Composite works contracts involving goods and services fall outside construction-service categories confined to services simpliciter. Construction-service taxability of residential complexes requires proof of prescribed statutory conditions, including dwelling units attributable to the provider, and an explanation introduced from 1 July 2010 does not apply retrospectively to earlier construction. Subcontract and petty-job receipts require proof of their precise character and independent taxability; absent taxpayer documents do not relieve the Department of its burden of proof. Rental-service liability requires evidence of year-wise receipts, small service provider exemption eligibility, and tax payments on subsequent receipts. Penalties depend on establishing a sustainable underlying demand.

For refund of accumulated CENVAT credit attributable to exported services, the one-year limitation is reckoned from the last day of the quarter in which export proceeds are received in foreign exchange, rather than from the export-invoice date. Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules did not require registration of the premises as a condition for refund of unutilised credit. Requirements concerning the jurisdictional authority for filing a claim do not bar refund solely because invoices relate to unregistered premises. Accordingly, neither the invoice-date limitation objection nor non-registration alone defeats the refund claim.

Conflicting Tribunal decisions on a subcontractor's independent service-tax liability after the main contractor had paid tax created genuine uncertainty. That uncertainty supported a bona fide belief and prevented use of the extended limitation period under the Finance Act, 1994, although recovery for the normal limitation period remained available. The extended-period demand and the associated penalty for that period were set aside, while the normal-period demand and the applicable penalty were sustained. Substantive subcontractor tax liability had otherwise been settled by a Larger Bench decision.

Tender fees paid to obtain tender documents do not constitute consideration for a taxable service where the charge represents the cost of supplying those documents. Taxability under section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 requires an identifiable service provided for consideration. Supplying tender documents is characterised as their sale or supply, not a service rendered to bidders. Since a tender is only an invitation to offer and creates no contractual service arrangement with each document purchaser, the fee is not liable to service tax.

Cancellation, refund and no-show charges collected by an airline are liquidated damages for a passenger's breach of the carriage contract, not consideration for a separate declared service of agreeing to tolerate an act. Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994 applies only where an agreement is intended to tolerate an act in return for consideration. The passenger-airline contract is for carriage against fare, while such charges arise only when the passenger cancels, seeks a refund or fails to travel. They are therefore not taxable under the declared-service provision, and abatement is immaterial.

Royalty paid by a partnership firm to partner co-owners for use of a jointly owned trade mark falls outside taxable intellectual-property services where the mark is deployed for the partnership's common business. A partner's contribution or use of jointly owned property for mutual partnership benefit does not establish separate service provider and recipient roles, consideration for a distinct service, or the required quid pro quo; it is service to self. Extended limitation is unavailable where royalty payments were disclosed in accounts and records and returns remained available, with no suppression or intent to evade. Availability of CENVAT credit to the firm further supported the bona fide belief that no taxable service relationship existed.

Declarations under the Sabka Vishwas Legacy Dispute Resolution Scheme, 2019, rejected solely because the disclosed amount differs from departmental records should be reconsidered where the declarant accepts the liability quantified in the show-cause notice as final and undertakes not to contest it. The Scheme is intended to settle eligible legacy tax disputes. For recalculation under the Scheme, the show-cause notice amount is to be treated as the final liability after the declarant receives an opportunity to present its case. This permits settlement despite a mismatch between the declared amount and departmental records.

Service-taxability and valuation of interest arising from bill-discounting facilities raise a jurisdictional question under the appellate framework. Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944, applied to service-tax matters through Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, covers determinations on taxability and valuation for assessment. Such disputes were considered prima facie capable of falling within the Supreme Court's direct appellate jurisdiction rather than High Court review. Further submissions on jurisdiction remained open, and the matters were listed for orders.

Ex parte ad-interim relief against online reports requires a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. Reports portraying a person as an accused despite no summons, process or complaint, and referring to attachment of shares, were treated as prima facie unfair, sensational and capable of causing continuing reputational harm. Recent and continuing publications did not establish acquiescence. Protection of reputation and dignity must be balanced against freedom of speech, requiring reporting to remain accurate and non-sensational within constitutional limits. Restraint, takedown, de-indexing and preservation measures covered identified material and substantially similar later-identified content pending suit.

Property acquired during the established period of criminal activity may constitute proceeds of crime where it is directly or indirectly derived from a scheduled offence. Acquisition in 2020 fell within the relevant crime period, and the absence of documentary support for lawful business income, unexplained account credits and cash deposits supported continued attachment of the immovable property. Statements recorded under summons were treated as reliable where written by their makers and corroborated by investigation material and unexplained financial transactions; allegations of coercion alone did not justify their exclusion. The provisional attachment remained legally sustainable.

Provisional attachment of properties may be substituted with a joint escrow arrangement where it secures the quantified proceeds of crime and permits asset sales. After accounting for earlier realised sale proceeds, the remaining quantified amount was supplemented by an additional 50% security requirement to protect investors' interests and preserve funds for the pending trial. Sale proceeds must remain in escrow until the stipulated aggregate amount is secured. Attachment is to be lifted proportionately as properties are sold and fully lifted once the entire secured amount is placed in a fixed deposit pending trial.

Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act requires an authorised officer to possess material, record reasons to believe a person is guilty of money-laundering, communicate arrest grounds promptly, and forward material to the adjudicating authority within a reasonable time. Judicial scrutiny is limited to compliance with these safeguards rather than the adequacy of the underlying material. Section 45's twin bail conditions and Section 24's statutory burden apply to money-laundering allegations, but prolonged pre-trial detention may engage Article 21. Completed investigation, no need for custodial interrogation, documentary evidence held by investigators, and an unlikely early trial support personal liberty and speedy-trial protections over continued detention.

Quashing a predicate FIR through compromise does not, by itself, eliminate alleged proceeds of crime for bail consideration under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. Given serious laundering allegations, their substantial scale and the need for further investigation, the statutory bail rigour applied; bail previously granted to one accused was set aside. For the other accused, the incomplete investigation and seriousness of the allegations required application of the same threshold, and bail was refused.

Section 19(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act requires immediate forwarding of the arrest order and supporting material, but imposes no fixed time limit. Expeditious, substantially contemporaneous compliance may accommodate time needed to compile voluminous records and complete administrative requirements; a five-day delay therefore did not invalidate the arrest or custody. The bail restrictions under Section 45 cannot displace Article 21 protection of personal liberty where investigation is complete, pre-trial custody is prolonged, and trial completion is not reasonably foreseeable. Continued detention in those circumstances becomes punitive, warranting bail despite the twin conditions.

Seized documents recovered under a signed panchnama may be relied on without forensic verification or panch-witness examination where authenticity, forgery and recovery are not genuinely disputed. A retracted statement requires corroboration; seized transactional records and statements of connected persons can establish a foreign-exchange contravention even without recovery of foreign currency. Medical records and later loss of departmental files do not displace otherwise reliable contemporaneous evidence. Where the contravention amount is unquantified, monetary sanction must remain proportionate to the proved circumstances and health condition; liability remained sustained while the penalty was reduced.

Late-filed homebuyer claims in a corporate insolvency resolution process need not be collated or incorporated into the information memorandum or resolution plan where no corresponding liability appears in the corporate debtor's records. Regulation 12 operates within a time-bound process; transfers through a holding company and settlements not binding on the corporate debtor do not establish a recorded liability. Admission of delayed claims requires genuine and sufficient cause. Prior legal assistance, creditor-committee participation, and a claimed misunderstanding about separate filings did not justify a prolonged delay after creditors approved the resolution plan. Such claims remain outside the insolvency resolution process.

Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code imposes a 45-day appeal period and permits condonation for no more than 15 additional days; its self-contained limitation regime prevails over Companies Act appellate provisions. "Date of receipt" does not allow a litigant to postpone limitation by delaying an application for, or collection of, a certified copy. Pronouncement in open court constitutes pronouncement of the order, and Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act excludes only the period from applying for the copy until it becomes available, not preceding inaction. Because the appeal exceeded the absolute 60-day ceiling even after permissible exclusion, it was time-barred and delay could not be condoned.

Finality of prior appellate directions affirmed by the Supreme Court prevents renewed appellate interference with consequential implementation orders. Where an impugned order merely reiterates binding directions and contains no independent factual or legal finding on the merits of the company petition, a challenge to that order would indirectly reopen matters already settled. Connected compliance directions remain governed by the finality of the affirmed appellate directions.

Rule 22 of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1982 was applied after the appellant's death certificate was produced. The customs appeal consequently abated. The operative point is that the appellant's death, established through the submitted certificate, brought the pending appeal to an end under the Tribunal's procedural framework.

Section 123 of the Customs Act places the statutory burden of proof on the relevant party only for notified goods. As the seized betel nuts were neither prohibited nor notified goods, the Revenue bore the burden of establishing that they were smuggled. That burden was not discharged on materially identical facts arising from the same adjudication order. The penalty was therefore unsustainable because smuggling of the seized goods remained unproved.