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Issues: Whether dismissal of the appeal against the rectification order without adjudicating the cash-deposit addition on merits warranted remand for merits adjudication.
Analysis: The request to treat the earlier appeal as null and void was conditional upon its merger with the later appeal and a decision on the addition on merits in that later appeal. The earlier appeal was dismissed without such merger, while the later appeal was dismissed without examining the substantive addition. The proceedings concerned an addition under Section 68 read with Section 115BBE in an assessment under Section 143(3), subsequently addressed through an order under Section 154.
Conclusion: The cash-deposit addition must be adjudicated on merits by the appellate authority after affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard; no determination on the validity or merits of the addition was made.
Issues: Whether the bank could be treated as an assessee in default under section 201(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and charged interest under section 201(1A), for non-deduction of tax from leave fare concession reimbursements involving a foreign leg during the operation of binding interim judicial directions.
Analysis: Though leave fare concession reimbursements involving foreign travel were substantively not exempt under section 10(5), substantive taxability was distinct from the bank's liability as a deductor. The operative interim directions expressly required that the reimbursements not be treated as income for tax deduction at source and placed the eventual tax liability upon the employees if the writ petition failed. For the relevant assessment years, no material showed that the judicial protection had been modified, vacated, or was inapplicable to the payments. A subsequent declaration of substantive taxability could not retrospectively convert compliance with a binding judicial direction into a statutory default. Since section 201(1) requires failure to deduct tax despite an enforceable obligation, the consequential interest under section 201(1A) could not survive.
Conclusion: The bank was not an assessee in default under section 201(1), and interest under section 201(1A) was not leviable.
Issues: Whether penalty for the attempted export of red sander logs, substituted for granite slabs declared in the shipping bill, was justified.
Analysis: The purchase order subsequently produced did not correspond with the quantity, description, or value declared in the shipping bill and could not establish a bona fide export. The use of a low-value free shipping bill, loading at premises other than the exporter's unit, and failure to use the usual company seal for the container were material lapses. Earlier genuine exports did not negate these circumstances, which demonstrated lack of due diligence in the attempted export of prohibited goods.
Conclusion: The penalty was justified, but its quantum was reduced from Rs. 5,00,000 to Rs. 3,00,000.
Issues: Whether the directions in an oppression-and-mismanagement order, including a buy-out based on fair valuation, should be suspended pending appeal.
Analysis: The interim assessment noted that the valuation report was challenged as derivative of earlier disputed reports and that a fair valuation-based buy-out alongside a mutually agreed price created uncertainty. It also recorded the apparent exclusion of a minority shareholder from meaningful participation in management after the founder's death.
Outcome: The impugned directions were stayed on an interim basis pending the next listing, with the order separately addressing the removal and nominee-director directions.
Issues: Whether the petitioner should be permitted to avail the statutory appellate remedy despite expiry of the prescribed and condonable limitation.
Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to file a statutory appeal within two weeks, to be entertained without objection on limitation.
Issues: Whether an order under Section 74 based on a show-cause notice uploaded only on the GST portal after cancellation of the taxpayer's registration violates principles of natural justice.
Analysis: Section 74 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was invoked after the taxpayer's registration had been cancelled and it had ceased business operations. In those circumstances, uploading the show-cause notice solely on the GST portal was not adequate service, and notice was required to be issued through an alternative mode consistent with principles of natural justice.
Conclusion: The order under Section 74 was invalid for violation of principles of natural justice and was set aside.
Issues: (i) Whether the statutory appellate remedy barred writ jurisdiction despite alleged denial of natural justice; (ii) Whether an order under Section 74 could stand when an acknowledged manual reply and subsequently permitted documents were not considered.
Issue (i): Whether the statutory appellate remedy barred writ jurisdiction despite alleged denial of natural justice.
Analysis: Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 remains available despite an alternative statutory remedy where the impugned adjudication is affected by a breach of procedural fairness and the principles of natural justice, particularly audi alteram partem.
Conclusion: The alternative remedy did not bar writ jurisdiction because the adjudication was affected by a breach of natural justice.
Issue (ii): Whether an order under Section 74 could stand when an acknowledged manual reply and subsequently permitted documents were not considered.
Analysis: Section 74(9) requires consideration of the taxpayer's representation before determination. Rule 142(4), while requiring a reply in Form GST DRC-06, does not make electronic uploading the exclusive mode for a reply. A manually filed reply bearing the Proper Officer's acknowledgment could not be treated as nonexistent merely because it was not uploaded on the portal. The order was also made before expiry of the time granted for production of documents and did not address the objections raised in the acknowledged reply.
Conclusion: Non-consideration of the acknowledged reply and permitted material violated natural justice, vitiating the adjudication order and requiring fresh adjudication.
Final Conclusion: The authority must reconsider the reply, evidence and jurisdictional objections after affording an effective opportunity of hearing, without any view on the merits or jurisdictional objections being predetermined.
Ratio Decidendi: An adjudicating officer cannot disregard an acknowledged manual reply in Form GST DRC-06 merely because it was not electronically uploaded; its non-consideration before determining liability under Section 74 violates natural justice and invalidates the adjudication.
Issues: Whether GST is leviable on assignment for consideration of leasehold rights in an industrial plot and building by the lessee to an assignee.
Analysis: The assignment transfers the benefits arising from immovable property to the assignee, who replaces the original lessee. Under Section 7(1)(a) read with clause 5(b) of Schedule II and clause 5 of Schedule III to the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, such assignment is not a taxable supply of service. The classification of the transaction as other miscellaneous services under Serial No. 35 of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 was inapplicable. The jurisdictional ruling excluding such transactions from GST remained binding in the absence of any stay or recall.
Conclusion: GST is not leviable on the assignment of the leasehold rights and building.
Issues: (i) Whether interest under Section 50 is payable on differential tax paid through post-GST debit notes for retrospective price escalation of pre-GST clearances under Section 142(2)(a); (ii) Whether penalty under Section 122 is sustainable where differential tax arose from a bona fide transitional dispute and was voluntarily paid.
Issue (i): Whether interest under Section 50 is payable on differential tax paid through post-GST debit notes for retrospective price escalation of pre-GST clearances under Section 142(2)(a).
Analysis: A retrospective upward price revision determines the true value of goods as at their original clearance. The deeming fiction in Section 142(2)(a) is a transitional and procedural mechanism enabling reporting and payment of differential tax under GST; it does not create a fresh taxable event or alter the original time of supply. Sections 34(4) and 39(7) govern declaration and payment through returns, but do not defer the accrual of liability arising from the original clearances. Statutory interest consequently attaches to the delayed payment of the differential tax.
Conclusion: Interest under Section 50 is payable on the differential tax from the original clearance period; the interest demand is valid and is decided in favour of Revenue.
Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Section 122 is sustainable where differential tax arose from a bona fide transitional dispute and was voluntarily paid.
Analysis: The liability arose from contractual price escalation during a complex legislative transition, without fraud, wilful misstatement, suppression, or deliberate non-compliance. The differential tax was voluntarily discharged after price finalisation, and the interpretative position concerning the transitional mechanism was bona fide.
Conclusion: Penalty under Section 122 is not sustainable and is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The transitional mechanism for post-GST reporting of price revisions does not extinguish interest on historical tax liability, whereas a bona fide interpretative dispute without contumacious conduct does not warrant penal consequences.
Ratio Decidendi: A deeming fiction for transitional reporting of retrospective price revisions does not shift the original accrual of tax liability or negate statutory interest, though penalty is unwarranted absent deliberate default or suppression.
Issues: Whether credit notes issued for supplies, including credit notes relating to invoices of an earlier financial year, are deductible from adjusted total turnover while computing refund of accumulated input tax credit under the prescribed refund formula.
Analysis: A credit note issued upon return, rejection or reduction in the value of a supply reduces the taxable turnover and is consequently deductible in determining adjusted total turnover. The records established that credit notes of Rs. 11,03,065 related to invoices of the refund period. However, credit notes of Rs. 1,01,510, though issued during the refund period, related to invoices of Financial Year 2019-20 and were issued after the statutory deadline for declaration of such credit notes. Those belated credit notes could not reduce adjusted total turnover. On recomputation, the maximum admissible refund remained higher than the refund actually claimed.
Conclusion: Valid credit notes relating to the refund period are deductible from adjusted total turnover, whereas belated credit notes relating to invoices of Financial Year 2019-20 are not deductible; nevertheless, the refund claimed remained admissible.
Issues: Whether credit notes issued in relation to supplies of an earlier financial year, but issued beyond the statutory period, may be excluded from adjusted total turnover while computing refund under the inverted duty structure.
Analysis: Section 34 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits reduction of taxable turnover through credit notes where the underlying supply is returned, deficient, or otherwise requires reduction. For refund computation under Rule 89(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, valid credit notes relating to the refund period reduce adjusted total turnover. The records established that credit notes of Rs. 11,03,065 related to invoices of the refund period, whereas credit notes of Rs. 1,01,510 related to invoices of Financial Year 2019-20 and were issued only in June 2021, beyond the applicable statutory deadline for declaring such credit notes.
Conclusion: Credit notes of Rs. 1,01,510 issued beyond the permissible period could not be excluded from adjusted total turnover. The eligible refund was consequently restricted to Rs. 4,30,073, and the excess refund of Rs. 2,464 was recoverable.
Ratio Decidendi: Only credit notes validly issued and declared within the statutory time limit may reduce adjusted total turnover for computing an inverted-duty-structure refund.
Issues: Whether electricity subsidy granted under the power-subsidy scheme, computed with reference to energy charges incurred after commencement of production, is a capital receipt or a revenue receipt.
Analysis: The character of a subsidy is determined by the purpose test: the object and operative mechanism of the scheme, rather than the timing, source or form of payment, govern whether the receipt is capital or revenue. Although the scheme broadly sought industrial growth, the subsidy was available for a limited period after production commenced, was calculated as a percentage of actual electricity charges, and directly reduced power costs incurred in manufacturing. It was neither linked to capital investment nor earmarked for acquisition of assets, construction, repayment of capital borrowings, or expansion of the undertaking. The subsidy therefore constituted operational assistance in carrying on the business rather than assistance towards the capital structure.
Conclusion: The electricity subsidy is a revenue receipt chargeable to tax.
Outcome: Delay condoned and the Special Leave Petition dismissed; question of law kept open.
Issues: (i) Whether reassessment initiated beyond four years under Sections 147 and 148 on third-party information was valid without independent verification or established failure to make a full and true disclosure of material facts; (ii) Whether the addition under Section 69C for alleged cash payments to obtain foreign remittances was sustainable on uncorroborated third-party material without cross-examination, despite documented export receipts.
Issue (i): Whether reassessment initiated beyond four years under Sections 147 and 148 on third-party information was valid without independent verification or established failure to make a full and true disclosure of material facts.
Analysis: The original scrutiny assessment had accepted the recorded export sales and business results. For reopening beyond four years, the first proviso to Section 147 required a reasoned belief of escapement caused by the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The recorded reasons substantially adopted information originating from a third-party search, without independent enquiry into the books, export records, alleged cash payments, or any direct nexus between the third-party material and the assessee. A general assertion of nondisclosure did not establish the statutorily required failure.
Conclusion: The reassessment was invalid and the proceedings initiated under Sections 147 and 148 were quashed, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the addition under Section 69C for alleged cash payments to obtain foreign remittances was sustainable on uncorroborated third-party material without cross-examination, despite documented export receipts.
Analysis: The foreign remittances were supported by books of account, export invoices, shipping and customs particulars, bank reconciliations, VAT records, commission details, and other contemporaneous documents. No independent evidence established that any cash payment or unexplained expenditure had actually been incurred. The adverse inference rested substantially on a third-party diary and statement, while an effective opportunity to cross-examine the maker of the statement was not provided. Section 69C required proof of the foundational fact that unexplained expenditure was incurred; treating already recorded and accepted export receipts as such expenditure without reliable corroboration would also result in double taxation.
Conclusion: The addition under Section 69C was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The reassessment lacked the jurisdictional foundation required for reopening beyond four years, and the alleged unexplained expenditure was not established on the evidentiary material.
Issues: (i) Whether the addition for unexplained expenditure under section 69C was sustainable on third-party material without disclosure, cross-examination, or independent corroboration; and (ii) whether the addition for unexplained money under section 69A was sustainable on the same material without evidence of the assessee's possession or ownership.
Issue (i): Whether the addition for unexplained expenditure under section 69C was sustainable on third-party material without disclosure, cross-examination, or independent corroboration.
Analysis: An addition for unexplained expenditure required the Department to establish, through reliable evidence, the actual incurrence of expenditure and its nexus with the assessee. The third-party entry was not supported by the furnishing of the specific seized document, effective cross-examination, or independent evidence such as a cash trail, bank withdrawal, transportation or delivery record, stock discrepancy, or confirmation. The disclosed presumptive income under section 44AD did not permit an isolated alleged unrecorded purchase to be treated as unexplained expenditure without first establishing the expenditure itself.
Conclusion: The addition under section 69C was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the addition for unexplained money under section 69A was sustainable on the same material without evidence of the assessee's possession or ownership.
Analysis: The addition rested solely on the same third-party information. No independent material established that the assessee possessed or owned unexplained money represented by the alleged cash receipt.
Conclusion: The addition under section 69A was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Additions founded exclusively on uncorroborated third-party material lacked a reliable evidentiary basis, and the consequential tax and penalty consequences had no surviving foundation.
Ratio Decidendi: Additions under sections 69C or 69A cannot be sustained solely on uncorroborated third-party entries where the relied-upon material is not furnished, meaningful cross-examination is unavailable, and no independent evidence links the alleged expenditure or money to the assessee.
Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings could be validly initiated where the recorded reasons attributed the entire sale consideration to the assessee despite the registered sale deed, already available with the Assessing Officer, showing joint ownership and a lower attributable share.
Analysis: Section 147 requires a valid reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, founded on correct and relevant facts available when jurisdiction is assumed. The registered sale deed was already in the Assessing Officer's possession before recording reasons and disclosed that the property was jointly owned. Nevertheless, the reasons proceeded on the incorrect premise that the entire sale consideration belonged to the assessee. The subsequent reassessment itself accepted the assessee's lower share. A factual foundation contrary to material already on record cannot constitute a valid reason to believe, and the defect cannot be cured by facts considered during reassessment.
Conclusion: The assumption of jurisdiction under Sections 147 and 148 was invalid; the notice and consequential reassessment proceedings were void ab initio.
Issues: (i) Whether deduction for a political-party donation was allowable under Section 80GGC of the Income-tax Act, 1961; and (ii) Whether interest paid on borrowed capital was deductible as interest for house construction where the loan was described as a personal loan.
Issue (i): Whether deduction for a political-party donation was allowable under Section 80GGC of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: Search material and sworn statements of the political party's office-bearers disclosed an accommodation-entry arrangement under which donations were returned in cash after retention of commission. The statutory presumption as to seized material under Section 292C and the evidentiary value of the search statement supported the finding that the donation was non-genuine. No material was produced to discharge the burden of rebuttal.
Conclusion: The deduction for the political-party donation was rightly disallowed, against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether interest paid on borrowed capital was deductible as interest for house construction where the loan was described as a personal loan.
Analysis: The bank communication indicated that the personal loan could be used for any purpose, including house construction or repair. Verification of the actual construction and supporting evidence was necessary to determine entitlement to the interest deduction.
Conclusion: The interest-deduction claim was remitted for fresh verification on production of necessary evidence; no final entitlement was determined.
Final Conclusion: The political-donation disallowance remains undisturbed, while the interest claim requires factual verification; the directed tax-credit and professional-tax adjustments are to be given effect in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: A deduction for a political contribution cannot be allowed where search admissions and material establish an accommodation-entry donation and the taxpayer provides no rebuttal evidence.
Issues: (i) Whether the entire addition for alleged bogus purchases for AY 2018-19 under Section 68 was sustainable; (ii) Whether the estimated commission addition for arranging alleged accommodation entries for AY 2018-19 was sustainable; (iii) Whether the addition for alleged accommodation entries for AY 2019-20 under Section 69C was sustainable; (iv) Whether the estimated commission addition for alleged accommodation entries for AY 2019-20 was sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether the entire addition for alleged bogus purchases for AY 2018-19 under Section 68 was sustainable.
Analysis: Banking-channel payments and GST registration of the counterparties did not by themselves establish genuineness where the entities were non-filers, summons issued to them remained unserved, and the ledgers and account details claimed to have been furnished were not uploaded before the Assessing Officer. These circumstances warranted only a limited addition rather than disallowance of the entire alleged purchases.
Conclusion: Addition to the extent of 3% of the allegedly dubious purchases was sustained, with deletion of the balance; the issue was partly in favour of the Revenue.
Issue (ii): Whether the estimated commission addition for arranging alleged accommodation entries for AY 2018-19 was sustainable.
Analysis: The commission addition rested on estimation without evidentiary support and was based on surmises and conjectures.
Conclusion: The estimated commission addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the addition for alleged accommodation entries for AY 2019-20 under Section 69C was sustainable.
Analysis: Section 69C requires proof that the assessee actually incurred expenditure. The alleged transactions were not reflected in the books, purchase register, GSTR-2A, or audited financial statements. No invoices, payment trail, movement of goods, or other independent evidence linked the assessee to the alleged entry provider. A generic third-party statement and unilateral GST reporting, without corroboration or independent verification, did not establish actual expenditure.
Conclusion: The addition under Section 69C was deleted in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether the estimated commission addition for alleged accommodation entries for AY 2019-20 was sustainable.
Analysis: No statement, document, or financial trail established payment of any commission; the addition was founded solely on presumption and estimation.
Conclusion: The estimated commission addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Only 3% of the alleged dubious purchases for AY 2018-19 remains subject to addition, while the remaining purchase-related and commission additions do not survive.
Ratio Decidendi: An addition for unexplained expenditure cannot rest solely on uncorroborated third-party information where actual expenditure and its nexus with the assessee are not established by independent evidence.
Issues: Whether departmental appeals concerning an unasserted fiscal demand could continue after final approval of a corporate resolution plan.
Analysis: The resolution plan had attained finality through the insolvency proceedings, and the relevant fiscal authority had not lodged any claim in respect of the demand forming the subject matter of the appeals.
Conclusion: The final resolution plan governed the unasserted demand, and the substantial questions of law were left unanswered.
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The core legal questions considered by the Court in this appeal were:
(a) Whether the reopening of assessment under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was valid when the original return had been processed under section 143(1) and an intimation issued accordingly;
(b) Whether the High Court erred in applying the precedent relating to section 143(3) to a case involving section 143(1) intimation;
(c) The scope and effect of section 143(1) (both before and after amendment) and its distinction from section 143(3) with respect to assessment and reassessment;
(d) The interpretation of the phrase "reason to believe" under section 147 and the jurisdictional requirements for reopening assessments;
(e) The applicability of the decision in Adani Exports v. Deputy CIT (Assessments) to the facts of the present case;
(f) Whether the Assessing Officer had jurisdiction to initiate reassessment proceedings under section 148 despite the return having been processed under section 143(1).
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (a) and (c): Validity of reopening assessment under section 148 after processing under section 143(1) and distinction between sections 143(1) and 143(3)
The Court examined the legal framework governing assessment under sections 143(1), 143(3), 147, and 148 of the Income-tax Act. The relevant provisions were analyzed in detail, including their amendments effective from June 1, 1999.
Section 143(1) provides for processing of returns filed under section 139 or in response to notices under section 142(1). The processing involves sending an intimation to the assessee specifying any tax or interest payable or refund due. Importantly, the intimation under section 143(1) is not an assessment order but merely a communication of the outcome of processing the return. The Assessing Officer's powers under section 143(1) are limited to correcting arithmetical errors, allowing prima facie admissible losses or deductions not claimed, and disallowing prima facie inadmissible claims based on the information available in the return and accompanying documents.
The Court emphasized that under section 143(1), the Assessing Officer cannot adjudicate on debatable issues or go beyond the information furnished in the return. No opportunity is granted to the assessee during this stage, and the intimation is often issued by ministerial staff. Thus, no "assessment" in the strict sense occurs under section 143(1).
By contrast, section 143(3) contemplates a detailed scrutiny assessment, where the Assessing Officer issues a notice requiring the assessee to produce evidence and then passes an assessment order after considering the evidence and submissions. Section 143(3) involves a substantive assessment, unlike the limited processing under section 143(1).
The Court noted that the High Court had erroneously relied on the decision in Adani Exports, which concerned reassessment after an order under section 143(3), not after processing under section 143(1). The distinction between the two provisions was lost sight of by the High Court.
Issue (b) and (e): Applicability of Adani Exports precedent
The appellant contended that the factual matrix in Adani Exports was entirely different, as that case dealt with reassessment after scrutiny assessment under section 143(3), whereas the present case involved only processing under section 143(1). The Court agreed with this submission, holding that the Adani Exports decision was not applicable to the facts of the present case.
Issue (d): Interpretation of "reason to believe" under section 147 and jurisdictional requirements for reopening
The Court analyzed section 147, which empowers the Assessing Officer to reassess income if he has "reason to believe" that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The phrase "reason to believe" was interpreted to mean a cause or justification to form such belief, not a conclusive finding or proof. The Assessing Officer's subjective satisfaction based on relevant material is sufficient at the stage of issuing a notice under section 148.
The Court referred to precedents establishing that the Assessing Officer need not have established the escapement of income conclusively before reopening. It suffices that there is relevant material on which a reasonable person could form the requisite belief.
Furthermore, the Court observed that under the amended section 147, only the existence of reason to believe is necessary to confer jurisdiction to reopen assessment; the proviso requiring failure to disclose material facts applies only in certain cases not relevant here.
Issue (f): Jurisdiction of Assessing Officer to initiate reassessment under section 148 despite processing under section 143(1)
The Court held that the issuance of intimation under section 143(1) does not preclude the Assessing Officer from initiating reassessment proceedings under section 148 read with section 147. The intimation under section 143(1) is not an assessment order and does not amount to a final determination of tax liability. Therefore, the Assessing Officer retains jurisdiction to reopen the assessment if there is reason to believe income has escaped assessment.
The Court rejected the argument that the issuance of intimation under section 143(1) precludes reassessment on the basis of change of opinion or otherwise.
The Court also noted that the Assessing Officer's power to proceed under section 143(2) for scrutiny assessment remains intact notwithstanding the intimation under section 143(1).
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
"What was permissible was correction of errors apparent on the basis of the documents accompanying the return. The Assessing Officer had no authority to make adjustments or adjudicate upon any debatable issues. In other words, the Assessing Officer had no power to go behind the return, accounts or documents, either in allowing or in disallowing deductions, allowance or relief."
"The very fact that no opportunity of being heard is given under section 143(1)(a) indicates that the Assessing Officer has to proceed accepting the return and making the permissible adjustments only."
"The intimation under section 143(1)(a) was deemed to be a notice of demand under section 156, for the apparent purpose of making machinery provisions relating to recovery of tax applicable. By such application only recovery indicated to be payable in the intimation became permissible. And nothing more can be inferred from the deeming provision."
"The phrase 'reason to believe' would mean cause or justification. If the Assessing Officer has cause or justification to know or suppose that income had escaped assessment, it can be said to have reason to believe that an income had escaped assessment. The expression cannot be read to mean that the Assessing Officer should have finally ascertained the fact by legal evidence or conclusion."
"So long as the ingredients of section 147 are fulfilled, the Assessing Officer is free to initiate proceeding under section 147 and failure to take steps under section 143(3) will not render the Assessing Officer powerless to initiate reassessment proceedings even when intimation under section 143(1) had been issued."
"The High Court has wrongly applied Adani's case which has no application to the case on the facts in view of the conceptual difference between section 143(1) and section 143(3) of the Act."
The Court concluded that the reopening of assessment under section 148 was valid despite the return having been processed under section 143(1), and the High Court erred in quashing the reassessment notice relying on a precedent concerning section 143(3). The appeal was allowed accordingly without costs.
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