2007 (5) TMI 197 - SC - Income Tax

Assessing Officer can initiate reassessment under section 147 despite incomplete assessment under section 143(3)

Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax Versus Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers P. Limited

The SC held that the Assessing Officer can initiate reassessment proceedings under section 147 when its ingredients are satisfied, regardless of failure ... Reopening of assessment u/s 148 - claim of bad debts as expenditure - escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147 - Scope and effect of section 147 as substituted with effect from April 1, 1989 - distinction between the position as u/s 143(1) of the Act vis-a-vis u/s 143(3) - Word 'intimation' as substituted for' assessment' - HELD THAT:- After considering the material and evidence produced and after making necessary inquiries, the officer had power to make assessment under section 143(3). With effect from April 1, 1989, the provisions underwent substantial and material changes. A new scheme was introduced and in the new substituted section 143(1) prior to the subsequent substitution with effect from June 1, 1999, in clause (a), a provision was made that where a return was filed under section 139 or in response to a notice under section 142(1), and any tax or refund was found due on the basis of such return after adjustment of tax deducted at source, any advance tax or any amount paid otherwise by way of tax or interest, an intimation was to be sent, without prejudice to the provisions of section 143(2), to the assessee specifying the sum so payable and such intimation was deemed to be a notice of demand issued under section 156. The first proviso to section 143(1)(a) allowed the Department to make certain adjustments in the income or loss declared in the return. The scope and effect of section 147 as substituted with effect from April 1, 1989, as also sections 148 to 152 are substantially different from the provisions as they stood prior to such substitution. Under the old provisions of section 147, separate clauses (a) and (b) laid down the circumstances under which income escaping assessment for the past assessment years could be assessed or reassessed. To confer jurisdiction under section 147(a) two conditions were required to be satisfied: firstly the Assessing Officer must have reason to believe that income, profits or gains chargeable to income tax have escaped assessment, and secondly he must also have reason to believe that such escapement has occurred by reason of either omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully or truly all material facts necessary for his assessment of that year. Both these conditions were conditions precedent to be satisfied before the Assessing Officer could have jurisdiction to issue notice under section 148 read with section 147(a). But under the substituted section 147 existence of only the first condition suffices. In other words if the Assessing Officer for whatever reason has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment it confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. It is, however, to be noted that both the conditions must be fulfilled if the case falls within the ambit of the proviso to section 147. The case at hand is covered by the main provision and not the proviso. So long as the ingredients of section 147 are fulfilled, the Assessing Officer is free to initiate proceeding under section 147 and failure to take steps under section 143(3) will not render the Assessing Officer powerless to initiate reassessment proceedings even when intimation under section 143(1) had been issued. The inevitable conclusion is that the High Court has wrongly applied Adani's case [1998 (12) TMI 51 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT], which has no application to the case on the facts in view of the conceptual difference between section 143(1) and section 143(3) of the Act. Appeal is allowed without any orders as to costs. 1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDEREDThe core legal questions considered by the Court in this appeal were:(a) Whether the reopening of assessment under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was valid when the original return had been processed under section 143(1) and an intimation issued accordingly;(b) Whether the High Court erred in applying the precedent relating to section 143(3) to a case involving section 143(1) intimation;(c) The scope and effect of section 143(1) (both before and after amendment) and its distinction from section 143(3) with respect to assessment and reassessment;(d) The interpretation of the phrase 'reason to believe' under section 147 and the jurisdictional requirements for reopening assessments;(e) The applicability of the decision in Adani Exports v. Deputy CIT (Assessments) to the facts of the present case;(f) Whether the Assessing Officer had jurisdiction to initiate reassessment proceedings under section 148 despite the return having been processed under section 143(1).2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSISIssue (a) and (c): Validity of reopening assessment under section 148 after processing under section 143(1) and distinction between sections 143(1) and 143(3)The Court examined the legal framework governing assessment under sections 143(1), 143(3), 147, and 148 of the Income-tax Act. The relevant provisions were analyzed in detail, including their amendments effective from June 1, 1999.Section 143(1) provides for processing of returns filed under section 139 or in response to notices under section 142(1). The processing involves sending an intimation to the assessee specifying any tax or interest payable or refund due. Importantly, the intimation under section 143(1) is not an assessment order but merely a communication of the outcome of processing the return. The Assessing Officer's powers under section 143(1) are limited to correcting arithmetical errors, allowing prima facie admissible losses or deductions not claimed, and disallowing prima facie inadmissible claims based on the information available in the return and accompanying documents.The Court emphasized that under section 143(1), the Assessing Officer cannot adjudicate on debatable issues or go beyond the information furnished in the return. No opportunity is granted to the assessee during this stage, and the intimation is often issued by ministerial staff. Thus, no 'assessment' in the strict sense occurs under section 143(1).By contrast, section 143(3) contemplates a detailed scrutiny assessment, where the Assessing Officer issues a notice requiring the assessee to produce evidence and then passes an assessment order after considering the evidence and submissions. Section 143(3) involves a substantive assessment, unlike the limited processing under section 143(1).The Court noted that the High Court had erroneously relied on the decision in Adani Exports, which concerned reassessment after an order under section 143(3), not after processing under section 143(1). The distinction between the two provisions was lost sight of by the High Court.Issue (b) and (e): Applicability of Adani Exports precedentThe appellant contended that the factual matrix in Adani Exports was entirely different, as that case dealt with reassessment after scrutiny assessment under section 143(3), whereas the present case involved only processing under section 143(1). The Court agreed with this submission, holding that the Adani Exports decision was not applicable to the facts of the present case.Issue (d): Interpretation of 'reason to believe' under section 147 and jurisdictional requirements for reopeningThe Court analyzed section 147, which empowers the Assessing Officer to reassess income if he has 'reason to believe' that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The phrase 'reason to believe' was interpreted to mean a cause or justification to form such belief, not a conclusive finding or proof. The Assessing Officer's subjective satisfaction based on relevant material is sufficient at the stage of issuing a notice under section 148.The Court referred to precedents establishing that the Assessing Officer need not have established the escapement of income conclusively before reopening. It suffices that there is relevant material on which a reasonable person could form the requisite belief.Furthermore, the Court observed that under the amended section 147, only the existence of reason to believe is necessary to confer jurisdiction to reopen assessment; the proviso requiring failure to disclose material facts applies only in certain cases not relevant here.Issue (f): Jurisdiction of Assessing Officer to initiate reassessment under section 148 despite processing under section 143(1)The Court held that the issuance of intimation under section 143(1) does not preclude the Assessing Officer from initiating reassessment proceedings under section 148 read with section 147. The intimation under section 143(1) is not an assessment order and does not amount to a final determination of tax liability. Therefore, the Assessing Officer retains jurisdiction to reopen the assessment if there is reason to believe income has escaped assessment.The Court rejected the argument that the issuance of intimation under section 143(1) precludes reassessment on the basis of change of opinion or otherwise.The Court also noted that the Assessing Officer's power to proceed under section 143(2) for scrutiny assessment remains intact notwithstanding the intimation under section 143(1).3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS'What was permissible was correction of errors apparent on the basis of the documents accompanying the return. The Assessing Officer had no authority to make adjustments or adjudicate upon any debatable issues. In other words, the Assessing Officer had no power to go behind the return, accounts or documents, either in allowing or in disallowing deductions, allowance or relief.''The very fact that no opportunity of being heard is given under section 143(1)(a) indicates that the Assessing Officer has to proceed accepting the return and making the permissible adjustments only.''The intimation under section 143(1)(a) was deemed to be a notice of demand under section 156, for the apparent purpose of making machinery provisions relating to recovery of tax applicable. By such application only recovery indicated to be payable in the intimation became permissible. And nothing more can be inferred from the deeming provision.''The phrase 'reason to believe' would mean cause or justification. If the Assessing Officer has cause or justification to know or suppose that income had escaped assessment, it can be said to have reason to believe that an income had escaped assessment. The expression cannot be read to mean that the Assessing Officer should have finally ascertained the fact by legal evidence or conclusion.''So long as the ingredients of section 147 are fulfilled, the Assessing Officer is free to initiate proceeding under section 147 and failure to take steps under section 143(3) will not render the Assessing Officer powerless to initiate reassessment proceedings even when intimation under section 143(1) had been issued.''The High Court has wrongly applied Adani's case which has no application to the case on the facts in view of the conceptual difference between section 143(1) and section 143(3) of the Act.'The Court concluded that the reopening of assessment under section 148 was valid despite the return having been processed under section 143(1), and the High Court erred in quashing the reassessment notice relying on a precedent concerning section 143(3). The appeal was allowed accordingly without costs.