Section 148 notice issued in the name of a person who had died before its issuance is void from the outset, as reassessment must be initiated against a living assessee or, where permitted, a legal representative. Legal-representative provisions permit continuation of proceedings validly begun during the assessee's lifetime but do not validate fresh proceedings commenced against a deceased person. Participation by a legal heir cannot cure this jurisdictional defect. Consequently, reassessment initiated and completed in the deceased assessee's name is invalid and liable to be quashed.

Section 189(1) permits assessment of a dissolved partnership only where its business has been discontinued, treating the firm as continuing for that limited purpose. Where a successor company takes over and continues the business as a going concern, Section 170 governs the succession. A reassessment notice issued under Section 148 in the name of the dissolved, non-existent firm is a substantive jurisdictional defect; the resulting reassessment is void ab initio.

Deletion of additions through an appeal-effect order removes the basis for a concealment penalty because no concealed income remains when the penalty is imposed. Penalty for non-compliance with statutory notices may warrant relief where affidavits establish that the taxpayer lacked familiarity with tax law and relied on a professional who may have failed to make the required compliances.

Section 56(2)(x) requires a legally available valuation basis before stamp-duty value can replace stated purchase consideration for a property acquisition. Where a valuation reference is made but the valuation report is not received within the statutory period, stamp-duty value cannot independently support the addition. Alleged acquisitions of other properties also require disclosure and confrontation of system data or other corroborative material, particularly where the taxpayer denies the transactions. Additions cannot rest on undisclosed evidence or unverified property-acquisition records.

Foreign tax credit under Section 90 is substantive double-taxation relief and cannot be curtailed solely because the return or Form No. 67 was filed late. Rule 128 prescribes procedural and documentation requirements for claiming the credit, including filing Form No. 67, but its filing requirement is directory where the taxpayer's entitlement, credit quantum, and supporting compliance are undisputed. As subordinate legislation, Rule 128 cannot defeat the statutory entitlement to foreign tax credit merely due to delayed filing under Section 139(4) or delayed submission of Form No. 67.

Foreign tax credit under tax treaties is not forfeited merely because Form 67 is filed late. Rule 128(9) fixes the filing timeline but does not prescribe forfeiture for delay; the requirement is procedural and directory rather than a mandatory condition of eligibility. Form 67 should therefore be accepted, and the foreign tax credit claim determined after verification in accordance with applicable law.

CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011 assigned assessment jurisdiction over non-corporate assessees reporting income at or above the prescribed metropolitan-city threshold to a Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner. Where an Income-tax Officer issued a reassessment notice despite lacking that allocated jurisdiction, the notice was jurisdictionally defective. The defect was not curable, rendering the reassessment proceedings and consequential assessment invalid and liable to be quashed.

Reassessment following a completed scrutiny assessment requires fresh tangible material and cannot rest on a review of the same loan confirmation, bank statements and balance sheet previously examined. Deletion of an addition in search-related assessment proceedings for lack of incriminating material does not prevent available remedial action, but it does not supply fresh material to justify reopening. A reassessment notice served on or after 1 April 2021 under the earlier regime must undergo the Section 148A process: show-cause notice, disclosure of material, consideration of response and a reasoned order before a Section 148 notice. Non-compliance renders reopening procedurally defective.

Refunds arising from fresh returns filed after condonation of delay under section 119(2)(b) are treated as belated refund claims for the purposes of CBDT Circular No. 11/2024. Clause (ii) of paragraph 6 excludes interest under section 244A on belated refund claims generally, rather than only on supplementary claims. Consequently, statutory refund interest is unavailable where the original return was filed after the statutory deadline without a valid condonation order and the refund follows a subsequently condoned return.

Ex parte reassessments under Sections 147, 144 and 144B, coupled with dismissal of first appeals in limine for delayed filing, warrant a further opportunity to substantiate disputed transactions where additions have not been examined on merits. The assessee may present its case and supporting evidence before the Assessing Officer. If it fails to comply, the assessment may be completed on the material available in accordance with law.

Orders under section 201 issued in the name of an amalgamating company after it has ceased to exist under an approved amalgamation scheme are jurisdictionally invalid where the Revenue received timely notice of the amalgamation. Issuing a show-cause notice to the amalgamated company does not cure a final order addressed to, carrying the tax-deduction account number of, and served on the non-existent entity. The defect is not merely procedural: an order against the ceased entity is void ab initio. Principles concerning curable notice defects or delayed intimation do not apply where prior intimation was given.

Cash-deposit explanations based on agricultural income must reflect net income available after agricultural expenses, not gross receipts. Accordingly, only the net agricultural income supported the deposits, while the excess agricultural claim remained unexplained. Gift-based explanations require reliable evidence of donor identity, relationship and financial capacity. In the absence of confirmations, identity proof and evidence of capacity, only the accepted portion of gifts could explain the deposits; the remaining amount was treated as unexplained money under Section 69A.

Jewellery purchased from a company's disclosed income and held by its managing director for safe custody does not, by itself, establish that the managing director accepted a cash loan or deposit. Characterising the value of such jewellery as a cash loan requires evidence of an actual loan or deposit transaction; assumptions, presumptions and surmises are insufficient. On these facts, the alleged contravention of the cash-loan restriction was not established, and the related penalty was unsustainable.

Section 151 sanction for reopening may rest on available material indicating escaped income where no return was filed, provided the approval reflects application of mind rather than mechanical consent. Section 69 applies to investments not recorded in the books; a loan or advance recorded in the books and received through banking channels cannot be characterised as unexplained investment merely because the creditor's creditworthiness is doubted. Documentary support must be addressed, and an adverse creditworthiness finding requires enquiry from the creditor or other rebutting evidence; recourse to Section 68 does not cure an unsupported addition.

Breach of prescribed investment conditions by a charitable trust triggers forfeiture of exemption only for the income connected with the non-conforming investment. Under Section 13(1)(d), the proviso to Section 164(2), and Circular No. 387, eligibility for exemption under Section 11 remains distinct from the extent of exemption forfeited because of a statutory contravention. The maximum marginal rate applies only to the affected portion of income, while the trust retains Section 11 exemption for its remaining qualifying income.

Revisionary jurisdiction cannot be invoked over cash deposits merely because the Principal Commissioner adopts a different view after assessment. Where the Assessing Officer examined the deposits in detail during assessment, the assessment order is not erroneous or prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue on that issue. Revision is therefore impermissible where the existing assessment record establishes adequate inquiry.

Under the faceless reassessment framework, a jurisdictional assessing officer cannot validly issue a reassessment notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act. Issuance must conform to the prescribed faceless mechanism rather than the conventional jurisdictional-officer process. The legal position is presented as settled by an earlier ruling against the Revenue, rendering the impugned reassessment notice unsustainable and supporting the assessee's position.

Notional rental income under Section 23(1)(a) is not chargeable on unsold flats for the period before an occupancy certificate is issued. A property without an occupancy certificate is legally incapable of occupation; where it was neither legally occupiable nor actually occupied, no annual letting value can be attributed on a notional basis under income from house property. A completion certificate alone does not establish legal occupiability without an occupancy certificate.

Section 107(4) of the CGST Act confines condonation of delayed appeals to its express outer period; a statutory appellate authority has no inherent or equitable power to extend that limit, and writ relief cannot enlarge appellate jurisdiction. Departmental implementation of orders restoring cancelled GST registrations can preclude a challenge to that restoration where taxpayers have resumed business and reversal would disturb intervening transactions. The revocation remedy under Section 30 and Rule 23 operates independently of the appellate remedy under Section 107; expiry of the portal-based revocation period does not bar an appeal against registration cancellation.

Section 107 confines condonation of delay in statutory appeals to its express additional period; a first appellate authority has no inherent or equitable power to extend that outer limit. Constitutional relief under Article 226 does not expand that statutory appellate jurisdiction. Registration revocation and appeal operate as independent remedies, so inability to seek revocation through the portal after the prescribed period does not extinguish the right of appeal. Where appellate orders have been implemented by restoring registrations and enabling subsequent business transactions, reopening those orders without addressing the consequences may yield no effective relief; the implemented restoration prevents reopening the settled position in these proceedings.