Issues: (i) Whether the Supreme Court's deferral direction concerning delayed adjudication required the writ petition to remain pending; (ii) Whether, following the adjudication orders, the petitioner should be relegated to the statutory appellate remedy.

Issue (i): Whether the Supreme Court's deferral direction concerning delayed adjudication required the writ petition to remain pending.

Analysis: The deferral direction was issued in the context of matters concerning pending adjudication and the larger issue of delay. The provisional assessments in question had culminated in adjudication orders, including an order that pre-dated the writ petition. The controversy was therefore no longer confined to delayed finalisation of provisional assessments.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in the negative; the writ petition was not required to remain pending awaiting the Supreme Court proceedings.

Issue (ii): Whether, following the adjudication orders, the petitioner should be relegated to the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: Section 128(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 provides an efficacious appeal against the adjudication orders. The appellate forum can consider the legality of those orders, the legal effect of the alleged delay, and consequential claims concerning the securities furnished. No exceptional circumstance justified bypassing that remedy. The material non-disclosure of the pre-existing adjudication order also supported refusal of discretionary writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in the affirmative; the challenges and available contentions must be pursued through the statutory appellate remedy.

Final Conclusion: The legality of the adjudication orders, the consequences of any delay in their making, and related claims concerning bank guarantees remain open for determination by the competent appellate forum in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where appealable adjudication orders have been passed and no exceptional circumstance is shown, writ jurisdiction should not bypass an efficacious statutory appellate remedy.

Issues: Whether interest on the refund of amounts deposited during investigation is payable from the date of deposit until the date of refund, notwithstanding that the Revenue's challenge to the order setting aside the demand was dismissed subsequently.

Analysis: The confirmed demand had been set aside, with the result that the investigation deposit was not payable from inception. The amount was deposited in 2008 and retained until its refund in 2024. Applying the established principle governing interest on delayed refund of investigation deposits, the subsequent dismissal of the Revenue's challenge did not justify retention of money that was never lawfully due without interest for the period of such retention.

Conclusion: Interest is payable to the assessee on the refunded investigation deposit from the date of deposit until the date of refund.

Issues: Whether the Supreme Court ruling concerning State legislative competence over intoxicating liquors supported an additional ground challenging the service-tax demand on job-work production.

Analysis: The constitutional ruling relied upon concerned the respective legislative fields relating to intoxicating liquors, including the scope of State power under Entry 8 of List II and Parliamentary control over industries under Entry 52 of List I. It did not determine the levy of service tax on services used for production of goods on a job-work basis. A precedent governs what it actually decides and cannot be extended to a distinct service-tax issue not considered therein. Reliance on an otherwise relevant decision could also be made during hearing without a separate application.

Conclusion: The cited constitutional ruling did not establish that the service-tax demand or jurisdiction to levy service tax on the job-work service was invalid.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal concerning gold chains brought into India by an international passenger.

Analysis: The first proviso to Section 129A(1) expressly excludes the Tribunal's appellate jurisdiction over orders relating to goods imported or exported as baggage. The gold chains were brought by the appellant as an arriving international passenger; their recovery from his person, alleged non-declaration, intended use, concealment, invoice, or duty-evasion allegations concern the merits and do not change the goods' character as baggage. Section 129DD provides revision before the Central Government for such orders.

Conclusion: The impugned order related to goods imported as baggage, and the Tribunal therefore lacked appellate jurisdiction; the available recourse is revision under Section 129DD of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: (i) Whether e-governance portal and data-digitisation services provided to government departments and educational institutions were taxable as OIDAR, business auxiliary, or business support services before 1 July 2012; (ii) Whether portal services supplied to universities and educational institutions after 1 July 2012 were exempt from service tax; and (iii) Whether interest earned on fixed deposits from temporarily retained collections was liable to service tax.

Issue (i): Whether e-governance portal and data-digitisation services provided to government departments and educational institutions were taxable as OIDAR, business auxiliary, or business support services before 1 July 2012.

Analysis: OIDAR requires the service provider to provide access to data possessed by it. The appellant merely created and operated a network enabling government officers and citizens to access data owned by the State Government; it did not provide access to its own data. The support rendered to State departments, universities, and educational institutions was directed to governmental and educational functions and was not supplied to entities engaged in business or commerce.

Conclusion: The services were not taxable as OIDAR, business auxiliary, or business support services for the pre-negative-list period, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether portal services supplied to universities and educational institutions after 1 July 2012 were exempt from service tax.

Analysis: Although services were generally taxable after the negative-list regime commenced, portal services supplied to universities and educational institutions fell within Entry 9(d) of Exemption Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012.

Conclusion: The portal services provided to universities and educational institutions were exempt from service tax after 1 July 2012, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether interest earned on fixed deposits from temporarily retained collections was liable to service tax.

Analysis: The fixed-deposit interest arose because amounts collected towards government fees, educational fees, utility bills, and premiums were remitted after the stipulated short interval. Interest represented the time value of money paid by the bank for the deposits and was not consideration for any service rendered by the appellant.

Conclusion: Fixed-deposit interest was not exigible to service tax under either the pre-negative-list or post-negative-list regime, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disputed e-governance and educational-service receipts either did not constitute taxable services or were exempt, while fixed-deposit interest lay outside the charge of service tax.

Issues: (i) Whether separately billed food and beverages supplied by room/grand-room service were taxable restaurant or accommodation services; (ii) Whether consideration for exclusive branding and display of liquor brands constituted taxable sponsorship/promotional activity; (iii) Whether electricity charges recovered at actual consumption from tenants formed taxable consideration; (iv) Whether the demand beyond the normal limitation period was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether separately billed food and beverages supplied by room/grand-room service were taxable restaurant or accommodation services.

Analysis: Section 65(105)(zzzzv) of the Finance Act, 1994 confined restaurant service to serving food or beverages in the premises of an air-conditioned restaurant licensed to serve alcohol. Hotel rooms were not restaurant premises, and the food was separately invoiced without evidence that its value formed part of the room tariff. Such separately charged food was a sale/transfer of goods excluded from service under Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Conclusion: The room and grand-room food and beverage receipts were not taxable services. In favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether consideration for exclusive branding and display of liquor brands constituted taxable sponsorship/promotional activity.

Analysis: The agreements required exclusive branding and promotion of specified liquor brands and mandatory display of branded accessories. The receipts were therefore consideration for promotional and branding activity, rather than trade margins arising solely from liquor sales. For the pre-negative-list period, the arrangements fell within the statutory scope of sponsorship; for the post-negative-list period, they were services under Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 and were not covered by Section 66D of that Act.

Conclusion: The branding-related receipts constituted taxable promotional activity and not mere trading income. Against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether electricity charges recovered at actual consumption from tenants formed taxable consideration.

Analysis: The charges represented actual electricity consumption recorded through sub-meters, collected from tenants and remitted to electricity suppliers. They were not consideration for renting services. Rule 5(1) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules could not include such reimbursement in taxable value, having been held ultra vires.

Conclusion: Electricity charges recovered on actual-consumption basis were not taxable consideration. In favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the demand beyond the normal limitation period was sustainable.

Analysis: The notice did not invoke the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994, and the record did not establish a deliberate act of suppression or other conduct evidencing intent to evade tax. Mere non-declaration or omission did not establish wilful suppression.

Conclusion: Recovery beyond the normal limitation period was unsustainable; the sponsorship-service demand could survive only for the normal period. In favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Only the service-tax liability on sponsorship/promotional activity for the normal limitation period survives; the remaining impugned demands are set aside.

Issues: (i) Taxability of pre-July 2012 construction services and entitlement to abatement and recipient-side tax liability; (ii) Valuation of post-July 2012 works contract services under Rule 2A and entitlement to abatement and recipient-side tax liability; (iii) Inclusion of free-of-cost materials supplied by customers in the taxable value of works contracts; (iv) Classification of the services treated as exclusive service contracts; (v) Appropriation of service tax allegedly deposited during investigation; (vi) Validity of penalty for non-payment of service tax and non-filing of returns.

Issue (i): Taxability of pre-July 2012 construction services and entitlement to abatement and recipient-side tax liability.

Analysis: Construction of a hospital is commercial or industrial construction service unless evidence establishes that it was intended to be a charitable hospital. The applicable abatement had already been extended, and the tax liability was correspondingly reduced wherever the recipient was required to discharge part of the tax.

Conclusion: The demand for the pre-July 2012 period was sustained; against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Valuation of post-July 2012 works contract services under Rule 2A and entitlement to abatement and recipient-side tax liability.

Analysis: Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 permits exclusion of the actual value of goods where established, or valuation on the prescribed presumptive basis. The assessment had allowed the applicable abatement and reduced provider-side liability wherever reverse-charge liability applied. No material established that the actual value of goods exceeded the abatement already allowed.

Conclusion: The valuation and demand for the post-July 2012 works contract services were sustained; against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Inclusion of free-of-cost materials supplied by customers in the taxable value of works contracts.

Analysis: Materials supplied free of cost by customers do not form part of the gross amount charged for determining the taxable value of a works contract.

Conclusion: The service tax demand attributable to free-of-cost customer-supplied materials was set aside; in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Classification of the services treated as exclusive service contracts.

Analysis: The assertion that the services classified as exclusive service contracts were works contracts was unsupported by material in the appeal.

Conclusion: The classification and corresponding demand were sustained; against the assessee.

Issue (v): Appropriation of service tax allegedly deposited during investigation.

Analysis: The alleged deposits require verification as to whether they were paid as service tax.

Conclusion: Any amounts verified as service tax deposits shall be appropriated against the confirmed demand; in favour of the assessee to that extent.

Issue (vi): Validity of penalty for non-payment of service tax and non-filing of returns.

Analysis: The assessee neither paid service tax nor filed returns or declared the services, and the transactions emerged only through investigation.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 76 of the Finance Act, 1994 was sustained; against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tax component attributable to customer-supplied free-of-cost materials is excluded, while the remaining valuation, classification, and penalty findings stand, with adjustment of verified tax deposits.

Ratio Decidendi: Free-of-cost materials supplied by the recipient cannot be included in the gross amount charged for valuation of works contract service.

Issues: (i) Validity of State GST adjudication and rectification orders for a period for which Central GST proceedings had already been initiated; (ii) Validity of the ex parte Central GST adjudication order made without a fresh communicated hearing after the dates previously fixed.

Issue (i): Validity of State GST adjudication and rectification orders for a period for which Central GST proceedings had already been initiated.

Analysis: The Central GST show-cause notice had been issued before the State GST notice for the same period. The later State GST adjudication could not stand alongside the first-initiated Central GST proceedings, and the rectification order consequential to that adjudication also could not survive.

Conclusion: The State GST adjudication order and consequential rectification order were invalid and were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Validity of the ex parte Central GST adjudication order made without a fresh communicated hearing after the dates previously fixed.

Analysis: Natural justice requires an effective opportunity of hearing before adjudication. Although dates had earlier been fixed and a reply had been filed, the order was passed substantially later without communicating a fresh hearing date, resulting in ex parte adjudication without an effective opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The Central GST ex parte adjudication order was invalid for breach of natural justice and was set aside; a fresh hearing and speaking order were required, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: For the same taxable period, first-initiated Central GST proceedings prevail over later State GST adjudication, while any fresh Central GST determination must follow an effective hearing and a reasoned decision.

Issues: Whether an appeal against cancellation of GST registration was time-barred where the original order was only uploaded on the GST portal and was not communicated to the affected person in the prescribed manner.

Analysis: Section 107(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 makes the three-month period for appeal run from communication of the decision or order. Section 169(1) prescribes the modes for service of an order. Since the Appellate Authority may condone delay only for the limited additional period stipulated by Section 107(1), effective communication of the order is mandatory for commencement of limitation. Uploading the order on the common portal, without service in accordance with the prescribed modes, does not amount to communication for this purpose. The exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act reinforces the requirement of strict compliance with the statutory procedure for service.

Conclusion: Limitation for filing the appeal had not commenced merely upon upload of the cancellation order on the GST portal; the appeal could not be rejected as barred by limitation, and the delay was liable to be condoned for adjudication on merits.

Issues: Whether a confiscation order passed on the same day as the show-cause notice, despite the notice allowing seven days for filing a reply, violated the requirement of an effective opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The notice granted seven days for submission of a reply, but the confiscation order was issued on the date of service itself, before expiry of that period and without any written objection having been filed. A direction to appear on the date of issuance did not afford a real and reasonable opportunity to respond. Payment made to secure release of detained goods and conveyance could not constitute admission, acquiescence, or waiver of the right to contest the demand. The appellate finding that the appellant had participated in the proceedings was inconsistent with the confiscation order, which recorded that no objections had been filed.

Conclusion: The confiscation order, consequential demand order, and appellate order were set aside for breach of principles of natural justice, and the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication after allowing a written reply and personal hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether one-time, non-refundable membership fees from time-share members could be recognised over the membership period rather than fully in the year of receipt; (ii) Whether payments to resident suppliers for renewal of software licences in assessment year 2008-09 constituted royalty requiring tax deduction under Section 194J and disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia); (iii) Whether the expression "payable" in Section 40(a)(ia) includes amounts already "paid".

Issue (i): Whether one-time, non-refundable membership fees from time-share members could be recognised over the membership period rather than fully in the year of receipt.

Analysis: The consistently followed accounting method apportioned membership receipts over the period during which membership benefits were available. The identical issue had been resolved by applying the regular method of accounting instead of bringing the entire receipt to tax in the year of collection.

Conclusion: Membership fees were eligible for recognition over the membership period and not taxable in full in the year of receipt; in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether payments to resident suppliers for renewal of software licences in assessment year 2008-09 constituted royalty requiring tax deduction under Section 194J and disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia).

Analysis: Section 194J applies to payments for specified services or royalty. The statutory clarification treating a right to use computer software, including a licence, as royalty was held to operate prospectively from 1 April 2012. Consequently, licence-renewal payments in assessment year 2008-09 did not constitute royalty. Tax treatment of payments to non-resident suppliers did not establish taxability of payments to resident suppliers.

Conclusion: The software-licence renewal payments did not attract tax deduction under Section 194J or disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia); in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the expression "payable" in Section 40(a)(ia) includes amounts already "paid".

Analysis: The interpretation excluding amounts already paid from the scope of Section 40(a)(ia) had been reversed by the Supreme Court. The provision applies to amounts paid as well as amounts remaining payable.

Conclusion: The expression "payable" includes amounts already paid; in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeds on recognition of membership fees and on the non-applicability of tax deduction requirements to the pre-2012 software-licence payments, while the statutory interpretation of "payable" is affirmed in favour of the Revenue.

Issues: (i) Whether the Binding Term Sheet was a binding but conditional arrangement, and the extent of the acquirer's funding obligations under it and the Addendum; (ii) Whether the advances of Rs.23.45 crore constituted acquisition consideration and whether the acquirer showed readiness and willingness to perform; (iii) Whether interim and ad-interim protection under Section 9 was warranted to preserve the shares, transaction and corporate assets pending arbitration.

Issue (i): Whether the Binding Term Sheet was a binding but conditional arrangement, and the extent of the acquirer's funding obligations under it and the Addendum.

Analysis: The express final-and-binding clause established that the Term Sheet created enforceable obligations. However, the payment structure, due diligence, regulatory approvals, escrow requirements, pre-conditions and contemplated Definitive Agreements showed that completion of the acquisition remained conditional. The Addendum provided for a Rs.20 crore infusion under one clause and a further Rs.20 crore creditor payment subject to pre-conditions under another clause. The contractual framework did not support either an absolute limit of Rs.20 crore on the acquirer's obligations or an unlimited and unconditional obligation to fund all liabilities of the target company.

Conclusion: The Term Sheet was binding in favour of the acquirer's contention, but it was not an unconditional completed transfer or an unconditional right to complete the acquisition. The competing absolute funding positions were not accepted.

Issue (ii): Whether the advances of Rs.23.45 crore constituted acquisition consideration and whether the acquirer showed readiness and willingness to perform.

Analysis: The Inter-Corporate Loan Agreement pre-dated the Term Sheet, provided for loan tranches, repayment and interest, and the first substantial payment followed its execution. Contemporaneous correspondence and the draft Definitive Agreement described the advances as loan tranches. The transaction documents could be read together for the limited purpose of understanding the overall arrangement, but loan advances did not thereby become share-purchase consideration. Under the staged payment clause, Rs.52.50 lakh became payable on the earlier of completion of due diligence or the thirtieth day from the Term Sheet; it was not shown to have been paid before the termination notice. The principle of reciprocal promises did not excuse that independently due instalment.

Conclusion: The Rs.23.45 crore advances were not established as acquisition consideration, and the acquirer failed to establish compliance with its payment obligations or readiness and willingness to perform. This issue was decided against the acquirer.

Issue (iii): Whether interim and ad-interim protection under Section 9 was warranted to preserve the shares, transaction and corporate assets pending arbitration.

Analysis: Interim protection requires a sufficient prima facie case and a present need to preserve the subject matter without granting control-oriented or mandatory relief beyond what is necessary. The incomplete pre-conditions, unexecuted Definitive Agreements, disputed performance, and unpaid instalment prevented the asserted right to immediate completion from being treated as established. The communication directing maintenance of status quo over the escrow shares materially reduced the apprehended immediate risk. The disputed status of the remaining securities did not justify a mandatory injunction, while restraints over corporate management, operational assets, permits and contracts would exceed limited preservative protection.

Conclusion: The acquirer did not establish a sufficient prima facie case, irreparable injury, or an immediate threat warranting the requested interim or mandatory protection. This issue was decided against the acquirer.

Final Conclusion: The contractual acquisition, accounting of advances, validity of termination and any appropriate protective measures remain matters for determination in arbitration, without the requested court-imposed restraints over the company or its securities.

Ratio Decidendi: Interim protection for a proposed acquisition cannot be granted where material contractual conditions remain unfulfilled, the applicant has not established performance of an independently due obligation, and no present risk requiring preservative or mandatory relief is shown.

Issues: (i) Whether tax could be levied on projected revenue for Blocks 12 and 13 solely on the basis of planning approval before construction commenced; (ii) Whether the assessment order could stand when adequate opportunity to file a detailed reply was not afforded.

Issue (i): Whether tax could be levied on projected revenue for Blocks 12 and 13 solely on the basis of planning approval before construction commenced.

Analysis: The tax demand for Blocks 12 and 13 was computed from projected revenue solely because planning approval had been granted. Construction in respect of those blocks had not commenced, and planning approval alone did not justify levy based on projected revenue.

Conclusion: Levy of tax on the projected revenue of Blocks 12 and 13 was improper, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment order could stand when adequate opportunity to file a detailed reply was not afforded.

Analysis: The records showed that time had been sought for filing a detailed reply, but sufficient opportunity to place the defence was not afforded. A fresh determination must comply with the principles of natural justice by considering objections and supporting material after personal hearing.

Conclusion: The assessment order could not stand without adequate opportunity to reply, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Fresh adjudication is required after the stipulated deposit, submission of objections and a personal hearing; the bank-account attachments are to be lifted upon proof of deposit.

Issues: Whether an ex parte adjudication under Section 74, passed without deciding the matter on the scheduled hearing date and without notice of a subsequent hearing date, was valid.

Analysis: Where the adjudicating authority does not decide the proceedings on the date fixed for hearing, it must fix and communicate a further hearing date. Failure to communicate the fresh date deprives the assessee of an effective opportunity of personal hearing and results in an ex parte order contrary to principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The ex parte adjudication was set aside, with a direction to grant personal hearing and thereafter pass a reasoned order in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) whether an advance ruling may be issued for an ongoing import activity; (ii) whether die cut tape and tape in roll are classifiable under the claimed tariff items; and (iii) whether both goods qualify for concessional basic customs duty under Serial No. 295 of Notification No. 45/2025-Customs dated 24.10.2025.

Issue (i): whether an advance ruling may be issued for an ongoing import activity.

Analysis: The statutory scheme permits an advance ruling for an ongoing import activity where the goods are not involved in a pending dispute or already settled matter. Such a ruling operates prospectively in respect of the goods covered by it.

Conclusion: An advance ruling may be issued for the ongoing import activity, with prospective operation.

Issue (ii): whether die cut tape and tape in roll are classifiable under the claimed tariff items.

Analysis: Under the General Rules for Interpretation and the relevant Section and Chapter Notes, the die cut tape is imported in pre-cut, non-rectangular, battery-specific and ready-to-use form. Its exclusive or principal use as an insulating and heat-protection component of lithium-ion battery packs makes it a part of an electric accumulator under Note 2(b) to Section XVI; it is not a plastic article of general use. As it is neither an accumulator case nor a battery separator, it falls under the residual entry for other accumulator parts.

Analysis: Tape in roll is imported as a continuous, pressure-sensitive self-adhesive plastic tape, without battery-specific shape or dimensions, and is capable of use in diverse electronic and electrical applications. Subsequent cutting after import cannot alter its tariff identity. It is consequently excluded from Section XVI as a general-use plastic article and falls under heading 3919; the declared roll width not exceeding 20 cm places it under the applicable eight-digit tariff item.

Conclusion: Die cut tape is classifiable under CTI 8507 90 90, and tape in roll of width not exceeding 20 cm is classifiable under CTI 3919 10 00, subject to verification of the declared dimensions at import.

Issue (iii): whether both goods qualify for concessional basic customs duty under Serial No. 295 of Notification No. 45/2025-Customs dated 24.10.2025.

Analysis: Serial No. 295 applies to eligible goods under Chapter 85 or any other Chapter when used in the manufacture of lithium-ion batteries or battery packs. The die cut tape is a battery-specific part or component under clause (i), while tape in roll is a sub-part used to manufacture insulating battery components under clause (ii). The concessional treatment is contingent on specified end use and compliance with Condition No. 3 and the prescribed concessional-duty procedure.

Conclusion: Both die cut tape and tape in roll qualify for the concessional basic customs duty rate of 2.5%, subject to fulfilment of the stipulated end-use condition and procedural requirements.

Final Conclusion: The ruling prospectively confirms the tariff treatment of the two imported products and their coverage under the concessional-duty entry for lithium-ion battery-pack manufacture.

Issues: Whether the limitation for completing the assessment recommenced upon receipt of the digitally signed order setting aside the earlier special-audit direction, rather than upon later receipt of its certified copy, and whether the subsequent special audit and assessment proceedings were consequently valid.

Analysis: Clause (iv)(b) of Explanation 1 to Section 153 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 refers to receipt of a copy of the order setting aside a special-audit direction, unlike clause (ii), which expressly requires receipt of a certified copy. The earlier order required all concerned to act upon a digitally signed copy produced by email or fax. The digitally signed order was communicated to the departmental authorities by 10 January 2026 and emailed to the Principal Commissioner by 12 January 2026; the departmental instruction also required prompt dissemination of uploaded High Court orders. The statutory period therefore expired, at the latest, on 13 March 2026. Limitation must be strictly applied, and action after its expiry is without jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The assessment became time-barred by 13 March 2026; the special-audit direction dated 25 March 2026 and consequential audit report were without jurisdiction, no valid assessment order could thereafter be made, and the returned income stood deemed accepted.

Issues: Validity of a faceless assessment adding gross sale proceeds as capital gains while disregarding documentary material supporting the cost of acquisition, transfer expenses and reinvestment claims.

Analysis: The assessment under Sections 143(3) and 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 concerned claims for computation of capital gains, including deductions for acquisition cost and transfer expenses under Section 48 and reinvestment benefits under Sections 54 and 54EC. The record showed that the relevant sale deeds, acquisition documents, evidence of legal expenses and documents supporting the reinvestments had been furnished through the assessment portal. No specific deficiency in that material was identified, nor was any enquiry, verification or reasoned consideration undertaken before denying the claims. The assessment also failed to address the admitted material relating to the reinvestment benefits.

Conclusion: The assessment was legally infirm; the assessee was entitled to a fresh, reasoned assessment after a personal hearing.

Issues: Whether CENVAT credit could be denied for payment of excise duty during the period of default under Rule 8(3A) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002.

Analysis: The demand was founded on the requirement under Rule 8(3A) that duty during the default period be paid without utilisation of CENVAT credit. The appellant subsequently discharged the outstanding duty along with applicable interest. The applicable precedents had declared Rule 8(3A) ultra vires and recognised that CENVAT credit could not be denied for duty payment during the defaulted period. The facts were found to be squarely covered by that settled position.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit could not be denied for payment of duty during the default period under Rule 8(3A) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee was entitled to additional depreciation under Section 32(1)(iia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for new plant and machinery installed in captive and wind power plants; and (ii) Whether revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was validly invoked to revise the assessment allowing that claim.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee was entitled to additional depreciation under Section 32(1)(iia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for new plant and machinery installed in captive and wind power plants.

Analysis: Section 32(1)(iia) allows additional depreciation where new plant or machinery is acquired and installed after 31.03.2005 by an assessee engaged in manufacture or production of an article or thing. The new machinery was admittedly acquired and installed after the prescribed date. Electricity is movable property capable of transmission, transfer, delivery and possession; its generation constitutes production. The assessee was also engaged in manufacturing mineral products, and the power generated through the captive and wind power plants was used in its manufacturing operations.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to additional depreciation under Section 32(1)(iia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. This issue was decided against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was validly invoked to revise the assessment allowing that claim.

Analysis: Revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263(1) requires the assessment order to be both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue; both conditions must coexist. Since the additional depreciation claim was legally allowable and had been correctly accepted in assessment, the assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue.

Conclusion: Invocation of revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was invalid. This issue was decided against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment allowing additional depreciation remains effective, while the revisional order setting it aside has no legal basis.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee satisfies the conditions for additional depreciation on new machinery used in manufacture or production, the allowance is legally sustainable and cannot be revised under Section 263(1) absent an assessment order that is both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue.

Issues: Whether the pending first appeals for the relevant assessment years were required to be decided expeditiously notwithstanding the priority framework under the departmental circular.

Analysis: Section 250(6A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 contemplates disposal of appellate proceedings within one year from the end of the financial year in which the appeal is filed or transferred, where possible. The departmental circular prescribing priority categories for disposal of appeals cannot prevail over the statutory framework where the appeals have remained undecided despite compliance with notices.

Conclusion: The National Faceless Appeal Centre appellate authority must decide the pending appeals within three months after affording proper and reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessees.