TaxTMI Updates e-Newsletter
Feb 09,2024

Royalty as tax - consideration - goods and services tax - stay of payment of GST - mining lease/royalty - correction of party array - correction of court record

Royalty as tax - consideration - goods and services tax - mining lease/royalty - stay of payment of GST - Interim relief staying payment of GST claimed to be leviable on royalty/grant of mining lease - HELD THAT: - The court recorded the petitioner's contention that royalty paid for the privilege granted by the State to mine sand is in the nature of a tax and not consideration for supply of goods or services, and noted reliance on the Constitution Bench decision in India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu. The court also observed that an identical controversy is pending before the Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1076 of 2021 and that the Supreme Court has earlier stayed GST payment in related proceedings. In view of these circumstances and the pendency of the larger issue before the apex court, the High Court granted interlocutory relief restraining the respondents from demanding or recovering GST payable by the petitioner in respect of grant of mining lease/royalty until further orders.

Payment of GST in respect of grant of mining lease/royalty by the petitioner shall remain stayed until further orders.

Correction of party array - correction of court record - Amendment of petition to delete petitioner no.1 and correction of party numbering and court record - HELD THAT: - The court granted the petitioner leave to delete the name of petitioner no.1 from the array of parties and permitted correction of the numbering of parties during the day, with liberty to file a fresh petition on behalf of members of the Society. The office was directed to correct petitioner details in the computer record. Appearance of counsel for respondent no.3 on filing of power was accepted and to be shown in the cause list when next listed.

Deletion and correction of parties and corresponding correction in court records permitted; power filed for respondent no.3 accepted.

Final Conclusion: The petition was permitted to amend the array of parties and court records as directed, and an interim stay was granted restraining recovery or payment of GST claimed on grant of mining lease/royalty by the petitioner until further orders.

Imposition of penalty under Section 129(3) of the U.P. Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 for non-filling of Part B of the E-Way Bill - E-Way Bill Part B non-filling and absence of intention to evade tax - technical defect in documentation versus evasion of tax - quashing of penalty orders and return of security

Imposition of penalty under Section 129(3) of the U.P. Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 for non-filling of Part B of the E-Way Bill - E-Way Bill Part B non-filling and absence of intention to evade tax - technical defect in documentation versus evasion of tax - Whether penalty under Section 129(3) could be sustained where Part B of the E-Way Bill was not filled but the consignment and accompanying documents were consistent and there was no intention to evade tax. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that Part A of the E-Way Bill was duly filled and that the goods were accompanied by invoice, gate pass, 9R and bilty which contained the vehicle number; there was no variance between the goods and the invoice and the department did not point to any indicia of intent to evade tax. Reliance was placed on earlier High Court decisions treating non-filling of Part B, without intention to evade tax, as a technical defect insufficient to attract penalty under Section 129(3). Applying that principle, the defect in the present case was held to be technical only and not constitutive of tax evasion; accordingly the penalty could not be sustained.

Penalty imposed under Section 129(3) quashed and penalty order and appellate order set aside; security to be returned.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition is allowed: the penalty and the appellate order are quashed on the ground that non-filling of Part B of the E-Way Bill was a technical defect without any intention to evade tax; respondents directed to return the security within four weeks.

Filing of appeal within prescribed period and condonation of delay under Section 107(4) of the GST Act - effect of provisional acknowledgement and requirement of submission of certified copy under Rule 108(1)-(3) CGST Rules (pre-amendment) - mistaken transmission to incorrect department and bona fide conduct as ground for condonation - restoration of appeal and direction to decide on merits

Filing of appeal within prescribed period and condonation of delay under Section 107(4) of the GST Act - effect of provisional acknowledgement and requirement of submission of certified copy under Rule 108(1)-(3) CGST Rules (pre-amendment) - mistaken transmission to incorrect department and bona fide conduct as ground for condonation - Whether the appeal was filed within time or, alternatively, whether delay (if any) was liable to be condoned - HELD THAT: - The petitioner digitally filed the appeal through the online portal within three months from communication of the Order in Original and annexed a scanned copy of that order. Under Rule 108 (pre amendment) a provisional acknowledgement issued on filing and a certified copy was required to be submitted within seven days for issuance of final acknowledgement. The petitioner dispatched the hard copy by post within five days but to an incorrect departmental office and was only later informed; the petitioner thereafter retrieved and delivered the original to the correct office. The Department does not controvert these facts. The Court found that the filing through the portal with the scanned order constituted timely initiation of the appeal process and that the subsequent misdelivery of the hard copy was a bona fide, rectifiable error. Applying Section 107(4) and the procedural scheme of Rule 108(1)-(3), the delay (if any) was attributable to a bonafide mistake and is liable to be condoned. The appellate order rejecting the appeal solely on the ground of delay was therefore set aside and the appeal restored for adjudication on merits. [Paras 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]

Delay held bonafide and condoned; appeal restored for disposal on merits.

Final Conclusion: Impugned order rejecting the appeal as barred by limitation set aside; appeal restored to the Appellate Authority (Commissioner of Central Taxes, Appeals II) with a direction to decide the appeal on merits in accordance with law.

Cancellation of GST registration with retrospective effect under Section 29(2) - objective satisfaction for retrospective cancellation - opportunity to be heard regarding retrospective cancellation - consequences of retrospective cancellation on recipients' input tax credit

Cancellation of GST registration with retrospective effect under Section 29(2) - opportunity to be heard regarding retrospective cancellation - Validity of the order dated 25.11.2019 cancelling the petitioner's GST registration retrospectively from 01.07.2017 - HELD THAT: - The show cause notice and the impugned order did not put the petitioner on notice that cancellation would be with retrospective effect and thus the petitioner had no opportunity to object to retrospective cancellation. Cancellation with retrospective effect under Section 29(2) cannot be mechanically applied; the proper officer must deem it fit on objective grounds rather than act on a merely subjective satisfaction. Mere non-filing of returns for some period does not justify cancelling registration retrospectively covering periods when returns were filed and the taxpayer was compliant. In these circumstances the court found the retrospective cancellation to 01.07.2017 unsustainable and modified the effective date of cancellation to the date on which business was shut down, namely 01.10.2019. [Paras 6, 9, 11]

Order of cancellation dated 25.11.2019 is modified so that cancellation operates with effect from 01.10.2019 instead of 01.07.2017.

Objective satisfaction for retrospective cancellation - consequences of retrospective cancellation on recipients' input tax credit - Whether the proper officer must consider consequences (including denial of input tax credit to recipients) and apply an objective satisfaction before ordering retrospective cancellation - HELD THAT: - The court observed that one consequence of retrospective cancellation is denial of input tax credit to the taxpayer's customers and that the proper officer is required to consider such consequences when ordering retrospective cancellation. Therefore, cancellation with retrospective effect is permissible only where such consequences are intended and warranted and where the proper officer's satisfaction is based on objective criteria. [Paras 9, 10]

Proper officer must base any retrospective cancellation on objective satisfaction and consider its consequences, including impact on recipients' input tax credit.

Final Conclusion: The petition is disposed of by modifying the retrospective cancellation so that the GST registration is cancelled with effect from 01.10.2019; respondents remain free to pursue recovery of any tax, penalty or interest in accordance with law.

Input Tax Credit blockage - genuineness of transactions - burden to produce invoices, e-way bills, delivery challans and bank records - Form GST DRC-01A notice - direction for expeditious reconsideration of representation

Genuineness of transactions - burden to produce invoices, e-way bills, delivery challans and bank records - Petitioner must produce documentary evidence to establish that purchases from the specified suppliers were genuine. - HELD THAT: - The Court records that to establish the genuineness of transactions with M/s. Vetrivel Traders and M/s. Shri Vaari Steels the petitioner is under an obligation to produce documentary evidence such as invoices, e-way bills, lorry receipts, delivery challans and bank statements. The petitioner had stated that some documents were with central authorities and, while documents relating to M/s. Vetrivel Traders appear to have been furnished subsequently, it remains unclear whether documents for M/s. Shri Vaari Steels were provided; in any event the petitioner must supply the necessary documents to enable verification of the transactions. [Paras 5]

Obligation placed on the petitioner to produce relevant documents to establish genuineness of purchases.

Input Tax Credit blockage - Form GST DRC-01A notice - direction for expeditious reconsideration of representation - Respondent must consider and decide the petitioner's representation for release of blocked ITC expeditiously on receipt of documents. - HELD THAT: - Having noted that the petitioner sought release of blocked ITC by a representation dated 08.01.2024 and that an intimation in Form GST DRC-01A was issued, the Court directed that the respondent should take a decision on the representation after taking into account all documents produced by the petitioner to establish that the transactions were genuine. The Court emphasised the need for an expeditious decision and fixed a definite timeframe for disposal. [Paras 6, 7]

Respondent directed to consider and dispose of the representation after examining documents establishing genuineness.

Direction for expeditious reconsideration of representation - Timelines for production of documents by petitioner and decision by respondent were fixed. - HELD THAT: - The Court granted the petitioner leave to produce any additional documents within one week from receipt of a copy of the order and directed the respondent to consider and dispose of the representation within thirty days from the date of receipt of further documents from the petitioner. This calendared procedure is intended to ensure prompt verification and a definite outcome on the request to release blocked ITC. [Paras 7]

Petitioner permitted one week to furnish additional documents; respondent to decide the representation within thirty days thereafter.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed by directing the respondent to consider the petitioner's representation dated 08.01.2024 and decide, after taking into account documents produced to establish genuineness of purchases, within thirty days of receipt of those documents; petitioner permitted one week to file additional documents.

Annuity as consideration for supply of services - scope of Entry 23A under Heading 9967 - clarification of notifications under Section 11(3) of the CGST Act, 2017 - challenge to Demand cum Show Cause Notice by way of writ petition

Annuity as consideration for supply of services - scope of Entry 23A under Heading 9967 - Interim relief in respect of the Demand cum Show Cause Notice dated 29.09.2023 - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the petitioner has made out a prima facie case for interim relief by reference to the treatment of annuity as consideration for services provided by concessionaires to NHAI (Agenda item 13(iv) of the 22nd GST Council Meeting) and the Notification dated 13.10.2017 which introduced Entry 23A under Heading 9967. The Court also noted that the Circular dated 17.06.2021, relied upon in the impugned notice, has been set aside by a coordinate High Court, which weighed in favour of granting interim protection. In view of these factors and the need to preserve the subject matter pending further consideration, the impugned Demand cum Show Cause Notice was directed to be kept in abeyance until the returnable date. [Paras 10]

The impugned Demand cum Show Cause Notice dated 29.09.2023 is kept in abeyance until the returnable date.

Clarification of notifications under Section 11(3) of the CGST Act, 2017 - challenge to Demand cum Show Cause Notice by way of writ petition - Proceedings directed for further consideration and issuance of notice - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that the matter requires further examination on merits, including the applicability of the Circular dated 17.06.2021 and the legal effect of the Notification dated 13.10.2017 read with Section 11(3) of the CGST Act, 2017. Accordingly, the Court issued notice in the writ petition and listed the matter for final disposal on the returnable date to enable fuller adjudication of these contested legal questions. [Paras 7, 8, 9]

Notice issued returnable on 06.03.2024 and the matter directed to be considered further on that date.

Final Conclusion: Pending final adjudication, the Demand cum Show Cause Notice dated 29.09.2023 is stayed and the writ petition has been admitted for further consideration with notice issued returnable on 06.03.2024.

Direction to executive to consider representation - reasoned and speaking order - opportunity of hearing - interim protection from coercive action

Direction to executive to consider representation - reasoned and speaking order - opportunity of hearing - Liberty granted to petitioners to seek executive consideration of claims for neutralising GST-related additional tax burden and for updating the Schedule of Rates; authority directed to decide on merits. - HELD THAT: - The Court did not adjudicate the substantive claim that respondents must bear the additional tax liability or immediately update the Schedule of Rates. Instead, the petitioners were granted liberty to file representations within a specified time and the matter was committed to the executive authority for final disposal. The Additional Chief Secretary, Finance Department, is directed to take a final decision on the representations after consulting relevant departments and after giving the petitioners or their authorised representatives an opportunity of hearing. The Court required that the decision be in accordance with law and be a reasoned and speaking order, taking into consideration the judgments the petitioners intend to rely upon. This constitutes a direction for fresh administrative consideration rather than a judicial determination on the merits.

Petitioners permitted to file representations; executive to decide merits after hearing and issue a reasoned speaking order.

Interim protection from coercive action - Interim protection from coercive action pending the executive decision. - HELD THAT: - The Court stayed any coercive action against the petitioners until the Additional Chief Secretary takes the final decision on the representations. This interim protection is conditional on the petitioners making the representation within the time stipulated in the order; absence of representation within that period removes the protective effect of the order. The order thus preserves the petitioners' position pending administrative adjudication but does not dispose of the substantive claim.

No coercive action to be taken against petitioners until the executive decision; protection lapses if representations are not filed within the prescribed time.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed by granting petitioners liberty to file representations within four weeks; Additional Chief Secretary to decide within four months after consultation and hearing, by a reasoned and speaking order; interim protection from coercive action until that decision, subject to filing of representation.

Opportunity of hearing - audi alteram partem - quashing of ex parte order - remand for fresh hearing - order under Section 73 of the OGST Act - application of ratio in Khani Khyatigrasta Gramya Committee

Opportunity of hearing - audi alteram partem - quashing of ex parte order - order under Section 73 of the OGST Act - The order dated 18.11.2023 passed by the State Tax Officer under Section 73 of the OGST Act without affording the petitioner an opportunity of personal hearing was not sustainable and was quashed. - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that the impugned order was passed ex parte without granting any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. In light of the requirement of audi alteram partem and without expressing any opinion on the merits, the absence of personal hearing rendered the order unsustainable in law. The petitioner's case was also said to be covered by the ratio in Khani Khyatigrasta Gramya Committee (supra), which the Court directed the authority to take into consideration upon rehearing. The determinative legal consequence was that the impugned order must be set aside for violation of the right to be heard. [Paras 3, 4, 6]

Order dated 18.11.2023 quashed for having been passed without affording opportunity of personal hearing.

Remand for fresh hearing - application of ratio in Khani Khyatigrasta Gramya Committee - The matter was remitted to the same authority to rehear the case afresh after giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing and taking into consideration the ratio of Khani Khyatigrasta Gramya Committee. - HELD THAT: - Having quashed the impugned order for want of hearing, the Court directed remand to enable the authority to afford the petitioner a hearing in accordance with law. The remand is for fresh consideration and adjudication by the authority, applying the legal principles enunciated by this Court in Khani Khyatigrasta Gramya Committee (supra). The Court did not express any view on the substantive merits and confined its direction to procedural compliance and reconsideration. [Paras 6]

Matter remitted to the authority to rehear afresh after affording opportunity of hearing and applying the cited ratio.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed; impugned order dated 18.11.2023 quashed and the matter remitted to the same authority for fresh hearing in accordance with law and the ratio in Khani Khyatigrasta Gramya Committee; writ petition disposed of.

Bona fide error - mechanical order without application of mind - opportunity to rectify inadvertent mistake - no loss of revenue - quashing of order and direction to permit correction of entries

Mechanical order without application of mind - bona fide error - Whether the Designated Officer erred in passing the impugned order without addressing the petitioner's explanation of an inadvertent error in the E-way bill and reversal of input tax credit - HELD THAT: - The court found that the petitioner had demonstrated that the taxable value punched in the E-way bill was the result of an evident inadvertent mistake (HSN code entered in the taxable value field), and that the petitioner had earlier reversed the input tax credit. The material showing the error, including correspondence and supporting documents, had been placed before the Designated Officer. The impugned order recorded a mismatch on scrutiny parameters but did not deal with the petitioner's explanation, rendering the order a mechanical exercise lacking application of mind. Given the absence of any loss of revenue to the department, the principles permitting rectification of bona fide mistakes were held applicable. [Paras 8, 9]

The impugned order is quashed as passed mechanically without adequately considering the petitioner's explanation of an inadvertent error.

Opportunity to rectify inadvertent mistake - no loss of revenue - quashing of order and direction to permit correction of entries - Whether the petitioner should be permitted to correct the error in the E-way bill and the Department directed to accept such corrections and reconsider the returns - HELD THAT: - Applying settled principles that bona fide errors which do not prejudice revenue may be permitted to be rectified, the court directed remedial steps rather than remitting the matter for fresh factual determination. The petitioner was ordered to make an application to the Department to permit correction of the tariff code error (electronically or manually) within a specified time, and the Department was directed to accept such corrections and thereafter consider the returns in accordance with law. The direction was given in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction to ensure that the inadvertent mistake does not produce disproportionate tax demand. [Paras 9, 10]

Petitioner permitted to seek correction of the E-way bill error; Department directed to accept corrections and thereafter consider the returns as per law.

Final Conclusion: The High Court quashed the impugned order dated 29 July 2022, permitted the petitioner to apply within three weeks for correction of the inadvertent E-way bill entry, and directed the Department to accept such corrections and reconsider the petitioner's returns in accordance with law.

Condonation of delay - proviso to Rule 23 of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Rules - revocation application under OGST Rules - acceptance of GSTR-3B return subject to payment of taxes, interest, late fee and penalty - direction to proper officer to open portal for filing return

Condonation of delay - proviso to Rule 23 of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Rules - acceptance of GSTR-3B return subject to payment of taxes, interest, late fee and penalty - revocation application under OGST Rules - direction to proper officer to open portal for filing return - Delay in invoking the proviso to Rule 23 OGST Rules is condoned and the petitioner's revocation application/filing of GSTR-3B will be processed subject to compliance with payment and formalities. - HELD THAT: - The Collector's counsel stated that if the delay in filing the revocation application is condoned and the petitioner complies with payment of taxes, interest, late fee and penalty and other formalities, the GSTR-3B return filed by the petitioner will be accepted. Applying that concession, the Court condoned the delay in invoking the proviso to Rule 23 of the OGST Rules and directed that the petitioner's application for revocation shall be considered in accordance with law provided the petitioner deposits all taxes, interest, late fee, penalty and complies with other formalities. The Court further directed that on production of a copy of this order and subject to such compliance, the proper officer shall open the portal to enable filing of the GST return. [Paras 2, 3, 4]

Delay condoned; petitioner to deposit taxes, interest, late fee and penalty and comply with formalities; upon production of this order and compliance the proper officer shall open the portal and consider the revocation application/accept the GSTR-3B in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed by condoning delay in invoking the proviso to Rule 23 OGST Rules and directing conditional acceptance of the petitioner's revocation application/GSTR-3B upon payment of dues and compliance; proper officer to open portal on production of this order.

Confiscation and option to pay fine in lieu - interim release of goods and conveyance on security - security by deposit and bank guarantee - prima facie finding of bogus transactions/fraud on revenue - challenge under Articles 226 and 227 - availability of appellate remedy before the Appellate Authority

Challenge under Articles 226 and 227 - availability of appellate remedy before the Appellate Authority - Whether the notices and subsequent adjudication under Section 130 could be quashed for want of jurisdiction - HELD THAT: - The writ petition sought quashing of the Form GST MOV-02 and Form GST MOV-10 notices on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Court noted that an order in Form GST MOV-11 dated 18.01.2024 has been passed after notice and non-appearance of the petitioner and that the petitioner has a statutory remedy by way of appeal to the Appellate Authority under the Act. In these circumstances the Court declined to quash the impugned proceedings or the adjudicatory order, observing that the petitioner is free to challenge the adjudication before the appropriate appellate forum. [Paras 1, 2, 3, 9]

Writ petition not sustained on jurisdictional grounds; petitioner permitted to challenge the MOV-11 order before the Appellate Authority.

Confiscation and option to pay fine in lieu - interim release of goods and conveyance on security - security by deposit and bank guarantee - prima facie finding of bogus transactions/fraud on revenue - Whether provisional release of the goods and vehicle could be permitted and on what security, having regard to the prima facie findings of ingenuine/bogus transactions - HELD THAT: - The authorities recorded a specific prima facie finding that the supply chain of the petitioner was verified to be ingenuine and that earlier purchases had no tax discharge, indicating bogus transactions to defraud the exchequer. Applying the approach in the cited Apex Court precedents permitting conditional release, and having regard to practical difficulties of enforcing personal sureties outside the State, the High Court held that provisional release of the goods and vehicle should be subject to the petitioner depositing 25% of the amount assessed in the MOV-11 order in cash and securing the balance by a bank guarantee. The Court rejected the contention that a local consignee (not before the Court) could be directed to furnish sureties. [Paras 6, 7, 8, 9]

Goods and vehicle to be released on deposit of 25% of the amount mentioned in MOV-11; balance to be secured by bank guarantee; local consignee cannot be directed to furnish surety in these proceedings.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed with liberty to challenge the MOV-11 adjudication before the Appellate Authority; goods and vehicle ordered released on deposit of 25% of the amount assessed and balance secured by bank guarantee.

Cancellation of GST registration - non-application of mind and absence of reasons - breach of principles of natural justice - treatment of impugned order as show cause notice and remand for fresh consideration - revocation of cancellation and restoration of registration on compliance - prohibition on utilization of Input Tax Credit pending finalization

Cancellation of GST registration - non-application of mind and absence of reasons - breach of principles of natural justice - Validity of the order dated 11.07.2022 cancelling the petitioner's GST registration - HELD THAT: - The impugned order of cancellation was quashed on the ground that it neither records reasons nor discloses the grounds on which cancellation was effected, thereby demonstrating non-application of mind. The court noted the petitioner's uncontroverted statement that the show cause notice of 07.06.2022 was not served and that no reply dated 08.07.2022 was submitted as purported in the impugned order. Reliance was placed on precedents of High Courts emphasizing that cancellation of GST registration carries civil consequences and must not be effected mechanically; defective or reason bereft show cause notices and orders violate principles of natural justice and are liable to be set aside. In these circumstances the impugned cancellation order was held illegal and interfered with. [Paras 3, 5, 10]

The order dated 11.07.2022 cancelling the petitioner's GST registration is set aside/quashed.

Revocation of cancellation and restoration of registration on compliance - treatment of impugned order as show cause notice and remand for fresh consideration - prohibition on utilization of Input Tax Credit pending finalization - Directions on remand, opportunity to be afforded, and interim consequences pending fresh consideration - HELD THAT: - The court set aside both the cancellation order dated 11.07.2022 and the rejection of revocation dated 26.12.2023 and remitted the matter to respondent No.1 for fresh consideration. The impugned cancellation order was ordered to be treated as a show cause notice; the petitioner was permitted to appear and file a detailed reply by 09.02.2024 and to submit outstanding returns along with late fees on application for delayed submission so that registration may be restored upon compliance. The court further clarified that limitation should not impede consideration of the petitioner's claim and that any unutilized Input Tax Credit shall not be permitted to be utilized until finalization of the show cause proceedings. [Paras 11, 12, 13]

The rejection of revocation is set aside; the matter is remitted for fresh consideration with directions to treat the impugned order as a show cause notice, allow the petitioner to file reply and returns by the stipulated date, and prohibit utilization of ITC pending finalization.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed: the cancellation order dated 11.07.2022 and the rejection of revocation dated 26.12.2023 are set aside; matter remitted for fresh consideration after treating the impugned order as a show cause notice, petitioner permitted to file reply and outstanding returns by 09.02.2024 with late fees, limitation not to be a bar, and unutilized Input Tax Credit restrained until finalization of proceedings.

Condonation of delay - proviso to Rule 23 of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Rules - revocation of cancellation of registration - acceptance of GSTR-3B upon compliance with tax, interest, late fee and penalty - direction to open portal for filing GST return

Condonation of delay - proviso to Rule 23 of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Rules - revocation of cancellation of registration - acceptance of GSTR-3B upon compliance with tax, interest, late fee and penalty - direction to open portal for filing GST return - Delay in invoking the proviso to Rule 23 for filing the revocation application was condoned and the revocation application was directed to be considered subject to compliance with payment and formalities; the portal was to be opened for filing the GST return. - HELD THAT: - The Standing Counsel for the CT & GST Organisation informed the Court that if the delay in filing the revocation application is condoned and the petitioner complies with payment of taxes, interest, late fee and penalty and other requirements, the Form GSTR-3B filed by the petitioner will be accepted by the authorities. Accepting this position, the Court condoned the delay in invoking the proviso to Rule 23 of the OGST Rules and directed that the petitioner's application for revocation shall be considered in accordance with law provided the petitioner deposits all taxes, interest, late fee and penalty and complies with other formalities. The Court further directed that a copy of the order be produced before the proper officer and, subject to the petitioner meeting the stated conditions, the proper officer shall open the portal to enable the filing of the GST return. [Paras 2, 3, 4]

Delay condoned; revocation application to be considered on compliance with payment and formalities; portal to be opened for filing the GST return.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition is disposed of by condoning the delay in invoking the proviso to Rule 23; subject to depositing all taxes, interest, late fee, penalty and compliance with formalities the revocation application shall be considered and the portal shall be opened to enable filing of the GST return.

Condonation of delay - proviso to Rule 23 of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Rules - revocation of cancellation of GST registration - acceptance of Form GSTR-3B - compliance with payment of taxes, interest, late fee and penalty - opening of portal by proper officer for filing GST return

Condonation of delay - proviso to Rule 23 of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Rules - Delay in invoking the proviso to Rule 23 of the OGST Rules was condoned. - HELD THAT: - The counsel for the Revenue stated that if delay in filing the revocation application is condoned and the petitioner complies with payment and other formalities, the 3B Return will be accepted. The Court thereupon condoned the delay in invoking the proviso to Rule 23 and directed that the petitioner's application for revocation be considered in accordance with law, subject to compliance with payment and formalities. [Paras 2, 3]

Delay condoned and revocation application to be considered subject to compliance with statutory requirements.

Acceptance of Form GSTR-3B - compliance with payment of taxes, interest, late fee and penalty - Acceptance of the petitioner's Form GSTR-3B is contingent upon deposit of taxes, interest, late fee, penalty and fulfillment of other formalities. - HELD THAT: - The Revenue expressly undertook that the 3B Return filed by the petitioner will be accepted provided the delay (now condoned) and the petitioner deposits all taxes, interest, late fee, penalty and complies with other formalities. The Court recorded this position and made acceptance conditional upon such compliance. [Paras 2, 3]

Form GSTR-3B to be accepted only after required payments and formalities are completed.

Opening of portal by proper officer for filing GST return - The proper officer is directed to open the portal to enable filing of the GST return on production of the Court order and compliance with conditions. - HELD THAT: - The Court directed that a copy of the order be produced before the proper officer and, subject to the petitioner complying with the stated conditions (depositing dues and completing formalities), the proper officer shall open the portal to enable the petitioner to file the GST return. [Paras 4]

Proper officer to open portal for filing after petitioner produces order and complies with conditions.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition is disposed of by condoning the delay in invoking the proviso to Rule 23 OGST Rules and directing that the petitioner's revocation application and GSTR-3B be processed/accepted, subject to payment of taxes, interest, late fee, penalty and compliance with other formalities, and the proper officer opening the portal on production of this order.

Passage of benefit of tax rate reduction - Commensurate reduction in prices - Anti-profiteering under Section 171 - 'Exception' category and comparability of sales - Reinvestigation under Rule 133(4)

Passage of benefit of tax rate reduction - Commensurate reduction in prices - Anti-profiteering under Section 171 - Whether the respondent passed on the benefit of GST rate reduction to consumers by charging commensurate prices from 04.02.2019. - HELD THAT: - The Commission examined the DGAP's three reports and other record materials and found that the respondent reduced the rate of GST charged on all categories of cinema tickets with effect from 04.02.2019 and charged prices commensurate with the reduced tax rate. The earlier quantification of profiteering in the first DGAP report was held to be flawed on conceptual grounds, including calculation of profiteering beyond the date when the respondent had effected commensurate price reductions. On review, the Commission concludes that in respect of tickets sold after the respondent reduced prices w.e.f. 04.02.2019 there was no failure to pass on the benefit of the tax rate reduction, and therefore no contravention of the anti profiteering obligation under Section 171. [Paras 8]

Respondent passed on the benefit of the GST rate reduction by charging commensurate prices w.e.f. 04.02.2019; no contravention of Section 171 in this respect.

'Exception' category and comparability of sales - Comparability of pre- and post-rate-reduction sales - Reinvestigation under Rule 133(4) - 'Exception' category tickets: whether such a category existed for comparison with pre reduction prices and whether profiteering was attracted for those tickets sold from 23.08.2019. - HELD THAT: - The Commission found that the term 'Exception Category' was coined in the DGAP's first report to denote six specific movies for which the respondent had applied for rate revision; those tickets were not sold in the pre rate reduction period and were first sold from 23.08.2019. Because these tickets were sold only after the implementation of Notification No. 27/2018 (rate reduction), their prices cannot be compared with tickets sold prior to the reduction. Further, although the respondent increased base prices of these tickets about six months after 23.08.2019, the increase occurred after the benefit of tax reduction had already been passed and GST at 18% was charged; such subsequent base price increases do not attract the anti profiteering provisions. [Paras 9, 10]

No profiteering in respect of the so called 'Exception' category; the category did not afford a valid pre reduction comparison and subsequent price increases do not attract Section 171.

Reinvestigation under Rule 133(4) - Proceedings dropped - Whether proceedings under Rule 133(4) against the respondent should be continued or dropped in view of the findings. - HELD THAT: - Having considered the DGAP's initial, reconsidered and reinvestigation reports and resolved the inconsistencies identified earlier, the Commission concluded that the respondent had passed on the tax reduction benefit and that no valid instance of profiteering remained. In light of these determinations the Commission held that the matter does not fall within the ambit of the anti profiteering provisions and that continuation of proceedings is unwarranted. [Paras 11, 12]

Proceedings initiated under Rule 133(4) are dropped.

Final Conclusion: On review of the DGAP reports and record, the Commission found that the respondent passed on the benefit of the GST rate reduction (effective 04.02.2019) by charging commensurate prices; the 'Exception' category tickets were not comparable with pre reduction sales and no profiteering was established; accordingly, proceedings under Rule 133(4) are dropped and the case is closed.

Reopening of assessment - reassessment under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - reason to believe - year specific belief of escapement of income - borrowed belief / borrowed satisfaction - live link / nexus between material and escapement - preliminary investigation report of CBI not constituting information

Reopening of assessment - reassessment under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - reason to believe - year specific belief of escapement of income - live link / nexus between material and escapement - Validity of reopening assessments under section 147 where AO recorded one consolidated reason for multiple years without year specific belief or nexus. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that power to reassess under section 147 is year specific and requires the Assessing Officer to form a reasoned belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for the particular assessment year. Reasons recorded for reopening must provide a basis for year specific belief and must show a tangible nexus between the material relied upon and the escapement for that year. A consolidated reason covering several assessment years, devoid of specific findings for each year and described as vague, does not satisfy the statutory requirement. The Tribunal applied settled authorities emphasizing that the AO's belief must be his own and based on material having a live link to escapement; mere aggregation of figures or generalized statements from an investigative agency without independent application of mind is insufficient. On the facts, the AO recorded a single consolidated figure from the CBI report attributing disproportionate assets across the period and did not record year wise escapement or undertake independent verification; consequently the reopening was invalid. [Paras 16, 20, 21, 22, 28]

Reopening and assessments framed under section 147 for the impugned years are invalid and are quashed.

Borrowed belief / borrowed satisfaction - preliminary investigation report of CBI not constituting information - live link / nexus between material and escapement - Whether the AO could rely on the preliminary CBI report without independent inquiry (i.e., whether the belief was borrowed). - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the AO had merely adopted the conclusions in the CBI's preliminary report without undertaking independent scrutiny or verification, and therefore the belief was 'borrowed' and not his own. Reliance solely on a preliminary investigative report which in fact recorded assets in names of the assessee's relatives and contained dates and particulars called for independent analysis by the AO to establish the link between the assets and escapement of income for each assessment year. Authorities were applied holding that mere intimation or preliminary investigative findings do not, without more, furnish the necessary information to form a reasoned belief for reassessment. In these circumstances the AO's action lacked the requisite application of mind and was invalid. [Paras 23, 24, 26, 27]

AO's belief was borrowed from the CBI report; reliance on the preliminary CBI report without independent inquiry did not validate reopening.

Reopening of assessment - reassessment under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Consequential effect on quantum appeals where assessments are quashed. - HELD THAT: - Having held that the assessments for the impugned years were invalidly framed and therefore quashed, the Tribunal declined to consider the merits of the additions made in the assessments as that would be an academic exercise. The invalidation of the assessments entailed that consequential consequences flowing from those assessments also fall away. [Paras 29, 30]

Quantum grounds not adjudicated since assessments quashed; Revenue's appeal for 1996-97 does not survive.

Penalty under section 271(1)(c) - reopening of assessment - Validity of penalty under section 271(1)(c) where the underlying assessments were quashed. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that because the reassessments were invalidated, the levy of penalty under section 271(1)(c) based on those assessments could not be sustained. The penalty having no independent foundation after quashing of assessments was set aside. [Paras 31]

Penalty appeals for the relevant assessment years are allowed; penalties set aside.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal quashed the reassessment orders framed under section 147 for A.Y. 1996-97 to 2000-01 on the grounds that the AO recorded a consolidated and vague reason without year specific belief, and had borrowed the preliminary CBI report without independent application of mind; consequentially the quantum appeals were allowed as academic issues and the penalty under section 271(1)(c) was set aside. Appeals by the assessee allowed; department's appeal dismissed.

Condonation of delay in filing appeal - Condonation of delay - limitation under Section 260A - time barred appeals - limitation binds the Government - separate statute of limitation for governmental appeals

HELD THAT:- Pursuant to our order [2024 (1) TMI 804 - SC ORDER] the Commissioner of Income Tax (International Taxation-I), New Delhi has filed an affidavit clearly stating that pursuant to the impugned order of the ITAT [2016 (3) TMI 680 - ITAT DELHI] a decision was taken not to file an appeal. That it was only after coming to know that in the case of M/s Vodafone South Limited, the ITAT, Bangalore Bench [2015 (1) TMI 1018 - ITAT BANGALORE] had given a decision in favour of the Department that as an afterthought it was decided to file an appeal in the instant case.

We do not think that the said explanation has any merit in explaining the delay in filing the appeal before the High Court and neither can it be construed to be a sufficient cause for condoning the same.

In the circumstances, the High Court [2023 (3) TMI 1450 - DELHI HIGH COURT] was justified in dismissing the appeal filed under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act on the ground of delay. We do not find any merit in the special leave petition(s) as the impugned order not call for any interference.

Disallowance u/s 40(a) (ia) - AO decision to add back the amount, on the ground that the TDS has not been deducted -Addition was upset by the CIT(A) who noticed that the payee i.e. the Delhi Transport Corporation had reflected the amount as its tax liability in its returns - As decided by HC [2018 (5) TMI 2145 - DELHI HIGH COURT] issue decided in assessee favour as covered by a judgment of Ansal Land Mark Township (P) Ltd. - [2015 (9) TMI 79 - DELHI HIGH COURT] and Rajinder Kumar - [2013 (7) TMI 454 - DELHI HIGH COURT]

HELD THAT:- As heard learned senior counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.

Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - breach of section 11(3)(d) - eligibility of reason to believe - misuse or abuse of funds by the trustees of the trust - violation of section 11(2) read with section 11(3)(d) of the Act as payment was made to CIMS Hospital Pvt. Ltd. for Linac machine - as decided by HC [2019 (4) TMI 291 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] reasons recorded it is evident that the AO has consciously decided that there was violation of section 11(3)(d) of the Act, and since on the reasons recorded, the AO could not have formed the belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, the impugned notice u/s 148 of the Act lacks validity and cannot be sustained.

HELD THAT:- We have heard learned senior counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent at length.

The special leave petition is dismissed.

Unverifiable sundry Creditors - Disallowances of 25% of total bogus creditors - As decided by HC [2018 (2) TMI 1876 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] CIT(Appeals) and Tribunal correctly limited the additions to 25% - HELD THAT:- We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. Hence, the Special Leave Petition is dismissed.

Characterization of receipt - sales tax subsidy - whether has to be treated as a capital receipt and not to be added as part of the income of the assessee? - As petitioner contended that although these special leave petitions may be disposed of in terms of the order passed by this Court while sustaining the order passed in the aforesaid case of M/s Munjal Auto Industries Limited [2018 (5) TMI 1738 - SC ORDER] had also taken note of the fact that, if, the sales tax subsidy is held to be a capital receipt then the natural consequences of the said fact should follow.

Our attention was drawn order in the case of M/s Munjal Auto Industries Limited[2013 (10) TMI 650 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] which order was sustained by this Court [2018 (5) TMI 1738 - SC ORDER] by placing reliance on another judgment of this Court in M/s Chaphalkar Brothers, Pune [2017 (12) TMI 816 - SUPREME COURT]. Therefore, the said direction may also be issued in the instant special leave petitions also.

Assessee drew our attention to another judgment of Gujarat High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Central-II vs. Ellora Time Private Limited[2011 (6) TMI 853 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] which order was also sustained by this Court in Ajanta Limited [2016 (4) TMI 1460 - SC ORDER] wherein on an identical question no such consequential direction was issued inasmuch as the special leave petitions were simply dismissed.

HELD THAT:- Having noted the submissions at the Bar, we are conscious of the fact that this Court while dismissing the Civil Appeal which arose in the case of M/s Munjal Auto Industries Limited has sustained the judgment of the Gujarat High Court passed in the said case. In the circumstances, we find that the observations of the Gujarat High Court would have a bearing on the present case and therefore, we observe that consequent upon holding that the sales tax subsidy receipt by the respondent-assessee being treated as a capital receipt, the natural consequences as a result of the said declaration would follow.

The special leave petitions are disposed of in the aforesaid terms. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Application u/s 264 - treatment to sales tax subsidy - HELD THAT:- Following the order passed in SLP(C) [supra] this Civil Appeal is also dismissed subject to the observations made in the aforesaid Special leave petitions.

Procedure under Section 245D - call for report under Section 245D(2B) - obligation to proceed in absence of Commissioner's report under Section 245D(2C) - Rule 9 report - opportunity of hearing - adjournment on account of election duty - valuation of assets for addition - genuineness of gifts

Procedure under Section 245D - call for report under Section 245D(2B) - obligation to proceed in absence of Commissioner's report under Section 245D(2C) - Rule 9 report - Whether the Settlement Commission complied with the statutory procedure under Section 245D in calling for and dealing with the Commissioner's report and the Rule 9 report before passing its final order. - HELD THAT: - The Commission had directed on 24.11.2017 that the applications be proceeded with and called for a report under Section 245D(2B). The communication calling for the report was dated 27.11.2017; the reply was dated 27.12.2017 and the report was received in the Commission's office on 12.01.2018, i.e., after the 30 day period contemplated by Section 245D(2B). Section 245D(2C) requires the Commission to proceed where no report is furnished within the prescribed period. Notwithstanding the delayed receipt, the Commission had before it the Rule 9 report submitted by the office of the Commissioner and expressly extracted and considered the objections contained therein in its order. The Court confined itself to judicial review of procedure and found that the Commission proceeded in accordance with the statutory scheme and took into account the available report material.

Commission complied with the statutory procedure under Section 245D; no interference with the order.

Opportunity of hearing - adjournment on account of election duty - Whether the Department was denied sufficient opportunity of hearing or entitled to adjournment on account of the officer's election duty before the Commission. - HELD THAT: - The Commission considered and rejected the request for adjournment grounded on the officer being deputed for election duty. It noted that the Assessing Officer's report was due on 28.02.2019 while the General Elections were announced only on 10.03.2019; further delay would risk time bar. The Department was represented before the Commission and given an opportunity to be heard. The High Court's review was limited to procedural fairness and it found no denial of reasonable opportunity.

No procedural infirmity; adjournment rightly refused and sufficient opportunity was afforded to the Department.

Valuation of assets for addition - genuineness of gifts - Whether the Settlement Commission wrongly declined additions on valuation and rejected the Department's contentions as to non genuineness of gifts and related payments. - HELD THAT: - The Commission accepted the Valuation Cell's assessment that the building's valuation was only marginally (6.21%) above book value and deemed the difference negligible for making additions. The Commission found the gifts genuine on the basis that the donors (close relatives) depose in consonance with the applicants' case and that the receipts were routed through banks and NRI accounts of donors abroad. Payments shown in the sale agreements were found to be consistent with amounts actually received. The High Court, confined to reviewing procedural regularity, found no reason to disturb these factual findings of the Commission.

Findings on valuation, genuineness of gifts and matching of payments upheld; no interference.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed. The High Court found that the Settlement Commission followed the statutory procedure under Section 245D, considered the Rule 9 material and the Department was afforded opportunity to be heard; the Commission's factual findings on valuation, gifts and payments were not disturbed.

Offence under Section 276C(2) of the Income Tax Act relating to wilful attempt to evade payment of tax - wilful attempt to evade - mens rea - distinction between mere failure to pay and wilful attempt to evade - strict construction of penal statutes - abuse of process - non-application of mind in sanction for prosecution

Offence under Section 276C(2) of the Income Tax Act relating to wilful attempt to evade payment of tax - wilful attempt to evade - mens rea - distinction between mere failure to pay and wilful attempt to evade - strict construction of penal statutes - Mere failure to pay self-assessment tax, without a positive act or evidence of a guilty mind, does not constitute a wilful attempt to evade payment punishable under Section 276C(2). - HELD THAT: - The Court analysed the language and purpose of Section 276C(1) and (2) and the Explanation thereto, observing that the linchpin of both sub-sections is a "wilful attempt to evade" which imports a mental element and ordinarily requires a positive act or omission done with intent to defeat the liability to pay tax. Penal provisions must be construed strictly and cannot be extended to cover mere non-payment. The authorities relied on by the applicants (including Prem Dass and subsequent High Court decisions) were held to support the proposition that delayed payment or mere omission to pay (even if followed by payment after demand or notice) does not ipso facto attract Section 276C(2). The Court noted that other provisions of the statute provide for recovery, interest or penal consequences for delay, and that equating mere failure with a wilful attempt to evade would improperly broaden the penal provision. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that the assessees had disclosed income and computed self-assessment tax, and that payment made within five days of the show cause notice and subsequent payment of interest evidenced bona fides rather than a design to evade tax. [Paras 26, 38, 41, 42, 44]

Section 276C(2) does not, on the facts of this case, apply to the applicants; mere delay in payment is not a wilful attempt to evade tax.

Abuse of process - non-application of mind in sanction for prosecution - presumption under Section 278B (rebuttable) in context of prosecution - Continuation of prosecution was an abuse of the process of the Court and the sanction to prosecute suffered from non-application of mind in the circumstances of this case, warranting quashing of the criminal proceedings. - HELD THAT: - Having considered the material on record - including the ITR, show cause notice, the applicants' prompt payment within five days of service of notice and subsequent payment of interest - the Court concluded that the sanctioning authority failed to give due weight to the absence of mens rea and the fact that income had been disclosed and tax computed. The Court observed that invocation of prosecutorial machinery where the essential ingredient of a wilful attempt to evade is not made out amounts to abuse of process. While recognising that the existence of intent is ordinarily a matter for trial, the Court found that on the admitted record no offence under Section 276C(2) was prima facie made out and that continuing the prosecution would be unjustified. The Court therefore quashed the proceedings in the relevant criminal case. [Paras 11, 42, 43, 44, 45]

Proceedings in Criminal Case No. 1195/SW/2018 were quashed as an abuse of process and for non-application of mind in sanctioning prosecution.

Final Conclusion: The petition is allowed: prosecution under Section 276C(2) of the Income Tax Act for AY-2010-2011 cannot be sustained where only delayed payment (followed by payment within five days of notice and payment of interest) is shown and no positive act or mens rea to evade tax is established; the criminal proceedings (Criminal Case No. 1195/SW/2018) are quashed and set aside.

Reopening of assessment - Section 147 of the Income Tax Act - Explanation 3 to Section 147 - reasons recorded under Section 148 - reassessment on issues not specified in the reasons - independence of 'any other income' in Section 147

Explanation 3 to Section 147 - reasons recorded under Section 148 - reassessment on issues not specified in the reasons - Whether the ITAT erred in not appreciating Explanation 3 to Section 147 and whether that Explanation empowers the Assessing Officer to assess or reassess income in respect of any issue which has escaped assessment despite such issue not being included in the reasons recorded under Section 148(2). - HELD THAT: - The ITAT had upheld the order of the CIT(A) on the ground that additions made in reassessment did not relate to the amounts adverted to in the notice and reasons recorded; it followed the view in Ranbaxy Laboratories which applied Jet Airways (Bombay HC). Attention was drawn to Explanation 3 to Section 147 (as it stood at the relevant time), which permits assessment or reassessment of income in respect of any issue that comes to the AO's notice during the course of proceedings notwithstanding that reasons for such issue were not included in the reasons recorded under section 148(2). The Court noted contrasting high court decisions and recalled earlier reasoning where the ambit and effect of Explanation 3 had been examined, including that differing interpretations warranted fuller consideration. In view of the conflicting authorities and the importance of the legal question - namely whether the second limb of Section 147 (as clarified by Explanation 3) can be applied independently of the reasons recorded for reopening - the High Court admitted the appeal for determination on that specific question of law. [Paras 5, 6, 7]

Appeal admitted on the articulated question of law relating to the scope and effect of Explanation 3 to Section 147; matter listed for hearing.

Final Conclusion: The High Court admitted the appeal and framed the question whether Explanation 3 to Section 147 permits assessment of issues not mentioned in the reasons recorded under Section 148(2); the matter is listed for further hearing.

Requirement under Section 144C(4) to await Dispute Resolution Panel directions before completing assessment - Validity of assessment passed while objections to draft order are pending before DRP - Quashing of assessment order and remand for fresh assessment after DRP directions

Requirement under Section 144C(4) to await Dispute Resolution Panel directions before completing assessment - Validity of assessment passed while objections to draft order are pending before DRP - Final assessment passed despite objections filed and pending consideration by the Dispute Resolution Panel was without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. - HELD THAT: - The Court found on the admitted facts that the petitioner had filed objections to the draft assessment order in Form No. 35A and that those objections were pending adjudication before the DRP when the National e-Assessment Centre issued the final assessment order. Applying the principle that the Assessing Officer can complete the assessment only after the assessee accepts the draft order or if no objections are received within the prescribed time, and having regard to prior decisions of this Court addressing the same issue, the final assessment passed while DRP directions were awaited was held to be illegal. The Court therefore quashed the impugned assessment and remitted the matter for fresh assessment to be completed only after receipt of directions from the DRP. [Paras 3, 4, 5, 6]

Impugned assessment order dated 16th November, 2023 quashed; matter remitted to Assessing Officer to pass fresh assessment after receipt of DRP directions.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed; final assessment order set aside and Assessing Officer directed to pass a fresh assessment order after receipt of directions from the Dispute Resolution Panel.

Rectification application under Section 154(8) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 - statutory time limit of six months for disposal of rectification applications - short grant of TDS credit and consequential refund with interest - binding effect of CBDT instructions on time limits for disposal

Rectification application under Section 154(8) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 - statutory time limit of six months for disposal of rectification applications - short grant of TDS credit and consequential refund with interest - binding effect of CBDT instructions on time limits for disposal - Respondents were directed to decide the petitioner's pending rectification applications and to release any consequential refunds with interest. - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that the petitioner filed rectification applications dated 30th June, 2021 and 29th January, 2020 seeking rectification for short grant of TDS credit and brought forward loss/unabsorbed depreciation for AY 2017-18 and AY 2018-19. The statutory period for disposal under Section 154(8) is six months from the end of the month in which the application was received, and the Court observed the CBDT Circular and Instruction emphasising strict adherence to the six month time limit. In light of the limited relief sought and the expiry of the statutory period, the Court directed respondent no.1 to decide the rectification applications by way of a speaking order in accordance with law within eight weeks, and directed that any consequential refunds along with up to date interest, if payable, be released within a further eight weeks. [Paras 3, 5]

Petitions disposed with direction to decide rectification applications by way of a speaking order within eight weeks and to release consequential refunds with up to date interest within a further eight weeks.

Final Conclusion: Writ petitions allowed in part: respondent directed to decide the petitioner's rectification applications for AY 2017-18 and AY 2018-19 within eight weeks and to pay any consequent refunds with interest within eight additional weeks.

Requirement of incriminating material discovered during search for reopening - reopening of assessment under Section 153A read with search under Section 132 - insufficiency of unverified foreign bank statement as incriminating material

Requirement of incriminating material discovered during search for reopening - reopening of assessment under Section 153A read with search under Section 132 - insufficiency of unverified foreign bank statement as incriminating material - Validity of the addition made by the AO under the assessment completed pursuant to proceedings under Section 153A, in the absence of incriminating material discovered during the search - HELD THAT: - The Court concluded that the revenue did not produce any material found during the search of 14.11.2011 that incriminated the appellant; the material relied upon by the revenue pre-dated the search and consisted principally of a purported bank statement whose provenance and veracity were disputed by the appellant. The Court noted that the affidavit filed by the revenue confirmed that no physical material related to the foreign bank account was found during the search and that the information on which the addition was based was available before the search. Applying the principle, as articulated by this Court and approved by the Supreme Court in earlier decisions, that a completed assessment can be reopened under Section 153A only if incriminating material is found during the course of a search under Section 132, the Court found the material on record insufficient to justify reopening and sustaining the addition. The Court also observed that the consent/waiver form sought to be relied upon by the revenue was framed such that its execution could have compelled self-incrimination, and that the revenue had not placed before the Court reliable corroborative material to displace the appellant's denial of ownership of the account. Reference was made to this Court's decision in CIT v. Kabul Chawla and to the decision of the Supreme Court in PCIT v. Abhishar Buildwell P. Ltd. as laying down the controlling legal principle regarding the necessity of incriminating material discovered during search for reopening assessments; on that foundation the question of law was answered in favour of the appellant. [Paras 12, 15, 16]

The addition made by the Assessing Officer pursuant to proceedings under Section 153A is set aside and deleted for AY 2006-07, the question of law answered in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the Tribunal's order is set aside, the impugned addition deleted for AY 2006-07, on the ground that no incriminating material was found during the search to justify reopening under Section 153A.

Limitation under Section 149 - notice under Section 148 - reassessment under Section 147 - consequential orders and notice of demand - jurisdictional vires of reassessment initiation

Notice under Section 148 - limitation under Section 149 - amount constituting escaped income threshold - Validity of the notice dated 21.07.2022 issued under Section 148 for AY 2016-17 on the ground of limitation - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the limitation scheme in Section 149 and the material on record showing the alleged escaped income as Rs. 39,21,450/- for AY 2016-17. The three-year period for issuance of a notice under Section 148 for AY 2016-17 expired on 31.03.2020. Extension of the limitation up to ten years is available only where escaped income is Rs. 50,00,000/- or more and the requisite conditions are satisfied. The notice under Section 148A(b) dated 30.05.2022 and the order under Section 148A(d) dated 21.07.2022 both record the alleged escaped income as below Rs. 50,00,000/-, and therefore the filing of the notice dated 21.07.2022 falls outside the three-year period and cannot be saved by the ten-year exception. Consequently, initiation of reassessment by that notice was beyond the statutory limitation and hence without jurisdiction. [Paras 10, 11, 12]

The notice dated 21.07.2022 issued under Section 148 is barred by limitation under Section 149 and is void ab initio.

Reassessment under Section 147 - consequential orders and notice of demand - doctrine that consequent proceedings fail if foundation is void - Validity of the reassessment order dated 31.05.2023 passed under Section 147 and the consequential Notice of Demand dated 31.05.2023 - HELD THAT: - The Court applied the settled principle that proceedings founded upon an act which is void for want of jurisdiction must also fall. Since the initiation of reassessment was held to be beyond jurisdiction (the impugned Section 148 notice being time-barred), all consequential actions flowing from that notice, including the reassessment order under Section 147 and the Notice of Demand under Section 156, are inseparably connected to and vitiated by the defective initiation. The Court therefore quashed and set aside those consequential orders without adjudicating other grounds raised by the petitioner. [Paras 13, 14]

The reassessment order dated 31.05.2023 and the Notice of Demand dated 31.05.2023 are quashed as consequential to the void Section 148 notice.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed: the Section 148 notice dated 21.07.2022 for AY 2016-17 is time-barred and void; the reassessment order dated 31.05.2023 and the consequential notice of demand dated 31.05.2023 are quashed. Other grounds were not adjudicated.

Order under Section 148A(d) of the Income-tax Act - reopening of assessment - material to justify reopening - principles of natural justice - quashing of notice under Section 148

Order under Section 148A(d) of the Income-tax Act - material to justify reopening - reopening of assessment - principles of natural justice - Validity of the order dated 04.08.2023 under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under Section 148 for assessment year 2017-18 - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the show-cause notice and the annexure and found no tangible material demonstrating escapement of income for assessment year 2017-18. The assessing officer's reliance on bank transactions of the earlier financial year (assessment year 2016-17), proceedings in respect of which had already been quashed and become final, was a conspicuous omission and could not furnish the requisite material to reopen assessment. The assessing officer's assertion that a 'prudent businessman' would not withdraw and redeposit large sums was treated as personal opinion and insufficient as a legal basis for reopening. Having regard to the statutory scheme under Section 148A and the requirement that conditions precedent and tangible material be placed before invoking reopening, the impugned order was held to be legally unsustainable. The Court further noted prior remand on grounds of violation of natural justice and that the subsequent order, although elaborate in form, failed to cure the substantive lack of material justifying reopening. [Paras 8, 9, 10]

The order under Section 148A(d) dated 04.08.2023 and the consequential notice under Section 148 are quashed for want of requisite material and glaring omissions.

Final Conclusion: The intra-court appeal is allowed; the impugned order under Section 148A(d) dated 04.08.2023 and the consequential notice under Section 148 for assessment year 2017-18 are quashed for failure to place tangible material justifying reopening and for conspicuous omissions.

Requirement of recording reasons for reopening assessments - Procedure under Section 148A(b) and Section 148A(d) - Reopening of assessment under Section 147 - Right to opportunity to reply and personal hearing - Preclusion of limitation defence after remand

Procedure under Section 148A(b) and Section 148A(d) - Requirement of recording reasons for reopening assessments - Right to opportunity to reply and personal hearing - Validity of the orders passed under Section 148A(d) and the consequent assessment under Section 147 where the show cause order under Section 148A(b) was not accompanied by contemporaneous reasons and the assessee did not file a reply before final action. - HELD THAT: - The High Court held that the order under Section 148A(b) dated 18.04.2022 is non-speaking and gives an impression that the reopening was confirmed because the assessee failed to file a reply. The Court emphasised that even in ex parte proceedings the authority must record reasons for coming to the conclusion to reopen assessment and for confirming the proposal in the show cause notice. For want of such reasons and adequate opportunity to the assessee, the impugned orders under Section 148A(d) and the assessment under Section 147 cannot stand. The Court set aside those orders and restored the matter to the assessing officer to the stage of the show cause notice under Section 148A(b), directing the assessee to file a reply within 20 days of service of the order, and directing the assessing officer to grant personal hearing (including by video conferencing) and pass fresh orders on merits and in accordance with law.

Impugned orders set aside; proceedings remitted to AO to reopen consideration from Section 148A(b) stage, with fresh opportunity to file reply and for personal hearing, and for passing fresh reasoned orders on merits.

Preclusion of limitation defence after remand - Whether the appellant could raise the limitation point after remand. - HELD THAT: - The Court expressly precluded the appellant from raising any issue with regard to the limitation aspect when the matter is re-heard following remand. That exclusion was made part of the order restoring the matter to the assessing officer for fresh consideration.

Appellant is precluded from raising limitation as a defence in the remanded proceedings.

Final Conclusion: The writ appeal is allowed in part: the orders under Section 148A(d) and the assessment under Section 147 for AY 2018-2019 are set aside and the matter is remitted to the assessing officer to resume at the Section 148A(b) show cause stage; the assessee to file reply within 20 days and be afforded personal hearing, with fresh reasoned orders to follow, subject to the preclusion of raising limitation.

Summary order. Special Leave Petition dismissed; delay of 206 days in filing condoned; pending applications disposed of.

Summary order. Appeals dismissed and Tribunal's view concurred with; no order as to costs; question of law kept open for adjudication in an appropriate case.

Pre-arrest protection by writ under Article 226 - mandamus against arrest pursuant to summons under the Customs Act - summons under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 - power of arrest under the Customs Act and exercise of statutory arrest powers on objective grounds - non-availability of anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC where arrest is by Customs authority - bailability of offences under the Customs Act - exercise of writ jurisdiction sparingly

Pre-arrest protection by writ under Article 226 - mandamus against arrest pursuant to summons under the Customs Act - summons under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 - exercise of writ jurisdiction sparingly - Maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 seeking protection from arrest in response to a summons issued under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 and the standard for exercise of such jurisdiction. - HELD THAT: - The High Court accepted that a writ under Article 226 seeking pre arrest protection is maintainable but reiterated the settled principle that such extraordinary relief must be exercised sparingly. The Court noted competing authorities on the scope of Customs officers' arrest powers and on bailability under the Customs Act, and observed that maintainability does not compel the court to grant relief in every case where a summons is issued. Having considered the authorities relied upon by both parties, the Court concluded that, on the facts before it, it would not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to grant pre arrest protection at this stage and therefore declined to entertain the petition. [Paras 7]

The writ petition is maintainable in principle but the court will exercise the power sparingly and, on the facts, will not grant pre arrest relief.

Power of arrest under the Customs Act and exercise of statutory arrest powers on objective grounds - non-availability of anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC where arrest is by Customs authority - bailability of offences under the Customs Act - Appropriate course where a person summoned under Section 108 fears arrest and the judicial stance on interference with departmental proceedings and arrest powers under the Customs Act. - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that Customs authorities possess statutory arrest powers which must be exercised on objective grounds and that invocation of CrPC Section 438 is not the automatic remedy against departmental arrest proceedings arising from a summons. While decisions such as Om Prakash recognising bailability of certain Customs offences were noted, the Court emphasised that absent compelling circumstances it will not pre empt or restrain departmental action and directed the authorities to proceed in accordance with law. Applying these principles, the Court declined to issue a mandamus restraining arrest and dismissed the petition. [Paras 8, 9]

The petition for a direction restraining arrest and for expeditious disposal is declined; the authorities are directed to proceed in accordance with law and the writ petition is dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The High Court held that while a writ seeking pre arrest protection is in principle maintainable, such relief is to be granted sparingly; on the facts the court declined to interfere with the respondent authorities' powers under the Customs Act, dismissed the petition, and directed the authorities to proceed in accordance with law.

Waiver of show cause notice - re-classification of imported goods - confiscation of goods under Customs law - finalisation of assessment and issuance of adjudication order by customs authorities - right to challenge adjudication by filing an appeal

Waiver of show cause notice - finalisation of assessment and issuance of adjudication order by customs authorities - re-classification of imported goods - Petitioner's offer to waive issuance of a show cause notice in respect of Bill of Entry No. 8560406 dated 31st October 2023 was accepted and the respondents directed to pass an adjudication order similar to the Order dated 5th January 2024 in respect of that Bill of Entry within two weeks. - HELD THAT: - The petitioner expressly offered to forgo the procedural step of issuing a show cause notice in relation to the goods imported under the specified Bill of Entry and requested that an order on the lines of the adjudication already passed on 5th January 2024 be made forthwith. The Court accepted this consent-based course and directed the respondents to pass an order in respect of the goods covered by Bill of Entry No. 8560406 within a prescribed period. The direction contemplates replication of the operative effect of the earlier adjudication (including re classification), subject to the respondents carrying out the adjudicatory act within two weeks of intimation of this order. The Court's order is founded on the parties' consent and the petitioner's willingness to have the matter disposed of in the same terms as the prior adjudication while preserving statutory remedies. [Paras 15, 16]

Petitioner's waiver accepted; respondents directed to pass an order similar to the Order dated 5th January 2024 in respect of Bill of Entry No. 8560406 within two weeks.

Right to challenge adjudication by filing an appeal - confiscation of goods under Customs law - Petitioner's right to challenge the adjudication so passed by filing an appeal and to raise all contentions permitted in law was preserved. - HELD THAT: - While directing the respondents to proceed with an order akin to the earlier adjudication, the Court expressly made this direction subject to the petitioner's statutory right to pursue appellate remedies. The order thus implements the consensual disposition without foreclosing the petitioner from litigating the correctness of the resultant adjudication on merits through the normal appellate process. [Paras 16]

Order to be passed without prejudice to petitioner's right to file an appeal and raise all contentions as may be permitted in law.

Final Conclusion: Petition disposed of by accepting petitioner's waiver of a show cause notice and directing respondents to pass, within two weeks of intimation, an adjudication order in respect of Bill of Entry No. 8560406 on the lines of the Order dated 5th January 2024, while preserving the petitioner's right to challenge the order by filing an appeal; no order as to costs.

Validity of executive notification - effective date of statutory notification - retrospective application of tariff valuation notification - availability of departmental remedy for payments made under protest

Validity of executive notification - effective date of statutory notification - retrospective application of tariff valuation notification - Notification No.36 of 2001 dated 03.08.2001 is enforceable only from the date it was published in the Official Gazette and not from 03.08.2001. - HELD THAT: - The Division Bench in the earlier writ petitions had held, following the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Param Industries Ltd., that Notification No.36 of 2001 could not be applied to imports on 03.08.2001 because the notification came into force only on or after 06.08.2001 when it was notified/published in the Official Gazette. The court endorses that view and finds no reason to interfere. Consequently, departmental action applying the tariff value prescribed in Notification No.36 with effect from 03.08.2001 was incorrect; the notification operates only from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette (06.08.2001). [Paras 5, 6]

Notification No.36 of 2001 is valid but its effect is confined to the date it was published in the Official Gazette and not from 03.08.2001.

Validity of executive notification - effective date of statutory notification - Notification No.40 of 2001 is to be treated similarly and is effective only from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette, not from any earlier date. - HELD THAT: - Notification No.40 of 2001 is identical in character to Notification No.36 of 2001. Applying the same reasoning endorsed by the Division Bench, the court holds that Notification No.40 should be given effect only from the date it was published in the Official Gazette and cannot be applied retrospectively to any earlier date. [Paras 7]

Notification No.40 of 2001 is valid but its operative effect is limited to its Gazette publication date and not to any prior date.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed by endorsing the Division Bench's conclusion that Notifications No.36 and No.40 of 2001 take effect only from their publication in the Official Gazette; petitioner, having paid under protest, may avail appropriate departmental remedies in accordance with that position.

Places of import under Rule 45 of the Insecticides Rules, 1971 - Prohibited goods - Confiscation under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act, 1962 - Redemption fine under Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 - Clearance for home consumption

Places of import under Rule 45 of the Insecticides Rules, 1971 - Prohibited goods - Confiscation under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act, 1962 - Redemption fine under Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 - Clearance for home consumption - Whether import of insecticide at a port not specified in Rule 45 renders the goods 'prohibited' and liable to confiscation, and whether payment of the redemption fine permits clearance for home consumption instead of mandatory re export. - HELD THAT: - The Court accepted that import of insecticides at ports other than those specified in Rule 45 renders such consignments liable to be treated as 'prohibited goods' and attracts action under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act. The respondent authority adjudicated the consignment as confiscated and offered redemption on payment of a fine under Section 125, and directed re export only. The petitioner had paid the redemption fine and there was no dispute on valuation, classification, duty payment or licence compliance; the sole breach related to import at a non specified port. The Court held that once the breach of Rule 45 is remedied by imposition and payment of the redemption fine, the purpose of confiscation is satisfied and the goods are not required to be deported. Consequently, the authority's direction restricting redemption to back to origin re export was erroneous: the proper course, where redemption fine has been paid and other statutory conditions are met, is to permit clearance for home consumption. The Court noted that similar cases had been treated by authorities permitting home clearance on payment of redemption fine and found no justification for insisting on re export in the present facts.

Impugned order modified to permit clearance of the goods for home consumption as the redemption fine has been paid; direction for re export set aside to that extent.

Final Conclusion: Petition allowed to the extent that the adjudication order is modified permitting clearance of the imported insecticide for home consumption, in view of payment of the redemption fine; rule made absolute to that extent, no order as to costs.

Confiscation for overvaluation - market survey evidence - redemption fine and penalty - mitigation of penalty

Confiscation for overvaluation - market survey evidence - Whether the export goods were liable for confiscation on the finding of overvaluation and inferior quality. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal upheld the Adjudicating Authority's finding that the goods were overvalued and of inferior quality. The Revenue conducted a market survey in the presence of the appellant's representative which concluded that the export value was materially higher than market value; the appellant accepted the result of that survey. The Tribunal agreed with the Revenue's observation that claimed transport and handling charges and profit margins could not reasonably account for the substantial disparity between invoiced and market values, and therefore the finding of overvaluation and liability for confiscation was sustained. [Paras 6]

The goods are liable for confiscation on the finding of overvaluation and inferior quality.

Redemption fine and penalty - mitigation of penalty - Whether redemption fine and penalty could be imposed and, if so, whether the quantum awarded required adjustment. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that, consequent to the upheld finding of confiscation, imposition of a redemption fine and penalty on the appellant was justified. However, exercising its corrective discretion as to quantum, the Tribunal found the amounts originally imposed to be excessive in the facts and reduced them. The redemption fine was reduced and the penalty was proportionately moderated to reflect the Tribunal's view on appropriate mitigation. [Paras 6, 7]

Redemption fine and penalty are imposable; redemption fine reduced and penalty moderated by the Tribunal.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal sustained the finding of overvaluation and liability for confiscation; redemption fine and penalty were held to be payable but the Tribunal reduced the redemption fine and moderated the penalty, and the appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Admissibility of panchnama evidence - duty to produce panch witnesses for cross-examination - voluntariness of confessional statements - requirement of proof for illegal import and foreign origin of goods - scope of penalty under Section 112(b) of the Customs Act - insufficiency of call detail records as proof of complicity or importation

Admissibility of panchnama evidence - duty to produce panch witnesses for cross-examination - Panchnama alone, without production and cross-examination of panch witnesses, is insufficient to establish recovery of seized goods. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that the two persons from whose alleged recovery the proceedings originated disputed the correctness of the panchnama. Established law treats a panchnama as a contemporaneous record usable to refresh a panch's memory but not as substantive evidence when the panch is not produced for cross-examination. Here, although an opportunity to cross-examine was afforded, the panch witnesses did not appear. In those circumstances the contents of the panchnama could not safely be relied upon as proof of recovery and the Revenue could not rest its case solely on that document. [Paras 9]

Contents of the panchnama could not be treated as proved in the absence of panch evidence and cross-examination.

Voluntariness of confessional statements - Confessional statements recorded by customs officials could not be relied upon because there was no adjudicatory finding that they were voluntarily made and appellants had retracted them while in custody. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal applied the settled principle that only voluntary statements can be admitted as evidence. The two persons initially made confessional statements but later retracted them, alleging duress and coercion. The Adjudicating Authority did not undertake the necessary inquiry to determine voluntariness, as required by precedent. Absent such a finding, the statements could not form a basis for penalising the appellants. [Paras 10, 11]

Confessional statements could not be relied upon because voluntariness was not established by the adjudicating authority.

Insufficiency of call detail records as proof of complicity or importation - Call detail records relied upon by the Revenue did not furnish concrete evidence linking the appellants to illegal importation or proving presence in Kolkata. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal observed that mere telephonic contact does not establish that the goods were of foreign origin, illegally imported, or that the appellants were personally involved in handling the goods. The show cause notice and record did not demonstrate that the call records placed the appellants at Kolkata during the relevant period, and some call references related to phone numbers not traced to the appellants. Consequently, call detail records did not supply the necessary corroboration. [Paras 12]

Call detail records were inadequate to establish involvement in smuggling or illegal importation.

Requirement of proof for illegal import and foreign origin of goods - The Revenue failed to prove that the seized gold bars were of foreign origin or illegally imported. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found no evidence on record to demonstrate foreign origin of the gold. The statements suggesting knowledge of foreign-origin gold in Kolkata were hearsay and generic. The Revenue did not subject the seized gold to tests (such as touchstone) to establish purity or origin. Therefore the initial burden of proving illegal importation was not discharged. [Paras 14]

Foreign origin and illegal importation of the seized gold were not proved.

Scope of penalty under Section 112(b) of the Customs Act - requirement of proof for illegal import and foreign origin of goods - Penalty under Section 112(b) cannot be imposed in the absence of proof of illegal import under Section 111; accordingly, the penalties imposed were set aside. - HELD THAT: - Section 112(b) penalises dealing in goods which a person believes or has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under Section 111. Since confiscation under Section 111 presupposes illegal import, penalty under Section 112(b) requires proof of illegal import. Given the Revenue's failure to establish foreign origin or illegal importation, and absence of corroborative material linking the appellants to the seized goods, the Tribunal concluded that the statutory precondition for imposing penalties under Section 112(b) was not satisfied. [Paras 15, 16, 17]

Penalties under Section 112(b) could not be sustained and were set aside for want of proof of illegal importation.

Final Conclusion: All appeals are allowed; penalties imposed under Section 112(b) of the Customs Act on the appellants are set aside because recovery, voluntariness of statements, foreign origin of the gold and illegal importation were not satisfactorily proved and corroborated.

Financial debt - commercial effect of a borrowing - debt and default - maintainability of a section 7 petition - limitation for enforcement of a contract

Financial debt - commercial effect of a borrowing - debt and default - Whether the amount of Rs. 1.25 crores paid by the appellant constitutes a financial debt and whether a default exists under the IBC - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the statutory definitions of "debt", "default" and "financial debt" under the IBC and applied them to the transaction. The payment of Rs. 1.25 crores was established as an advance made in relation to a future share/purchase transaction but no written Share Purchase Agreement or contemporaneous document evidencing a borrowing or terms of repayment was produced. Clause (f) of the statutory definition extends to transactions having the commercial effect of a borrowing, but the pleadings and documents before the Adjudicating Authority did not demonstrate that the advance had the commercial character of a borrowing or that it created a liability subject to repayment. In addition, no date of default was pleaded or proved. On these bases the Tribunal found that the Adjudicating Authority did not err in concluding that the transaction was not a "financial debt" and that no "default" under the IBC had been made out. [Paras 20, 21, 25]

The payment does not constitute a financial debt and no default under the IBC is established; the Adjudicating Authority's finding is sustained.

Limitation for enforcement of a contract - maintainability of a section 7 petition - Whether the section 7 petition was maintainable in view of limitation and the nature of the underlying claim - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that the alleged transaction related to the specific purchase of property/shareholding in December 2014 and that, if treated as an agreement for specific performance or similar relief, the appellant ought to have sought enforcement within the three year period applicable to such claims. The appellant's first reminder to execute the Share Purchase Agreement was in January 2018, and the section 7 petition was filed in July 2021. The Tribunal held that pursuing enforcement through the IBC for a time-barred claim concerning a specific contract is not the correct course and that the Adjudicating Authority was justified in concluding that the section 7 petition was not a proper or maintainable vehicle for recovery of the asserted time barred claim. [Paras 23, 25]

The section 7 petition was not maintainable as a means to recover a claim that ought to have been enforced within the statutory limitation period.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed. The Adjudicating Authority rightly concluded that the Rs. 1.25 crores advance did not constitute a financial debt nor was there a shown default under the IBC, and the section 7 petition was not a maintainable remedy for an allegedly time barred contractual claim; no costs.

Condonation of delay - dismissal of appeal - leave to agitate question of law in future proceedings

Dismissal of appeal - exercise of appellate discretion - Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the impugned order. - HELD THAT: - The Court heard learned senior counsel for the appellant department and, having considered the matter, stated that it was not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. No substantive reasoning or legal principle was articulated beyond the Court's discretion not to interfere on the material before it. Consequently, the Court dismissed the civil appeal.

The civil appeal is dismissed; the Court declines to interfere with the impugned order.

Leave to agitate question of law in future proceedings - Whether questions of law decided or raised in the proceedings are finally foreclosed. - HELD THAT: - Although the appeal is dismissed, the Court expressly left open any question of law that may arise, permitting such legal questions to be agitated in another appropriate case. The order therefore does not constitute a definitive adjudication on any unsettled point of law, and preserves the parties' right to raise such issues afresh in proper proceedings.

Any question of law is left open for determination in an appropriate future case.

Final Conclusion: Delay is condoned; the civil appeal is dismissed with no interference in the impugned order, while any question of law is left open to be agitated in another appropriate case; pending applications stand disposed of.

Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 - rejection of application under SVLDRS as a co-noticee - designation committee empowered to process applications manually under board instruction - acceptance of main applicant and issuance of SVLDRS-4 - remand for fresh decision by designated committee

Rejection of application under SVLDRS as a co-noticee - acceptance of main applicant and issuance of SVLDRS-4 - designation committee empowered to process applications manually under board instruction - remand for fresh decision by designated committee - Validity of the rejection of the appellant's SVLDRS application on the ground that the main applicant had not applied or settled under the scheme, and appropriate remedy. - HELD THAT: - The designated committee's SVLDRS portal entry recorded rejection because the appellant was a co-noticee and the main applicant had allegedly not applied or settled under the scheme. The record before the Court shows that the main applicant, M/s. Shakambhari Ispat & Power Limited, had in fact filed under the scheme and the designated committee issued SVLDRS-4 on 12th August, 2020; consequent thereto an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was disposed of as deemed withdrawn. Further, Instruction No. 01/2021-CX dated 17th March, 2021 authorises designated committees to process declarations manually without reference to the Board upon fulfilment of conditions. In these circumstances the factual premise for rejection - that the main applicant had not applied or settled - is incorrect, and the rejection cannot be sustained. The appropriate course is to set aside the rejection and remit the matter to the designated committee, which is empowered by the Board's instruction to take a fresh decision on the appellant's application. The designated committee is directed to comply expeditiously, preferably within four weeks of receipt of the server copy of the order. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]

The rejection of the appellant's SVLDRS application is set aside and the matter is remanded to the designated committee to take a fresh decision in accordance with the Board's instruction, to be completed expeditiously preferably within four weeks.

Final Conclusion: Appeal allowed; the writ court order is set aside, the appellant's SVLDRS application rejection is quashed and the matter remanded to the designated committee to decide afresh in accordance with the Board's instruction within the time directed; no costs.

Retention of tax collected on behalf of principal - agency and remittance of tax collected by agent - appreciation of documentary evidence in tax disputes - contravention of provisions regarding retention under Section 73A(2) & (3) - quashing of confirmed demand

Retention of tax collected on behalf of principal - agency and remittance of tax collected by agent - appreciation of documentary evidence in tax disputes - quashing of confirmed demand - Whether the finding of the appellate tribunal that the appellant retained service tax collected on behalf of the principal is sustainable in view of documentary evidence of remittance to the principal and deposit with the department. - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the tribunal's finding that the appellant acted as an agent who charged and collected service tax which should have been remitted to the exchequer, and that the appellant's claim of having returned the collected tax to the principal was unsupported by evidence. The High Court noted the undisputed factual matrix: of the total service tax collected, a sum was remitted to the principal initially, and the remaining amount claimed as retained by the appellant was deposited with the department by way of a bank challan dated 23.07.2013. The challan and related documents were available on record and were not controverted by respondents. On that basis the Court held that the tribunal's conclusion that there was unlawful retention was contrary to the documentary materials and appreciation of evidence; the tribunal failed to properly accept or appreciate the exhibited proof of payment to the department and earlier remittance to the principal. For these reasons the tribunal's finding was held unsustainable and interference was warranted to set it aside and quash the confirmed demand to the extent based on that finding. [Paras 6, 8, 9, 10]

The finding in paragraph 4 of the tribunal's order that the appellant retained service tax collected on behalf of the principal is set aside and the confirmed demand of Rs.38,53,951/- is quashed.

Final Conclusion: The High Court allowed the appeal limited to the retention issue, set aside the tribunal's adverse finding concerning retention in light of documentary proof of remittance/deposit, and quashed the demand founded on that finding; other issues (including the business auxiliary service matter) remain subject to separate proceedings.

Exemption of consulting engineer's services in relation to computer software - maintenance of computer software not chargeable to service tax - jurisdiction of Additional Commissioner to exercise powers of a subordinate Central Excise Officer under Section 83 of the Finance Act as read with Section 12E of the Central Excise Act - Information Technology Software Services inserted w.e.f. 16.05.2008 not leviable for earlier period - penalty and interest not leviable where no service tax liability

Jurisdiction of Additional Commissioner to exercise powers of a subordinate Central Excise Officer under Section 83 of the Finance Act as read with Section 12E of the Central Excise Act - Competency of the Additional Commissioner to adjudicate the show cause notice issued to the appellant. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the Adjudicating Authority recorded in the Order-in-Original and noted the Additional Commissioner was shown as the adjudicating authority. The Commissioner (Appeals) relied on the application of provisions of the Central Excise Act to service tax under Section 83 of the Finance Act and on Section 12E of the Central Excise Act, which authorises a Central Excise Officer to exercise powers of a subordinate officer. The Tribunal found that the Assistant Commissioner in the instant case was subordinate to the Additional Commissioner and accordingly there was no legal infirmity in the Additional Commissioner adjudicating the matter. [Paras 6]

The Additional Commissioner had jurisdiction to adjudicate the show cause notice.

Exemption of consulting engineer's services in relation to computer software - maintenance of computer software not chargeable to service tax - Information Technology Software Services inserted w.e.f. 16.05.2008 not leviable for earlier period - penalty and interest not leviable where no service tax liability - Whether the appellant's services to Yamaha India for operation, development and support of software were taxable during the period 01.10.2002 to 12.03.2004 or exempt under Notification No. 04/1999-ST and CBEC Circular No. 70/19/2003-ST. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal analysed the exemption Notification No. 04/1999-ST which exempts taxable service provided by a consulting engineer in relation to computer software and examined CBEC Circular No. 70/19/2003-ST which clarifies that maintenance of software is not chargeable to service tax and that consulting engineer services in relation to software are covered by the exemption. The agreement between the appellant and Yamaha India was considered; its scope described services of IT support, application implementation, maintenance, customization and related activities that enable use and continuity of software. The Tribunal relied on the reasoning in Nokia (India) Pvt. Ltd. recognising that software engineering/support activities fall within the domain of consulting engineer/software engineer services and are therefore covered by the exemption. The Tribunal further noted that the separate taxable category of Information Technology Software Services was introduced only w.e.f. 16.05.2008 and thus was not applicable to the disputed period. Because the appellant's activities fell within the exemption for consulting engineer services in relation to computer software, there was no service tax liability for the period in dispute, and consequently demands of interest and penalties could not be sustained. [Paras 6]

The appellant's services for the period 01.10.2002 to 12.03.2004 were exempt under Notification No. 04/1999-ST read with CBEC Circular No. 70/19/2003-ST; demands of service tax, interest and penalty are not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is entitled to consequential relief as per law since the services in dispute for 01.10.2002 to 12.03.2004 were held exempt and no interest or penalty could be imposed.

Interest on delayed refund - Entitlement to interest from date of deposit till date of refund - Refund of amounts paid under protest/deposited during investigation - Inapplicability of Mafatlal Industries to refunds of amounts paid under protest - Rate of interest at 12% per annum - Distinction between statutory refund provisions and other refunds (section 11B/11BB)

Interest on delayed refund - Entitlement to interest from date of deposit till date of refund - Refund of amounts paid under protest/deposited during investigation - Rate of interest at 12% per annum - Distinction between statutory refund provisions and other refunds (section 11B/11BB) - Appellant entitled to interest on the sanctioned refund at 12% per annum from the date of payment (deposit) till the date of disbursement. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal recorded that the refund claim arose from amounts deposited by the appellant during investigation under protest, the claim was within time and not hit by unjust enrichment, and therefore the Supreme Court decision in Mafatlal Industries does not apply to these facts. The adjudicating authority's reliance on provisions governing duty refunds (section 11B/11BB) was held inapposite because those provisions relate to refund of excise duty and do not govern refunds of sums collected without authority of law which were deposited under protest. Following precedents and parity with provisions dealing with delayed refunds, the Tribunal applied the established principle that interest on delayed refund is payable from the date of payment/deposit until realization. On judicial discipline and consistent authorities, the Tribunal fixed the rate of interest at 12% per annum and directed calculation from the date of deposit till the date of disbursement. [Paras 4, 5, 6, 8]

Allow interest on the sanctioned refund at 12% per annum, to be computed from the date of payment until the date of disbursement.

Final Conclusion: Appeal allowed to the extent that interest on the refunded amount is granted at 12% per annum, calculated from the date the amount was deposited (payment) until the date of its disbursement.

Eligibility to avail Cenvat credit - capital goods - inputs - attached to the earth / immovable property - CKD condition - time of receipt of goods - permanency test - functional utility test

Eligibility to avail Cenvat credit - capital goods - CKD condition - attached to the earth / immovable property - time of receipt of goods - Whether the appellant was entitled to avail Cenvat credit on pre-fabricated building/green house shelter (received in CKD condition and subsequently assembled and fastened at site). - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the pre-fabricated shelters/towers were received as excisable goods in CKD condition and assembled on site with nuts and bolts. Mere fastening to a foundation for stability does not ipso facto convert such assembled articles into immovable property. The test of permanency requires assessment of intention and the factum of fastening from the circumstances; mere attachment for efficient operation or stability does not automatically make an article immovable. Reliance was placed on the principle that eligibility for credit is to be ascertained at the time of receipt of goods and that goods which are excisable when received cannot be disentitled to credit merely because they are later fastened to earth for use. The Tribunal noted and followed the reasoning in the Vodafone decision that towers and shelters received in CKD form and assembled at site qualify as capital goods and/or inputs because they are functionally used in conjunction with active equipment, and that emergence of an immovable property at an intermediate stage does not defeat entitlement to credit if the goods are ultimately used for provision of the output service. Applying these principles, the Tribunal concluded that the pre-fabricated shelter was not excluded from the definition of capital goods/inputs merely because it was fastened to the earth after assembly, and hence Cenvat credit was properly claimable under the Cenvat Credit Rules.

The pre-fabricated shelter/tower received in CKD condition and assembled/fastened on site is a capital good/input for which the appellant is entitled to avail Cenvat credit; the impugned orders denying credit are set aside.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the appeal, held that the pre-fabricated shelter/tower is not rendered ineligible for Cenvat credit by being fastened to earth after assembly, and set aside the orders rejecting the credit claim.

Cenvat credit - Outdoor Catering Services - eligibility of credit where service-tax paid by service provider and supported by supplementary invoice - time-limit for invoicing under Rule 9 of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 - availability of credit for services provided prior to amendment notwithstanding invoice raised after 31.03.2011 - Circular No.943/04/2011-CX dated 29.04.2011 clarification

Cenvat credit - Outdoor Catering Services - eligibility of credit where service-tax paid by service provider and supported by supplementary invoice - time-limit for invoicing under Rule 9 of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 - Cenvat credit taken for Outdoor Catering Services during August 2008 to September 2009 is allowable despite a supplementary invoice being raised after fourteen days because the invoice related to service-tax paid by the service provider for past periods. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the invoice dated 24.07.2008 was akin to a supplementary invoice specifically raised to record Service Tax already deposited by the service provider and that the deposited amount was reflected in the show cause notice. There was no dispute that the service provider had in fact remitted the Service Tax. The adjudicating authority's denial premised on the fourteen-day invoicing provision was inapposite because that provision applies to ordinary invoices, whereas the invoice in question was raised to pass on the tax actually paid by the provider for an earlier period. Moreover, for the period August 2008 to September 2009 there was no exclusion of credit for Outdoor Catering Services. Applying these facts to the statutory scheme, the Tribunal held the credit rightly taken by the appellant and set aside the confirmed demand for that period. [Paras 7]

Set aside the confirmed demand of Rs.1,52,82,260/- relating to August 2008 to September 2009 and allow the Cenvat credit claimed.

Cenvat credit - availability of credit for services provided prior to amendment notwithstanding invoice raised after 31.03.2011 - Circular No.943/04/2011-CX dated 29.04.2011 clarification - Cenvat credit for services provided before 31.03.2011 is allowable even where invoices or bills were raised after 31.03.2011, in light of the departmental clarification. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the billing dates and the period of service. It noted that almost the entire credit in dispute pertained to services actually provided before 31.03.2011; in one instance the bill dated 01.04.2011 related to services provided in March 2011 and in another the bill was dated 31.03.2011 though credit was taken later. The Tribunal applied the clarification in Circular No.943/04/2011-CX (29.04.2011) which states that credit is available so long as the service was provided prior to 31.03.2011 even if the invoice is raised subsequently. On these factual findings, the Tribunal concluded that the invoices/bills did not disentitle the appellant from credit and set aside the confirmed demand for the period July 2010 to March 2011. [Paras 8, 9]

Set aside the confirmed demand of Rs.98,12,269/- relating to July 2010 to March 2011 and allow the Cenvat credit claimed.

Final Conclusion: Both appeals are allowed and the confirmed demands for the periods August 2008 to September 2009 and July 2010 to March 2011 are set aside, with consequential relief as per law.

Refund of CENVAT credit on duties paid on capital goods - eligibility of capital goods as 'inputs' under CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 - EPCG scheme - consequence of non fulfilment of export obligation - requirement of reasons in administrative orders - consequential relief on setting aside flawed administrative orders

Refund of CENVAT credit on duties paid on capital goods - eligibility of capital goods as 'inputs' under CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 - Whether the impugned orders rejecting refund of duties (CVD and SAD) paid on imported capital goods under the EPCG scheme were sustainable. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the appellants imported capital goods under the EPCG scheme, failed to meet the export obligation and paid the customs duties, thereafter claiming refund of amounts reflected as CENVAT credit which could not be carried forward under GST. The impugned orders rejecting the refund were cryptic and rested on a novel ground that duty paid on capital goods cannot be refunded, without discussing the relevant legal provisions or rationale. The Tribunal noted that CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 include capital goods within the definition of 'inputs' and that the original authority had not disputed eligibility to CENVAT credit under CCR, 2004. The Commissioner (Appeals) had not engaged with these points or with the authorities relied upon, and therefore the conclusions lacked requisite reasoning. Relying on the principle that administrative decisions must state adequate reasons, the Tribunal held that the impugned orders could not stand. In consequence, the orders were set aside and the appeals allowed with consequential relief as per law. [Paras 4, 5, 6, 7]

Impugned orders rejecting the refund were set aside and the appeals allowed; consequential relief granted.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal set aside the impugned appellate orders for want of reasoned decision-making, allowed the appeals and granted consequential relief, holding that the rejection of refund on the ground that duties on capital goods are not refundable was unsustainable in the absence of adequate reasoning.

Transitional refund under Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017 - cash refund of CENVAT credit where input credit is not available under GST - equivalence of CVD/SAD and IGST for entitlement to input credit/refund - jurisdiction of the CESTAT to decide appeals under Section 142(3) - limited remand for verification of stock records in refund claims

Transitional refund under Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017 - cash refund of CENVAT credit where input credit is not available under GST - equivalence of CVD/SAD and IGST for entitlement to input credit/refund - jurisdiction of the CESTAT to decide appeals under Section 142(3) - Entitlement to cash refund under Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017 for duties (CVD/SAD or IGST) paid after the appointed day in respect of imports/transactions prior to 30.06.2017 when transitional input credit cannot be availed under GST. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal applied the Larger Bench ruling in Bosch Electricals and subsequent Tribunal decisions holding that where amounts (CVD/SAD or IGST) which would have been available as Cenvat/Input credit in the pre-GST regime cannot be availed under the GST regime, the correct remedy is a cash refund under Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017. The Tribunal treated IGST paid post-01.07.2017 and earlier CVD/SAD as functionally equivalent for the purpose of transitional relief because in each case the amount was paid to Customs and would have been eligible as credit under the earlier law but is not available in the electronic GST credit ledger. The Tribunal rejected the Revenue's contention that Customs law cannot give way to Section 142(3), holding that Section 142(3) is a transitional provision that permits disposal of refund claims of amounts paid under the existing law in accordance with existing law and payment in cash where credit cannot be carried forward under GST. Having regard to consistent Tribunal precedents (Mithila Drugs, Clariant, ITCO and others) and the Larger Bench decision, the refunds (except in cases remanded for limited verification) were held to be admissible and the impugned rejections set aside, directing grant of refund with consequential relief as per law. [Paras 15, 16, 21, 23]

Appeals allowed insofar as claims for cash refund under Section 142(3) are concerned; refunds to be granted with consequential relief.

Limited remand for verification of stock records in refund claims - Whether verification is required before granting refunds in cases where exported goods were partly returned and re imported. - HELD THAT: - For six specific refund claims where part consignments were rejected overseas and re imported, the Tribunal directed a limited remand to the jurisdictional officer to verify that the returned stocks have been properly accounted for and recorded in the appellant's books. The remand is confined to this verification; subject to satisfactory verification, refunds may be granted. This limited factual verification does not reopen the legal entitlement to refund under Section 142(3) decided by the Tribunal. [Paras 22]

Matter remanded for limited verification of accounting/stock records; subject to verification, refunds may be granted.

Final Conclusion: Following the Larger Bench and consistent Tribunal precedents, the appeals are allowed: claimants are entitled to cash refund under Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017 for duties (CVD/SAD or IGST) paid post appointed day in respect of transactions/imports prior to 30.06.2017 where credit cannot be availed under GST; six matters are remanded for limited verification of returned stocks and, otherwise, refunds to be granted with consequential relief as per law.

Abatement under Rule 96ZO(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 - mandatory conditions for claiming abatement - requirement of electricity meter readings as proof of non production - burden to substantiate non use of alternative power during closure

Abatement under Rule 96ZO(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 - mandatory conditions for claiming abatement - requirement of electricity meter readings as proof of non production - burden to substantiate non use of alternative power during closure - Entitlement to claim abatement for 188 days under Rule 96ZO(2) where electricity meter readings at closure and restart were not furnished. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the conditions enumerated in Rule 96ZO(2) are mandatory and must be fulfilled to avail abatement. The appellant admitted that meter readings at the times of closure and re start were not produced because the meter room was sealed and under the control of the State Electricity Board. The Tribunal held that electricity meter readings are the most crucial evidence to demonstrate absence of production during the claimed closure periods; alternatively, if other sources of power were used on restart, the appellant bore the burden of producing evidence of such sources to show that no production occurred during the claimed closures. The appellant produced neither meter readings nor documentary evidence of alternative power arrangements or their non use. For these reasons the mandatory conditions of Rule 96ZO(2) were not satisfied and the claim for abatement could not be allowed. [Paras 8, 9, 10]

Claim for abatement for 188 days rejected; impugned order upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed; the Tribunal upholds the Commissioner's rejection of the abatement claimed under Rule 96ZO(2) because mandatory conditions, in particular production of electricity meter readings or evidence concerning alternative power use, were not fulfilled.

Prima facie satisfaction at summoning stage - no mini-trial at the issuance of process - vicarious liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - burden on directors to prove absence of knowledge or exercise of due diligence - scope of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. limited to irrefutable material

Prima facie satisfaction at summoning stage - no mini-trial at the issuance of process - vicarious liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - burden on directors to prove absence of knowledge or exercise of due diligence - scope of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. limited to irrefutable material - Validity of summoning orders where accused had purportedly resigned before cheques were dishonoured and whether proceedings should be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that at the stage of issuing process the Trial Court need only be prima facie satisfied that there are sufficient grounds to proceed and is not to conduct a mini trial. The complaint contains specific averments that the petitioners were in charge of the company's day to day affairs and gave assurances that cheques would be honoured; such allegations suffice to make them vicariously liable under Section 141 of the NI Act for the purpose of summoning. Reliance on S.P. Mani was applied: the complainant need only make specific averments to fasten vicarious liability, and the burden lies on directors/officers to show absence of knowledge or that all due diligence was exercised. To persuade the High Court under Section 482 to quash process, the accused must produce sterling, incontrovertible material demonstrating that proceeding would be an abuse of process; no such material was furnished. Whether the petitioners in fact had resigned or were not responsible for the transactions is a matter to be tested at trial on evidence, not at summons stage. [Paras 7, 11, 12, 13, 14]

Summoning orders are sustained; petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. dismissed and the accused shall stand trial.

Final Conclusion: The High Court dismissed the petitions challenging the summoning orders, holding that the complaint contained specific averments making the petitioners prima facie liable under Section 141 of the NI Act and that quashing under Section 482 was not warranted in the absence of incontrovertible material; the factual contentions are to be examined at trial.

Classification of account as fraud - principles of natural justice - audi alteram partem - forensic audit report - reasoned order - quash and remit

Audi alteram partem - principles of natural justice - forensic audit report - classification of account as fraud - Validity of the decision by the consortium banks to classify the Company's account as fraud in absence of providing the forensic audit report and an opportunity of hearing. - HELD THAT: - The Court applied the ratio of the Apex Court in State Bank of India v. Rajesh Agarwal (paras 81, 93-95, 98 reproduced) reading the rule of audi alteram partem into Clauses 8.9.4 and 8.9.5 of the Master Directions on Frauds. The Master Directions require that, before classifying an account as fraud, a borrower be furnished with the forensic audit report, given notice of the proposed action and a reasonable opportunity to explain and represent; a reasoned order must be passed on objections. In the present case it is undisputed that only observations of a draft forensic audit report were shared and the forensic audit report and its supplementary report were not supplied to the petitioners, nor were they afforded the requisite opportunity to explain the findings. In view of the above legal position and the admitted facts, the decision to classify the account as fraud was vitiated by non-observance of natural justice and was therefore quashed. [Paras 8, 11, 12]

Decision classifying the Company's account as fraud set aside for failure to afford audi alteram partem; impugned classification quashed.

Quash and remit - forensic audit report - reasoned order - Directions as to the remedial course and scope of fresh consideration after quashing the fraud classification. - HELD THAT: - The Court remitted the matter to the respondents for fresh completion of the proceedings in conformity with the Apex Court's directions. The respondents are directed to furnish copies of the forensic audit report and the supplementary forensic audit report to the petitioners, grant a reasonable opportunity to submit representations, and thereafter pass a reasoned order addressing objections. The exercise is to be completed within six months from receipt of this order. The Court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on criminal proceedings, if any. [Paras 12]

Matter remitted to respondents to furnish reports, hear petitioners and pass reasoned order in accordance with the Apex Court's mandate within six months; no opinion expressed on criminal proceedings.

Final Conclusion: Writ petition partly allowed: the consortium banks' decision of 29.09.2020 declaring the Company's account as fraud is quashed for non-observance of audi alteram partem; matter remitted for fresh consideration after supply of forensic audit reports and giving the petitioners a reasonable opportunity to be heard, with final orders to be passed within six months; no order as to costs.