strict compliance with statutory provisions, particularly regarding the registration requirement for availing Cenvat Credit on dumpers/tippers.
Key legal reasoning included the principle that ambiguity in taxation statutes should be resolved in favor of the subject, except in the case of exemption provisions, which must be interpreted strictly in favor of the Revenue.
The final determination was a partial modification of the impugned order, allowing the appeal to the extent of setting aside penalties and the extended period demand.
CENVAT Credit - dumpers/tippers were received from M/s SREI Equipment Finance Pvt. Ltd. (SEFPL) under operating lease agreement and not registered in their name - penalty - demand of interest - extended period of limitation.
HELD THAT:- The issue relating to availment of Cenvat Credit on Dumpers/Tippers prior to 22.06.2010 is no more res integra. Reliance placed on the decision of Commissioner of Central Excise, Bhopal vs Hindustan Copper Ltd [2016 (8) TMI 1127 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] in the regard. This Tribunal in the case of Commissioner, C.Ex & CGST, Delhi-III vs Brahmaputra Infrastructure Ltd., [2018 (7) TMI 438 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] has held 'appellant would be eligible for Cenvat credit 6 ST/53655 of 2015 on dumpers / tippers as inputs which are used for providing the output service. However, the controversy stand resolved with effect from 22/06/2010 with issue of notification No. 25/2010-CE which has amended the Cenvat Credit Rules to allow Cenvat credit for dumpers / tippers registered in the name of service provider for providing taxable service for providing site formation etc.'
The definition of capital goods in clause (C) was inserted to provide availment of Cenvat credit on Dumpers/Tippers provided such dumpers and tippers are registered in the name of the service provider. When there was ambiguity in the said Rules, the Tribunal and other Appellate forum allowed the credit on such dumpers/tippers following the Apex Court decision in the case of Belani Ores Ltd. Etc. vs. State of Orissa Etc. [1974 (9) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT]. However, once a specific provision had been inserted in the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, it would have to be given a strict interpretation. In the present case, it is noted that the dumpers/tippers on which Cenvat credit had been availed, was not registered in the name of the appellant, as it was in the name of SREI Equipment Finance Pvt Ltd. As the aforesaid notification clearly laid down that such credit could be availed only if the dumpers/tippers were registered in the name of the service provider, the same was not available to the appellant.
Demand of interest - HELD THAT:- Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha Processors & Ors vs Union of India & Ors [1996 (10) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT] has held that “Interest is compensatory in character and is imposed on an assessee who has withheld payment of any tax as and when it is due and payable.” Accordingly, the demand for interest is also upheld.
Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- Prior to the N/N. 3/2011-CE(NT) dated 01.03.2011, the issue was settled in the favour of the appellant by several decisions of the Tribunal and other appellate fora. The appellant was under the genuine belief that the Cenvat credit on such dumpers/tippers were available to him, under Rule 4(3) of the said Rules. There is no evidence of their intention to evade duty. Thus, the penalty under Rule 14 is not attracted. The demand for the extended period is set-aside.
Conclusion - i) Since the dumpers/tippers were not registered in the appellant's name, Cenvat Credit was not admissible. ii) The demand of interest upheld. iii) Demand for the extended period is set-aside.
Appeal allowed in part.
The core legal issue considered was whether the appellants were liable to pay service tax on the turnover related to cable network service charges and the sale of Set Top Boxes (STBs) amounting to Rs. 47,99,960/- for the financial year 2014-2015 under the Finance Act, 1994.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant legal framework and precedents: The primary legal framework involved was the Finance Act, 1994, specifically concerning the levy of service tax. The case also referenced the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC) instructions regarding the issuance of show cause notices based on ITR-TDS data. The Tribunal's decision in the case of UCN Cable Network Pvt. Ltd. and the Supreme Court's ruling on the nature of STBs as a deemed sale (not liable to service tax) were pivotal precedents.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal scrutinized the original and appellate authorities' orders, which were based on the assumption that the entire turnover was liable to service tax. It noted that the CBIC had issued instructions to ensure show cause notices were not issued indiscriminately based on discrepancies between ITR-TDS data and service tax returns without proper verification. The Tribunal also considered the precedent that STBs are deemed sales and not services, thereby not subject to service tax.
Key evidence and findings: The appellants provided a detailed breakdown of their turnover, certified by a Chartered Accountant, distinguishing between service-related turnover and STB sales. The Tribunal found that the appellants had already paid the service tax, interest, and penalties voluntarily, based on the correct taxable turnover.
Application of law to facts: The Tribunal applied the CBIC instructions and relevant case law to determine that the appellants' turnover related to STBs was not subject to service tax. It further acknowledged the appellants' voluntary compliance in paying the service tax on the correct turnover amount, as verified by their financial records.
Treatment of competing arguments: The Tribunal noted that the original and appellate authorities failed to discuss how the facts of the case aligned with the relied-upon decision in UCN Cable Network Pvt. Ltd. It also highlighted the lack of consideration for the CBIC's instructions in the adjudication process.
Conclusions: The Tribunal concluded that the appellants had correctly determined and paid their service tax liability, including interest and penalties. It found no grounds to uphold the demands made in the show cause proceedings, given the appellants' compliance and the CBIC's instructions.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning: The Tribunal emphasized that "the nature of activity undertaken by the DTH operator in providing STB to a subscriber, is provision of an equipment, which is one-time activity, and it is not a part of DTH service in providing television channels for viewing by the subscriber."
Core principles established: The Tribunal reinforced the principle that STBs are deemed sales and not subject to service tax. It also highlighted the necessity of adhering to CBIC instructions to avoid indiscriminate issuance of show cause notices based on ITR-TDS data discrepancies.
Final determinations on each issue: The Tribunal set aside the impugned order, allowing the appeal based on the appellants' voluntary payment of the differential service tax amount. It recognized the appellants' compliance with the law and the lack of evidence supporting the additional service tax demand.
Levy of service tax - value of turnover towards cable network service charges and sale of Set Top Box (STB) as shown in the Profit & Loss account enclosed with ITR-V Income Tax Return for the Financial Year 2014- 2015 in terms of the Finance Act, 1994 - HELD THAT:- Though the SCN was issued in the present case prior to the issue of the instructions dated 26.10.2021, the crux of the above instructions squarely apply to the present case. Firstly, the original authority did not discuss the issues under consideration for coming to a conclusion and for confirming the demands raised in show-cause notice, and the learned Commissioner (Appeals) had upheld such order, on the basis of the decision taken by the Tribunal in the case of UCN Cable Network Pvt. Ltd. [2016 (9) TMI 188 - CESTAT MUMBAI] without discussing how the present facts of the case fits in to such relied upon decision.
The issue of supply of Set Top Box (STB) by the MSO to their customer, whether it would amenable to levy of service tax or not, was examined by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Dish TV India Limited Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Aurangabad [2023 (7) TMI 1238 - CESTAT MUMBAI], wherein it was held that supply of STBs by the appellants is not a service, rather it is a deemed sale, leviable to VAT under the State legislature.
The appellants themselves have correctly determined the service tax payable by them, from their financial records duly certified by the Chartered Accountant, and thus have fulfilled all the requirements for discharge of service tax liability along with applicable interest and penalty voluntarily, before filing this appeal before the Tribunal on 28.06.2021. In the above circumstances and on the basis of the discussions, there are no strong grounds found to hold that the appellants did not pay service tax in respect of the differential amount demanded in the show cause proceedings, owing to the reason that the service tax on the taxable value of turnover relating to the financial year 2014-2015 as detailed, have been duly paid by the appellants and the same has been accepted by the Department.
Conclusion - The nature of activity undertaken by the DTH operator in providing STB to a subscriber, is provision of an equipment, which is one-time activity, and it is not a part of DTH service in providing television channels for viewing by the subscriber. STBs are deemed sales and not subject to service tax.
The impugned order set aside - appeal allowed.
Issues: Whether, in respect of credit attributable to exempted clearances, the demand under Rule 6(3)(i) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 could be sustained when the appellant had already reversed the credit along with interest.
Analysis: The credit relatable to exempted goods stood reversed and the interest liability was also discharged. The undisputed excess availment was limited, while the demand raised under the procedural requirement was far higher than the benefit, if any, derived. No deliberate deception or unfair advantage was established. In these circumstances, the dispute was treated as one of procedure, and the principle of substantial justice was applied to avoid prolonging a low-value demand.
Conclusion: The demand was not sustained as such. The credit reversed by the appellant and the interest already paid were confirmed, and the impugned order was set aside.
Ratio Decidendi: Where credit relatable to exempted goods is reversed with interest and no deliberate evasion is shown, a purely procedural lapse should not justify a disproportionate demand; substantial justice prevails over technical non-compliance.
Denial of CENVAT Credit - input services - Goods Transport by Road (Freight Inward) - Manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency service - Business Support Service - recovery with interest and penalty - HELD THAT:- It is observed that the appellant has reversed the credit involved on the exempted products and have also paid the interest due. The fact that the excess availed is only Rs 4,03,509/- has not been contested by the Ld. Original Authority. He however felt that the proper procedure had not been followed and demanded the amount payable in terms of Rule 6(3)(i) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.
The whole issue is procedural in nature and while the appellant was required to follow the prescribed procedure, no act of deliberate deception with the design of securing an unfair advantage has been made out. This being so and considering that demand is disproportionately higher than the advantage if any gained by the appellant and which has subsequently been reversed along with interest, the ends of justice would be met by confirming the credit reversed along with interest already paid and the dispute brought to a close. No purpose would be served in pursuing this low tax amount now that the Finance Act 1994, itself has been repealed.
Conclusion - While acknowledging procedural lapses, there are no deliberate deception by the appellant to gain an unfair advantage. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, consideration of justice and expediency requires that the impugned order be set aside and the credit reversed and interest already paid by the appellant be confirmed.
Appeal disposed off.
Issues: Whether the duty demand raised on the principal unit for clearances shown in the name of the alleged separate unit could be sustained when the record showed the existence of a distinct unit and the show cause notice was not effectively pursued against the alleged dummy unit.
Analysis: The record showed that the appellant had leased a demarcated portion of the premises to the other concern under a written rent agreement, that the other concern had obtained independent registrations and certificates from several statutory authorities, and that its manufacture and clearances were supported by invoices and other documentary material. The demand itself proceeded on the basis that the clearances in the name of the other concern were to be treated as those of the appellant, which was in substance a clubbing case. The statement relied upon by the department was treated as insufficient to displace the contemporaneous documentary evidence, and the absence of a sustainable basis to fasten the entire liability on the principal unit was held to be fatal to the demand.
Conclusion: The demand could not be sustained against the appellant, and the impugned order was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on merits and the assessee obtained complete relief from the duty demand and consequential penalties.
Ratio Decidendi: Where contemporaneous documentary evidence establishes the existence and independent functioning of a separate unit, a duty demand cannot be sustained against the principal unit merely on the basis of contrary oral statements and an unsubstantiated clubbing theory.
Clubbing of clearances for excise duty purposes - clearance of M/s Macons Engineers are required to be clubbed with the clearances of M/s Maxocrete Equipments (M/s Macons Equipments) or not - M/s Macons Engineers was a dummy unit - HELD THAT:- The unit of M/s Macons Engineers was considered as a dummy unit by the Central Excise authorities and therefore the documented clearances of M/s. Mecons Engineers cleared from the premises 37-C/A were considered to be that of Ms/ Maxocrete Equipments i.e. the present appellant.
The appellants in the instant case has sought to rely on the various case laws as cited above (para 3.1 of this order refers) in their submissions that the show cause notice if not issued to alleged dummy unit, all proceedings initiated against the principal unit would be vitiated. The above said proposition is a question of trite law emanating from above cited rulings which can be raised at any time. Therefore, the Learned Commissioner (Appeals) has clearly erred in denying them the benefit of legal proportion as indicated by appellants which mostly developed later. As things stand today, it is fairly well settled that the show cause notice is required to be issued both to Principal unit as well as alleged dummy unit. Same having been done by the department, the case against principal unit cannot stand.
The violation of GIDC agreement, if at all exists is a matter between GIDC and the appellants. Apart from, the above proposition additionally the overwhelming evidence indicates that M/s Macons Engineers was a unit in existence duly documented by various agencies and statement under Section 14 if any to the contrary cannot be given precedence over such documentary evidence.
Conclusion - i) The proceedings against a principal unit cannot stand without issuing a Show-cause Notice to the alleged dummy unit. ii) The documentary evidence presented by M/s Maxocrete Equipments sufficiently established the separate existence of M/s Macons Engineers, thereby nullifying the department's allegations.
Te order of Commissioner (Appeals) is set aside and appeal is allowed.
The core legal question considered in this judgment is whether interest is payable on the voluntary payments/deposit made by the appellant during the investigation period for the alleged removal of Coumarin without payment of duty. Specifically, the Tribunal examined whether the appellant is entitled to interest on the refund of Rs. 19,47,750/- at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of deposit until the date of payment.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents
The legal framework primarily involves Section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944, which deals with the payment of interest on refunds. Additionally, the Tribunal referred to Section 11B and Section 11BB of the Excise Act, which pertain to claims for refund of duty and interest on delayed refunds, respectively. The Tribunal also considered precedents set by similar cases, notably the decision in Parle Agro Pvt. Ltd. and the guidance from the Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBE&C).
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning
The Tribunal noted that the issue of interest on voluntary deposits made during investigations has been previously addressed by a co-ordinate Bench in the Parle Agro Pvt. Ltd. case. It was determined that interest is payable from the date of deposit until the date of payment. The Tribunal emphasized that there is no specific provision in the Excise Act dealing with the refund of revenue deposits, and thus, general principles and precedents must guide the determination of interest rates.
Key Evidence and Findings
The Tribunal found that the appellant had deposited Rs. 20 lakhs during the investigation, which was later adjusted against the confirmed duty liability. The original authority sanctioned a refund of Rs. 19,47,750/- after deducting penalties. The Tribunal confirmed that the refund was processed as per the law, but the issue of interest remained unresolved.
Application of Law to Facts
The Tribunal applied the legal principles established in Parle Agro Pvt. Ltd., where interest was granted at the rate of 12% per annum. It considered the lack of specific provisions for revenue deposit refunds and relied on analogous sections of the Excise Act, which prescribe interest rates for delayed payments and refunds.
Treatment of Competing Arguments
The appellant argued that interest should be granted based on the precedent set by the Parle Agro Pvt. Ltd. case. The Revenue contended that Section 35FF only mandates interest if there is a delay beyond three months in sanctioning refunds, and since the provision was amended post-2014, it was not applicable. The Tribunal rejected the Revenue's argument, noting that the Parle Agro decision was still pending appeal and had not been overturned.
Conclusions
The Tribunal concluded that the appellant is entitled to interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the refund amount from the date of deposit until the date of payment. This conclusion was supported by the CBE&C's circular and the legal reasoning in Parle Agro Pvt. Ltd.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Tribunal held that the appellant is entitled to interest on the refund of the pre-deposit amount at the rate of 12% per annum. It emphasized that the legal position clarified by the CBE&C and the precedent set by Parle Agro Pvt. Ltd. support this entitlement. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order denying interest and allowed the appeal with consequential relief.
Significant verbatim quotes include:
"In view for the aforesaid decisions, and the fact that the rate of interest varies from 6% to 18% in the aforesaid Notifications issued under sections 11AA, 11BB, 11DD and 11AB of the Excise Act, the grant of interest @12% per annum seems to be appropriate."
The Tribunal's final determination was that the appellant should receive interest on the refunded amount, aligning with the principles established in prior cases and administrative guidance.
Interest on refund of amount deposited during investigation - relevant date for calculation of interest - removal of Coumarin without payment of duty - whether interest is payable to the appellants in respect of voluntary payments/deposit made towards alleged removal Coumarin without payment of duty from 19th May, 2001 to 24th January, 2004, or otherwise? - HELD THAT:- The final demand confirmed by the Tribunal is limited to the adjudged demands in respect of seized goods alone and the issues have attained finality. These have been duly taken into account by the original authority in his order dated 01.04.2019 and he had accordingly sanctioned the refund of Rs.19,47,750/- and ordered for the said amount to be remitted separately by RTGS/NEFT to the appellant. Thus, the amount of refund has been sanctioned as per law by the original authority and the same bas been duly confirmed by the first appellate authority also.
As regards the appellant’s claim of interest, it is found that the issue with regard to payment of interest on voluntary deposit made during investigation has been examined by the co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the similar set of facts in the case of Parle Agro Private Limited [2017 (2) TMI 984 - CESTAT ALLAHABAD] and it was held that interest is payable from the date of deposit till the date of payment.
The Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBE&C) has also issued instructions to the departmental field formations vide Circular No. 984/8/2014-CX dated 16.09.2014, wherein it has been clarified that the appellant is entitled for interest on refund of pre-deposit from the date of deposit to the date of refund.
In the case of Pace Marketing Specialties [2011 (8) TMI 796 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT], the Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad upon consideration of the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sandvik Asia Limited [2006 (1) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT] had granted interest at the rate of 12% in similar case. In view of the specific stand taken by the co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Parle Agro Pvt. Ltd., this Bench cannot take a different view contradicting the stand already taken therein.
Conclusion - The appellant is entitled to interest on the refund of the pre-deposit amount at the rate of 12% per annum.
Appeal allowed.
The appellant, a manufacturer of textile chemicals, was found to have directors who were siblings and sons of the partners of their distributor, M/s. Harris and Menuk. The department argued that this relationship required the valuation of goods under Rule 9, leading to a demand for differential duty. Initially, the adjudicating authority dropped the proceedings, but the appellate authority reversed this decision, prompting the current appeal.
The appellant contended that the impugned order failed to establish mutuality of interest and misinterpreted legal precedents, particularly concerning the definition of "relatives" as applicable only to natural persons. They argued that the corporate veil should not be lifted without evidence of mala fides and that the relationship between shareholders and partners did not constitute a related party transaction.
The department maintained that the appellant undervalued goods by selling through related persons, contravening the Act and CEVR, and thus the demand was justified. They argued that the appellant's actions indicated an intent to evade duty.
The tribunal examined whether the appellant and distributor were related under Section 4(3)(b). The directors of the appellant company were siblings, and their parents were partners in the distributor firm. This familial relationship suggested a direct or indirect interest in each other's business, fulfilling the criteria for related persons under the Act.
The tribunal referenced several legal precedents. In Dhanesh Textile Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, it was held that a company and partnership firm were distinct entities unless financial flowback was evident. In Reliance Industrial Product vs. CCE, it was noted that the concept of "relative" did not apply to impersonal bodies like corporations. However, in the current case, the tribunal found that the familial relationship and business arrangements indicated mutual interest and interdependence.
The tribunal concluded that the appellant and distributor were related persons under Section 4(3)(b), and the valuation should be based on the distributor's sale price as per Rule 9. The tribunal noted that the appellant had paid the differential duty without protest, indicating acceptance of the valuation method.
The tribunal upheld the appellate authority's decision, finding no reason to interfere with the order. The appellant's payment of duty without protest and the absence of a cross-objection from the department regarding penalties led the tribunal to reject the appeal. The tribunal refrained from remanding the matter for penalty consideration, aiming to conclude the prolonged litigation.
The judgment emphasizes the importance of examining the totality of relationships and transactions to determine related party status and the appropriate valuation method for excise duty purposes. The tribunal's decision reinforces the principle that familial relationships and business arrangements can establish mutual interest, warranting the application of related party valuation rules.
Short payment of duty - clearances to related persons were to be assessed under Rule 9 of Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rule, 2000 (CEVR) or in terms of Section 4(1) of the Act read with Rule of CEVR - Mutuality of ineterst - Penalty under Section 11AC - HELD THAT:- The Appellant is a Private Limited Company with 2 directors, who are siblings, holding together 99% shares of the company. The Appellant is reportedly effecting most of the clearances to M/s. Harris and Menuk, their main Distributor in which the parents of the 2 directors of the Appellant Company are the Partners. The Appellant and the distributor are related and therefore fall within the ambit of Section 4(3)(b). In terms of Section 4(3)(b) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, it is obvious that both the appellant company and the distributor partnership firm are relatives, and they are so associated with each other, they have interest directly or indirectly in the business of each other. Audit verification has revealed that the price adopted to the distributor was much less than the price adopted at which these goods were sold to ultimate Customers. The pricing pattern itself reveals the mutuality of interest as the Appellant was benefited by reduced tax outflow and benefit to the distributor company was by way of reduction in cost of purchase and payment resulting in the distributor seeking increased supply of goods from the appellant, thus resulting in mutual benefit.
The Appellant in their reply to Show Cause Notice or in the Grounds of Appeal have never contested the fact that there did exist a different and depressed price for the sales made by the appellant to their parent’s distributorship firm and further they have not disputed the differential duty arising out of such undervalued sales which stood paid up. Such payment of short paid duty according to the price difference as suo motu assessed and computed by them itself evidences the differential pricing and the extent of duty evasion.
The transaction value on which the duty is required to be paid is the value of the goods at which the distributor has sold the goods. The Appellant Company and the distributor firm are related persons and the clearances have to be valued in terms of Rule 9 of Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000. As such, there are no reasons to interfere with the impugned Order-in-Appeal.
Demand of interest - HELD THAT:- Evidently the duty incidence has been passed on to the end customer. It is only after six months from commencement of differential duty payment by appellant, and a month after payment of the final installment of differential duty due upto October 2014 in March 2014, that in May 2014, the SCN came to be issued. The appellant is liable to pay interest on the differential duty suo moto paid by the appellant. Since the duty paid without protest to the exchequer is already merged with the consolidated fund of India, any exercise in appropriation is a mere superfluity.
Penalty under Section 11AC - HELD THAT:- While the Ld. Commissioner (Appeals) has set aside the impugned Original-in-Original of the Adjudicating Authority, he has not rendered any finding or discussed about the penalty proposed. The Department too has not filed any cross objection against the non-imposition of penalty. It is a settled principle in law that the appellant cannot be put in an worse off position upon the appellant’s preferring of the appeal.
Conclusion - i) The transaction value on which the duty is required to be paid is the value of the goods at which the distributor has sold the goods. The Appellant Company and the distributor firm are related persons and the clearances have to be valued in terms of Rule 9 of Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000. ii) The appellant is liable to pay interest on the differential duty suo moto paid by the appellant. iii) The Department too has not filed any cross objection against the non-imposition of penalty. It is a settled principle in law that the appellant cannot be put in an worse off position upon the appellant’s preferring of the appeal.
Appeal rejected.
Issues: (i) Whether Cenvat credit was admissible on services used for setting up or expanding the factory building under Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004; (ii) whether Cenvat credit was admissible on outdoor catering services provided to employees in the factory; (iii) whether Cenvat credit was admissible on insurance services, including insurance of the factory building and group health insurance of employees; and (iv) whether Cenvat credit was admissible on air travel agent services used for official travel of expatriate employees.
Issue (i): Whether Cenvat credit was admissible on services used for setting up or expanding the factory building under Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.
Analysis: For the period up to 31.03.2011, the definition of input service specifically included services used in relation to setting up, modernisation, renovation or repairs of a factory. Services used for construction of the factory building were therefore treated as directly connected with manufacturing activity and within the inclusive part of the definition. The exclusion introduced later did not apply to the relevant period.
Conclusion: Cenvat credit on factory construction and setting up services was admissible and the finding of denial was unsustainable.
Issue (ii): Whether Cenvat credit was admissible on outdoor catering services provided to employees in the factory.
Analysis: Outdoor catering for employees was treated as an activity relating to business and, in the factory context, was also linked to the statutory canteen obligation under Section 46 of the Factories Act, 1948. Such service was held to fall within the scope of input service for the relevant period. However, where any amount recovered from employees had been reversed, interest remained payable on that reversed portion as determined by the original authority.
Conclusion: Cenvat credit on outdoor catering services was admissible, subject to liability to pay interest on the amount reversed from employees.
Issue (iii): Whether Cenvat credit was admissible on insurance services, including insurance of the factory building and group health insurance of employees.
Analysis: Insurance of the factory building was treated as connected with the business of manufacture, and group health insurance of employees was treated as an activity relating to business falling within the broad scope of input service. The services were therefore held to satisfy the relevant definition under Rule 2(l) for the pre-01.04.2011 period.
Conclusion: Cenvat credit on the disputed insurance services was admissible.
Issue (iv): Whether Cenvat credit was admissible on air travel agent services used for official travel of expatriate employees.
Analysis: The travel was found to be for official purposes connected with procurement of machinery, tools and dies and with technical training relating to manufacture of the final product. Such services were held to have a sufficient nexus with manufacture and to fall within the ambit of input service during the relevant period.
Conclusion: Cenvat credit on air travel agent services was admissible.
Final Conclusion: The denial of credit on the disputed services was set aside for the relevant period, while the obligation to pay interest on the amount reversed in relation to outdoor catering remained intact.
Ratio Decidendi: For the pre-01.04.2011 period, services expressly or sufficiently connected with setting up of a factory, business-related employee welfare, statutory canteen facilities, insurance supporting the manufacturing establishment, and official travel linked to manufacture qualify as input services under the inclusive definition in Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.
Cenvat Credit - services related to setting up and expansion of the factory building under the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 - outdoor catering services provided to employees under the statutory obligation of the Factories Act, 1948 - insurance services for factory buildings and employees - air travel agent services used for international travel of expatriate employees in relation to business activities.
Whether the appellant is eligible to Cenvat Credit on these impugned services up to 31.03.2011 under the un-amended definition of ‘input services’ as provided in Rule 2(l) of Cenvat Credit Rules? - HELD THAT:- Cenvat Credit on construction of the factory building has been denied only on account of lack of nexus between the construction services and the manufacturing of the goods. In this regard, it is to be noted that the construction relates to the setting up of the factory which in turn, is directly used for manufacturing and is directly covers under the inclusive part of the definition of ‘input service’. Moreover, during the relevant period, construction service was included in the definition of ‘input service’ and it is only after 01.04.2011 that it has been specifically excluded from it.
Reference made to the decision of the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CCE vs. Bellsonica Auto Components India P Ltd [2015 (7) TMI 930 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT], wherein the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court has held 'The Tribunal rightly did not agree with the Commissioner’s findings that the services in question had been used for brining into existence an immovable property and not for the manufacture of the final product. The said services cannot be said to be remotely connected to the final product as observed by the Commissioner.'
Outdoor catering service for the employees - HELD THAT:- This service is also covered under the definition of ‘input service’ prior to 01.04.2011 because the outdoor catering service is an activity relating to appellant’s business and hence, is included in ‘means’ clause of Rule 2(l) and moreover, under the Factories Act, 1948 also, it is a statutory obligation. Further, as regards reversal of recovered amount by the appellant, the appellant is liable to pay interest on that portion, which will be calculated by the original authority and the appellant would be liable to pay the same.
Cenvat Credit on insurance services - HELD THAT:- The learned Commissioner has allowed 50% of the Cenvat Credit availed in relation to insurance of the building, but has denied the Cenvat Credit on insurance of the employees amounting to Rs.1,21,261/-. The insurance policies procured for group health insurance of the employees, are also included in ‘means’ clause of Rule 2(l) as the health insurance of the employees is an activity relating to business and it has been held in the cases relied upon by the learned Consultant for the appellant that this activity is an ‘input service’.
Cenvat Credit on air travel agent service - HELD THAT:- The said service was used for international travel of expats for visiting their home country as well as for purchasing plants & machineries, tools & dies and attending technical training at Japan office of the appellant which is used in relation to manufacture of final product. During the relevant time, Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules explicitly covers input services used by the manufacturer directly or indirectly in relation to manufacture or clearance of final products as held in the cases relied upon by the learned Consultant for the appellant.
Conclusion - The services directly or indirectly related to manufacturing activities or statutory business obligations qualify as input services under the Cenvat Credit Rules.
Appeal allowed.
TaxTMI