Independent show-cause notices remain separate proceedings, while customs adjudication challenges should ordinarily follow the statutory appellate rem...
Institutional incapacity in customs settlement proceedings excludes non-functional quorum periods from statutory disposal timelines, preventing automa...
Interactive touchscreen panels with integrated computing functions fall under automatic data-processing machines rather than display monitors for cust...
Ex parte injunction service requirements were substantially met, while civil recovery and SFIO investigation into provident fund defalcation continued...
Enforcement of resolution-plan directions continues without a Supreme Court stay, preventing suspension of redistribution and escrowed-fund distributi...
Third-party ownership claims over attached property require Special Court adjudication where purchasers lack registered sale deeds and bona fides rema...
Pure-agent reimbursements in clearing and forwarding services are excluded from taxable value when qualifying third-party payments are properly record...
The Appellate Tribunal held that the limitation period for filing the appeal commenced on the date the impugned order was pronounced, with a 30-day limitation period and an additional 15-day extension under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The appellant's delay of 117 days far exceeded the permissible period, and the Tribunal found the appellant's conduct reckless and lacking bona fides or due diligence. Consequently, the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of condonation under Section 14. Furthermore, relying on binding precedent, the Tribunal reaffirmed its lack of jurisdiction to condone delay beyond 15 days. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed for being barred by limitation.
The Appellate Tribunal held that the limitation period for filing the appeal commenced on the date the impugned order was pronounced, with a 30-day limitation period and an additional 15-day extension under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The appellant's delay of 117 days far exceeded the permissible period, and the Tribunal found the appellant's conduct reckless and lacking bona fides or due diligence. Consequently, the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of condonation under Section 14. Furthermore, relying on binding precedent, the Tribunal reaffirmed its lack of jurisdiction to condone delay beyond 15 days. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed for being barred by limitation.
Note: It is a system-generated summary and is for quick reference only.