A Resolution Professional removed and replaced during a personal insolvency resolution process has no continuing authority or interest to pursue process-related appeals concerning convening a creditors' meeting or considering a repayment plan. Any challenge to the validity of the removal must be pursued separately in an appeal directed against the removal order. Where the newly appointed Resolution Professional is prepared to convene the creditors' meeting, the former Resolution Professional lacks a subsisting role in those process-related proceedings.

Interim physical possession of secured property was directed to be transferred to the purchaser, who had paid the full sale consideration and held a registered sale certificate. The Bankruptcy Trustee had taken possession after appellate interim protection in the bankruptcy proceedings was vacated. Transfer remained subject to restrictions against creating third-party rights or making major alterations, and to further orders and the writ petition's final outcome. Questions concerning the bankruptcy process and the auction-payment timeline remained for final adjudication.

At the cognizance stage for alleged contravention of the Companies Act, scrutiny is limited to the complaint and supporting material to determine whether they disclose a prima facie case. Defence material and explanations cannot be assessed through a mini-trial at that preliminary stage. Allegations of non-cooperation with an investigation, supported by the complaint record, may justify cognizance and issuance of process where the order demonstrates application of mind to the available material.

Extended recovery of customs duty under Section 28(4) requires evidence that the importer colluded, wilfully misstated facts, or suppressed material facts. Where the importer submitted a certificate of origin and import documents accepted at clearance, and recovery was initiated nearly five years later without documentary evidence supporting those allegations, the extended limitation provision was inapplicable. Recovery proceedings based on that provision were therefore unsustainable.

Foreign Trade Policy import restrictions apply by reference to the policy-defined date of shipment or dispatch from the supplying country, rather than the Bill of Entry filing, out-of-charge, or customs-clearance date. For air imports, the relevant Airway Bill evidencing departure from the last airport in the exporting country determines that date. Customs Act duty-assessment timing does not govern import-policy restrictions. A restrictive notification takes legal effect only upon electronic Gazette publication and operates prospectively unless statutory authority permits retrospectivity. Goods dispatched and arriving before publication remain governed by the earlier policy; executive memoranda cannot retrospectively alter that position.

Cash found in a jointly held bank locker is not assessable as unexplained money under section 69A where its nature and source are plausibly explained through surrounding circumstances and supporting material. Confirmations, bank records, family-ceremony evidence, regular cash withdrawals and disclosed income can substantiate the explanation and shift the burden to the Revenue to prove it false or inherently improbable. Mere doubts based on human probabilities, without rebuttal evidence, do not displace a supported explanation; suspicion cannot replace proof.

Rectification jurisdiction under Section 254(2) is limited to a mistake apparent from the record existing when the original appellate order was passed. A subsequent legislative amendment, even if retrospective, and a later Supreme Court order do not form part of the legal position then available for deciding the appeal. Treating either later development as an apparent mistake would convert the narrow rectification power into a review mechanism for a concluded decision. Accordingly, retrospective insertion of Section 147A and the subsequent judicial order do not support recall or modification under Section 254(2).

Assessment proceedings may admit electronic records without a section 65B certificate or compliance with the CBDT Digital Evidence Investigation Manual, although authenticity and probative value require substantive scrutiny. Disputed search statements cannot alone support additions where shown unreliable or uncorroborated, and denial of cross-examination may breach natural justice. Seized fee data must be reconciled with banking receipts, scholarships, waivers, receivables, refunds and books; refundable caution deposits remain liabilities. Construction payments via authorised site imprest may qualify under Rule 6DD(k), while relevant additional consultancy evidence requires verification. Appellate enhancement cannot assess a new income source not considered for taxability by the Assessing Officer; recorded land and lease advances without benefit to specified persons do not establish diversion under section 13. A scrutiny notice issued by a non-jurisdictional officer need not invalidate the assessment.

Revision under section 263 is unavailable against an assessment completed under section 153C with mandatory section 153D approval unless the approval is specifically found erroneous, invalid, or vitiated. Section 153C(3) excludes the application of section 153C to searches or requisitions under sections 132 or 132A occurring on or after 1 April 2021. Consequently, a section 153C notice issued after that date produces a jurisdictionally defective assessment that cannot be revised under section 263. These limitations render the revisionary orders for the relevant assessment years legally unsustainable.

Rectification under Section 254(2) is limited to an obvious, patent and glaring mistake apparent from the record; it cannot be used to review or revisit an appellate order on merits through further arguments or extended reasoning. Non-grant of an adjournment does not itself establish an apparent error, particularly where no material shows that hearing notices were not served. In the absence of a record-based patent mistake, rectification of the prior appellate order is unavailable.

Section 194A(3)(v) exempts a co-operative bank, as a co-operative society, from deducting tax at source on interest paid to another co-operative society, including a non-member co-operative society. Its first limb limits the co-operative-bank exclusion to interest paid to members, while its second limb separately exempts interest paid by a co-operative society to another co-operative society without a membership condition. The time-deposit and threshold provisions do not override that express exemption. Consequently, no assessee-in-default liability or interest liability arises for failure to deduct tax on those payments.

Business-expenditure deductibility under Section 37(1) turns on whether rent is incurred wholly and exclusively for business. Corporate, banking, utility and other contemporaneous records supported occupation and use of the Sawant Corner premises for corporate functions. Unconfronted inspector photographs could not support an adverse inference, while no reliable material established non-occupation or a distinction between assessment years. Payment below comparable uncontrolled rent supported arm's-length pricing. In the absence of changed facts or law, consistent treatment supported allowing the rent deduction.

Section 69A does not cover alleged unrecorded cash payments for acquiring immovable property, because such payments constitute an investment rather than unrecorded money or another specified asset. The addition was unsustainable where the recorded consideration exceeded the stamp-duty valuation, no evidence established payment beyond the stated consideration, and the loose sheet was unsigned and lacked independent corroboration. A third-party statement could not support the addition without corroborating material. The presumption under section 132(4A) applies against the person from whose possession a document is found and cannot be applied against another person without corroboration. Denial of requested cross-examination also breached natural justice; the addition was deleted.

Revision under section 263 required the assessment order to be both erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue. Detailed inquiries into the investment in concession rights and related depreciation, supported by responses and the concession agreement, negated any alleged lack of inquiry. CBDT's BOT road or highway circular did not apply where the taxpayer acquired a licence to collect tolls and operate and maintain a bridge rather than construct or develop it. Depreciation instead of amortisation affected only cost-recovery timing and caused no Revenue prejudice. As revision was initiated on an audit objection without independent exercise of jurisdiction, the revisionary order was invalid and the original assessment restored.

Section 10(10AA)(ii) exempts leave encashment received on retirement. The increased exemption ceiling of Rs. 25 lakh, notified on 24 May 2023 in place of the earlier Rs. 3 lakh limit, is characterised as a beneficial and remedial rationalisation rather than a new exemption. On that basis, the enhanced ceiling applies to pending claims for Assessment Year 2020-21 without impairing any vested revenue right, rendering the retirement leave-encashment receipt exempt.

Section 54F exemption remained available where the purchase of a new residential flat occurred after the prescribed two-year period because the entire seven-month and eighteen-day delay fell within the COVID-19 limitation exclusion period. The original asset's sale, the stamp-duty valuation used for capital-gains computation, and the genuineness of the flat purchase were undisputed. As a beneficial provision, section 54F requires liberal interpretation, and a delay caused by circumstances beyond the assessee's control during the excluded pandemic period did not defeat the substantive exemption claim.

Rectification under section 254(2) is confined to patent, manifest errors apparent from the record and cannot be used to review or reconsider debatable matters. Where limitation was already determined after considering relevant dates, a request to apply jurisdictional precedent differently requires re-appreciation of the legal position and of that precedent's applicability. Such reconsideration falls outside rectification jurisdiction; absent a record-based apparent error, rectification is unavailable.

Erstwhile directors of a struck-off company lack locus standi to maintain an appeal on the company's behalf against a first appellate order. A pre-emptive assessment may be made against a struck-off company to protect revenue pending restoration of its name, even where the company did not participate before the tax authorities. An erstwhile director may contest only personal liability in proceedings initiated under Section 179 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; the company's appeal cannot be maintained by that director.

Reconciliation of gross commodity-trading proceeds recorded in the speculative-profit ledger with net bank credits requires verification of audited accounts, broker ledgers, contract notes, bank statements and related records. A difference between gross and net figures alone does not establish separate unrecorded receipts. Where supporting documentation was not produced during assessment, the bank receipt requires fresh factual examination to determine whether it represents net proceeds already accounted for.

Disputed stamp-duty value for purposes of Section 56(2)(vii) requires use of the prescribed reference mechanism to determine fair market value before an addition can be sustained. Where no reference is made despite an objection to the adopted value, the valuation issue requires fresh determination after verifying any relevant valuation report. Agricultural-income additions likewise require fresh examination where evidence of landholding and agricultural activity is produced. Both issues require verification by the Assessing Officer and a reasonable opportunity of hearing before reassessment.