Construction for educational or health-care institutions qualified as commercial or industrial construction before 1 July 2012 only where buildings were primarily intended for commerce or industry; educational surplus alone did not establish that use, and Revenue bore the classification burden. Construction involving transfer and incorporation of goods constituted composite works contracts after that date, taxable only on the service portion under the prescribed valuation mechanism, not on the entire consideration as a pure construction service. Taxing a works-contract service on a basis not proposed in the show-cause notice was impermissible. Extended limitation required wilful suppression or misstatement intended to evade tax; disclosure and bona fide belief defeated that basis, with consequential interest and penalties failing accordingly.

Foundational and preparatory work contractually performed for road construction, including earth removal, laying gravel and metal, compact rolling, and forming a granular sub-base, forms an integrated construction activity rather than an independently taxable Site Formation Service. Notification No. 17/2005-ST exempts such services undertaken in the course of road construction without an unstated requirement of Government ownership, public use, or non-commercial premises. Extended limitation requires wilful suppression with intent to evade tax; audit discovery from regular records and a classification dispute do not meet that standard. Reasonable reliance on the exemption and statutory exclusion also supports relief from interest and penalties.

Service-tax proceedings concerned reliance on third-party information shared between tax authorities, the duty to self-assess, principles of natural justice, negative-list and exemption coverage, and limitation. Original and appellate orders were set aside, and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration from the show-cause-notice stage in accordance with law. The writ petition was treated as covered by an earlier decision concerning these issues.

Unsubstantiated retained funds from payments received from entities involved in scheduled offences may constitute proceeds of crime where no agreement or other material establishes an entitlement to commission. Section 24 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act places the burden on the person concerned to prove that such property is untainted. Where direct proceeds have been dissipated, siphoned off or cannot be traced, the definition of proceeds of crime extends to their value, permitting attachment of other property of equivalent value. This mechanism may apply to property acquired before the scheduled offence, leaving it liable to attachment as value-representing property.

Arrest under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act requires recorded reasons to believe, based on material in the authorised officer's possession, that the person is guilty. Where the statutory examination process under Section 50 has been invoked to confront a person with existing material, arrest on that same material requires completion of that process or fresh incriminating material or a supervening exigency. Omitting the prior examination permission and failing to establish a fresh necessity renders the arrest and consequential remand legally unsustainable; a remand order must address the related objection.

Money-laundering liability may arise even where a person is not accused in the scheduled offence, if material prima facie links that person to handling proceeds of a subsisting scheduled offence. The continuing-offence framework covers direct or indirect assistance, participation, concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projection of criminal proceeds as untainted property. Auditors may fall within "other officer" liability where their consent, connivance, or neglect is connected with a company's laundering activity, including alleged fictitious entries or fund layering. Quashing jurisdiction is exercised sparingly and does not permit assessment of evidentiary reliability where the complaint discloses a prima facie offence requiring trial.

Inherent jurisdiction under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita is confined to patent illegality or want of jurisdiction and does not pre-empt the trial court's factual assessment of whether relied-upon documents have been supplied. Fair-trial safeguards governing disclosure under the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to Prevention of Money Laundering Act complaints after cognizance. The trial court's hearing record is conclusive unless corrected before that court; adverse observations aimed at securing disclosure compliance do not determine officers' integrity. Investigating-officer attendance may be required for identified purposes, but not automatically on every hearing date; attendance must be specifically ordered, including through permitted video-conferencing.

Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act permits arrest only as a discretionary and exceptional measure where an authorised officer records reasons to believe, based on material in possession, that a person is guilty. Summons, examination and production of records may proceed under Section 50, whose proceedings are judicial proceedings. Where a person has complied with repeated examinations and the material relied on already existed, the absence of fresh incriminating material or a supervening necessity may negate the demonstrated need for arrest. Arrest cannot bypass the ongoing examination process or merely facilitate investigation; on these facts, the arrest and consequential remand orders were invalid.

Regular bail may be warranted where continued pre-trial custody is no longer necessary pending trial. Incarceration for about one year and three months, absence of cognizance, and proceedings at a nascent stage indicated that the trial would take considerable time. Bail granted to arrested co-accused and the non-arrest of several others further weighed against continued detention. Release was granted on terms to be fixed by the Trial Court.

Section 12A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and Regulation 30A prescribe the mechanism for withdrawal of the corporate insolvency resolution process. In an appeal limited to directions for cooperation with the resolution professional, Rule 11 inherent powers cannot be invoked to permit deposit of an admitted debt, defer resolution-plan steps, or secure closure outside that mechanism. A financial creditor cannot be compelled to accept a settlement or terminate the process. Seeking substantially identical relief before another forum while an application remains pending constitutes forum shopping and abuse of process, particularly because insolvency proceedings operate in rem.

Remitted resolution plans lacking final approval may be reconsidered, and where revised resolution and settlement proposals fail prescribed voting thresholds, the Committee of Creditors may invite fresh expressions of interest absent a prohibition under the Code or Regulation 36A. Its commercial assessment of funding, feasibility and viability is not to be substituted through judicial review without a legal infirmity. Assignments of homebuyer claims processed under Regulation 28 do not retrospectively invalidate voting undertaken while original allottees remained creditors on record, particularly where no material effect on approval is shown. Intervention applications cannot introduce independent issues beyond the impugned order's subject matter.

Recovery of unpaid contractual consideration under a business purchase agreement falls within liquidation where the amount is a receivable of the corporate debtor and has a direct nexus with realisation of the liquidation estate. A payment mechanism requiring discharge of liabilities from business income does not extinguish the purchaser's primary payment obligation. Where directors exercise managerial, financial and operational control, obtain the transaction's benefits, and use the purchaser-company as an alter ego or corporate fac ade, separate corporate personality and privity of contract do not protect them from recovery liability. Liability extends to the purchaser-company and controlling directors, but not to persons lacking that controlling role.

Section 35 compensation for an investor who subscribed to securities on the basis of a fraudulent prospectus is ordinarily a personal claim against liable persons, including a statutory auditor. Where the company is undergoing insolvency and the alleged fraudulent conduct is addressed through Section 66 proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, recoveries form part of the collective insolvency process for creditors. The claim consequently assumes an action-in-rem character and cannot be pursued through a separate civil suit for the exclusive benefit of one investor. Recourse lies through the collective Section 66 process.

Interim moratorium triggered by an insolvency application does not affect an auction concluded and confirmed before that application. Issuance of the sale certificate after filing does not disturb the completed sale where the insolvency proceedings are later dismissed. The dismissed proceedings create no continuing bar to delivery of possession, and the auction purchaser remains entitled to possession under the sale certificate.

Contractual requirement for a three-member arbitral tribunal may be waived where parties consent to sole arbitrators, participate without timely objection, accept extensions, and advance counterclaims. Corporate insolvency moratorium does not bar a corporate debtor from pursuing recovery claims that may improve its financial position; an authorised special purpose vehicle may continue arbitration and seek mandate extension. Extension of an arbitral mandate in domestic arbitration lies exclusively with the court defined for that purpose, not with a High Court or designate exercising arbitrator-appointment powers. Sole-arbitrator proceedings consequently remain valid, and the award may be pronounced after proceedings conclude within the stipulated period.

Wrongful withholding under section 452 of the Companies Act was alleged against a director who contended that continued directorship precluded the offence. The challenge also asserted non-application of mind in framing notice and breach of natural justice. The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition, finding no ground to interfere with the High Court order, leaving the notice order and pending proceedings undisturbed.

Customs circulars addressing agency commission and foreign bank charges govern only the FOB-value base for specified export incentives; they neither cap overseas agency commission nor regulate remittances under FEMA, RBI directions, or foreign trade law. Under the statutory export-valuation framework, commission paid from export proceeds to an overseas agent is a selling expense and does not reduce an otherwise acceptable transaction or FOB value merely because it exceeds 12.5%. For Duty Drawback, RoDTEP and RoSCTL, commission and bank charges above the aggregate 12.5% threshold are deducted from FOB value only to the extent of the excess when calculating benefits. The circulars cannot amend transaction-value rules or impose an independent commission cap.

Customs advance-ruling jurisdiction covers customs valuation and related export-benefit questions, not the permissibility of overseas agency-commission remittances under foreign-trade, FEMA or RBI frameworks. The 12.5% threshold in specified CBIC circulars governs deduction of agency commission and foreign bank charges solely in calculating duty drawback, RoDTEP and RoSCTL benefits; only the excess is deductible from the FOB basis. It neither caps commission nor regulates remittances. Under Section 14 and the export valuation rules, commission paid from sale proceeds is a selling expense and does not reduce an accepted transaction value unless the declared value is rejected. Administrative circulars cannot amend statutory valuation rules.

Sale or transfer of a customs broker licence requires evidence beyond handling an import transaction referred by a clearing and forwarding agent. Dealings with transaction stakeholders alone do not establish unauthorised conduct of business. Material inconsistency between alleged and attributed over-debiting, combined with the broker's limited role, undermines the allegation. Verification of debit entries was assigned to customs officers at the designated service centre and at out-of-charge. In the absence of forged or invalid licences, or evidence of failure to advise the importer or exercise due diligence, the alleged regulatory contraventions were not established. Licence revocation, security forfeiture, and penalty were therefore legally unsustainable.

Dismissal for non-prosecution under Rule 20 applies where appellants do not appear and demonstrate no intention to pursue their appeals. An appeal called for hearing in the appellant's absence must be dismissed for non-prosecution rather than decided on its merits. The appeals were accordingly dismissed for non-prosecution due to the appellants' lack of representation.