Rule 16 permits recovery of erroneously or excessively paid duty drawback but does not prescribe an express limitation period. Recovery power must therefore be exercised within a reasonable period determined by the circumstances. Where drawback availed in 2010 was pursued through a notice issued in 2018 and an order in 2022, the absence of fraud, suppression or any explanation for delay supported treating three years as the maximum reasonable period. A statutory appeal under Section 128(1) does not necessarily preclude writ jurisdiction where delayed recovery is challenged as lacking statutory authority. Consequential coercive recovery action cannot stand if the underlying recovery is time-barred.

Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 treats redemption of prohibited goods as discretionary, unlike redemption of other goods, which is mandatory. That discretion must be exercised judiciously on the facts and cannot be refused mechanically solely because goods are prohibited. Where there is no serious or prior violation and the imposed penalty is paid, redemption of confiscated gold jewellery should be permitted. The redemption fine must be determined consistently with applicable principles and cannot exceed the market price less applicable duty.

Duty drawback recovery for alleged non-realisation of export proceeds should be determined only after material official evidence of realisation, including DGFT receipts, is considered. A challenge based on non-service of a show-cause notice or denial of hearing is not established where no material proves non-receipt and available opportunities were not used. Procedural fairness nevertheless requires a further opportunity to substantiate realisation of export sale proceeds when the supporting documents could affect repayment liability. Recovery must therefore be determined after evaluating the relevant documentary material.

Provisional freezing of a bank account under the Customs Act is limited to six months, with a further extension not exceeding six months only for recorded reasons and prior communication. The statutory maximum is therefore twelve months. Issuance of a show cause notice and pending adjudication do not extend or preserve an attachment after that period expires. Continued freezing thereafter lacks legal authority, and the attachment ceases by efflux of time.

Section 110(5) limits provisional attachment of a bank account to six months, with a further extension of no more than six months where written reasons are recorded and prior communication is given. The maximum attachment period is therefore twelve months. Issuance of a show-cause notice and pending adjudication under Section 124 do not create an independent power to extend or revive the attachment after that limit expires. Continued freezing beyond the statutory period is unauthorised, requiring defreezing of the bank account.

Penalty for customs abetment requires material proving a Customs Broker's knowledge of the goods' true nature, conscious participation, or collusion with the exporter. Filing shipping bills, arranging containers, and processing exporter-supplied documents in the ordinary course, without more, do not establish the required mens rea; failure to investigate the goods' source alone is insufficient. An alternative statutory appellate remedy does not automatically preclude writ jurisdiction where the penal finding lacks a factual foundation for culpable abetment. Accordingly, penal liability cannot rest solely on procedural brokerage functions or inadequate further inquiry absent proof of knowing involvement.

Extended limitation for recovery of short-paid IGST under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act requires material establishing collusion, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts. Where an importer disclosed the goods, tariff classification, and claimed notification benefit in the Bill of Entry accepted by the proper officer, a later departmental disagreement on classification or exemption eligibility, or a bare allegation, does not establish those jurisdictional facts. Recovery must therefore proceed, if at all, within the applicable limitation period. Availability of an appeal under Section 128 does not bar writ jurisdiction where the statutory preconditions for invoking the extended period are absent or proceedings are patently illegal.

Section 128 of the Customs Act allows 60 days to file a statutory appeal and permits condonation for only a further 30 days, leaving the Commissioner (Appeals) without power to condone a delay beyond that aggregate period. Where the appeal was delayed by counsel's undisputed medical condition and involved classification of imported goods, Article 226 jurisdiction was invoked exceptionally. The limitation dismissal was set aside, and the appeal was restored for merits adjudication after an opportunity of hearing.

Provisional release of imported goods during investigation or adjudication should avoid unnecessary detention while adequately protecting revenue. Where final differential duty has not been determined, payment of duty on the declared value coupled with a personal bond for any subsequently determined differential duty constitutes proportionate security. Requiring an additional bank guarantee is unjustified in those circumstances; goods may be released on payment of applicable declared duty and execution of the personal bond.

Imported edible goods must be sampled under the prescribed food-safety procedure by an authorised officer, with Customs sampling powers exercised consistently with that regime. A food-test report based on a sample drawn solely by a customs officer is excluded where a subsequent authorised sample and accredited-laboratory test establishes conformity with applicable standards. Provisional release pending assessment should not be withheld merely on suspicion without a seizure memo or recorded grounds that the goods are liable to confiscation. Assessment and classification remain subject to adjudication, and an appropriate personal bond for potential differential duty or penalty may be required.

Airport searches and medically completed hospital recoveries in body-packer matters are treated as a continuous public-place action governed by the NDPS Act's public-place search provision. Defective communication of the right to a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate can affect an initial personal search, but medically supervised recovery under the Customs Act procedure may independently support prima facie possession; a fresh personal-search notice is unnecessary after admission and voluntary medical action. Sampling and inventory departures require trial evidence and do not alone invalidate seizure at the bail stage. Commercial-quantity restrictions remain applicable, but prolonged, unadvanced pre-trial detention can warrant conditional bail under the constitutional right to speedy trial.

Regulation 17(1) requires a customs broker revocation notice within 90 days of the licensing authority receiving an offence report. Where no separate investigation report exists, Customs Act show-cause notices and their relied-upon documents constitute that report if they contain the investigation summary and prima facie allegations. The licensing authority cannot defer the mandatory period by later seeking documents already annexed to the notices. A notice issued after the prescribed period leaves no statutory authority to revoke the licence; revocation must be set aside and the licence restored.

Provisional release of detained imported goods under section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 may be granted pending adjudication where adequate safeguards protect recovery of differential duty. Payment of duty on the declared value, a bank guarantee for 30% of the differential duty, and a personal bond for the remaining 70% sufficiently secure revenue interests. Continued detention is unwarranted once these conditions are met, and the goods are to be released provisionally subject to compliance.

Conditional registration under Section 12AB and approval under Section 80G cannot make their applicability or consequential tax benefits contingent on future litigation. The statutory framework permits the Commissioner to grant or reject registration and approval in accordance with law, but does not confer power to impose conditions dependent on a future judicial outcome. Quasi-judicial powers must arise expressly from statute. Once granted, registration and approval operate according to law; any cancellation or withdrawal must follow the prescribed statutory mechanism. Conditions imposing such contingencies were beyond statutory jurisdiction and must be deleted.

Complete books of account, bills, vouchers, ledgers and stock registers that are produced, accepted and free from identified defects cannot be disregarded merely because the net-profit rate has declined. Increased consumption of goods, raw materials and components, together with higher employee costs, can explain a lower net-profit ratio. In the absence of rejection of the books, a marginal net-profit variation alone does not justify an addition; the addition based solely on that variation was deleted.

For unquoted equity shares, Section 56(2)(viib) taxes issue consideration exceeding fair market value, while Rule 11UA(2) permits valuation under the Net Asset Value or Discounted Cash Flow method. The Assessing Officer may scrutinise the valuation report, underlying data, assumptions and methodology, but cannot replace the selected prescribed method merely because projections, management estimates or standard disclaimers appear unsatisfactory. Rejection requires identified defects in the data, assumptions or methodology. Where both prescribed valuations supported the issue price and no specific defect was established, the Section 56(2)(viib) addition was deleted.

Post-2021 search-related reassessment requires information in the nature of incriminating material found during the search. Where reassessment was initiated on issues arising from seized material and returned income was accepted after verification, transport expenses unsupported by incriminating material could not be examined or disallowed through revisionary jurisdiction. The reassessment was therefore neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, rendering the revision invalid.

Reassessment requires recorded reasons demonstrating independent application of mind and a rational, live nexus between identified material and income alleged to have escaped assessment; generic accommodation-entry information cannot replace that jurisdictional foundation. An enquiry initiated for alleged bogus purchases cannot support treatment of the same transactions as unexplained loans, because those characterisations require materially different factual and evidentiary enquiries. For loan credits, confirmations, bank statements, tax returns, ledgers and affidavits may discharge the initial burden on identity, source and banking trail. An immediate credit in a lender's account alone does not establish an accommodation entry without transaction-specific contrary material.

Alleged bogus purchases linked to accepted sales do not warrant disallowance of the full purchase value where books of account, stock records and quantitative particulars remain unrejected, payments are made through banking channels, and no material disproves the sales. Where accommodation bills may have been used but goods could have been procured from alternative sources, only the embedded profit element is taxable under unexplained expenditure provisions. Consistent profit estimation in earlier assessment years supports applying a 3% rate, confining the addition to 3% of the alleged purchases.

Under Article 12 of the India-USA DTAA, market-data charge reimbursements do not constitute royalty where the facts are indistinguishable from earlier coordinate-bench treatment. Cost-to-cost recoveries of seconded employees' salaries and related expenses likewise fall outside fees for included or technical services where no material factual distinction is shown. Consistency requires adherence to an earlier appellate determination in the absence of a factual or legal distinction; the pendency of a further Revenue appeal does not justify a contrary treaty characterisation. Both receipt categories are therefore excluded from taxation on the recorded facts.