The burden of proof lies on the party who would fail if neither side produced evidence. A claimant seeking land held by another on the basis of testamentary entitlement must establish that entitlement, since possession remains with the defendant without proof. Conversely, where a bond's execution is admitted but fraud is alleged in its procurement, the defendant alleging fraud must prove it; otherwise, the claimant's demand under the bond prevails.

Burden of proof lies on a person seeking a court's judgment concerning a legal right or liability dependent on facts asserted by that person. The person must establish those facts. This applies to allegations of criminal conduct and claims to land based on disputed facts.

Section 100 preserves statutory rules on construction of wills from the operation of evidentiary provisions concerning exclusion of oral evidence by documentary evidence. Those evidentiary provisions do not affect the succession-law framework for interpreting testamentary instruments.

Persons who are not parties to a written instrument, and their representatives in interest, may prove facts showing a contemporaneous agreement varying its terms where the agreement affects their interests. The parties to the instrument cannot use such evidence to alter their own written bargain. Thus, an oral credit arrangement accompanying a written sale contract requiring payment on delivery may be established by an affected third person, but not between the buyer and seller.

Evidence may establish the meaning of illegible or not commonly intelligible characters, foreign, obsolete, technical, local or provincial expressions, abbreviations, and words used in a peculiar sense. Where language refers to more than one subject matter, contextual evidence may identify the intended referent, including whether "all my mods" denotes models or modelling tools.

Ambiguous language may be clarified by evidence where it applies partly to each of two existing sets of facts but, taken as a whole, correctly applies to neither. Evidence is confined to identifying which of the two factual subjects the language was intended to denote.

Section 96 of the Indian Evidence Act permits evidence of surrounding facts to identify the person or thing intended by language that could refer to any one of several possible persons or things, but was intended to apply to only one. It enables an uncertain description to be applied to its intended subject, including where a seller owns two white horses or where an agreement refers to one of two places bearing the name Haidarabad.

Madhya Pradesh SGST commencement provisions bring specified amendments into force under the August 2024 framework. Clauses 25, 28 and 33 are deemed effective from 11 February 2025, while clauses 9, 38 and sub-clause (ii) of clause 39 take effect from 1 April 2025. The staggered commencement distinguishes between provisions given deemed effect and provisions operating prospectively.

Subsequently held includes both a taxpayer's own later identification of the correct character of the supply and a finding by a tax officer. Refund may be claimed in either case after payment of tax in the correct head. Rule 89(1A) requires electronic filing of FORM GST RFD-01 within two years from payment of corrected tax; pre-commencement correct-head payments receive the transitional two-year period from commencement. Refund is excluded where tax has been adjusted through a credit note.

Cash deposits made during demonetisation are not unexplained cash credits where recorded cash sales adequately establish their source. Audited books, cash books, stock records, sales details and VAT returns may discharge the taxpayer's burden when they consistently show cash sales as an established part of the business and reveal no defects or manipulation. Acceptance of sales, purchases and stock records supports the explanation, while festive-season sales and intervening bank holidays may explain an increased cash balance. Section 68 does not permit an addition once the nature and source of the deposits are satisfactorily explained.

Evidence of peculiar meaning is admissible where documentary language is plain on its face but unmeaning when applied to existing facts. Extrinsic evidence may establish that the words were used in a peculiar sense and identify the intended subject matter. Where a deed refers to a house in a place where the transferor owns none, evidence of ownership of a house elsewhere and the transferee's possession may show that the deed concerned that other house.

Plain language in a document, where it accurately applies to existing facts, cannot be contradicted by evidence alleging a different intended application. A deed identifying an estate by its location and stated extent cannot be varied through evidence suggesting that another estate at a different place and of a different size was intended.

For fiscally transparent UK partnerships, Indian-source receipts must be allocated and tested according to each partner's residence and treaty entitlement. India-UK treaty residence applies only to income taxed in the United Kingdom as income of a UK resident. Non-UK resident partners may require examination under India's treaty with their own residence State. Domestic fees-for-technical-services characterisation does not replace treaty analysis, particularly for legal and professional services. Treaty claims require residence certificates, prescribed information, and factual examination of applicable income articles, fixed-base or permanent-establishment tests, and other taxing conditions.

Section 93 excludes evidence of facts intended to explain the meaning of a written instrument where its language is, on its face, ambiguous or defective. The prohibition prevents oral or other extrinsic evidence from identifying an intended meaning or curing an apparent defect. It applies where an agreement states alternative prices without indicating the applicable price and where a deed contains unfilled blanks.

Section 92 excludes oral evidence between parties to a written contract, grant, disposition, or matter required to be in writing when it is offered to contradict, vary, add to, or subtract from proved written terms. Exceptions permit proof of invalidating facts, consistent collateral oral agreements on matters left silent, conditions precedent, permissible subsequent oral modifications or rescission, consistent trade usage, and facts connecting the language of the writing with existing facts.

Terms of contracts, grants, property dispositions, and matters legally required to be reduced to writing must be proved through the document itself or admissible secondary evidence of its contents. The rule applies to terms contained in one or several instruments, while proof of one original is sufficient where multiple originals exist. Oral evidence remains admissible to prove independent facts recorded in a document, rather than the written terms themselves.

Section 90A permits the Court to presume that an electronic signature was affixed by the identified person or an authorised person when a five-year-old electronic record is produced from proper custody. Proper custody includes the place and care in which the record would naturally be kept, while custody with a proved or probable legitimate origin is not improper. The same custody explanation applies to the electronic-record presumption under section 81A.

Presumption for documents purporting or proved to be thirty years old permits the Court, where the document is produced from proper custody, to infer the genuineness of signatures and handwriting. In the case of executed or attested documents, the presumption may extend to due execution and attestation. Proper custody includes natural custody and also custody with a proved or probable legitimate origin.

Where a document called for is not produced after notice to produce, the Court must presume it was attested, stamped and executed in the manner required by law. This presumption concerns the formal validity of the unproduced document, including due execution and satisfaction of legal requirements relating to attestation and stamping.

Courts may presume that an electronic message forwarded by its originator through an electronic mail server to its apparent addressee corresponds with the message entered into the originator's computer for transmission. The presumption does not establish the identity of the person who sent the message. "Originator" and "addressee" carry their assigned meanings under information-technology law.