Secured-asset auction validity is not defeated by a marginal earnest-money shortfall where the stipulation is non-statutory, the bid fulfils its purpose of screening serious bidders, the mandatory sale-price deposit is timely made, and no prejudice results. Balance consideration remains validly paid where the secured creditor grants a written extension permitted under the sale terms and governing rules. Surplus proceeds remaining after discharge of the secured debt belong to the borrower; retaining them in a non-interest-bearing account cannot prejudice that entitlement. The auction remains valid, and the borrower must receive the surplus proceeds with interest at 7% per annum from 23.03.2010 until payment.

Penalty under Rule 26(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 is not imposable on a registered dealer where dealer invoices identify both the ultimate manufacturer-consignee and an intermediary buyer, and goods are delivered directly to the manufacturer-consignee. Direct delivery remains valid where payment is received and there is no allegation that the transactions are merely paper transactions. Naming an intermediary buyer on the invoice does not invalidate the user-manufacturer's direct receipt of goods or justify penalty.

Rule 8(3A) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002, was declared ultra vires in binding decisions, including one affirmed by the jurisdictional High Court. Its restriction on using CENVAT credit to pay duty during a default period therefore cannot sustain a duty demand or penalty. Demands and penalties founded solely on that restriction are unsustainable, resolving the issue in favour of the assessee.

Before 1 April 2011, the input-service definition under the CENVAT Credit Rules did not exclude services used to construct a building or civil structure. Construction services used for a mall were connected with the taxable output service of renting immovable property. Consequently, CENVAT credit was available for construction-related input services used before the exclusion became effective.

Reverse-charge service-tax liability for OIDAR services arises under Section 66A only where a recipient in India receives the taxable service. Where an overseas head office contracted with foreign CRS/GDS providers, controlled the systems, received the services, and was responsible for payment, its Indian branch neither received nor used those services. The foreign-provider-to-overseas-head-office supplies therefore fell outside the charge under Section 66, and the Section 66A deeming provision could not be applied to the Indian branch. Service-tax demands against the branch were unsustainable.

Cenvat credit is treated as admissible where xerox invoices and GAR-7 challans establish service-tax payment, invoices identify the company despite additional names, and minor address errors do not dispute receipt of services or tax payment. Credit availed before the effective date of the revised one-year limit is treated as unrestricted by that limit. Debit notes meeting prescribed particulars support credit despite their nomenclature. Consultancy, convention, banking and financial services for business training or service exports, and business-related parking charges, satisfy input-service nexus. Export-turnover refund computation cannot be denied where eligible credit exceeds credit availed despite a calculation discrepancy.

Seventy-five per cent abatement for goods transport agency services remained available where transporters gave general declarations that they had not availed Cenvat credit or the specified alternative exemption benefit. The governing exemption notification did not require a separate declaration for each consignment note. A Board circular could not impose that additional procedural requirement beyond the notification's stipulated conditions. Accordingly, the service recipient could claim the abatement on the basis of general transporter declarations, and the related service-tax demand was unsustainable.

VCES eligibility is assessed by reference to the prescribed date, so an investigation initiated later does not retrospectively disqualify a declaration. Rejection for substantial falsity requires proof; differences arising from taxability, valuation, classification, exemption, or works-contract treatment, and a higher computation from available records, are insufficient alone. The VCES declaration date does not replace the return-period-wise relevant date for limitation or restart the recovery period. Extended limitation requires deliberate fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression, or intent to evade; where transactions are traceable in records and their legal treatment is disputed, consequential interest and penalty do not arise. Amounts paid under VCES remain non-refundable.

Construction for educational or health-care institutions qualified as commercial or industrial construction before 1 July 2012 only where buildings were primarily intended for commerce or industry; educational surplus alone did not establish that use, and Revenue bore the classification burden. Construction involving transfer and incorporation of goods constituted composite works contracts after that date, taxable only on the service portion under the prescribed valuation mechanism, not on the entire consideration as a pure construction service. Taxing a works-contract service on a basis not proposed in the show-cause notice was impermissible. Extended limitation required wilful suppression or misstatement intended to evade tax; disclosure and bona fide belief defeated that basis, with consequential interest and penalties failing accordingly.

Foundational and preparatory work contractually performed for road construction, including earth removal, laying gravel and metal, compact rolling, and forming a granular sub-base, forms an integrated construction activity rather than an independently taxable Site Formation Service. Notification No. 17/2005-ST exempts such services undertaken in the course of road construction without an unstated requirement of Government ownership, public use, or non-commercial premises. Extended limitation requires wilful suppression with intent to evade tax; audit discovery from regular records and a classification dispute do not meet that standard. Reasonable reliance on the exemption and statutory exclusion also supports relief from interest and penalties.

Service-tax proceedings concerned reliance on third-party information shared between tax authorities, the duty to self-assess, principles of natural justice, negative-list and exemption coverage, and limitation. Original and appellate orders were set aside, and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration from the show-cause-notice stage in accordance with law. The writ petition was treated as covered by an earlier decision concerning these issues.

Unsubstantiated retained funds from payments received from entities involved in scheduled offences may constitute proceeds of crime where no agreement or other material establishes an entitlement to commission. Section 24 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act places the burden on the person concerned to prove that such property is untainted. Where direct proceeds have been dissipated, siphoned off or cannot be traced, the definition of proceeds of crime extends to their value, permitting attachment of other property of equivalent value. This mechanism may apply to property acquired before the scheduled offence, leaving it liable to attachment as value-representing property.

Arrest under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act requires recorded reasons to believe, based on material in the authorised officer's possession, that the person is guilty. Where the statutory examination process under Section 50 has been invoked to confront a person with existing material, arrest on that same material requires completion of that process or fresh incriminating material or a supervening exigency. Omitting the prior examination permission and failing to establish a fresh necessity renders the arrest and consequential remand legally unsustainable; a remand order must address the related objection.

Money-laundering liability may arise even where a person is not accused in the scheduled offence, if material prima facie links that person to handling proceeds of a subsisting scheduled offence. The continuing-offence framework covers direct or indirect assistance, participation, concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projection of criminal proceeds as untainted property. Auditors may fall within "other officer" liability where their consent, connivance, or neglect is connected with a company's laundering activity, including alleged fictitious entries or fund layering. Quashing jurisdiction is exercised sparingly and does not permit assessment of evidentiary reliability where the complaint discloses a prima facie offence requiring trial.

Inherent jurisdiction under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita is confined to patent illegality or want of jurisdiction and does not pre-empt the trial court's factual assessment of whether relied-upon documents have been supplied. Fair-trial safeguards governing disclosure under the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to Prevention of Money Laundering Act complaints after cognizance. The trial court's hearing record is conclusive unless corrected before that court; adverse observations aimed at securing disclosure compliance do not determine officers' integrity. Investigating-officer attendance may be required for identified purposes, but not automatically on every hearing date; attendance must be specifically ordered, including through permitted video-conferencing.

Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act permits arrest only as a discretionary and exceptional measure where an authorised officer records reasons to believe, based on material in possession, that a person is guilty. Summons, examination and production of records may proceed under Section 50, whose proceedings are judicial proceedings. Where a person has complied with repeated examinations and the material relied on already existed, the absence of fresh incriminating material or a supervening necessity may negate the demonstrated need for arrest. Arrest cannot bypass the ongoing examination process or merely facilitate investigation; on these facts, the arrest and consequential remand orders were invalid.

Regular bail may be warranted where continued pre-trial custody is no longer necessary pending trial. Incarceration for about one year and three months, absence of cognizance, and proceedings at a nascent stage indicated that the trial would take considerable time. Bail granted to arrested co-accused and the non-arrest of several others further weighed against continued detention. Release was granted on terms to be fixed by the Trial Court.

Section 12A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and Regulation 30A prescribe the mechanism for withdrawal of the corporate insolvency resolution process. In an appeal limited to directions for cooperation with the resolution professional, Rule 11 inherent powers cannot be invoked to permit deposit of an admitted debt, defer resolution-plan steps, or secure closure outside that mechanism. A financial creditor cannot be compelled to accept a settlement or terminate the process. Seeking substantially identical relief before another forum while an application remains pending constitutes forum shopping and abuse of process, particularly because insolvency proceedings operate in rem.

Remitted resolution plans lacking final approval may be reconsidered, and where revised resolution and settlement proposals fail prescribed voting thresholds, the Committee of Creditors may invite fresh expressions of interest absent a prohibition under the Code or Regulation 36A. Its commercial assessment of funding, feasibility and viability is not to be substituted through judicial review without a legal infirmity. Assignments of homebuyer claims processed under Regulation 28 do not retrospectively invalidate voting undertaken while original allottees remained creditors on record, particularly where no material effect on approval is shown. Intervention applications cannot introduce independent issues beyond the impugned order's subject matter.

Recovery of unpaid contractual consideration under a business purchase agreement falls within liquidation where the amount is a receivable of the corporate debtor and has a direct nexus with realisation of the liquidation estate. A payment mechanism requiring discharge of liabilities from business income does not extinguish the purchaser's primary payment obligation. Where directors exercise managerial, financial and operational control, obtain the transaction's benefits, and use the purchaser-company as an alter ego or corporate fac ade, separate corporate personality and privity of contract do not protect them from recovery liability. Liability extends to the purchaser-company and controlling directors, but not to persons lacking that controlling role.