Independent show-cause notices remain separate proceedings, while customs adjudication challenges should ordinarily follow the statutory appellate rem...
Institutional incapacity in customs settlement proceedings excludes non-functional quorum periods from statutory disposal timelines, preventing automa...
Interactive touchscreen panels with integrated computing functions fall under automatic data-processing machines rather than display monitors for cust...
Ex parte injunction service requirements were substantially met, while civil recovery and SFIO investigation into provident fund defalcation continued...
Enforcement of resolution-plan directions continues without a Supreme Court stay, preventing suspension of redistribution and escrowed-fund distributi...
Third-party ownership claims over attached property require Special Court adjudication where purchasers lack registered sale deeds and bona fides rema...
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The CESTAT held that a "deemed sale" under Article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution had occurred when the appellant granted the right to use the brewery license to Skol/Sab Miller through the License Agreement. The consideration received by the appellant under the License Agreement cannot be subjected to service tax or clubbed with the consideration under the Lease Deed for "renting of immovable property" service. The Commissioner's findings to the contrary were set aside. The License Agreement and Lease Deed were separate documents, and merely because the Lease Deed mentioned procuring an endorsement/sub-license, it did not make the License Agreement an integral part of the Lease Deed. The License Agreement gave complete freedom to Skol/Sab Miller to operate the brewery without hindrance. The Commissioner's reasoning that no "sale" took place due to restrictions was incorrect, as a "deemed sale" under Article 366(29A)(d) is distinct from a regular "sale." Consequently, the impugned order passed by the Commissioner adjudicating the show cause notices was set aside.
The CESTAT held that a "deemed sale" under Article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution had occurred when the appellant granted the right to use the brewery license to Skol/Sab Miller through the License Agreement. The consideration received by the appellant under the License Agreement cannot be subjected to service tax or clubbed with the consideration under the Lease Deed for "renting of immovable property" service. The Commissioner's findings to the contrary were set aside. The License Agreement and Lease Deed were separate documents, and merely because the Lease Deed mentioned procuring an endorsement/sub-license, it did not make the License Agreement an integral part of the Lease Deed. The License Agreement gave complete freedom to Skol/Sab Miller to operate the brewery without hindrance. The Commissioner's reasoning that no "sale" took place due to restrictions was incorrect, as a "deemed sale" under Article 366(29A)(d) is distinct from a regular "sale." Consequently, the impugned order passed by the Commissioner adjudicating the show cause notices was set aside.
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