5. . (1) Every request made to a Data Principal under section 6 for consent shall be accompanied or preceded by a notice given by the Data Fiduciary to the Data Principal, informing her,- (i) the personal data and the purpose for which the same is proposed to be processed; (ii) the manner in which she may exercise her rights under sub-section (4) of section 6 and section 13; and (iii) the manner in which the Data Principal may make a complaint to the Board, in such ... ... ...

CHAPTER II OBLIGATIONS OF DATA FIDUCIARY 4. . (1) A person may process the personal data of a Data Principal only in accordance with the provisions of this Act and for a lawful purpose,- (a) for which the Data Principal has given her consent; or (b) for certain legitimate uses. (2) For the purposes of this section, the expression "lawful purpose" means any purpose which is not expressly forbidden by law. =============... ... ...

3. . Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall- (a) apply to the processing of digital personal data within the territory of India where the personal data is collected-- (i) in digital form; or (ii) in non-digital form and digitised subsequently; (b) also apply to processing of digital personal data outside the territory of India, if such processing is in connection with any activity related to offering of goods or services to Data Principals within t... ... ...

2. . In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (a) "Appellate Tribunal" means the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal established under section 14 of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 (24 of 1997); (b) "automated" means any digital process capable of operating automatically in response to instructions given or otherwise for the purpose of processing data; (c) "Board" means the Data Protection Board of India established by ... ... ...

MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE (Legislative Department) New Delhi, the 11th August, 2023/Sravana 20, 1945 (Saka) The following Act of Parliament received the assent of the President on the 11th August, 2023 and is hereby published for general information:- THE DIGITAL PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION ACT, 2023 (NO. 22 OF 2023) [11th August, 2023.] An Act to provide for the processing of digital personal data in a manner that recognises both the right of individuals to protect their per... ... ...

JUSTICE TARUN AGARWALA, PRESIDING OFFICER, JUSTICE M. T. JOSHI, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MS. MEERA SWARUP, TECHNICAL MEMBER For the Appellant : Mr. Sharad Bansal, Advocate with Mr. Sumit Agrawal, Mr. Tarun Toprani, Mr. Pratham Darad, Mr. Abhay Chauhan, Advocates i/b Regstreet Law Advisors For the Respondent : Mr. Aakash Rebello, Advocate with Ms. Monika Tanna, Advocate i/b Singhania & CO LLP. ORDER Per : Justice Tarun Agarwala, Presiding Officer (Oral) 1. We have heard the learned coun... ... ...

Digital personal data may be processed only for a lawful purpose based on valid consent or specified legitimate uses. Consent must be free, specific, informed, unconditional and unambiguous, supported by clear notice, and withdrawable with comparable ease. Data Fiduciaries remain responsible for processing undertaken by themselves or their processors, must maintain security safeguards, notify personal data breaches, erase data when no longer needed unless legal retention is required, and provide grievance redressal. Children's data requires verifiable parental or guardian consent, with restrictions on harmful processing, tracking, behavioural monitoring and targeted advertising.

Section 153D prior approval for search assessments requires the approving authority to independently examine draft assessment orders, assessment records and relevant search material for each assessment year. A composite approval issued without evidence of record movement, separate year-wise consideration, reasons or verification indicates a routine and mechanical exercise rather than informed statutory approval. Approval granted in this manner is invalid for want of application of mind, and assessment orders founded on it are vitiated and liable to be quashed.

In an unabated assessment under Section 153A, additions require incriminating material found during the search and a link between that material and the proposed addition. An unsecured-loan addition lacking that nexus is unsustainable. Alleged unexplained-expense additions are likewise unsustainable where seized entries are reconciled with agreements and books, verification reveals no adverse discrepancy, and the transactions represent genuine accounted business dealings. These principles support deletion of additions founded on recorded expenses or loans unconnected with incriminating search material.

Transfer-pricing benchmarking under the Transactional Net Margin Method requires a disclosed, reasoned functional, asset and risk analysis to support comparable-company exclusions and selections across distribution, software-development and technical-support segments. Absent that analysis, comparability determinations require fresh, transparent evaluation with an opportunity to submit evidence. Deferred payment or receivables exceeding the agreed credit period constitute a separate international transaction, because only credit within that period is embedded in the sale price. Foreign-currency delayed receivables require separate interest benchmarking at LIBOR plus a 200-basis-point spread.

Brand-development outlays incurred in an existing business are revenue expenditure where they support the profit-earning process and create no capital asset; commercial expediency cannot be displaced without evidence of non-business purpose. Additional deduction claims may be considered in appellate proceedings, and accrued redemption premium on transferable zero-coupon debentures is deductible where no identifiable payee gives rise to withholding obligations. Corporate guarantees require a service charge but are not benchmarked as bank guarantees; a 0.2% fee reflected limited benefit. Aircraft treated as aeroplanes qualify for 40% depreciation. Investment shares consistently held as investments and sold through limited delivery-based transactions generate capital gains, supported by consistency of past treatment.

Freight income from operating ships in international traffic qualifies for exemption under Article 8 of the India-Singapore tax treaty where eligibility is undisputed. Where such income was offered under section 44B because the return form did not permit a direct treaty-exemption claim, relief under section 90 must be granted. An incorrect treaty-country code in the original return cannot justify denial when a revised return corrected the code to Singapore but was not processed. Relief is to be granted for eligible income after an opportunity of hearing.

Penalty for failure to obtain an audit under Section 44AB cannot be sustained where the assessee proves reasonable cause under Section 273B. Dependence on a person responsible for business and regulatory compliance, that person's death, and the assessee's disability and resulting inability to manage the business showed that the default was neither deliberate nor lacking in bona fides. These circumstances constituted reasonable cause, making the penalty for audit non-compliance unsustainable.

Charitable exemption may not be denied in return processing solely because Form No. 10B was filed after the prescribed date where the audit report was available before the intimation. The filing deadline for the audit report is treated as procedural and directory in those circumstances, with timely availability before processing constituting substantial compliance. The condonation route for delayed filing operates as an additional remedy and does not exclude appellate review of an adjustment to the exemption claim. Consequently, refusal to condone delay need not prevent appellate consideration or acceptance of the exemption claim.

Jurisdictional objections to reassessment may be raised collaterally in an appeal against revision under section 263 because revision presupposes a legally valid assessment order. A defect in the authority to initiate reassessment cannot be cured by waiver, acquiescence, participation, or failure to challenge the reassessment directly. Where more than three years have elapsed, section 151(ii) requires sanction from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner; approval by the Principal Commissioner under section 151(i) does not meet that condition. Reassessment without competent sanction is void ab initio and cannot support revisionary jurisdiction under section 263.

Reassessment notices issued in a deceased assessee's name lack jurisdiction where death preceded their issuance. Failure by legal representatives to inform tax authorities of the death does not validate proceedings against a non-existent person. Section 159 permits continuation only of proceedings validly initiated during the assessee's lifetime against legal representatives. This defect is jurisdictional, not procedural, and cannot be cured under Section 292B; the notice, order under Section 148A(d), and consequential reassessment proceedings are void ab initio.

Genuine COVID-19-related non-appearance justified setting aside the ex parte appellate order and restoring the matter to the Tribunal. As the Tribunal is the final authority on facts and law, principles of natural justice required a fresh hearing. The merits and questions of law remained open for adjudication, with the assessee to be heard before a fresh decision.

Statutory priority for a registered secured interest gives a prior mortgagee first charge over later income-tax attachments; those attachments cannot displace the secured debt. Registration law does not empower a Sub-Registrar to delete attachment entries already shown in encumbrance records. Priority should instead be implemented through a contra entry identifying the secured creditor's precedence, while preserving the attachment record and allowing any surplus sale proceeds, after satisfaction of the secured debt, to be applied towards the attachment.

Revision under Section 263(1) requires both an erroneous assessment order and prejudice to Revenue; a different possible view does not justify revisional jurisdiction. Where the Assessing Officer examines allegedly bogus steel-scrap transactions, verifies the relevant material, and disallows the related loss, the assessment reflects an informed and legally plausible view rather than lack of inquiry. Revision is therefore unavailable on those facts, and no substantial question of law arises.

Rule 3(d) is amended by replacing "State Government/Union Territories" with "Central Government/State Government/Union Territories." The change adds the Central Government to the governmental entities expressly named in the provision while retaining State Governments and Union Territories. The amendment is confined to the institutional description in rule 3(d).