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Issues: Whether bail should be granted in a prosecution under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 despite the rigours of Section 45, where the applicant was not named in the predicate FIR or ECIR, the material against him was prima facie limited, and the trial was not likely to conclude in the near future.
Analysis: The application turned on the interplay between the statutory restrictions on bail under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 and the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty and speedy trial. The material showed that the applicant had been in custody for a substantial period, had cooperated with the investigation, and that the prosecution case against him was substantially founded on statements of co-accused and on allegations that were yet to be tested at trial. The Court also noted that charges had not yet been framed and that the case was not likely to proceed to an early conclusion. In these circumstances, continued detention was considered inconsistent with the protection of liberty under Article 21, and the statutory threshold under Section 45 was not treated as a bar where the trial itself was unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time.
Conclusion: Bail was granted to the applicant.
Ratio Decidendi: The rigours of Section 45 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 may yield where the accused has undergone substantial pre-trial incarceration, has cooperated with investigation, and the trial is not likely to conclude within a reasonable time, because the constitutional right to personal liberty and speedy trial cannot be defeated by continued detention without meaningful progress in trial.