Issues: (i) Whether a Bill-to/Ship-to transaction under Section 10(1)(b) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is legally valid; (ii) Whether the supply in question was a Bill-to/Ship-to transaction supported by valid invoices and e-way bills; (iii) Whether penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the Central and Chhattisgarh GST Acts, 2017 was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether a Bill-to/Ship-to transaction under Section 10(1)(b) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is legally valid.

Analysis: Section 10(1)(b) contemplates a supply in which goods are delivered by the supplier to a recipient or other person on the direction of a third person, who is deemed to have received the goods. Such a transaction involves an original supplier, an intermediate buyer, and an ultimate consignee. Direct dispatch to the consignee, coupled with onward invoicing by the intermediate buyer, is a recognised arrangement where the transactions are genuine, documented, accounted for, and taxed in accordance with law.

Conclusion: A genuine and duly documented Bill-to/Ship-to transaction is legally permissible.

Issue (ii): Whether the supply in question was a Bill-to/Ship-to transaction supported by valid invoices and e-way bills.

Analysis: The original supplier's e-invoices identified the intermediate buyer as the Bill-to party and the ultimate recipient as the Ship-to party. The onward e-invoices identified the ultimate recipient, and the e-way bills corresponded with those invoices and were generated before interception. Under Rule 138(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, the person causing movement, including the consignor or consignee as applicable, may generate the e-way bill. The transport arrangement and factory-gate records supported genuine movement of the goods.

Conclusion: The supply was a Bill-to/Ship-to transaction supported by valid e-invoices and e-way bills, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the Central and Chhattisgarh GST Acts, 2017 was sustainable.

Analysis: The e-way bills had been generated by the person responsible for arranging the transport before the vehicle was intercepted. Therefore, the original supplier's alleged failure to generate the e-way bill could not independently justify detention when the goods were accompanied by the requisite documentary evidence.

Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable and Section 129(1)(a) did not apply, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Detention and penal action cannot be sustained merely because the original supplier did not generate the e-way bill where a genuine Bill-to/Ship-to supply is evidenced by valid invoices and an e-way bill generated by the person causing movement.

Ratio Decidendi: In a genuine and documented Bill-to/Ship-to supply, Rule 138(2) is satisfied when the person causing movement generates the e-way bill; penalty under Section 129 cannot rest solely on the original supplier not generating it.

Issues: Whether a departmental GST appeal involving a disputed penalty below the prescribed monetary threshold could be admitted without establishing an applicable exception under the departmental litigation policy.

Analysis: Section 120 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorises monetary limits for departmental appeals. The applicable circular fixed a threshold of Rs. 20,00,000 for appeals before GSTAT. As the dispute concerned only penalty, the disputed amount was Rs. 3,35,286, which was below that threshold. An exception to the threshold had to be specifically pleaded and supported by material. Authorisation under Section 112(3) was distinct from compliance with the monetary-limit policy and did not itself establish an exception. No material established a recurring legal issue, any other specified exception, or a case-specific and reasoned exercise of the Commissioner's residual power to contest the matter.

Conclusion: The departmental appeal was not maintainable for want of an established exception to the applicable monetary-limit policy.

Issues: Whether a departmental appeal involving disputed tax below the prescribed monetary limit was maintainable without establishing a recognised exception.

Analysis: Section 120 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorises monetary-limit instructions regulating departmental appeals. The applicable circular fixed a threshold of Rs. 20,00,000 before the Tribunal and required only the aggregate disputed tax, rather than interest or penalty, to be considered where tax is in dispute. The disputed CGST and SGST components together were below that threshold. Section 112(3) permits the Commissioner to direct an application to the Tribunal, but such authorisation does not dispense with compliance with the monetary-limit policy. A recognised exception had to be specifically pleaded and supported; where the residual exception based on the interests of justice or revenue was invoked, the record had to disclose the Commissioner's case-specific reasoned opinion. No such exception or material was established. The departmental monetary-limit instructions were binding upon the Revenue, and maintainability had to be determined before entering upon the merits.

Conclusion: The departmental appeal was not maintainable and could not be admitted for adjudication on the merits because no recognised exception to the applicable monetary limit was established.

Issues: Whether the assessment could be made without granting the assessee an effective opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses after the Assessing Officer issued a second notice for cross-examination.

Analysis: The earlier judicial direction required the witnesses to be made available for cross-examination and a fresh assessment to be made after giving due regard to that exercise, in conformity with principles of natural justice. Although the assessee failed to attend at the originally fixed time, the subsequent issuance of notices to the assessee and both witnesses for another date amounted to condonation of that lapse. As the assessee and counsel attended on the subsequent date but the witnesses did not, the Assessing Officer could not treat the earlier missed opportunity as exhaustion of the right to cross-examine.

Conclusion: The assessment made without providing effective cross-examination was vitiated; the assessee must be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine both witnesses before a fresh assessment, subject to payment of the stipulated witness costs.

Issues: (i) Whether interest under Section 132B(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was payable on requisitioned cash from the expiry of 120 days after requisition until completion of assessment; (ii) Whether compensatory interest was payable for retention of requisitioned cash after assessment despite no express statutory provision.

Issue (i): Whether interest under Section 132B(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was payable on requisitioned cash from the expiry of 120 days after requisition until completion of assessment.

Analysis: Section 132B(4)(a) provides for simple interest at one-half per cent for every month or part of a month, and Section 132B(4)(b) fixes the period from the day immediately following expiry of 120 days after execution of the requisition to completion of assessment. The 120-day period expired on 25.04.2012 and the assessment was completed on 20.03.2014.

Conclusion: Simple interest at one-half per cent for every month or part thereof was payable from 26.04.2012 to 20.03.2014.

Issue (ii): Whether compensatory interest was payable for retention of requisitioned cash after assessment despite no express statutory provision.

Analysis: Section 132B(3) requires the forthwith release of seized assets remaining after discharge of liabilities. As no tax liability was determined, continued retention after assessment was contrary to that mandate. The absence of an express provision for post-assessment interest did not displace the restitutionary principle or preclude compensatory interest in writ jurisdiction. Whether the Revenue earned interest on the retained cash was immaterial, since compensation addresses deprivation of the use of money.

Conclusion: Interest at 6% per annum was payable from 21.03.2014 until actual release of the cash on 15.01.2017.

Final Conclusion: The statutory entitlement for the pre-assessment period and restitutionary compensation for the unjustified post-assessment retention together required payment of interest for the entire period of delayed release.

Ratio Decidendi: Where seized cash is required to be forthwith released after assessment determines no tax liability, unjustified retention warrants compensatory interest on restitutionary principles notwithstanding the absence of an express statutory provision for the post-assessment period.

Issues: Whether an order imposing penalty under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be passed while the assessee's appeal against the relevant assessment order was pending before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 253 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 275(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires penalty proceedings to remain in abeyance where the relevant assessment order is the subject of a pending appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The appeal had been filed and remained pending when the penalty order was made; whether the Assessing Officer had been intimated of the appeal was immaterial.

Conclusion: The penalty order passed during the pendency of the Tribunal appeal contravened Section 275(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and could not stand, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an adjudicating authority may confirm GST tax and penalty exceeding the amounts proposed in the show-cause notice, contrary to Section 75(7).

Analysis: Section 75(7) was treated as mandatory and as restricting the adjudicating authority from confirming a demand greater than that proposed in the show-cause notice. The notice proposed tax and penalty of Rs. 16,20,000 each, whereas the adjudication order confirmed tax and penalty of Rs. 25,28,400 each.

Conclusion: No; confirmation of tax and penalty exceeding the amounts proposed in the show-cause notice was without jurisdiction and invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an ex parte GST adjudication order could stand when the taxpayer's request for relied-upon documents and for cross-examination had not been addressed.

Analysis: The Revenue could not dispute the asserted procedural error. The ex parte order was therefore set aside, and the adjudicating authority was directed to furnish the available relied-upon documents, exclude from reliance any documents not furnished, consider any cross-examination request through a reasoned order, and thereafter undertake fresh adjudication.

Conclusion: The ex parte adjudication was set aside for fresh proceedings after disclosure of relied-upon documents and determination of the cross-examination request, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the amended pre-deposit requirement under Section 107(6) applies to a statutory appeal against a penalty-only order where the show-cause notice was issued before 1 October 2025.

Analysis: Section 107(6) governs the pre-deposit required for maintaining a statutory appeal. The liability imposed was solely penalty, and the show-cause notice initiating the proceedings preceded the amendment effective from 1 October 2025. These facts attracted the applicable principles governing pre-deposit in penalty-only proceedings initiated before that amendment.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to the benefit of the applicable pre-deposit principles for the penalty-only proceedings, and the requirement under Section 107(6) shall be determined accordingly.

Issues: Whether deduction under the first proviso to section 36(1)(viia)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is an alternative to deduction under the main clause and is unavailable once the main-clause deduction has been allowed.

Analysis: Section 36(1)(viia)(a) permits deduction for provisions for bad and doubtful debts within the prescribed ceiling, while the first proviso addresses provisions for assets classified under RBI guidelines as doubtful or loss assets. The expression "at its option" vests the choice of claiming the special statutory benefit in the assessee and cannot be treated as surplusage. Reading the proviso as an alternative mechanism controlled by the Assessing Officer would deprive that expression of operative effect. The proviso, enacted to address banking-sector provisioning for specified assets, must receive effect within its express factual requirements and statutory limits.

Conclusion: The first-proviso deduction is not automatically exhausted or barred merely because deduction under section 36(1)(viia)(a) has been allowed. The issue is answered in favour of the assessee, subject to satisfaction of the prescribed conditions, RBI classification requirement and statutory ceiling.

Issues: (i) Whether the bond and bank-guarantee requirements for provisional release of the seized consignment required modification; (ii) Whether demurrage and other charges on the detained consignment were liable to be waived.

Issue (i): Whether the bond and bank-guarantee requirements for provisional release of the seized consignment required modification.

Analysis: The tariff value justified securing the assessable value through a bond. However, fine and penalty would become recoverable only if the investigation established the Revenue's case and after the consequential litigation; their quantification at the provisional-release stage was premature. The previous final clearance of a consignment from the same exporter on the basis of a certificate of origin also supported recalibration of the security conditions.

Conclusion: The issue was determined partly in favour of the assessee. Provisional release was made subject to a bond of Rs.9,05,73,295 and a bank guarantee of Rs.1,00,00,000.

Issue (ii): Whether demurrage and other charges on the detained consignment were liable to be waived.

Analysis: Regulation 6(1)(l) prohibits a Customs Cargo Service Provider from charging rent or demurrage on goods that are seized, detained or confiscated, subject to any other applicable law.

Conclusion: The issue was determined in favour of the assessee. Complete waiver of demurrage and other charges for the detained consignment was directed.

Final Conclusion: The provisional-release safeguards were recalibrated to protect revenue without requiring security for unascertained penal liabilities, and the detained consignment was entitled to waiver of demurrage and related charges.

Ratio Decidendi: Security for provisional release must adequately protect revenue, but cannot be fixed by prematurely quantifying fine and penalty before investigation establishes the underlying liability.

Issues: (i) Whether the show-cause notice was invalid because it was issued by an Assistant Commissioner and later corrected by corrigendum, and for want of pre-notice consultation; (ii) Whether differential customs duty could be demanded under Section 28 without first challenging self-assessment; (iii) Whether the imported CKD e-bike components were classifiable as complete electrically operated motorcycles under CTH 87116020; (iv) Whether the goods qualified for concessional duty under Serial No. 531A(1), or alternatively Serial No. 531A(2), of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017; (v) Whether confiscation and penalty were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the show-cause notice was invalid because it was issued by an Assistant Commissioner and later corrected by corrigendum, and for want of pre-notice consultation.

Analysis: An officer designated as an officer of customs under Section 2(34) of the Customs Act, 1962 is a proper officer for the assigned function. A corrigendum issued before adjudication that merely corrected the clause making the notice answerable to the Principal Commissioner caused no prejudice and related back to the notice. The record also showed receipt of the pre-consultative letter.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice and adjudication proceedings were valid, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether differential customs duty could be demanded under Section 28 without first challenging self-assessment.

Analysis: Recovery proceedings for duty not levied or not paid under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 are distinct from refund proceedings. The existence of self-assessment did not bar issuance of a notice for recovery of differential duty.

Conclusion: Differential duty could be demanded under Section 28 without prior challenge to self-assessment, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the imported CKD e-bike components were classifiable as complete electrically operated motorcycles under CTH 87116020.

Analysis: Rule 2(a) of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 requires classification by the identity and essential character of goods as presented for assessment. An incomplete vehicle may retain the essential character of a complete vehicle despite absence of items such as a battery or charger. The imported goods were declared as e-bikes in CKD condition with pre-assembled essential parts and components.

Conclusion: The goods possessed the essential character of complete electrically operated motorcycles and were correctly classified under CTH 87116020, against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the goods qualified for concessional duty under Serial No. 531A(1), or alternatively Serial No. 531A(2), of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017.

Analysis: The exemption under Serial No. 531A(1) required a knocked-down kit containing all necessary components for assembly of the complete vehicle. Battery packs, chargers and electric compressors were admittedly not imported. The alternative exemption had not been claimed in the Bills of Entry and could not be claimed subsequently.

Conclusion: The claimed concessional and alternative exemption benefits were unavailable, against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether confiscation and penalty were sustainable.

Analysis: Confiscation under Section 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962 and imposition of redemption fine are legally distinct. The absence of redemption fine did not invalidate confiscation or the penalty under Section 112(a)(ii) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Conclusion: The confiscation and penalty were sustainable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The denial of the claimed exemption and the consequential customs liability were maintained.

Issues: Whether the impugned orders, being consequential implementation of prior binding appellate directions, warranted appellate interference.

Analysis: The order under challenge merely reiterated earlier appellate directions, already affirmed by the Supreme Court, and supplied no independent factual or legal finding affecting the merits of the company petition. The connected directions were consequential compliance measures. Entertaining the challenge would indirectly reopen the affirmed appellate directions.

Conclusion: The consequential orders did not warrant appellate interference and remain governed by the finality of the prior affirmed directions.

Issues: Whether cancellation, refund and no-show charges recovered by an airline from passengers constitute consideration for a distinct declared service of agreeing to tolerate an act.

Analysis: Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994 applies where an agreement is intended to tolerate an act for consideration. The passenger-airline contract is intended for carriage of the passenger in return for fare; cancellation charges operate only upon the passenger's failure to perform that contract. Such charges are liquidated damages compensating the airline for breach and do not arise from a separate agreement to tolerate cancellation or default. The absence of a service charge makes the question of abatement immaterial.

Conclusion: Cancellation, refund and no-show charges are compensation for breach of contract and are not taxable as consideration for tolerating an act under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Issues: Whether tender fee collected for supplying tender documents is consideration for a taxable service liable to service tax.

Analysis: Service tax under Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 requires an identifiable service provided for consideration. The prescribed tender fee was the cost of supplying tender documents and constituted sale or supply of documents, rather than a service rendered to bidders. A tender is merely an invitation to offer and does not create a contractual service arrangement between the tendering authority and every purchaser of tender documents.

Conclusion: Tender fee collected towards supply of tender documents is not consideration for a taxable service and is not liable to service tax; decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of service tax from a subcontractor where conflicting decisions had created uncertainty about the subcontractor's tax liability after payment of tax by the main contractor.

Analysis: The substantive tax liability of a subcontractor stood settled by the Larger Bench decision. However, prior conflicting Tribunal decisions had generated genuine uncertainty on whether a subcontractor was independently liable where the main contractor had paid service tax. This acknowledged confusion supported the appellant's bona fide belief and precluded invocation of the extended limitation period under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994. The normal limitation period remained unaffected.

Conclusion: The extended-period demand and the penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994, were set aside; the demand for the normal period and the penalty under Section 72 of the Finance Act, 1994, were sustained. The issue was decided partly in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the relevant date for limitation of refund of accumulated CENVAT credit attributable to export of services is the date of the export invoice or the last day of the quarter in which foreign exchange is received; and (ii) Whether refund of CENVAT credit can be denied solely because the invoices relate to unregistered premises.

Issue (i): Whether the relevant date for limitation of refund of accumulated CENVAT credit attributable to export of services is the date of the export invoice or the last day of the quarter in which foreign exchange is received.

Analysis: Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, read with Notification No. 27/2012-C.E. (N.T.) dated 18.06.2012, governed the refund. Although Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 applied to such refund claims, it did not prescribe a specific relevant date for export of services. The applicable principle fixed the relevant date as the last day of the quarter in which the export proceeds were received in foreign exchange. The date of the export invoice could not invariably be adopted, and the prospective character of the subsequent notification did not displace that principle.

Conclusion: The one-year limitation is to be reckoned from the last day of the quarter in which foreign exchange is received, and not from the date of the export invoice. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether refund of CENVAT credit can be denied solely because the invoices relate to unregistered premises.

Analysis: Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, did not make registration of the premises a prerequisite for refund of unutilised CENVAT credit attributable to exported services. The requirement concerning the jurisdictional authority for filing the refund application could not operate as a prohibition on refund merely because the premises from which services were exported were unregistered. The jurisdictional High Court ruling on this point was binding.

Conclusion: Refund cannot be denied merely because the invoices pertain to unregistered premises. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The limitation objection based on the export-invoice date and the objection based solely on non-registration of premises cannot defeat the refund claim.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax on construction of the residential complex was sustainable under Construction of Residential Complex Service; (ii) Whether receipts accounted for as sub-contract and petty job receipts were liable to service tax under the same category; and (iii) Whether the demand under Renting of Immovable Property Service was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether service tax on construction of the residential complex was sustainable under Construction of Residential Complex Service.

Analysis: The statutory definition of a residential complex required proof that the prescribed conditions, including the number of dwelling units, were satisfied. The material did not establish that the additional units were constructed by, or attributable to, the appellant. Further, the Explanation inserted in Section 65(105)(zzzh) with effect from 01.07.2010 could not be retrospectively applied to construction undertaken before that date. The contracts were composite contracts involving goods and services; such contracts could not be taxed under the construction-service categories, which applied to services simpliciter.

Conclusion: The construction-service demand was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether receipts accounted for as sub-contract and petty job receipts were liable to service tax under the same category.

Analysis: The receipts were treated as consideration for construction services without establishing their precise nature or that they represented independently taxable services simpliciter. The absence of documents from the appellant did not displace the Department's obligation to prove the taxable service and its legal basis. The reasoning applicable to composite works contracts also precluded their taxation under the construction-service category.

Conclusion: The demand on sub-contract and petty job receipts was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the demand under Renting of Immovable Property Service was sustainable.

Analysis: Commercial letting alone did not establish the amount of tax payable. The eligibility for small service provider exemption, year-wise rental receipts, and the asserted tax payment on later receipts required verification. The allegations were not supported by sufficient evidence or cogent rebuttal of these matters; consequently, the evidentiary benefit enured to the appellant.

Conclusion: The demand under Renting of Immovable Property Service was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The construction-related and rental demands lacked a sustainable legal and evidentiary basis, and the associated penalties could not survive.

Issues: (i) Whether sewage and drainage pumps were eligible for the concessional duty rate under Entry No. 235 of Notification No. 12/2012-C.E. dated 17.03.2012; (ii) Whether the earlier audit objection or the principle of res judicata precluded Revenue from denying the concessional rate; (iii) Whether the penalty imposed for availing the concessional rate was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether sewage and drainage pumps were eligible for the concessional duty rate under Entry No. 235 of Notification No. 12/2012-C.E. dated 17.03.2012.

Analysis: Entry No. 235 grants the concessional rate only to power-driven pumps primarily designed for handling water. As the expression "water" is undefined, it was construed in its common and commercial sense as clean water, and not as sewage or drainage water. A claimant for a concessional notification must establish clear compliance with its conditions. The material showed that sewage and drainage pumps had a different design and manufacturing process from pumps for handling water; the engineer's certificate only stated that the pumps could also handle clean water and did not establish design similarity.

Conclusion: Sewage and drainage pumps were not eligible for the concessional rate under Entry No. 235; the differential duty and applicable interest were rightly sustained, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the earlier audit objection or the principle of res judicata precluded Revenue from denying the concessional rate.

Analysis: The audit objection was neither implemented through adjudication nor accepted by the assessee, which continued to pay duty at the full rate until March 2016. It therefore did not constitute a concluded determination capable of binding Revenue. Further, res judicata does not apply to distinct tax periods in the manner asserted, and a different position may be adopted where the prior view is not a binding final decision.

Conclusion: The earlier audit objection did not bar Revenue from denying the concessional rate, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the penalty imposed for availing the concessional rate was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee had initially paid duty at the full rate and began claiming the concession after the audit objection. Revenue subsequently reversed its position and demanded differential duty. These circumstances did not disclose evidence warranting the penalty retained by the appellate authority.

Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The differential duty together with interest remains enforceable, while no penalty is exigible.

Ratio Decidendi: A claimant for a concessional excise notification must establish strict satisfaction of its conditions, and an undefined product expression is to be understood in its common-parlance meaning.

Issues: (i) Whether the claimed transitional input tax credit attributable to input services, exceeding the closing balance reflected in the ER-1 and ST-3 returns, required verification. (ii) Whether the notice under section 74(1) could be sustained on the alleged wilful misstatement or suppression of facts.

Issue (i): Whether the claimed transitional input tax credit attributable to input services, exceeding the closing balance reflected in the ER-1 and ST-3 returns, required verification.

Analysis: Section 140(1) permits carry-forward of eligible credit under the existing law. The difference between the credit declared in TRAN-1 and the balance reported in the pre-GST returns required verification against the relevant records before entitlement could be determined.

Conclusion: The transitional credit claim is to be verified by the Proper Officer/Adjudicating Authority through a reasoned order.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice under section 74(1) could be sustained on the alleged wilful misstatement or suppression of facts.

Analysis: Invocation of section 74(1) requires material establishing fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with a deliberate intent to evade tax. Mere incorrect information or an ordinary non-declaration does not by itself establish those elements. No investigation or evidence establishing such deliberate intent was on record.

Conclusion: The notice issued under section 74(1) was not sustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transitional-credit claim remains subject to factual verification, but the fraud-based notice cannot be maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: An incorrect declaration, without material evidence of a deliberate intent to evade tax, does not establish wilful misstatement or suppression of facts for invoking section 74(1).